•  182
    Abstract In Creative Evolution (1907/1911), a pivotal discussion is the extreme complexity of instinctual behavior. As one of many examples, a member of the Hymenoptera “knows” precisely the three locations of motor-neuron complexes at which to sting a cricket such that it is paralyzed, yet remains fully alive for the wasp’s larvae. Two points: a) This behavior is as much an “irreducible” complex of acts as the structural organization of the wasp’s body, and just as inexplicably formed by nat…Read more
  •  425
    In discussion on consciousness and the hard problem, there is an unquestioned background assumption, namely, our experience is stored in the brain. Yet Bergson (1896) argued that this very question, “Is experience stored in the brain?” is the critical issue in the problem of consciousness. His examination of then-current memory research led him, save for motor or procedural memory, to a “no” answer. Others, for example Sheldrake (2012), have continued this negative assessment of the research …Read more
  •  356
    In discussion on consciousness and the hard problem, there is an unquestioned background assumption, namely, our experience is stored in the brain. Yet Bergson argued that this very question, “Is experience stored in the brain?” is the critical issue in the problem of consciousness. His examination of then-current memory research led him, save for motor or procedural memory, to a “no” answer. Others, for example Sheldrake, have continued this negative assessment of the research findings. So, has…Read more
  •  33
    Analogical reminding and the storage of experience: the paradox of Hofstadter-Sander
    Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 16 (3): 355-385. 2017.
    In their exhaustive study of the cognitive operation of analogy, Hofstadter and Sander arrive at a paradox: the creative and inexhaustible production of analogies in our thought must derive from a “reminding” operation based upon the availability of the detailed totality of our experience. Yet the authors see no way that our experience can be stored in the brain in such detail nor do they see how such detail could be accessed or retrieved such that the innumerable analogical remindings we experi…Read more
  •  44
    The cost of explicit memory
    Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (1): 33-66. 2009.
    Within Piaget there is an implicit theory of the development of explicit memory. It rests in the dynamical trajectory underlying the development of causality, object, space and time – a complex (COST) supporting a symbolic relationship integral to the explicit. Cassirer noted the same dependency in the phenomena of aphasias, insisting that a symbolic function is being undermined in these deficits. This is particularly critical given the reassessment of Piaget’s stages as the natural bifurcations…Read more
  •  65
    Bergson, perception and Gibson
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (5): 23-45. 2000.
    Bergson's 1896 theory of perception/memory assumed a framework anticipating the quantum revolution in physics, the still unrealized implications of this framework contributing to the large neglect of Bergson today. The basics of his model are explored, including the physical concepts he advanced before the crisis in classical physics, his concept of perception as ‘virtual action’ with its relativistic implications, and his unique explication of the subject/object relationship. All form the basis…Read more
  •  33
    Semantics, experience and time
    Cognitive Systems Research 3 (3): 301-337. 2002.
    The computational hypothesis, with its inherent representationalism, and the dynamical hypothesis, with its apparent absence of representations and its commitment to continuous time, stand at an impasse. It is unclear how the dynamical stance can handle representational thought, or how computationalism can deal effectively with a tightly coupled, reciprocally causative agent-environment system in continuous transformation. Underlying this dilemma is the complex relation of mind to time, a relat…Read more
  •  806
    SSecial relativity and perception: the singular time of philosophy and physics
    Journal of Consciousness Exploration and Research 1 500-531. 2010.
    The Special Theory of Relativity (STR) holds sway as a theory of time due to its apparently successful predictive structure regarding time-related phenomena such as the increased life spans of mesons or retarded clocks on jets circling the globe, and due to the relativization of simultaneity intrinsic to this theoretical structure. Yet the very structure of the theory demands that such very real physical effects be construed as non-ontological. The scope and depth of this contradiction is expl…Read more
  •  71
    Time, form and the limits of qualia
    Journal of Mind and Behavior 28 (1): 19-43. 2007.
    Our understanding of qualia is extremely weak when considerations of time are brought into play. Ignored has been the fact that the scale of time imposed by the brain on the events of the matter-field already defines quality, and that there is an essential “primary memory” or continuity of time that underlies all qualitative events. This weakness is magnified when the concept of qualia is applied to form. The origin of the dilemma lies in the fact that the problem of qualia is posed in the conte…Read more
  •  25
    Meditation on a mousetrap: On consciousness and cognition, evolution, and time
    Journal of Mind and Behavior 33 (1): 69. 2012.
    Evolutionary theory has yet to offer a detailed model of the complex transitions from a living system of one design to another of more advanced, or simply different, design. Hidden within the writings of evolution's expositors is an implicit appeal to AI-like processes operating within the "cosmic machine" that has hitherto been evolving the plethora of functional living systems we observe. In these writings, there is disturbingly little understanding of the deep problems involved, resting as th…Read more
  •  35
    Semantic redintegration: Ecological invariance
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (6): 726-727. 2008.
    In proposing that their model can operate in the concrete, perceptual world, Rogers & McClelland (R&M) have not done justice to the complexities of the ecological sphere and its invariance laws. The structure of concrete events forces a different framework, both for retrieval of events and concepts defined across events, than that upon which the proposed model, rooted in essence in the verbal learning tradition, implicitly rests
  • Commentary on: A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness. Authors' reply
    with Bruce Bridgeman, Naoyuki Osaka, Peter D. Sparks, and Ee Krieckhaus
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (6): 904-908. 2004.
  •  53
    Virtual action: O'Regan & noë meet Bergson
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (6): 906-907. 2004.
    Bergson, writing in 1896, anticipated “sensorimotor contingencies” under the concept that perception is “virtual action.” But to explain the external image, he embedded this concept in a holographic framework where time-motion is an indivisible and the relation of subject/object is in terms of time. The target article's account of qualitative visual experience falls short for lack of this larger framework. [Objects] send back, then, to my body, as would a mirror, their eventual influence; they t…Read more
  •  48
    On time, memory and dynamic form
    Consciousness and Cognition 13 (4): 762-788. 2004.
    A common approach to explaining the perception of form is through the use of static features. The weakness of this approach points naturally to dynamic definitions of form. Considering dynamical form, however, leads inevitably to the need to explain how events are perceived as time-extended—a problem with primacy over that even of qualia. Optic flow models, energy models, models reliant on a rigidity constraint are examined. The reliance of these models on the instantaneous specification of form…Read more
  •  322
    The Case for Qualia (review)
    Journal of Mind and Behavior 31 (1-2): 141-156. 2010.
    This is a review of "The Case for Qualia" (Ed., Edmund Wright). The review is in three parts. In Part 1, I briefly lay out the general metaphysic in which the debate on qualia has been unfolding. I term it the classical or spatial metaphysic. In Part 2, we traverse the essays and relate them – the problems with which they grapple, the pitfalls they encounter – to this classic metaphysic. In Part 3, I will briefly sketch out a transformed metaphysic – a temporal metaphysic – along with the…Read more
  •  138
    Bergson and the holographic theory of mind
    Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (3-4): 365-394. 2006.
    Bergson’s model of time (1889) is perhaps the proto-phenomenological theory. It is part of a larger model of mind (1896) which can be seen in modern light as describing the brain as supporting a modulated wave within a holographic field, specifying the external image of the world, and wherein subject and object are differentiated not in terms of space, but of time. Bergson’s very concrete model is developed and deepened with Gibson’s ecological model of perception. It is applied to the problems …Read more
  •  49
    On the Possibility of Direct Memory
    In V. W. Fallio (ed.), New Developments in Consciousness Research, Nova Science. pp. 1--64. 2006.
    Is experience stored in the brain? The universal assumption is that it is, yet the answer to this question is critical to the theory of consciousness. If “yes,” it must be understood that this answer absolutely constrains all theories of the origin and nature of consciousness. Memory images, dreams, even perceptual images and perceptual experience must somehow be generated from stored elements within the neural substrate. If the answer is “no,” Searle’s principle of “neurobiological suffi…Read more
  •  901
    Form, Qualia and Time: The Hard Problem Reformed
    Mind and Matter 2 153-181. 2013.
    The hard problem – focusing essentially on vision here – is in fact the problem of the origin of our image of the external world. This formulation in terms of the “image” is never seen stated, for the forms populating our image of the world are considered computable, and not considered qualia – the “redness” of the cube is the problem, not the cube as form. Form, however, cannot be divorced from motion and hence from time. Therefore we must examine the classical, spatial metaphysic of space …Read more