Stefan Schick

Zusammenfassung Nach einer in der Fichte-Forschung mehrfach vertretenen Ansicht stellt erstmals Fichtes Wissenschaftslehre von 1804 den Widerspruch als produktives Prinzip zur Bewegung des Denkens in aller Klarheit heraus. Anders als seine Jenaer Wissenschaftslehre affirmiere Fichtes Spätphilosophie den Widerspruch, da er das nicht mehr mit dem Selbstbewusstsein identifizierte Absolute im vollen Bewusstsein seiner Unbegreiflichkeit begreifen wolle. Die veränderte Stellung des Widerspruchs resultiere also aus Fichtes Versuch, das Denken in ein Verhältnis zum Absoluten als seiner unvordenklichen Voraussetzung zu setzen. Der Beitrag untersucht diese These von der veränderten, affirmativen Stellung des Widerspruchs in Fichtes Spätphilosophie. Dabei wird für folgende Position argumentiert: Logisch ändert sich der Status des Widerspruchs nicht. Der Widerspruch hat in Fichtes Spätphilosophie darüber hinaus immer noch den selben Grund wie in der Jenaer WL: nämlich den Bezug des Ich auf das Andere seiner selbst. Insofern dieses nun aber nicht mehr als durch das absolute Ich bedingte Setzung, sondern als absolute Voraussetzung eines nun seinerseits bedingt-unbedingten Ich verstanden wird, kann Fichte den Widerspruch in der Konzeption des Ich, der seine frühe Grundlage zu kontaminieren droht, auflösen.

Among legal scholars, P. J. A. Feuerbach is considered one of the most important German jurists of the 19th century: not only has he established Germany’s modern doctrine of penal law and the Bavarian penal code of 1813, but he is also the founder of the theory of psychological force, i.e. the idea of the threat of punishment (not punishment itself!) as deterrence. Whereas one cannot comprehend Feuerbach’s legal doctrines without their original philosophical justification, namely his concept of the legal subject as a citizen of two worlds, most contemporary interpreters ignore this aspect of Feuerbach’s theory of punishment. Against this reductionist interpretation of Feuerbach, by reconstructing his philosophy of punishment, this article exposes both the theoretical potential and shortcomings of Feuerbach’s main philosophical concepts.

RésuméLes modernistes arabes et les humanistes occidentaux considèrent souvent le philosophe musulman Averroès comme l’un des premiers précurseurs de Kant et des Lumières européennes. Contrairement à cette réputation, cet article soutient que ce sont les critiqueurs de Kant, Herder et Tiedemann, qui ont redécouvert Averroès. Tiedemann a été le premier historiographe allemand à donner un compte rendu précis de la pensée d’Averroès. Cela s’est accompagné d’une réévaluation d’Averroès par Herder dans ses Lettres sur les progrès de l’humanité, dans lesquelles il reconnaît la similitude entre son propre concept de l’esprit du temps en tant que raison historique – son alternative au concept des Lumières d’une raison universelle et anhistorique – et le concept d’Averroès d’un intellect matériel unique pour tous les esprits humains individuels. Enfin, l’article expose les liens possibles entre l’interprétation d’Averroès de l’intellect d’Aristote et le concept de raison historique de Hegel.

This study defends the legitimacy of the Enlightenment project by way of its different realizations in the philosophies of Immanuel Kant and Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi. Today, Enlightenment as a cosmopolitan project with a global claim is often considered synonymous with Western chauvinism. The assertion of a universally binding reason is all too obviously inconsistent with the much-cited recognition of cultural differences. In contrast, it is the conviction brought forward in this book that an adequately understood Enlightenment is an unconditional right of every person taking an active interest in a self-determined way of life. Only the realization of this conception of Enlightenment can provide the required space for the reciprocal recognition of human differences to freely unfold.

Both in academic and public discussions the term “enlightened” is not only an often used but also an often misused one. Thus, this article again investigates the question “What is Enlightenment?” One main thesis, which for some contemporary self-proclaimed followers of Enlightenment may be a bit hard to swallow, is that it is just the influence of a certain mediaeval thinker on historical Enlightenment that can help to develop a systematic and not only historical concept of Enlightenment. For this purpose, this article combines three problems of this very concept: the discussion on “What is Enlightenment?” in late German Enlightenment; the fuzziness of any distinction between “Enlightenment” and “Counter-Enlightenment”; the very difference between the way that Jewish Enlightenment (Haskala) and “Christian” Enlightenment refer to their mediaeval philosophical ancestors.

The Doctrine of Right is one of Kant’s most disputed works: Defamed as an alleged sign of Kant’s emerging senility by Schopenhauer, it is now considered a classic of both philosophy of right and philosophy of the state. But to this day, even the reliability of the original edition of the Doctrine of Right is an object of learned and heated discussions. According to Martin Heuser’s recently published study Zur Positivität des Rechts in der kritischen Naturrechtslehre Immanuel Kants the whole scholarly disputes on Kant’s Doctrine of Right originate from a complete misunderstanding of the Doctrine’s very methodology, the method of synthetic a priori knowledge. In a critical discussion of Heuser’s book, this paper hence re-reads Kant’s Doctrine of Right. It first takes into consideration some methodological issues with the Doctrine of Right and its interpretation. Afterwards, it investigates the metaphysical character of Kant’s philosophy of right. In a further step, it confronts Kant’s intrapersonal foundation of right with its interpersonal foundation by both Fichte and Hegel. Thereupon, it analyzes the status of private law, the state, and the relation of natural law and positive law in Kant’s Doctrine of Right. The paper ends with a critical examination of Kant’s matrimonial law and his rejection of any right of resistance.

It is one of the crucial insights of pragmatism that our judging is itself a discursive practice. Our judgments are normatively determined performances for which we are responsible. Therefore, judgments are a species of action. For in both actions and judgments, we subject ourselves and others to justifiable norms. Since these insights can already be found in Hegel, Hegel is now often interpreted as a champion of pragmatism. Hegel’s logic is thereby mainly understood as the continuation of the Kantian project of transcendental philosophy. Based upon this pragmatist interpretation of Hegel, the paper reads F. H. Jacobi’s philosophy as an alternative pragmatism which is explicitly founded on our life praxis rather than our practice of judgment.

This paper defends Fichte’s conception of the absolute I by interpreting it as a modification of the reflection theory. It firstly provides a short outline of Dieter Henrich’s idea of Fichte’s “original insight,” before delineating the problems of Fichte’s “original insight” as they are presented by Henrich. It then analyzes Fichte’s concept of the absolute I by reconstructing its deduction in the Foundations of the Science of Knowledge (1794). With the concept of the absolute I delineated in this manner, it then argues against Henrich’s objections. It concludes that Fichte’s conception of the absolute I is not a rejection of the reflection theory, but rather a radical re-interpretation of it.

By denying the idea of an unprejudiced and presuppositionless reason and his assertion of a fundamental belief that underlies every performance of reason, Jacobi provoked both the German Enlighteners and the representatives of German Idealism. The paper tries to demonstrate the systematic importance of this provocation. To this end, it emphasizes Jacobi’s anticipation of Fichte’s and Schelling’s distinction between a negative (purely rational) and a positive philosophy. In particular, this study focuses on the idea of the self-annihilation of pure reason in its consequent self-realization.

Some contemporary readings of Averroes put special emphasis on the philosophical and critical character of the work of the Muslim theologian and mystic al-Ġazālī, who is also known as the “Proof of Islam”. They even regard him as some pioneer of Enlightenment thought. This paper therefore investigates the thesis of Averroes as a critical philosopher. It sets forth that one can indeed find some essential elements of critical thought in al-Ġazālī’s writings: for example Ġazālī’s critique of reason and especially his rejection of, which means the nonreflective imitation of a teacher, authority or tradition, especially in matters pertaining to religion. Nevertheless, comparing him to both, Kant and Descartes, we will try to show that his thought falls short of critical thinking and even of philosophy itself. To this end we will proceed as follows: First, we analyze his critique of taqlīd. Secondly, we investigate his critique of Aristotelian Arabic philosophy as a variety of taqlīd. Thirdly, we consider his skeptical suspension of reason in favor of immediate prophetic perception. Fourthly, we look upon the relationship between the super-rational perception and reason. Fifthly, we show that Ġazālī dismisses the idea of autonomous reason

Starting from the question whether one has to assign Fichte and Jacobi to the Enlightenment movement, this paper makes the attempt to show that it is the categorical interest in the reality of reason, which is an at least necessary condition for characterizing a certain way of thinking as enlightening. At the center of the study stands the relationship of Jacobi and Fichte to Friedrich Nicolai and the Berlin Enlightenment. In this controversy, all thinkers share the very same interest, namely, the interest in the reality of reason. But what distinguishes Fichte and Jacobi from Nicolai is the absoluteness of their interest in reason, scilicet an interest which is not induced by affects or needs exterior to reason. At the same time, the dispute addresses the relation between absoluteness and conditionality of reason itself. Both Fichte and Jacobi try to elaborate a critical notion of reason mediating between absoluteness and conditionality. Ausgehend von der Frage, ob Jacobi und Fichte der Aufklärung zuzuordnen sind, versucht der Artikel zu zeigen, dass das unbedingte Interesse an der Wirklichkeit der Vernunft eine wenn auch nicht hinreichende, so doch zumindest notwendige Bedingung für die Bezeichnung eines Denkens als aufklärerisch in einem systematischen Sinne ist. Im Zentrum der Untersuchung steht dabei das Verhältnis von Jacobi und Fichte zu Friedrich Nicolai und der Berliner Aufklärung. In ihrer Auseinandersetzung teilen alle Denker nämlich ein gemeinsames Interesse, und zwar das Interesse an der Wirklichkeit der Vernunft. Was Fichte und Jacobi aber von Nicolai unterscheidet, ist die Unbedingtheit ihres Interesses an der Vernunft – also ein Interesse, das nicht durch der Vernunft äußerliche Neigungen oder Bedürfnisse bedingt ist. Der Disput thematisiert dabei zugleich das Verhältnis von Bedingtheit und Unbedingtheit der Vernunft selbst. Fichte und Jacobi bringen jeweils einen zwischen Bedingtheit und Unbedingtheit vermittelnden kritischen Vernunftbegriff zur Geltung.

Die 4. Auflage bringt zunächst die Kommentierung der Präambel und der Art. 1 bis 19 auf den aktuellen Stand von Judikatur und Literatur. Die grundlegende Struktur des Kommentares wurde beibehalten und um neuere Entwicklungen wie die Implikationen der Europäisierung und Digitalisierung sowie der Corona-Pandemie ergänzt.Die Herausgeberschaft des Kommentares hat ab der 4. Auflage Frauke Brosius-Gersdorf übernommen. Auch im Autorenkreis sind personelle Veränderungen zu verzeichnen: Mit Ausnahme von Frauke Brosius-Gersdorf, Alexander Thiele und Ferdinand Wollenschläger, die bereits an der 3. Auflage mitgewirkt haben, liegen die Kommentierungen in den Händen neuer Autorinnen und Autoren.Der Kommentar erscheint in drei Bänden und wird nur geschlossen abgegeben.Der Grundgesetz-Kommentar ist Bestandteil des Moduls Verfassungsrecht PREMIUM, das bei beck-online.de erhältlich ist.