These articles are dedicated to the thesis that Bergson, in Matter and Memory (1896), had created, in retrospect, a holographic theory, where the universe is taken as a holographic field, but the brain is seen (as opposed to Pribram (1971) or Bohm (1980), in modern terms, as creating/being a reconstructive wave passing through this dynamic field, "specific to" a source external to the body - the coffee cup with stirring spoon on the table.
J. J. Gibson, and his theory of direct perception, with his invariance laws defining environmental events, is seen as the natural complement of Bergson, and Bergson's holographic framework is required to …
These articles are dedicated to the thesis that Bergson, in Matter and Memory (1896), had created, in retrospect, a holographic theory, where the universe is taken as a holographic field, but the brain is seen (as opposed to Pribram (1971) or Bohm (1980), in modern terms, as creating/being a reconstructive wave passing through this dynamic field, "specific to" a source external to the body - the coffee cup with stirring spoon on the table.
J. J. Gibson, and his theory of direct perception, with his invariance laws defining environmental events, is seen as the natural complement of Bergson, and Bergson's holographic framework is required to give Gibson's "direct" theory coherence - to make sense of the origin of the image of the external environment - to make sense of Gibson's "specific to."
As experience is not occurring solely within the brain in this model, neither can it be solely stored there, and this brings in an entirely new model of the retrieval of experience and of cognition (which is the use of this experience in thought), thus the papers on memory theory and cognition.
All of this requires a metaphysic different from the classic metaphysic of space and time underlying current physics, and Bergson laid this out as what I term his "temporal metaphysic."
Bergson was insistent on "tying philosophy to the fact," i.e., to science, a fact that philosophers, and sadly, Bergsonian philosophers have ignored, but consistent to this day with his worry that Matter and Memory with its Chapters 2 and 3 being totally devoted to then-current memory research, would simply bore philosophers (while Chaps. 1 and 4 - highly philosophical - would bore psychologists). These papers are obviously adhering to Bergson's approach on directly tying philosophy to science.
