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12Aristotle on Modality, IAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 74 (1): 143-161. 2000.Aristotle draws two sets of distinctions in Metaphysics 9.2, first between non-rational and rational capacities, and second between one way and two way capacities. He then argues for three claims: [A] if a capacity is rational, then it is a two way capacity [B] if a capacity is non-rational, then it is a one way capacity [C] a two way capacity is not indifferently related to the opposed outcomes to which it can give rise I provide explanations of Aristotle's terminology, and of how [A]-[C] shoul…Read more
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16Aristotle on Modality, IAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 74 (1): 143-161. 2000.[Stephen Makin] Aristotle draws two sets of distinctions in Metaphysics 9.2, first between non-rational and rational capacities, and second between one way and two way capacities. He then argues for three claims: [A] if a capacity is rational, then it is a two way capacity [B] if a capacity is non-rational, then it is a one way capacity [C] a two way capacity is not indifferently related to the opposed outcomes to which it can give rise I provide explanations of Aristotle's terminology, and of h…Read more
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54Aristotle: Metaphysics Theta: Translated with an Introduction and Commentary (edited book)Oxford University Press UK. 2006.Stephen Makin presents a clear and accurate new translation of an influential and much-discussed part of Aristotle's philosophical system, accompanied by an analytical and critical commentary focusing on philosophical issues. In Book Theta of the Metaphysics Aristotle introduces the concepts of actuality and potentiality---which were to remain central to philosophical analysis into the modern era---and explores the distinction between the actual and the potential.
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What Does Aristotle Mean by Priority in Substance?In David Sedley (ed.), Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, Volume Xxiv: Summer 2003, Oxford University Press. 2003.
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8What does Aristotle mean by priority in substance?Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 24 209-238. 2003.
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47Aristotle's Two Modal Theses AgainPhronesis 44 (2): 114-126. 1999.This paper offers an interpretation of the arguments Aristotle offers in "Metaphysics" 9.4, 1047b14-30, for the two modal theses [1] if (if A is the case then B is the case) then (if A is possible then B is possible) [2] if (if A is possible then B is possible) then (if A is the case then B is the case) Aristotle's arguments for these theses have not typically impressed commentators. I offer two arguments which are relatively faithful to Aristotle's text. The arguments rest on the following pair…Read more
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69Amusing Gorgias: Why Does the Encomium of Helen End as it Does?Ancient Philosophy 33 (2): 291-305. 2013.
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79Energeia and dunamisIn Christopher Shields (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Aristotle, Oup Usa. pp. 400. 2012.Modalities enter into practically every area of contemporary philosophy. Great progress has been made in understanding the variety of differences between what is possible, what is actual, and what is necessary. But things were not always so clear. We owe a great debt in this area, as in so many others, to Aristotle, who had a lot to say on the topic, part of which comprises his discussion and use of the actuality/potentiality distinction. One important task in understanding his discussion of act…Read more
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194Aristotle on Modality: Stephen MakinAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 74 (1): 143-161. 2000.[Stephen Makin] Aristotle draws two sets of distinctions in Metaphysics 9.2, first between non-rational and rational capacities, and second between one way and two way capacities. He then argues for three claims: [A] if a capacity is rational, then it is a two way capacity [B] if a capacity is non-rational, then it is a one way capacity [C] a two way capacity is not indifferently related to the opposed outcomes to which it can give rise I provide explanations of Aristotle's terminology, and of h…Read more
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2Colour: Some Philosophical Problems from Wittgenstein Aristotelian Society monographs Volume 7 By Jonathan Westphal Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987, 117 pp., £19.50 (review)Philosophy 64 (248): 271-272. 1989.
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47II—Stephen Makin: Ethics, Fixity and FluxAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 88 (1): 169-183. 2014.This paper engages with the idea at the core of my co‐symposiast's paper ‘Ethics of Substance’ : that the Aristotelian concept of substantial being has ethical implications, and an alternative understanding of existence in terms of affecting and being affected will help us more easily to accommodate relational values, which are thought to sit uneasily within the Aristotelian framework.I focus on two questions. First, is there really is a tension between an Aristotelian metaphysics of substance a…Read more
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7And melissusIn Frisbee Sheffield & James Warren (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Ancient Philosophy, Routledge. pp. 34. 2013.
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1Aristotle on Modality, ISupplement to the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 74 (1): 143-161. 2000.
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42Indifference ArgumentsPhilosophical Review 106 (1): 136. 1997.In this lucid and insightful study, Stephen Makin investigates a form of argument widespread in ancient Greek philosophy, where the absence of a reason for one alternative to be the case rather than another is used to establish substantive conclusions—where the alternatives are “indifferent”. Examples abound: Anaximander engages in such reasoning to show that the Earth does not move; Zeno of Elea to show that what is cannot be divided; Democritus to argue for finite divisibility, on the one hand…Read more
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20Colour: Some Philosophical Problems from Wittgenstein Aristotelian Society monographs Volume 7 By Jonathan Westphal Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987, 117 pp., £19.50 (review)Philosophy 64 (248): 271-. 1989.
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65Melissus And His Opponents: The Argument of DK 30 B 8Phronesis 50 (4): 263-288. 2005.In this paper I offer a new interpretation of Melissus' argument at DK 30 B8. In this passage Melissus uses an Eleatic argument against change to challenge an opponent who appeals to the authority of perception in order to support the view that there are a plurality of items in the world. I identify an orthodox type of approach to this passage, but argue that it cannot give a charitable interpretation of Melissus' strategy. In order to assess Melissus' overall argument we have to identify the op…Read more
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Action |
Philosophy of Mind |
Meta-Ethics |