Suki Finn

Some feminist movements treat new reproductive technologies such as ectogestation as having liberatory power. The author argues against this and situates such technologies as part of a neoliberal program that benefits some individuals at the expense of others. Instead of abolishing hierarchies and the oppression that results from them, ectogestation lends itself to perpetuating inequalities at a structural level for the sake of the supposed bodily autonomy of the neoliberal individual. The issue is not with gestation itself, and it cannot be resolved with ectogestation which only serves to disappear the social problem by disappearing the pregnant people who experience them.

This paper describes how fictionalism can be coupled with the quietism of Carnap, to create the position ‘Neo-Carnapian Fictionalism’. Carnap argues that it is not meaningful to question reality in an external sense to assess what really exists, rather it is only meaningful to talk in an internal sense within a framework about what exists according to the framework rules. I use the concept of fictions in place of frameworks to argue that we ought to treat much seemingly ontologically committing language as consisting in nothing more than a useful heuristic and as being fictional. This reframes ontological debates as being based around the practical advantages of utilizing a way of speaking in a fictionalist manner. The aim of this paper is thus to resurrect Carnap’s metaontology in the form of a deflated global fictionalism, that is divorced from the antirealism usually associated with fictionalism, where the fictionalism is based on quietism instead of antirealism.

There is a significant absence of theoretical work directed at contextualising and understanding trans pregnancy and its implications for the body, the law, ethics, and politics. This aggravates the challenges we highlight in this chapter, contributing to what we refer to as the hyper/in-visibility of trans pregnancy. We analyse these degrees of visibility through the concepts of representation and recognition, focussing on the gendered language of the medical setting in the United Kingdom. Whilst we expect that much of our analysis will be relevant and applicable beyond this setting, it is the traditional Western role assumptions that are being challenged. We argue for the need to employ gender-modality terms for the sake of inclusivity, and advocate for a standpoint methodology, to be able to accommodate the complexities of the hyper/in-visibility of trans pregnancy.

This paper delves into the political and philosophical underpinnings and legal implications of transgender pregnancy and parenthood within the European context. The European Court of Human Rights has played a pivotal role in shaping the discourse surrounding (trans) families, and in this paper, we argue that it is imperative to reverse that direction of influence, so that trans families are empowered to shape the legal discourse to become more inclusive. We refer to recent landmark judgements that have brought to the forefront the need to adapt existing conceptual and legal frameworks to the evolving landscape of family planning and parenthood for transgender individuals. We also compare the social and legal situation of trans pregnancy with surrogacy and anonymous birthing as analogies which also call for conceptual space between pregnancy and motherhood. This paper analyses case law, particularly under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, demonstrating the impact of European jurisprudence on European gender politics. We highlight the importance of reconceptualising pregnancy and parenthood away from what we describe as ‘(bio)logic’ in the pursuit of reproductive justice for all.

It is often assumed that only cis women experience pregnancy. This fails to account for the trans and nonbinary people who are and have been pregnant, and therefore presents a partial picture of what pregnancy is, how pregnancy is experienced, and the conceptual and normative issues that surround having a pregnancy. In this article we argue for rethinking pregnancy and re-envisioning conceptual, social, medical, and legal approaches to pregnant persons by focussing on trans experiences, thereby trans/forming pregnancy. We highlight the ‘genderfication’ that permeates dominant formulations of pregnancy, which often implicitly or explicitly endorse a biological essentialism that takes birth-giving as necessary and sufficient for motherhood. We look in depth at the United Kingdom, but take our analysis to have far wider applicability and implications. Our aim is to trans/form philosophical approaches to gender and reproduction and contribute to practical guidance built from empirical and theoretical research, looking for positive outcomes for trans individuals who experience pregnancy. We take trans pregnancy seriously, on its own terms, arguing that doing so is both a theoretical and ethical imperative.

In this paper I compare (Neo)Quine(an)’s views on ontology to that of (Neo)Carnap(ian)’s. My aim is to show that they ought not be perceived as rival positions, but should both be understood as ‘quiet relativists’. I do this by examining Quine’s critique of Carnap which was meant to set them apart. I explore their apparent differences regarding pragmatism and truth, which ultimately derive from Quine’s attack on the analytic/synthetic distinction. It turns out that their similarities outweigh their differences to the extent that the Quinean position is more properly understood as being quiet about ontology, with the only meaningful discussion of existence being relative to theory, similar to the Carnapian position. It is widely held that Quine’s place in history with regard to ontology is that he revived it in the face of Carnap’s deflation of it. This paper adds to the literature that seeks to clarify Quine not as the reviver of ontology but rather as being equally quiet about ontology as Carnap, defusing their presumed opposition. Furthermore, I will argue that the resulting Neo-Quinean position should not to be considered a form of realism, but is more accurately described as similar to a Neo-Carnapian position, namely, as a quietist relativism.

Each one of us who has come into this world (so far) has done so via birth. Everyone therefore has a birthing ‘parent’, but not all would consider that respective person to be their parent. For example, those who have been adopted might instead consider the person (or people) who adopted them to be their parent(s). There are, therefore, ways to become a parent that do not involve giving birth, and instances of giving birth that do not result in becoming a parent. But what about motherhood, more specifically? Must mothers be women, and must mothers have given birth? What makes a ‘mother’ – is it always and only the person who makes us? It is these questions that I explore here, in order to find a trans-inclusive approach to parental designations.

This chapter provides a historical account of the transformation of pregnancy through philosophical theory and legal practice. What has remained seemingly consistent across history, though, is the lack of rights a pregnant woman can enjoy. Whilst it may manifest differently across time and place, unfortunately misogynistic attitudes persist, and this is reflected in the continual degrading of the gestator (and gestation), which is reinforced by certain philosophical theorising and technological advancement. We thus urge caution in making philosophical claims about the epistemic transformation in pregnancy, given the epistemic (and other) injustices already faced by pregnant people. We recognise that there are transformations that occur because of pregnancy, but we argue that there ought not be with respect to the pregnant person's autonomy, agency, and control over their bodies. Through an analysis of legal cases, we can see that the practice falls out of line with the theory regarding how pregnant people are treated. But perhaps it is both the theory and the practice that need to change so as to bring them in line. How we theorise about pregnancy is intertwined with our cultural views, our technological advancements, and our medical and legal practices, requiring multi-disciplinary study for a more holistic overview. In this chapter, we contribute to this endeavour by bringing some such strands together, regarding the transformation that pregnancy is, that pregnancy makes, and that pregnancy has had historically, in philosophy, and in legal practice.

This article is about nothing. It is not the case that there is no thing that the article is about; nevertheless, the article does indeed explore the absence of referents as well as referring to absence. Nothing is said to have many extraordinary properties, but in predicating anything of nothingness we risk contradicting ourselves. In trying to avoid such misleading descriptions, nothingness could be theorised as ineffable, though that theorisation itself is an attempt to disparage it. Maybe nothingness is dialetheic, or maybe there are no things that are dialetheic, since contradictions are infamous for leading to absurdity. Contradictions and nothingness can explode very quickly into infinity, giving us everything out of nothing. So, perhaps nothing is something after all. This article considers different metaphysical and logical understandings of nothingness via an analysis of the presence/absence distinction, by considering nothing first as the presence of absence, second as the absence of presence, third as both a presence and an absence, and fourth as neither a presence nor an absence. In short, it analyses nothingness as a noun, a quantifier, a verb, and a place, and it postulates nothingness as a presence, an absence, both, and neither.

Consider the following two metaphysical questions about pregnancy: (1) When does a new organism of a certain kind start to exist? (2) What is the mereological and topological relationship between the pregnant organism and with what it is pregnant? Despite assumptions made in the literature, I take these questions to be independent of each other, such that an answer to one does not provide an answer to the other. I argue that the way to connect them is via a maximality principle that prevents one organism being a proper part of another organism of the same kind. That being said, such a maximality principle need not be held, and may not apply in the case of pregnancy. The aims of this paper are thus to distinguish and connect these metaphysical questions, in order to outline a taxonomy of rival mereotopological models of pregnancy that result from the various combinations of their answers.

Žene su nedovoljno zastupljene u filozofiji, a trudnoća je nedovoljno istražena u filozofiji. Može li se uspostaviti veza između ta dva fenomena? Tvrdit ću da, iako je kontrafaktična tvrdnja "da su žene bile povijesno bolje zastupljene u filozofiji, trudnoća bi bila također zastupljena" možda istinita, to ne znači nužno da sada, u sadašnjosti, možemo očekivati (ili poželjeti) da postoji korelacija. Kako bismo shvatili jaz između ovih dvaju područja nedovoljne zastupljenosti, dovoljno je usvojiti ne-esencijalističko shvaćanje žena kako bismo prepoznali da neke žene ne doživljavaju trudnoću ili nisu zainteresirane za trudnoću (filozofski ili na drugi način). Ipak, s obzirom na povijesno šutnju o trudnoći u filozofiji koju su proživljavale žene, važno je sada ispraviti tu neravnotežu istovremeno obrađujući obje teme nedovoljne zastupljenosti. Kako bih to dalje dokazala, upućujem na razliku između reprezentativne raznolikosti i suštinske raznolikosti (što je povezano s poznatijom razlikom između deskriptivne reprezentacije i suštinske reprezentacije). To će biti tema prvog dijela rada. Zatim, u drugom i trećem dijelu rada, istražit ću nedovoljnu zastupljenost i pogrešno predstavljanje žena u filozofiji, ne samo u smislu nedovoljnog broja žena, već i u smislu načina na koji su žene, kao opći "rod", (mizogino) opisivane u filozofiji kroz povijest. Isti postupak primijenit ću na trudnoću u četvrtom i petom dijelu rada, istražujući kako se tretira kao tema filozofskog istraživanja te kako je pogrešno predstavljena u društvu općenito. Kako bi se pružili dokazi za moje tvrdnje, analiza sadrži pregled literature i navodi statističke kvantitativne podatke i kvalitativno utemeljene intervjue. Završit ću hipotezom o odnosu između ovih nedovoljnih i pogrešnih predstavljanja, te ću ponuditi razmišljanja o budućnosti za žene i trudnoću u filozofiji.

Quantifier variance faces a number of difficulties. In this paper we first formulate the view as holding that the meanings of the quantifiers may vary, and that languages using different quantifiers may be charitably translated into each other. We then object to the view on the basis of four claims: (i) quantifiers cannot vary their meaning extensionally by changing the domain of quantification; (ii) quantifiers cannot vary their meaning intensionally without collapsing into logical pluralism; (iii) quantifier variance is not an ontological doctrine; (iv) quantifier variance is not compatible with charitable translation and as such is internally inconsistent. In light of these troubles, we recommend the dissolution of quantifier variance and suggest that the view be laid to rest.

One of the central questions in the metaphysics of pregnancy is this: Is the foetus a part of the mother? In this paper I aim not to answer this question, but rather to raise methodological concerns regarding how to approach answering it. I will outline how various areas attempt to answer whether the foetus is a part of the mother so as to demonstrate the methodological problems that each faces. My positive suggestion will be to adopt a method of reflective equilibrium. The aim of this is to ensure that pregnancy be included in the tribunal of experience that our theories are held up against such that our theories can accommodate what we say about pregnancy, whilst also ensuring that what we say about pregnancy be theoretically informed. That way, we rethink pregnancy in light of our theories as well as rethinking our theories in light of pregnancy.

Ectogenesis, or “artificial womb technology,” has been heralded by some, such as prominent feminist Shulamith Firestone, as a way to liberate women. In this chapter, we challenge this view by offering an alternative analysis of the technology as relying upon and perpetuating a problematic model of pregnancy which, rather than liberating women, serves to devalue them. We look to metaphysics as the abstract study of reality to elucidate how the entities in a pregnancy are related to one another. We consider two models of the metaphysics of pregnancy: (1) the Parthood Model, whereby the fetus is a part of what/who gestates it; and (2) and the Fetal Container Model, whereby the gestator is a container for the fetus. We suggest that under the assumption of the Fetal Container Model, we are more likely to think that any container will suffice for gestation, even an artificial one. In contrast, under the assumption of the Parthood Model, we are less likely to treat the gestator as interchangeable or replaceable, given the parthood relationship between gestator and fetus. This chapter argues that ectogenesis is conceptually linked to the Fetal Container Model and advocates a more cautious approach in promoting ectogenesis as a tool for women’s liberation.

A 2017 Nature report was widely touted as hailing the arrival of the artificial womb. But the scientists involved claim their technology is merely an improvement in neonatal care. This raises an under-considered question: what differentiates neonatal incubation from artificial womb technology? Considering the nature of gestation—or metaphysics of pregnancy—(a) identifies more profound differences between fetuses and neonates/babies than their location (in or outside the maternal body) alone: fetuses and neonates have different physiological and physical characteristics; (b) characterizes birth as a physiological, mereological and topological transformation as well as a (morally relevant) change of location; and (c) delivers a clear distinction between neonatal incubation and ectogestation: the former supports neonatal physiology; the latter preserves fetal physiology. This allows a detailed conceptual classification of ectogenetive and ectogestative technologies according to which the 2017 system is not just improved neonatal incubation, but genuine ectogestation. But it is not an artificial womb, which is a term that is better put to rest. The analysis reveals that any ethical discussion involving ectogestation must always involve considerations of possible risks to the mother as well as her autonomy and rights. It also adds a third and potentially important dimension to debates in reproductive ethics: the physiological transition from fetus/gestateling to baby/neonate.

In this paper I argue that pluralism at the level of logical systems requires a certain monism at the meta-logical level, and so, in a sense, there cannot be pluralism all the way down. The adequate alternative logical systems bottom out in a shared basic meta-logic, and as such, logical pluralism is limited. I argue that the content of this basic meta-logic must include the analogue of logical rules Modus Ponens and Universal Instantiation. I show this through a detailed analysis of the ‘adoption problem’, which manifests something special about MP and UI. It appears that MP and UI underwrite the very nature of a logical rule of inference, due to all rules of inference being conditional and universal in their structure. As such, all logical rules presuppose MP and UI, making MP and UI self-governing, basic, unadoptable, and required in the meta-logic for the adequacy of any logical system.

Anti-exceptionalism about logic takes logic to be, as the name suggests, unexceptional. Rather, in naturalist fashion, the anti-exceptionalist takes logic to be continuous with science, and considers logical theories to be adoptable and revisable accordingly. On the other hand, the Adoption Problem aims to show that there is something special about logic that sets it apart from scientific theories, such that it cannot be adopted in the way the anti-exceptionalist proposes. In this paper I assess the damage the Adoption Problem causes for anti-exceptionalism, and show that it is also problematic for exceptionalist positions too. My diagnosis of why the Adoption Problem affects both positions is that the self-governance of basic logical rules of inference prevents them from being adoptable, regardless of whether logic is exceptional or not.

As with most other areas of reproduction, surrogacy is highly regulated. But the legislation and policies on surrogacy are written in such ways that make large (and possibly mistaken) assumptions about the metaphysical relationship between the mother and the fetus – whether the fetus is a part of, or contained by, the mother. It is the purpose of this chapter to highlight these assumptions, and to demonstrate the impact that alternative metaphysical views can have on our conceptualization of surrogacy. With that in mind, I recommend that our public policies on surrogacy be at least neutral or otherwise responsive to metaphysics rather than presupposing it, such that the regulation and legislation of surrogacy will be metaphysically informed.

Quantifier variance faces a number of difficulties. In this paper we first formulate the view as holding that the meanings of the quantifiers may vary, and that languages using different quantifiers may be charitably translated into each other. We then object to the view on the basis of four claims: (i) quantifiers cannot vary their meaning extensionally by changing the domain of quantification; (ii) quantifiers cannot vary their meaning intensionally without collapsing into logical pluralism; (iii) quantifier variance is not an ontological doctrine; (iv) quantifier variance is not compatible with charitable translation and as such is internally inconsistent. In light of these troubles, we recommend the dissolution of quantifier variance and suggest that the view be laid to rest.

This paper reflects on metametaphysics and as such develops a metametameta-physical view: that quietist metametaphysics requires dialetheism, and in turn a paraconsistent logic. I demonstrate this using Carnap’s metametaphysical position in his 'Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology' as an example, with regard to how it exhibits self-reference and results in inconsistency. I show how applying Carnap’s position to itself produces a dilemma, both horns of which lead to a contradiction. Such inconsistency commonly arises from meta-theories with global scope, as the 'meta' approach aims to transcend the scope of that which it is theorizing about, whilst the global nature will place itself back within the scope of that which it is theorizing about, which together result in the theory referring to itself whilst refuting itself. I argue that any global metametaphysical theory that draws a limit to thought will face self-reference problems leading to contradictory realms. My conclusion is conditional: If we want to meta-philosophize in such a way and treat quietist meta-theories as being true, then we need to be dialetheist and utilize a paraconsistent logic in order to accommodate the contradictions that result from such theorizing.

Yablo suggests a ‘hostage crisis’ occurs when an unproblematic statement ϕ entails, and is therefore hostage to, a problematic statement ψ. Yablo proposes a technical solution to this kind of problem by diminishing ϕ to ϕ*, where ϕ* does not entail ψ and thus is not hostage to it. I argue that Yablo’s proposal is unnecessary because the original, undiminished ϕ does not in fact entail ψ. This is what Yablo calls a ‘defiant’ position. I defend defiance by arguing that ϕ and ψ are of different metaphysical weights, which I show through an analysis of their use of quantification.

Scientific realism holds that the terms in our scientific theories refer and that we should believe in their existence. This presupposes a certain understanding of quantification, namely that it is ontologically committing, which I challenge in this paper. I argue that the ontological loading of the quantifiers is smuggled in through restricting the domains of quantification, without which it is clear to see that quantifiers are ontologically neutral. Once we remove domain restrictions, domains of quantification can include non-existent things, as they do in scientific theorizing. Scientific realism would therefore require redefining without presupposing a view of ontologically committing quantification.

This paper is a response to Lewis’ ‘Humean Supervenience Debugged’ . Lewis was in the business of defending Humean Supervenience, and the project seemed successful until the case of chance. Lewis thus originally named chance the ‘big bad bug’ for Humean Supervenience until the aforementioned paper in which he claims victory. Here I argue that he was unsuccessful and that Humean Supervenience remains bugged by chance. I will show how this bug remains due to a misdiagnosis of where the problem lies with regard to undermining. First, I define Humean Supervenience and chance, and state the bug in its original form, then secondly I describe Lewis’ attempt to remove the bug. Thirdly, I explain why the bug persists, despite Lewis’ efforts, and show the real source of the undermining problem to be due to the circularity of Humean Supervenient style accounts of chance. Finally I describe the situation this leaves chance in, and show how the incompatibility of chance and Humean Supervenience is evidence for the nonexistence of chance. I conclude that it is the circularity of the formation of Humean Supervenient laws of chance which continue to bug Humean Supervenience, leaving it untenable and resulting in little chance for chance