Soren Flinch Midtgaard

One important objection to vaccination policies involving nudging or coercive measures such as restrictions on unvaccinated people’s access to public spaces is that they are paternalistic. This objection is weaker than is often assumed. We defend this claim by (1) introducing a novel distinction between individual and collective paternalism; (2) showing that, across a range of circumstances, vaccination programs involve collective, not individual, paternalism; and (3) arguing that collective paternalism is not wrong for the reasons that, arguably, individual paternalism is.

Many believe that relationships can make a constitutive difference to the moral status of paternalistic treatment. For example, it is often assumed that it’s easier to justify paternalizing a spouse than a stranger. But although this thought is widespread, there exists no detailed account of how relationships could mitigate paternalistic complaints. The aim of this paper is to develop an account of this phenomenon, drawing on the work of Margaret Gilbert and the notion of joint commitments. According to the resulting view, close relations can constitutively mitigate paternalistic complaints by rendering paternalistic interference consistent with the will of the paternalized agent.

This article assesses Van Parijs's proposal for an unconditional universal basic income according to the Rawlsian criterion of stability—a criterion Van Parijs arguably shares. First, I examine a number of stability-generating features of conceptions of justice that pertain to their scope and content. Second, I evaluate these features relative to an unconditional versus a conditional scheme, and argue that they favour the latter. Third, I rebut four central objections to the core argument. Although the unconditional scheme may emerge as the winner, all things considered, introducing the factor of stability or sustainability nevertheless deepens our understanding of the nature and justifiability of the basic income proposal.

Many believe that relationships can make a constitutive difference to the moral status of paternalistic treatment. For example, it is often assumed that it's easier to justify paternalizing a spouse than a stranger. But although this thought is widespread, there exists no detailed account of how relationships could mitigate paternalistic complaints. The aim of this paper is to develop an account of this phenomenon, drawing on the work of Margaret Gilbert and the notion of joint commitments. According to the resulting view, close relations can constitutively mitigate paternalistic complaints by rendering paternalistic interference consistent with the will of the paternalized agent.

Appearance discrimination, or lookism, occurs in many different contexts, including education, politics, the criminal justice system, employment, and personal relationships. We shall focus on two of these contexts, namely, employment and personal relationships, and consider when appearance discrimination in them is morally objectionable. In doing so we shall draw upon a number of theories of what makes discrimination wrong when it is wrong: Deborah Hellman’s theory that discrimination is wrong when it is demeaning; Larry Alexander’s and Benjamin Eidelson’s theories that discrimination is wrong when it is disrespectful; Sophia Moreau’s pluralist theory that considers the impact of discrimination on subordination, deliberative freedom, and access to basic goods; and Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen’s theory that discrimination is wrong when it fails to maximise moral value, e.g. when it harms people who are (undeservedly) worse off than others.

Some policies are paternalistic and discriminatory at the same time (e.g., certain benevolent sexist policies). Such policies constitute an interesting, yet somewhat overlooked, category. We scrutinize what paternalistic discrimination is and account for its wrongness. First, we argue that paternalistic discrimination is _pro tanto_ wrong because it is disrespectful. The disrespect consists in the selective negligence or denial of some people’s moral power over their own good. This applies even if the policies and actions in question benefit those interfered with. Second, we show that paternalistic discrimination gives rise to a dilemma in situations where different social groups face different risks. In such situations, a choice must be made between (i) protecting people equally and (ii) respecting people's moral power over their own good equally. Finally, we show that paternalistic discrimination in certain cases shows a lack of respect for the moral worth of the persons who are _not_ the target of the policies.

Is it fair for employers to select candidates partly based on how the employers think customers react to the candidates' appearances, that is, based on candidates' reaction qualifications? Both philosophically (in the literature on wrongful discrimination) and empirically, this question has recently been getting attention. Here, we focus on a theory of unfair disadvantages emphasizing (i) whether the possession of the appearance feature in question reflects choices on the part of the candidate and (ii) whether the appearance feature in question reflects values or convictions of importance to the candidate. We scrutinize the theory by evaluating how well these factors map on to folk intuitions about wrongful discrimination using an experimental-philosophical approach and data from the United States. We do so on the presumption that coherence with folk intuitions is one desideratum for a philosophical theory and that attention should be given to potential discrepancies between philosophical theories and folk intuitions. Our central finding is that there is only general support for factor (i), not (ii), in the American population. Our study also adds to the extant empirical literature on reaction qualifications that tend to focus on the employer's side of the matter, not the candidate's as we do.

Some policies are paternalistic and discriminatory at the same time (e.g., certain benevolent sexist policies). Such policies constitute an interesting, yet somewhat overlooked, category. We scrutinize what paternalistic discrimination is and account for its wrongness. First, we argue that paternalistic discrimination is pro tanto wrong because it is disrespectful. The disrespect consists in the selective negligence or denial of some people’s moral power over their own good. This applies even if the policies and actions in question benefit those interfered with. Second, we show that paternalistic discrimination gives rise to a dilemma in situations where different social groups face different risks. In such situations, a choice must be made between (i) protecting people equally and (ii) respecting people's moral power over their own good equally. Finally, we show that paternalistic discrimination in certain cases shows a lack of respect for the moral worth of the persons who are not the target of the policies.

Many believe that we have a duty not to discriminate when we act in certain ‘public’ capacities, for example when it is our job to select among various candidates for a job. In contrast, they deny that we have duties of a similar kind in our private lives, for example in our romantic lives. In this paper, we challenge this well-entrenched asymmetry. We do so primarily by canvassing and rebutting central arguments to the effect that acting discriminatorily, for example when we date, is something we have a right to, including arguments from: (1) freedom of association, (2) legitimate self-interest, (3) power and (4) love versus duties. In this way, we challenge a common permissive view regarding private discrimination.

X-Phi and Theory Acceptance in Political Philosophy What is the relevance of experimental philosophy (X-Phi) to theory acceptance in political philosophy? To answer this question, the paper distinguishes between four views, to wit: (i) X-Phi as a systematic method to avoid or reduce biases in our moral intuitions—The De-Biasing View; (ii) X-Phi as a tool for assessing the fruitfulness or consequences of various concepts—The Fruitfulness View; (iii) X-Phi as the best way to unearth the kind of moral principles we are interested in as political philosophers—The Unearthing Principles View; and (iv) X-Phi as a way of testing the coherence of principles with folk intuitions—The Defeasible Reason (or Squatters’ Rights) View. The paper argues that the first two views and the last—subject to some clarifications—describe important X-Phi contributions to theory acceptance as this is traditionally understood within contemporary political philosophy. In contrast, the third view goes too far in suggesting that X-Phi can supplant more traditional, in part non-empirical, methods. Keywords: Experimental philosophy (X-Phi); Theory acceptance in political philosophy; The De-Biasing View; The Fruitfulness View; The Unearthing Principles View; The Defeasible Reason (or Squatters’ Rights) View.

John Rawls' bog En teori om retfærdighed er blandt de absolut vigtigste værker i det 20. århundredes politiske filosofi. Det udkom første gang i 1971 og markerede et brud med en udbredt skepsis over for normative politiske teorier, det vil sige teorier, om hvorledes samfundet bør være indrettet. Med en sofistikeret version af klassisk kontraktteori argumenterer Rawls for en socialliberal vision om retfærdighed, hvor enhver sikres en frihed, der er forenelig med alles tilsvarende frihed, hvor de økonomisk dårligst stillede skal stilles bedst muligt. I nærværende antologi diskuterer en række forskere vigtige temaer i såvel det nævnte hovedværk, som hans øvrige forfatterskab. Bidragene introducerer derved ikke blot til Rawls' politiske filosofi, men også til diskussioner, der står helt centralt i nyere politisk teori såsom vores forhold til fremtidige generationer, civil ulydighed og global retfærdighed.

abstract The paper considers what (if anything) can justify that a utopian community or a micro‐society makes an exception to the general rules of society for itself. The discussion evolves around the Danish case of Christiania. Three moral theories, to wit Kantian constructivism, rule‐consequentialism and act‐consequentialism, are applied to the case at hand. The aim is to test whether the exceptions in question are unjust or in other ways morally problematic. The two former theories appear to deny the justice of Christiania. The relevant exceptions are unacceptable according to those two moral perspectives. Act‐consequentialism, however, seems to endorse the case of Christiania, including the exceptions pertaining to it. While the latter theory is often thought to conflict with widely shared reflective moral convictions, in this case it might square with at least an important pragmatic layer of Danish public culture.

The use of tanning beds has been identified as being among the most significant causes of melanoma and non-melanoma skin cancer. Accordingly, the activity is properly seen as one that involves profound harm to self. The article examines paternalistic reasons for restricting sunbed usage. We argue that both so-called soft and hard paternalistic arguments support prohibiting the use of sunbeds. We make the following three arguments: an argument from oppressive patterns of socialization suggesting that the autonomous nature of the conduct in question is questionable; an argument from so-called evaluative delusions in which individuals attach incorrect weights to some of their values; a strictly hard paternalistic argument appealing to the harm in itself pertaining to the use of sunbeds.

This paper considers the potentially wrongful discriminatory nature of certain of our dating preferences. It argues that the wrongfulness of such preferences lies primarily in the simple lookism they involve. While it is ultimately permissible for us to date people partly because of how they look, I argue that we have a duty to ‘look behind’ people’s appearance, which I take to mean that we ought not, on the basis of their appearance, to regard them as absolutely out of the question for us to engage with in a romantic setting. Further, constraints similar to those suggested by a duty to look behind people’s appearance gain support from another duty we have, namely, a duty to counteract, also in our daily lives, the fact that people are undeservedly disadvantaged in various ways.

According to the influential disrespect account of what paternalism is, and why it is wrong, paternalism involves an anti-egalitarian, disrespectful attitude on the part of the paternalist: X (the paternalist) assumes an attitude of superiority when interfering in Y's matters for Y's good. Pace this account, the article argues that an important, although somewhat overlooked, form of paternalism is not, all things considered, insulting. This form of paternalism focusses on people's occasional lack of appropriate self-respect or their failure to see themselves as equals or to stand vis-à-vis others as such.

This paper concerns Philippe Van Parijs’s case for an unconditional basic income. It argues that given central egalitarian commitments-to wit, (i) equal concern and respect; (ii) endowment-insensitivity (which can be seen to include Van Parijs’s project of maximizing or leximinning real freedom); (iii) ambition-sensitivity; and (iv) neutrality-endorsed by Van Parijs, a basic income does not appear to be a requirement of justice. The core claim defended is that there is a serious tension between (iii) and the idea of an unconditional basic income.

G. A. Cohen argues that egalitarians should compensate for expensive tastes or for the fact that they are expensive. Ronald Dworkin, by contrast, regards most expensive tastes as unworthy of compensation — only if a person disidentifies with his own such tastes (i.e. wishes he did not have them) is compensation appropriate. Dworkinians appeal, inter alia, to the so-called ‘first-person’ or ‘continuity’ test. According to the continuity test, an appropriate standard of interpersonal comparison reflects people's own assessment of their relative standing: Person A can only legitimately demand compensation from person B if he regards himself as worse off, all things considered, than B. The typical bearer of expensive tastes does not regard herself as being worse off than others with less expensive tastes. Hence, in the typical case, pace Cohen, compensation for expensive tastes is inappropriate. The article scrutinizes this rationale for not compensating for expensive tastes. Especially, we try to bolster the continuity test by relating it to Dworkin's distinction between integrated and detached values, pointing out that an argument for the continuity test can be built on the assumption that equality has integrated value. In brief, the point is that a metric of equality should be assessed, partly, in virtue of its consequences for related ideals. One of these is the kind of justificatory community promoted by the continuity test. We defend this view against an objection to the effect that equality is a detached value. We conclude that the continuity test constitutes a strong foothold for the resourcist egalitarian reluctance to compensate people for their expensive tastes

The paper defends the so-called political conception of the scope of justice proposed by Thomas Nagel. The argument has three stages: (a) I argue that A. J. Julius’ influential criticism of the political conception can be answered. Pace Julius, actual and (relevant) hypothetical cases of state coercion do in fact involve a claim to the effect that people have a duty to obey, so the problem of justice does arise, according to Nagel’s criterion, in the critical cases scrutinised by Julius. Hence the ‘perverseness’ objection lapses. (b) I argue, against other critics of Nagel’s view, that in central instances of international coercion such as immigration control people are not asked to accept the ongoing coercion. Consequently, the problem of justice does not, on Thomas Nagel’s view, arise internationally. Furthermore, to the extent that political authority is exercised internationally, it does not give rise to justificatory burdens involving principles of distributive justice.(c) I relate the notion of authority to other aspects of the political conception, including responsibility, and argue that together they constitute an attractive alternative to an influential allocative conception of justice.

The notion of a non-renounceable right is an integral part of recent liberal reconciliatory attempts to justify apparently paternalistic policies, such as compulsory insurance or providing people with certain goods irrespective of their subjective preferences, non-paternalistically. However, non-renounceable rights cannot be justified non-paternalistically. A critical scrutiny of the liberal reconciliatory arguments in question reveals this and points towards a plausible paternalist justification of the policies in question

In the luck egalitarian literature, one influential formulation of luck egalitarianism does not specify whether equalities that do not reflect people’s equivalent exercises of responsibility are bad with regard to inequality. This equivocation gives rise to two competing versions of luck egalitarianism: asymmetrical and symmetrical luck egalitarianism. According to the former, while inequalities due to luck are unjust, equalities due to luck are not necessarily so. The latter view, by contrast, affirms the undesirability of equalities as well as inequalities insofar as they are due to luck. The symmetrical view, we argue, is by far the more compelling, both by internal luck egalitarian standards and in light of the external rightist emphasis on choice and responsibility to which luck egalitarianism may partly be seen as a response. Our main case for the symmetrical view is that when some people, against a background of equal opportunities, do not exercise their responsibility to the same degree as others, they cannot justifiably call for equalizing measures to be put in place. Indeed, such measures would be positively unfair. The symmetrical view, accordingly, rejects compensation in such cases, whereas the asymmetrical view, implausibly, enjoins it. We also examine two objections to this argument. First, that this view fails to qualify as genuinely egalitarian, instead collapsing the notion of equality into the notion of desert. Second, that the opposing asymmetrical view, in contrast to the symmetrical view, can draw support from its compatibility with sufficientarian concerns. Both objections are rebutted. We conclude that luck egalitarians are best served by endorsing the symmetrical, luck-neutralizing stance.

Deceased organ donation is widely considered as a case of easy rescue―that is, a case in which A may bestow considerable benefits on B while incurring negligent costs herself. Yet, the policy implications of this observation remain unclear. Drawing on Christopher H. Wellman’s samaritan account of political obligations, the paper develops a case for a so-called opt-out system, i.e., a scheme in which people are defaulted into being donors. The proposal’s key idea is that we may arrange people’s options in specific ways for the sake of others.