Shane Duarte

This chapter addresses an aspect of Leibniz’s metaphysics that has not received much attention from scholars, namely, the doctrine of monadic domination. More specifically, it offers an account of what monadic domination, understood as a relation obtaining exclusively among monads, amounts to in the philosophy of Leibniz. It argues that Leibniz’s conception of monadic domination is usefully understood by appeal to the Aristotelian notion of a hierarchy of activities. It offers a fairly detailed account of what goes on in the monads that make up an animal when that animal performs some physical action. And it further argues that an understanding of Leibniz’s doctrine of monadic domination affords us some insight into his conception of how God ordains an end for his creation.

According to Suárez, unlike the properties that an Aristotelian science standardly demonstrates of its subject, being’s passions or properties – transcendental unity, truth and goodness – are distinguished only rationally from their subject. Despite the real identity of being and its properties, the conception of a being as one, true or good involves a conceptual addition, according to Suárez: _one_ formally signifies, over and above being itself, a negation of internal division, while _true_ and _good_ formally signify, over and above being itself, aptitudinal extrinsic denominations from intellect and appetite. The paper explains how each of the latter denominations, according to Suárez, serves to explain, point to, or make clear something about being itself, namely, its aptitude to be an object of intellect or appetite.

Francisco Suárez (1548–1617), one of the most important early modern scholastic philosophers, had considerable influence not only on canonical early modern philosophers such as Descartes and Leibniz, but even more so on subsequent scholastic philosophers and theologians. His _Metaphysical Disputations_ of 1597 was intended to provide the reader with a complete grounding in metaphysics and is one of the most detailed, comprehensive elaborations of an Aristotelian metaphysics ever published. This Critical Guide offers fourteen new essays on a wide range of topics in the _Metaphysical Disputations_, including Suárez's metaphysics of modality, his nominalism, and his accounts of the categories, prime matter, falsity, time, and causation. The volume will be valuable for scholars and students of early modern scholasticism, and also for those researching later thinkers whose work was influenced by Suárez.

This dissertation focuses on the one feature most clearly shared by the otherwise very different metaphysical systems of Aristotle, Descartes and Leibniz---i.e., the role of each in providing foundations for a system of natural science. Chapters 1 and 2 are devoted to a discussion of how Aristotle's metaphysics is foundational for his natural science. Chapters 3 and 4 do the same for Descartes and Leibniz. ;The thesis of the first two chapters is that for Aristotle, since scientific understanding of an object requires an understanding of its causes, and the unmoved movers are causes of every other substance, metaphysics is foundational for natural science because an understanding of the genus dealt with only by metaphysics is required for a proper understanding of the genus dealt with by the physicist. ;The thesis of the third chapter is that in the Meditations Descartes was never concerned to argue that bodies consist in nothing but their extension and certain essential modifications of extension; rather, Descartes was concerned: to establish that the ontology presupposed by his physics is one to which the human intellect is naturally bound by its limited stock of innate ideas; and to argue that this ontology is true even though possibly inadequate---i.e., that it is true at least insofar as it goes. ;In the final chapter I offer support for a commonly held, though not universally endorsed, interpretation of Leibniz's metaphysics. On this interpretation, Leibniz holds that the entities which make up the natural world are one and all phenomenal---i.e., confused representations of an underlying reality which consists in nothing but monads and their states. In support of this interpretation I try to show how to reconcile Leibniz's ostensibly conflicting pronouncements regarding the nature of body, and in doing so I offer a new explanation of the relation that obtains, according to him, between monads and the phenomena that make up the natural world.

In the second part of this essay, I aim to show that Leibniz, in asserting that bodies are aggregates of substances, wants to affirm something about bodies insofar as they exist a parte rei or in reality: in reality a body is not a being, but a multitude of beings or substances. And this, on my view, is precisely what leads Leibniz to assert that bodies are phenomena: since a body is not in reality a being, but many beings, it follows that a body, conceived as a being, is something that exists only objectively in the soul. That is, a body, conceived as a single thing, is not something real, but an imaginary being, a creature of the mind, a phenomenon.

I argue that the prime matter that Leibniz posits in every created monad is understood by him to be a mere defect or negation, and not something real and positive. Further, I argue that Leibniz’s talk of prime matter in every created monad is inspired by the thirteenth-century doctrine of spiritual matter, but that such talk is simply one way in which Leibniz frames a point that he frequently makes elsewhere—namely, that each creaturely essence incorporates a limitation that is the ultimate source of an original imperfection that affects the creature from the first moment of its existence.

According to Margaret Wilson, Leibniz is inconsistent when it comes to the question of whether one can have distinct ideas of sensible qualities, and this because he sometimes conceives of sensible qualities as sensations and sometimes conceives of them as complexes of primary qualities. When he conceives of them as sensations, he denies that we can have distinct ideas of sensible qualities; when he conceives of them as complexes of primary qualities, he asserts that we can. In this paper I argue that Wilson is wrong to think that Leibnizian ideas admit of various degrees of confusion or distinctness. I also argue that although Wilson's problem admits of being reformulated in a manner consistent with a correct understanding of Leibnizian perceptions and ideas, this reformulated version of the problem admits of a satisfactory interpretive solution.

A number of recent studies have called into question the traditional interpretation of Leibniz as an idealist beginning, at the latest, with the composition of the Discourse on Metaphysics (1686). In particular, in a recent book Daniel Garber affirms that between the late 1670s and late 1690s Leibniz maintains a realist doctrine according to which the created world is populated with extended corporeal substances. In trying to prove his thesis, Garber appeals to a document written in 1690 where Leibniz, addressing an objection by Michelangelo Fardella, denies that bodies are composed of souls, declares that souls are substantial forms, and affirms that bodies are composed instead of substances. According to Garber, this shows that Leibniz then believed that bodies were composed, not of simple substances, but of extended substances possessing souls. Here I try to show that, to the contrary, the mentioned document (along with two others closely associated with it) support the traditional interpretation of Leibniz as an idealist in 1690.

It's well known that Leibniz characterizes bodies in two apparently incompatible ways. On the one hand, he asserts that a body is a real or well-founded phenomenon; on the other, he claims that a body is an aggregate of substances that possesses the reality of these same substances. In this essay I aim to defend an explanation of the relation that exists, according to Leibniz, between these two conceptions of body, an explanation that shows them to be compatible and, indeed, complementary. In the first part of this paper I aim above all to show that Robert Adams and Donald Rutherford are wrong to think that these two conceptions are to be reconciled by recognizing that for Leibniz they apply to one and the same thing.

In this paper, I aim to offer a clear explanation of what monadic domination, understood as a relation obtaining exclusively among monads, amounts to in the philosophy of Leibniz (and this insofar as monadic domination is conceived by Leibniz not to account for the substantial unity of composite substances). Central to my account is the Aristotelian notion of a hierarchy of activities, as well as a particular understanding of the relations that obtain among the perceptions of monads that stand in relations of monadic domination and subordination.

The paper proposes a novel understanding of how Aristotle’s theoretical works complement each other in such a way as to form a genuine system, and this with the immediate (and ostensibly central) aim of addressing a longstanding question regarding Aristotle’s ‘first philosophy’—namely, is Aristotle’s first philosophy a contribution to theology, or to the science of being in general? Aristotle himself seems to suggest that it is in some ways both, but how this can be is a very difficult question. My answer is in some respects a version of one that goes back at least to the middle ages—i.e., that first philosophy is concerned with the gods (and to that extent offers a theology) because the gods are causes and principles of beings precisely insofar as they are beings. The more original aspect of my position lies in my claim that the sort of tension found in the Metaphysics is likewise to be found in many of Aristotle’s physical works. Thus, for example, the De caelo is (I argue) concerned generally with natural beings (= beings susceptible of change), but its discussions are focused largely on the heavenly bodies and the Aristotelian elements insofar as they admit of change with respect to place. Here I claim that the particular objects of discussion are dealt with precisely because they are causes and principles of natural beings as such. Something similar goes, I claim, for the De generatione et corruptione, the general concern of which is a particular species of natural being—i.e., natural beings susceptible of generation and corruption. In this way, I argue, Aristotle successively deals in his theoretical works with those causes and principles of (say) a horse which attach to it insofar as it is a being, those causes and principles of a horse which attach to it insofar as it is a natural being, those causes and principles of a horse which attach to it insofar as it is a perishable natural being, and so on for the lower genera under which the species horse is subsumed.