Stephen Munzer

Hebrews 4:15 says that Jesus was tempted like other human beings yet never sinned. Sinlessness is not the same as impeccability. Chalcedonian Christology or some variant of it seems necessary to show that Jesus was metaphysically unable to sin. Metaphysical impossibility to sin, though, appears to rule out temptation as experienced by ordinary human beings. This paper argues that Oliver D. Crisp, T. A. Hart, Brian Leftow, and Gerald O’Collins all fall short in trying to show how Jesus was both impeccable and tempted as we are.

Legal philosophers and property scholars sometimes disagree over one or more of the following: the meaning of the word 'property,' the concept of property, and the nature of property. For much of the twentieth century, the work of W.N. Hohfeld and Tony Honoré represented a consensus around property. The consensus often went under the heading of property as bundle of rights, or more accurately as a set of normative relations between persons with respect to things. But by the mid-l 990s, the consensus was under attack. Key figures in the attack were James Penner, a legal philosopher, and Thomas W. Merrill and Henry E. Smith, two highly regarded professors of property law. This article aims to repel the attack and argues for property as a set of normative relations between persons with respect to things. The positive case for this view of property pays special attention to the philosophy of language and the analysis of concepts. The positive case also maintains that the right to use and the power to transfer are as central to property as the right to exclude. It is possible that the virtues of Smith's modular theory of property differ from the virtues of a well-crafted bundle theory. Indeed, it may be the case that these two theories throw light on different features of property law and are not, save at the margin, competitors with each other. The label 'new essentialism' sometimes applied to the work of Penner, Merrill, and Smith seems inapt if property does not have an essence. Of course, they might refuse the label.

Silence often plays a significant role in Christian experience and practice. However, the varieties of silence and the effects of silence for good and. bad merit examination. It is important to distinguish between physical, auditory, and metaphorical silence, and bet- ween experiencing silence as "quiet" and experiencing silence as keeping quiet . Silence can be an instrumental good as well as an expressive good, a concomitant good, or a constitutive good. Christian monks, theologians, and other thinkers sometimes identify experiences of silence, for example, as light or dark, as spatially vast or enclosed, and as temporal or atemporal. Practices of silence can bring persons closer to God, though a kenotic spirituality; of silence and a stress on solitude create perils for some members of religious orders, such as Carthusians. The chief aim of this article is to show, with philosophical techniques, how silence .can be good in manifold ways and even, perhaps, an ideal.

This article engages critically and constructively with Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s biblical study ‘Temptation’ (1938). His study does not always do justice to the text of the New Testament or the theodicean and hamartiological issues pertaining to temptation. And his position that biblically temptation is not the testing of strength, but rather the loss of all strength and defenceless deliverance into Satan’s hands, is hard to defend. However, Bonhoeffer’s idea of Christ-reality undergirds his suggestion that all persons can find in Christ participation, help, and grace in resisting temptation. Bonhoeffer’s most important insight, which requires some unpacking, is that ‘my temptation is nothing other than the temptation of Jesus Christ in me.’

This study in moral, political, and legal philosophy contends that it is morally impermissible to circumcise male minors without a medical indication (nontherapeutic circumcision). Male minors have a moral anticipatory autonomy right-in-trust not to be circumcised. This right depends on norms of autonomy and bodily integrity. These norms generate three direct non-consequentialist arguments against nontherapeutic circumcision: (1) the loss of nonrenewable functional tissue, (2) genital salience, and (3) limits on a parental right to permanently modify their sons' bodies. An indirect argument holds (4) that if it is morally impermissible to remove the female prepuce (clitoral hood), then it is also morally impermissible to remove the male prepuce (foreskin). Although there is debate across medical cultures, a reasonable understanding supports the claim that nontherapeutic circumcision causes some harms and imposes unwarranted risks on male minors. The overall moral case applies to secular circumcisions and, with some qualifications, to religious circumcisions in Judaism and Islam. Arguments of political philosophy that invoke the freedom of religion, toleration, multiculturalism, and social meaning qualify somewhat, but do not eliminate, the case against circumcising male minors without a medical indication. Nevertheless, the arguments deployed in this study do not warrant legal interference at this time with secular and religious practices of nontherapeutic circumcision.

I argue for three theses: T1 — Access to scientific knowledge can be used to reinforce existing scientific communities and sometimes generate new ones. T2 — Community can be used to generate scientific knowledge, patent reform, scientific research, medical diagnostics, and trade secrets and occasionally patents. T3 — On the spectrum from commons to semicommons to private property to anticommons, an anticommons can arise if a biotechnological asset is fuzzily defined. I defend these propositions against objection and establish the fertility of my account by considering intellectual property issues relating to synthetic biology. Along the way I present a new understanding of the public domain. I also pursue several projects that are interwoven throughout the Article. The analytic project shows how careful definitions yield a useful taxonomy of biotechnological assets and their holders. The normative project explains why we should endorse intellectual property rights in some biotechnological assets but not others. Finally, the thematic project establishes larger contrasts between different forms of community on the one hand and individualism on the other, and reveals how my understanding of the public domain yields a surer grasp of these contrasts and their roles in institutions of property.

Self-abandonment and self-denial are, respectively, Catholic and hyper-Calvinist analogues of each other. Roughly, each requires the surrendering of a person to God's will and providence through faith, hope, and love. Should the self-abandoning/self-denying individual accept his or her own damnation if that be God's will? This article, which is virtually alone in discussing the Catholic and Reformed Protestant traditions together, answers "No." The unqualified self-abandonment present in quietism and the radical self-denial of Samuel Hopkins are perverse and irrational responses to the prospect of hell because they run counter to the Christian's deepest need to spend eternity with God. However, a qualified self-abandonment is intellectually defensible and offers a viable Christian piety

There are at least five types of innocence. Innocence of various, but not all, types can be possessed, then lost, and later still regained or even surpassed. The most important of these I call “mature innocence,” which is a confirmed state of character, attained reflectively and by an individual’s exercise of effort and agency, that is highly resistant to sin and moral wrongdoing. Mature innocence can be either a secular or a specifically Christian ideal. To surpass mature innocence is to attain a related ideal of purity of heart.

There has always been much controversy surrounding property rights in legal and political philosophy. Thinkers such as Plato, Locke, Kant, Hegel and Marx have all offered different views on the idea of property. This collection of essays, written by some of the most eminent scholars in the field, examines the most central issues of property theory from a variety of perspectives. The essays discuss whether property may be dissipated or used imprudently with impunity, and analyse how a person's property should be distributed after death. They survey the economic landscape of intellectual property and show that Locke's celebrated justification for private property falters when it comes to copyrights and patents. They also demonstrate how important it is that institutions of property be carefully justified. The variety and originality of these essays are evidence that the theory of property is one of the most exciting areas of intellectual inquiry in the humanities and social sciences.

This book represents a major new statement on the issue of property rights. It argues for the justification of some rights of private property while showing why unequal distributions of private property are indefensible. Three features of the book are especially salient: it offers a challenging new pluralist theory of justification; the argument integrates perceptive analyses of the great classical theorists Aristotle, Locke, Hegel and Marx with a discussion of contemporary philosophers such as Nozick and Rawls; and the author moves with assurance among philosophy, law and economics to present a very broad, interdisciplinary study.

In contemporary Western societies, public begging is associated with economic failure and social opprobrium--the lot of street people. So Christians may be puzzled by the fact that an interpretation of the imitation of Christ in the late Middle Ages elevated religious mendicancy into an ideal form of life. Although voluntary religious begging cannot easily be resurrected as a Christian ideal today, the author argues that a radical attitude and practice of trust, self-abandonment, and acknowledgment of dependence on God can be a Christian ideal in any time and place. To follow this way of life, which the author calls mendicancy in attitude, is to become a beggar of God

Kierkegaard holds that purity of heart is to will one thing. But his treatment of despair, double-mindedness, and self-deception runs into difficulties over whether one can choose beliefs about oneself, which theories of the will (if any) could establish its unity, and whether the individual who fails to become pure of heart is blameworthy. Pace Kierkegaard, willing the good does not make immutable the person who so wills, and purity of heart should not be entirely will-based. This essay articulates a broad understanding of purity of heart whose value and importance in moral and religious life are much clearer. This understanding recasts willing in terms of certain higher-order desires, identifies ambivalence as a different phenomenon from double-mindedness, brings in motives and beliefs, emphasizes trusting radically in God, and explicates purity of heart as a moral and religious ideal.

This paper, addressed to both philosophers of science and stem cell biologists, aims to reduce the obscurity of and disagreements over the nature of stemness. The two most prominent current theories of stemness—the entity theory and the state theory—are both biologically and philosophically unsatisfactory. Improved versions of these theories are likely to converge. Philosophers of science can perform a much needed service in clarifying and formulating ways of testing entity and state theories of stemness. To do so, however, philosophers should acquaint themselves with the latest techniques and approaches employed by bench scientists, such as the use of proteomics, genome-wide association studies, and ChIP-on-chip arrays. An overarching theme of this paper is the desirability of bringing closer together the philosophy of science and the practice of scientific research

This essay deals with property rights in body parts that can be exchanged in a market. The inquiry arises in the following context. With some exceptions, the laws of many countries permit only the donation, not the sale, of body parts. Yet for some years there has existed a shortage of body parts for transplantation and other medical uses. It might then appear that if more sales were legally permitted, the supply of body parts would increase, because people would have more incentive to sell than they currently have to donate. To allow sales is to recognize property rights in body parts. To allow sales, however, makes body parts into “commodities”—that is, things that can be bought and sold in a market. And some view it as morally objectionable to treat body parts as commodities.