It has been recently proposed that our evaluations of the relative adequacy of unreflective skilled action ought to be grounded in sociocultural normativities; that is, with respect to what is standardly done according to general practice or custom. This paper claims that the normative dimension of unreflective skilled action ought to be understood too in terms of a formal temporality, according to which an unreflective skilled action is adequate iff it fulfils the subdoxastic preferences of the…
Read moreIt has been recently proposed that our evaluations of the relative adequacy of unreflective skilled action ought to be grounded in sociocultural normativities; that is, with respect to what is standardly done according to general practice or custom. This paper claims that the normative dimension of unreflective skilled action ought to be understood too in terms of a formal temporality, according to which an unreflective skilled action is adequate iff it fulfils the subdoxastic preferences of the acting agent. More precisely, this position, inspired by an analysis of early Heideggerian phenomenology and modern-day neuroscience, positions the formal-temporal dimension of the normativity of unreflective skilled action as more fundamental than the sociocultural dimension of normativity for multiple reasons, without reducing the normativity of said behaviour to this agent-centred level.
