PhilPeople

University of Innsbruck
Institute For Christian Philosophy

Post-doctoral Fellow

University of Massachusetts, Amherst

Department of Philosophy

PhD, 2014

Email (login required)

Innsbruck, Tyrol, Austria

0000-0001-7042-8318

Areas of Specialization

Philosophy of Religion

Areas of Interest

Possible Worlds

Perception and Skepticism

Newcomb's Problem

Evidential Decision Theory

Causal Decision Theory

Decision-Theoretic Frameworks

Varieties of Skepticism

Consequentialism

Moral Skepticism

Death and Dying

Reformed Epistemology

The Argument from Evil

Religious Skepticism

10 more

PhilPapers Editorships

The Is/Ought Gap

Applied Ethics: An Impartial Introduction
Elizabeth Jackson, Tyron Goldschmidt, Dustin Crummett, and Rebecca Chan

Hackett Publishing. 2021.

This book is devoted to applied ethics. We focus on six popular and controversial topics: abortion, the environment, animals, poverty, punishment, and disability. We cover three chapters per topic, and each chapter is devoted to a famous or influential argument on the topic. After we present an influential argument, we then consider objections to the argument, and replies to the objections. The book is impartial, and set up in order to equip the reader to make up her own mind about the controver…Read more
This book is devoted to applied ethics. We focus on six popular and controversial topics: abortion, the environment, animals, poverty, punishment, and disability. We cover three chapters per topic, and each chapter is devoted to a famous or influential argument on the topic. After we present an influential argument, we then consider objections to the argument, and replies to the objections. The book is impartial, and set up in order to equip the reader to make up her own mind about the controversial topics covered.
Violent Deaths, Vicious Preferences, and Bare-Differences: A Reply to Hill
Zak Kopeikin

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (1): 196-201. 2021.

ABSTRACT Hill [AJP, 2018] argues that Rachels’s famous bare-difference argument for the moral irrelevance between killing and letting die fails. In this paper, I argue that certain features in Hill’s cases might lead our intuitions astray. I propose new cases and suggest that they support the conclusion that, in itself, intentional killing is morally equivalent to intentional letting-die.