Serene J. Khader

This chapter explains three conceptions of personal autonomy through a discussion of two teen girls’ struggles for self-definition. Autonomy is the ability to live a life that is genuinely one’s own. Starr, the protagonist of Angie Thomas’s _The Hate You Give_, struggles to know herself because the demands of upward mobility seem to ask her to disavow her Blackness. Kiara, the author of a blog post on oppressive beauty standards, struggles to find self-worth in a society that devalues the way she looks. The chapter discusses how coherentist, reasons-responsiveness, and socially constitutive conceptions of autonomy illuminate the girls’ lives. It also explains why autonomy should not be conceived of as the rejection of all social influence.

Feminist, and other liberatory, moral and political philosophies are widely understood as nonideal theories. But if feminism is just a set of first-order normative commitments, it is unclear why it should produce action-guiding philosophy. I argue that feminist philosophy characteristically takes oppressive salience idealization (OSI) to undermine the means-end consistency of normative theories. OSI involves characterizing the world in ways that give undue weight to the interests and perspectives of the dominant. Our ability to respond to the normative problems our actual world faces us with is undermined by OSI, especially at the levels of problem-framing and selection.

ABSTRACT This symposium brings together commentaries on Serene J. Khader’s Decolonizing Universalism: A Transnational Feminist Ethic from Linda Martín Alcoff, Sunaina Arya, and Olúfẹ'mi O. Táíwò with a reply from Khader. Khader’s book aims to develop a conception of feminism that is both universalist and anti-imperialist. Central to this feminism are (a) the idea that the normative core of feminism is opposition to sexist oppression and (b) the idea that the role of normative concepts in transnational feminist praxis is a justice-enhancing, or nonideal theoretical, one. Khader resists the universalism/relativism framing of debates in global feminisms and argues that opposition to sexist oppression can be detached from the values and social ontology of what she calls ‘Enlightenment liberalism’. She asks whether the values that are most often accused of being vehicles for Western imperialism, namely autonomy, individualism, and gender role eliminativism, are necessary for feminism at all.

Ich habe Decolonizing Universalism mit der Absicht geschrieben, eine große Frage zu beantworten – vielleicht die größte normative Frage, die die transnationale feministische Wissenschaft beschäftigt: Wie können wir gleichzeitig Feministinnen und Antiimperialistinnen sein? Anders ausgedrückt: Gibt es eine normative Position, die eine gründliche Kritik des Imperialismus ermöglicht, ohne in sexistischen oder patriarchalen Apologetismus zu verfallen? In diesem Buch entwickle ich eine solche Position. In dieser Antwort versuche ich, einige der von Hänel und Schuppert, Jugov, Müller und Reibold aufgeworfenen Fragen zu beantworten und meine Argumente gegen ihre kritischen Anmerkungen zu verteidigen.

The Routledge Companion to Feminist Philosophy is an outstanding guide and reference source to the key topics, subjects, thinkers, and debates in feminist philosophy. Fifty-six chapters, written by an international team of contributors specifically for the Companion, are organized into five sections: Engaging the Past; Mind, Body, and World; Knowledge, Language, and Science; Intersections; Ethics, Politics, and Aesthetics. The volume provides a mutually enriching representation of the several philosophical traditions that contribute to feminist philosophy. It also foregrounds issues of global concern and scope; shows how feminist theory meshes with rich theoretical approaches that start from transgender identities, race and ethnicity, sexuality, disabilities, and other axes of identity and oppression; and highlights the interdisciplinarity of feminist philosophy and the ways that it both critiques and contributes to the whole range of subfields within philosophy.

For readers of Hood Feminism and Against White Feminism An incisive examination of why the pillars of feminism have eroded—and how all women, not just the #girlbosses, can rebuild them After over 175 years, the feminist movement, now in its fourth wave, is at risk of collapsing on its eroding foundation. In Faux Feminism, political philosopher Serene Khader advocates for another feminism—one that doesn’t overwhelmingly serve white, affluent #girlbosses. With empathy, passion, and wit, Khader invites the reader to join her as she excavates the movement’s history and draws a blueprint for a more inclusive and resilient future. A feminist myth buster, Khader begins by deconstructing “faux feminisms.” Thought to be the pillars of good feminism, they may appeal to many but, in truth, leave most women behind. Khader identifies these traps that white feminism lays for us all, asking readers to think critically about –The Freedom Myth: The overarching misconception that feminism is about personal freedom rather than collective equality –The Individualism Myth: The pervasive idea that feminism aims to free individual women from social expectations –The Culture Myth: The harmful misconception that “other” cultures restrict women’s liberation –The Restriction Myth: The flawed belief that feminism is a fight against social restrictions –The Judgment Myth: The fallacy of celebrating women’s choices without first interrogating the privileges afforded or denied to the women In later chapters, Khader draws on global and intersectional feminist lessons of the past and present to imagine feminism’s future. She pays particular attention to women of color, especially those in the Global South. Khader recounts their cultural and political stories of building a more inclusive framework in their societies. These are the women, she argues, from whom today’s feminists can learn. Khader’s critical inquiry begets a new vision of feminism: one that tackles inequality at the societal, not individual, level and is ultimately rooted in community.

Development ethicists increasingly define women’s empowerment as the expansion of women’s agency. This chapter argues that this definition ignores the fact that women can increase their ability to achieve welfare by internalizing and discharging subordinate roles. This means that anti-poverty interventions may not only fail to reduce women’s acceptance of their subordination; they may increase it. Interventions that attach new material rewards to self-subordination can generate new incentives to engage in self-subordinating behavior. The chapter illustrates this by calling for a critical interrogation of Naila Kabeer’s assessment of microcredit in Bangladesh. Microcredit has, in some cases, offered women new reasons to form adaptive preferences toward the norms surrounding purdah (seclusion) and dowry.

Serene Khader argues against the widespread view that oppressed people have a self-regarding obligation to resist complying with oppressive norms, in order to preserve their self-respect. Khader notes that the cost of noncompliance is often underestimated. Flouting oppressive norms often poses substantial threats to an agent’s welfare and even her self-respect, and compliance may express self-respect, by affirming a commitment to the importance of her own projects and to gaining the means to pursue them. Khader offers an alternative way of maintaining self-respect in the face of oppression, namely to cultivate knowledge of the oppressive situation faced by oneself and one’s group, and to develop a normative perspective that recognizes and seeks to rectify injustices.

This paper elaborates and renders explicit some of the views about political philosophical methodology that underlie the author’s arguments in Decolonizing Universalism: A Transnational Feminist Ethic. It shows how the author’s stances on autonomy, individualism, intersectionality, human rights, the coloniality of gender, and the oppression of genders besides man and woman grow out of a commitment to scrutinizing our normative views in light of transnational criticism and empirical information from the qualitative social sciences.

ABSTRACT I discuss the issues raised by Alcoff, Arya, and Táíwò in their responses to Decolonizing Universalism: A Transnational Feminist Ethic. I pay special attention to a fact I think all nonideal theorists, particularly ones who care about reducing oppression, must take seriously: the fact that oppression characteristically faces its victims with tradeoffs such that attempts to advance their interests usually come with significant costs. I discuss how this fact bears on the situations of poor women and those oppressed by sexism and imperialism simultaneously. I also discuss how the nonideal universalist perspective I develop in Decolonizing Universalism supports criticism of neoliberalism, how it takes seriously concerns about the locus of enunciation in Latin American decolonial theory, how it supports transnational solidarities, and its upshots for thinking the relationships between feminism, culture, and modernity.

Feminist, and other liberatory, moral and political philosophies are widely understood as nonideal theories. But if feminism is just a set of first-order normative commitments, it is unclear why it should produce action-guiding philosophy. I argue that feminist philosophy characteristically takes oppressive salience idealization (OSI) to undermine the means-end consistency of normative theories. OSI involves characterizing the world in ways that give undue weight to the interests and perspectives of the dominant. Our ability to respond to the normative problems our actual world faces us with is undermined by OSI, especially at the levels of problem-framing and selection.

It is often argued that oppression reduces freedom. I argue against the view that oppression is wrong because it reduces freedom. Conceiving oppression as wrong because it reduces freedom is at odds with recognizing structural cases of oppression, because (a) many cases of oppression, including many structural ones, do not reduce agents’ freedom, and (b) the type of freedom reduction involved in many structural instances of oppression is not morally objectionable. If the mechanisms of oppression are sometimes indistinguishable from benign, or even ineluctable, processes of social shaping, arguments that oppression is objectionably freedom-reducing risk implausibly suggesting that socialization itself is objectionably freedom-reducing. I show how three strategies for explaining how oppression reduces freedom either fall into the trap of overgenerality, or end up appealing to values other than freedom to avoid it. I conclude by suggesting that oppression might be better thought of as an affront to equality.