Serhij Kiš

In his contribution to the adversariality debate, Scott Aikin argues that non-adversarialism about arguments is self-refuting because whenever its proponents affirm it, they inevitably reject adversarialism and thus become adversarial themselves. This, Aikin suggests, follows from the idea that reasons are contrastive—always for one thing instead of another. Here, I defend the non-adversariality project against this self-refutation charge. I do this by identifying one of the core tenets of adversarialism, namely that it views arguments are as zero-sum games. I then argue that Aikin’s self-refutation charge only obtains if we assume that the adversariality debate itself is zero-sum. However, whether the debate is zero-sum depends on how it is framed, and we might as well frame the debate in positive-sum terms. To illustrate, I draw on Katharina Stevens’ virtue-theoretic account, which offers such a positive-sum view by synthesizing insights from both adversarialist and non-adversarialist camps. For Stevens, a virtuous arguer is both adversarial and cooperative, guided by practical wisdom in adopting the most suitable arguing style for a given context. I contend that this approach bypasses Aikin’s challenge by shifting the question from whether arguments are inherently adversarial to when the adversarial or cooperative style is the most appropriate. I conclude by drawing a broader lesson for the adversariality debate, which is that some of the ways in which it is framed might keep our attention from other substantial research questions, such as how to counter the crowding-out of respect in our disagreements and thus mitigate the subsequent political polarization.

In his contribution to the adversariality debate, Scott Aikin argues that nonadversarialism about arguments is self-refuting because whenever its proponents affirm it, they inevitably reject adversarialism and thus become adversarial themselves. This, Aikin suggests, follows from the idea that reasons are contrastive – always for one thing instead of another. Here, I defend the non-adversariality project against this self-refutation charge. I first identify the core tenet of adversarialism: the view that arguments are inherently zero-sum. I then argue that Aikin’s self-refutation charge only obtains if we assume that the adversariality debate itself is zero-sum. However, whether the debate is zero-sum depends on how it is framed, and we might as well frame the debate in positive-sum terms. To illustrate, I draw on Katharina Stevens’ virtue-theoretic account, which offers such a positive-sum view by synthesizing insights from both adversarialist and non-adversarialist camps. For Stevens, a virtuous arguer is both adversarial and cooperative, guided by practical wisdom in adopting the most suitable arguing style for a given context. I contend that this approach bypasses Aikin’s challenge by shifting the question from whether arguments are inherently adversarial to when the adversarial or cooperative style is the most appropriate. I conclude by drawing a broader lesson for the adversariality debate, which is that some of the ways in which it is framed might keep our attention from other substantial research questions, such as how to counter the crowding-out of respect in our disagreements and thus mitigate the subsequent political polarization.

Although the use of argumentative fallacies is generally prohibited in discourse, a significant part of fallacy studies consists in identifying the specific circumstances where the use of a fallacy is permissible. However, this literature often remains silent on whether a fallacy should be used even when deemed legitimate. This silence is problematic, as it suggests that the legitimacy is the sole criterion for deploying a fallacy. In this paper, I challenge this approach by demonstrating that even when a fallacy is legitimate, its use could still jeopardize the arguer’s goals. I base this argument on an analysis of a specific instance of the whataboutism fallacy used by Noam Chomsky in his commentary on the Russian invasion of Ukraine. I show that Chomsky’s references to the United States’ actions in Afghanistan and Iraq are better understood as broadening the context of the discussion rather than distracting or even justifying Russian actions. This is what makes Chomsky’s whataboutisms plausibly legitimate. But while these whataboutisms might be legitimate, I argue, drawing on a cost-benefit analysis of decision to argue framework, that Chomsky has compelling reasons to avoid using them. Real-life examples show that such arguments are prone to misunderstanding and misuse. I conclude that the risks associated with Chomsky’s whataboutism outweigh the potential benefits, suggesting that he should avoid their deployment. This case study reveals a broader lesson for the fallacy literature: it must explicitly address whether the legitimacy of a fallacy is sufficient justification for its use.

How do we know that we are in a deep disagreement – i.e. disagreement irresolvable by rational means? Some suggest, we know that only after trying out all our rational arguments. However, such strategy risks backfiring by polarizing the parties. This paper proposes an alternative way of recognizing depth. Drawing on epistemic capacity of emotions, I argue that debater’s emotional experience during deep disagreement, namely frustration, functions as an indicator of the disagreement’s depth. Résumé: Comment savons-nous que nous sommes en profond désaccord, c'est-à-dire insoluble par des moyens rationnels? Certains suggèrent que nous ne le savons qu'après avoir présenté tous nos arguments rationnels. Cependant, une telle stratégie risque de se retourner contre nous en polarisant les parties. Cet article propose une autre façon de reconnaître la profondeur du désaccord. En m'appuyant sur la capacité épistémique des émotions, je soutiens que l'expérience émotionnelle du débatteur lors d'un profond désaccord, à savoir la frustration, fonctionne comme un indicateur de la profondeur du désaccord.

Text obhajuje názor, že tzv. argumenty první osoby pro svobodnou vůli nesplňují vysoký epistemický standard, a proto není vhodné jimi dokazovat existenci svobody vůle. V první části je krátce uvedena problematika svobodné vůle a charakterizace skupiny důkazů, které její existenci obhajují odkazem na lidské prožívání svobodného rozhodování. V druhé části argumentu je vylíčeno, jak se idea svobodné vůle projevuje na každodenním lidském fungování a jaký má dopad na lidský blahobyt. Třetí část textu obhajuje tvrzení, že kvůli spojení svobodné vůle s každodenní lidskou praxí je nezbytné, aby měly argumenty ve prospěch či neprospěch svobody vůle vysokou míru plauzibility a robustnosti. Čtvrtá část dokazuje, že argumenty první osoby pro svobodnou vůli na vysoký standard jistoty nedosahují, protože metody nabytí dat první osoby jsou přinejmenším pochybné a data sama vysoce proměnlivá. V páté a poslední části je předložen závěr, dle kterého je jakákoliv kredibilita argumentů první osoby pro svobodu vůle kvůli jejich principiální nerobustnosti apriori signifikantně snížena.

The existence of deep moral disagreement is used in support of views ranging from moral relativism to the impossibility of moral expertise. This is done despite the fact that it is not at all clear whether deep moral disagreements actually occur, as the usually given examples are never of real life situations, but of some generalized debates on controversial issues. The paper will try to remedy this, as any strength of arguments appealing to deep moral disagreement is partly depended on the fact the disagreement exists. This will be done by showing that some real life conflicts that are intractable, i.e. notoriously difficult to resolve, share some important features with deep moral disagreement. The article also deals with the objection that the mere conceptual possibility renders illustrations of actually happening deep moral disagreements unnecessary. The problem with such objection is that it depends on theoretical assumptions (i.e. denial of moral realism) that are not uncontroversial. Instead, the article claims we need not only suppose deep moral disagreements exist because they actually occur when some intractable conflicts occur. Thus, in so far as to the deep moral disagreement’s existence, the arguments appealing to it are safe. But as intractable conflicts can be resolved, by seeing deep moral disagreements as constitutive part of them, we might have to consider whether deep moral disagreements are resolvable too. A brief suggestion of how that might look like is given in the end of the paper.