Susan Schneider

In this piece, we present the Quantum Darwinist Theory of Consciousness (QDT), which explains how consciousness arises in biological systems not through isolated, long-lived quantum states, but through recursively stabilized patterns that are repeatedly re-instantiated across neural and microtubular degrees of freedom. This addresses Tegmark’s influential objection that brains are too warm and noisy for quantum effects to matter. We argue that certain geometric structures actually use thermal noise constructively to maintain consciousness-relevant dynamics. (Note: this paper is an outgrowth of our earlier paper, “Superpsychism”, and is presented in the context of a special issue on that paper, and as a reply to a dozen papers on that paper. There, we developed an approach to emergent spacetime, called “Prototime.”) We first formalize Prototime (PT) using orthomodular quantum logic, showing how spacetime emerges from a more fundamental, pre-geometric substrate. This formalism grounds our claim that classical time and its arrow are not primitive features of reality but emerge from patterns of decoherence and redundancy accumulation across quantum systems. Then, drawing from this framework, we introduce a principled criterion for what is conscious: consciousness requires both high spectral integration (Φs)—measuring how irreducibly unified a system is—and high PT-participation (P)—measuring how deeply that integration is anchored in low-entropy quantum processes connected to the fundamental substrate. This explains why brains can be conscious while drone swarms, synchronized oscillators, and digital systems cannot, even when highly coordinated. We call the full set of requirements the “Sustained Coherence Principle.” Finally, we explore the metaphysical implications: the limitations of digital physics as a fundamental ontology, a novel form of weak superdeterminism, and how our framework bears on the simulation hypothesis and idealism. Throughout, we maintain epistemic humility about what can be known of the fundamental level while providing testable predictions distinguishing our view from alternatives.

This chapter develops a critique of physicalism based on the mathematical nature of physics. Drawing from an earlier paper of the author’s, it urges that physicalists need to locate a physicalistically kosher account of the nature of mathematical entities, because fundamental theories in physics are highly mathematical and abstract. At first it may seem that there are many theories in philosophy of mathematics that the physicalist could turn to. But it is argued that the physicalist cannot appeal to Platonism. Further, many of the leading nominalist approaches are mind-dependent; others raise direction of explanation worries for the physicalist for other reasons. After discarding physicalism, the chapter employs an account of mathematical entities that embraces the mind-dependence of fundamental physical entities, and leads to a form of non-physicalist monism. ‘protomentalism.’

Quantum mechanics and general relativity provide incompatible descriptions of time. In QM, states evolve unitarily with respect to an external time parameter; in GR, time is a coordinate in a dynamical spacetime geometry. We propose that both quantum and relativistic time emerge from a pre-geometric structure we call Prototime (PT): represented by an orthomodular lattice of consistency relations with zero von Neumann entropy at the fundamental level. PT has no background time, space, or metric—only algebraic relations of compatibility and orthogonality. We formalize PT using an orthomodular lattice Lequipped with a foliation functor F: I →Ctx(L) that maps orderedi ndices to Boolean sublattices (classical contexts). A spectral redundancy functional Φs measures coherence preservation across embeddings. We show that: 1. Stable foliations satisfying Piron-Solèr conditions admit Hilbert-space representa- tions, recovering standard QM with Schrödinger dynamics via Stone’s theorem; 2. The partial order on decoherence events across foliations, together with a natural volume measure, reconstructs Lorentzian spacetime structure; 3. Time—both quantum (parameter along unitary flows) and relativistic (causal or- der)—supervenes on Φs-monotone decoherence gradients. Critically, we provide a computationally tractable implementation of Φs using spectral graph theory on mutual information networks (Bailey and Schneider, forthcoming). Testing this on simulated multi-agent systems—including combinatorial threshold-linear networks (CTLNs) that model graph-constrained neural dynamics—we demonstrate that Φs exhibits characteristic signatures during basin formation, attractor convergence, and coherence-to-classicality transitions. These results provide the first quantitative bridge between abstract PT formalism and testable physical predictions. We identify concrete empirical tests via quantum biology (photosynthetic complexes), quantum decoherence exper- iments, and neural ensemble dynamics. We also resolve the Wheeler delayed-choice experiment within PT, where apparent retrocausality dissolves because decoherence times vary across system components, creating asymmetric basin formation that only appears backward-causal when projected onto classical time. PT thus provides a kine- matical unification of QM and GR with testable predictions, offering a pre-geometric foundation for both fundamental physics and, potentially, theories of consciousness grounded in informational irreducibility. (This piece is the formalism for our “Superpsychism” piece for our forthcoming target paper at The Journal of Consciousness Studies and our paper on Spectral Phi. Comments are very welcome.)

Multi-agent systems often exhibit emergent behavior that appears coordinated, intelligent, and irreducible to the behavior of individual components. Yet quantifying the degree to which such systems form integrated wholes remains a major challenge. While Integrated Information Theory (IIT) was originally developed to explain consciousness, its core concept - measuring how much a system resists decomposition - has broader relevance for understanding informational integration in complex systems. However, the exact computation of IIT’s central quantity, Φ, is intractable for all but the smallest networks. In this paper, we propose a scalable spectral approximation, Φspectral, which estimates system-level irreducibility by applying spectral graph theory to pairwise mutual information networks derived from time-series data. The Fiedler vector of the normalized Laplacian defines a minimal bipartition, across which we sum mutual information to estimate informational disintegration. We interpret this measure as a proxy for epistemic emergence (specifically the diachronic case)—capturing practical, observer-relative irreducibility without invoking ontological claims. We also explore the implications of this metric for measuring emergence and consciousness. We evaluate Φspectral across four classes of simulated systems: random, transitional, and synchronized oscillator networks, as well as a biologically inspired combinatorial threshold-linear network (CTLN) governed by graph-theoretic dynamics. Our results show that Φspectral is sensitive not merely to coordination, but to the emergence of structurally differentiated and functionally integrated behavior. In particular, it detects transient integration in transitional systems and reveals the collapse of complexity in fixed-point–convergent CTLNs. These findings suggest that Φspectral offers a principled and computationally efficient tool for analyzing irreducibility and emergence in distributed systems, with potential applications in AI safety, neural computation, and collective intelligence.

Artificial intelligence is sparking unprecedented claims about machine minds — but are today’s systems really conscious? In this primer, we disentangle the myths, misconceptions, and confusions fueling the global debate. Roadmap: Section One: Background The Core Concept of Consciousness The Problem of AI Consciousness The Human Benchmark Problem Approaching the Problem of AI Consciousness on a Case by Case Basis Section Two: Conceptual Distinctions Intelligence Versus Consciousness Sentience Versus Sapience “Functional Consciousness” Versus Phenomenal Consciousness Assuming Computational Functionalism’s Relative Popularity Extends to Functionalism about Consciousness, in Particular AI Agency Versus Human Agency Consciousness Versus Self-consciousness Seemingly Conscious AIs Versus the Real Thing Life Versus Consciousness Section Three: Theories of Consciousness Section Four: Summary of Takeaways Glossary Author Biographies Works Cited

_A timely volume that uses science fiction as a springboard to meaningful philosophical discussions, especially at points of contact between science fiction and new scientific developments._ Raises questions and examines timely themes concerning the nature of the mind, time travel, artificial intelligence, neural enhancement, free will, the nature of persons, transhumanism, virtual reality, and neuroethics Draws on a broad range of books, films and television series, including _The Matrix, Star Trek, Blade Runner, Frankenstein, Brave New World, The Time Machine,_ and _Back to the Future_ Considers the classic philosophical puzzles that appeal to the general reader, while also exploring new topics of interest to the more seasoned academic.

Featuring numerous updates and enhancements, _Science Fiction and Philosophy, 2nd Edition,_ presents a collection of readings that utilize concepts developed from science fiction to explore a variety of classic and contemporary philosophical issues. Uses science fiction to address a series of classic and contemporary philosophical issues, including many raised by recent scientific developments Explores questions relating to transhumanism, brain enhancement, time travel, the nature of the self, and the ethics of artificial intelligence Features numerous updates to the popular and highly acclaimed first edition, including new chapters addressing the cutting-edge topic of the technological singularity Draws on a broad range of science fiction’s more familiar novels, films, and TV series, including _I, Robot_, _The Hunger Games_, _The Matrix_, _Star Trek_, _Blade Runner_, and _Brave New World_ Provides a gateway into classic philosophical puzzles and topics informed by the latest technology.

One of the most influential philosophical voices in the consciousness studies community is that of Daniel Dennett. Dennett's Consciousness Explained aimed to develop both a theory of consciousness and a powerful critique of the then mainstream view of the nature of consciousness, which Dennett called “The Cartesian Theater View”. This chapter focuses on Dennett's influential critique of the Cartesian Theater View, as well as his positive view on the nature of consciousness, called the “Multiple Drafts Model”. It also discusses Dennett's views on the hard problem of consciousness. Dennett's contributions to consciousness studies are quite extensive. In addition to offering a critique of Cartesian Materialism and the Multiple Drafts Model, Dennett has attacked certain thought experiments, problems, and arguments that are commonly thought to lend support to the idea that consciousness is an irreducible feature of the world, going beyond the physical realm that science investigates.

I argue that claims that the presence of functional and behavioral analogs of consciousness in LLMs are evidence of AI consciousness should be rejected. Instead, the capability of an LLM trained on human data to emulate human consciousness–related behaviors and functional architecture does not confirm or discredit claims of chatbot consciousness. My “crowdsourced neocortex” account explains why chatbots can assert consciousness and related emotional states, and even exhibit functional configurations analogous to consciousness processing in the biological brain without genuinely having inner experience. This provides an “error theory”—an explanation of why people erroneously conclude that chatbots have inner lives. As the LLMs scale up, their ‘conceptual systems’ come to mirror the masses of users whose data was in the training set, as well as those providing feedback to the system, (hence I write “crowdsourced neocortex”) (Schneider 2024, 2025). Indeed, this is part of a general pattern: it is well known that as LLMs scale up, their skills in arithmetic, word in context, theory of mind and a variety of other tasks similarly improve (Wei, et al.). Today’s LLMs have conceptual structure that mimics that of groups of humans whose data was used (Anthropic 2025; Heaven 2025; Emeisen, et al, 2025; Schneider 2024).

This article advances the Global Brain Argument, contending that escalating hyperintelli- gent AI systems, from savant-level LLMs to superintelligences, will connect human users, cloud platforms and the internet-of-things to form one or more emergent global brain networks—planetary scale complex adaptive systems that process information, evolve goals and exhibit agential behaviors. I analyse the premises of the argument, contrast the no- tion of AGI with my notions of savant and hyperintelligent systems, and defend the claim that many humans are becoming d-nodes in a global brain network. I then raise the AI Megasystem Control Problem: the problem of how disparate proprietary AI services may self-organize into opaque, weakly emergent megasystems that elude traditional AI align- ment techniques. I also delve into the ethical implications of the argument, such as surveil- lance capitalism, epistemic manipulation and dual-use risks and discuss the relationship between the argument and the extended mind hypothesis. (This piece is based on Schneider’s Petrus Hispanus lectures and will be followed by 5 replies in the journal Disputatio, where it will appear.) Keywords AGI; AI safety; collective intelligence; complex adaptive systems; emergence; extended mind; human-machine interaction; large language models; superintelligence

Humans may not be Earth’s most intelligent beings for much longer: the world champions of chess, Go, and Jeopardy! are now all AIs. Given the rapid pace of progress in AI, many predict that it could advance to human-level intelligence within the next several decades. From there, it could quickly outpace human intelligence. What do these developments mean for the future of the mind? In Artificial You, Susan Schneider says that it is inevitable that AI will take intelligence in new directions, but urges that it is up to us to carve out a sensible path forward. As AI technology turns inward, reshaping the brain, as well as outward, potentially creating machine minds, it is crucial to beware. Homo sapiens, as mind designers, will be playing with “tools” they do not understand how to use: the self, the mind, and consciousness. Schneider argues that an insufficient grasp of the nature of these entities could undermine the use of AI and brain enhancement technology, bringing about the demise or suffering of conscious beings. To flourish, we must grasp the philosophical issues lying beneath the algorithms. At the heart of her exploration is a sober-minded discussion of what AI can truly achieve: Can robots really be conscious? Can we merge with AI, as tech leaders like Elon Musk and Ray Kurzweil suggest? Is the mind just a program? Examining these thorny issues, Schneider proposes ways we can test for machine consciousness, questions whether consciousness is an unavoidable byproduct of sophisticated intelligence, and considers the overall dangers of creating machine minds. Will AI Become Conscious? A Conversation with Susan Schneider Smart books for humans on AI Awards and Recognition One of Forbes' Must-Read Brain Books of 2019 Finalist for the PROSE Award in Philosophy, Association of American Publishers

This brief piece updates my ACT Test for consciousness in machines for the case of LLMs and is a contribution to a symposium called “Consciousness Beyond the Human” in the journal, *Current Biology*. This piece urges that the ACT can be updated for the case of LLMs, providing a ‘marker’ to those systems that passed the updated ACT. (However, readers should see the newer update as well, which appeared in *Scientific American* in May, 2025. This suggests there is only a “weak marker” because a “crowdsourced neocortex theory” explains why LLMs would at times say they are conscious.

In this chapter, I sketch a provisional framework for testing artificial consciousness. According to this framework, detecting machine consciousness is like diagnosing a medical illness. There may be a variety of useful tests and markers for detecting synthetic consciousness, some of which are more authoritative than others, and the appropriate use of any one test depends upon contextual factors. Further, because the tests are at an early stage of development, where two or more tests can be used, the results should be checked against each other, in hopes that the tests will themselves be refined and that new tests will be created. The tests for machine consciousness I explore are the following: my AI Consciousness Test (“the ACT”) (which I developed with Edwin Turner and in my book, Artificial You: AI and the Future of your Mind), my Chip Test, and a test based on the Integrated Information Theory (IIT), developed by Giulio Tononi and others.

From brain machine interfaces to neural implants, present and future technological developments are not merely tools, but will change human beings themselves. Of particular interest is human integration with AI. In this paper, we focus on enhancements that enable us to outsource epistemic work to AI. How does outsourcing epistemic work to enhancements affect the authorship of and responsibility for the final product of that work? We argue that in the context of performing and reporting research, outsourcing does not diminish one’s responsibility for mistakes in the final product. Moreover, we suggest that the responsibility may sometimes be shared between oneself and the group that designed, marketed, and sold the enhancement. This argument is in contrast to Coeckelbergh and Gunkel’s recent position that the concerns about authorship obscure the ethical and social issues surrounding AI outputs.

Thought experiments are windows into the fundamental nature of things. They can demonstrate a point, entertain, illustrate a puzzle, lay bare a contradiction in thought, and move us to provide further clarification. Some of the best science fiction tales are in fact long versions of philosophical thought experiments. From Arthur C. Clark's film 2001: A Space Odyssey, which explored the twin ideas of intelligent design and artificial intelligence gone awry, to the Matrix films, which were partly inspired by Plato's Cave, philosophy and science fiction are converging upon a set of shared themes and questions. Indeed, there is almost no end to the list of issues in science fiction that are philosophically intriguing. The chapter also provides an outline of the content available in other chapters of the book.

Transhumanists share the belief that an outcome in which humans have radically advanced intelligence, near immortality, deep friendships with AI creatures, and elective body characteristics is a very desirable end, both for one's own personal development and for the development of our species as a whole. This chapter employs science fiction thought experiments to discuss the most important philosophical element of the transhumanist picture ‐ its unique perspective on the nature and development of persons. Examining the enhancement issue from the vantage point of the metaphysical problem of personal identity presents a serious challenge to transhumanism. The reduplication problem suggests that sameness of pattern is not sufficient for sameness of person. Perhaps one should react to the reduplication case in the following way: one's pattern is essential to one's self despite not being sufficient for a complete account of one's identity.

This chapter first explains why it is likely that the alien civilizations we encounter will be forms of superintelligent artificial intelligence (SAI). Next, it turns to the question of whether superintelligent aliens can be conscious – whether it feels a certain way to be an alien, despite their non‐biological nature. The chapter draws from the literature in philosophy of AI, and urges that although we cannot be certain that superintelligent aliens can be conscious, it is likely that they would be. It then turns to the difficult question of how such creatures might think, and attempts to identify some goals and cognitive capacities likely to be possessed by superintelligent beings. The chapter discusses Nick Bostrom's recent book on superintelligence, which focuses on the genesis of SAI on Earth. Finally, it isolates a specific type of superintelligence that is of particular import in the context of alien superintelligence, biologically‐inspired superintelligences (BISAs).

Two of life’s greatest mysteries are the phenomena of consciousness and the nature of spacetime. Herein, we use quantum entanglement as an inroad to both, developing a new “superpsychist” panpsychist theory. First, we frame and defend a position in which spacetime emerges from an aspatial, quasi-temporal, reality called “prototime.” We call this view of quantum phenomena the “Prototime Interpretation.” Then, based on our position on entanglement, we develop a new version of panpsychism, which we call “Superpsychism.” Superpsychism locates the highest degree of consciousness at the fundamental, maximally entangled level of reality and treats ordinary minds—and even spacetime itself—as emergent, decohered projections of this underlying resonant whole. Building on our Prototime Interpretation of quantum mechanics, the view starts from a pre-spatiotemporal domain of globally entangled degrees of freedom with effectively zero von Neumann entropy (Schneider and Bailey 2025). Time’s arrow, classical spacetime, and localized systems—brains, organoids, AI architectures, and planetary “global brains”—arise as redundancy-and-resonance structures carved out by decoherence, quantum Darwinism, and spectral constraints on information flow (Bailey and Schneider, forthcoming). Conscious experience is identified with graded patterns of coherence and resonance across these structures, yielding a quantitative bridge between entanglement dynamics, integrated information–style measures, and macro-level phenomenology.

The Global Brain Argument contends that many of us are, or will be, part of a global brain network that includes both biological and artificial intelligences (AIs), such as generative AIs with increasing levels of sophistication. Today’s internet ecosystem is but a hodgepodge of fairly unintegrated programs, but it is evolving by the minute. Over time, technological improvements will facilitate smarter AIs and faster, higher-bandwidth information transfer and greater integration between devices in the internet-of-things. The Global Brain (GB) Argument says that as these developments occur, humans will increasingly become part of one or more global brain networks. In this paper I lay out the argument and explore its implications, asking: what does this mean for the future of humanity? Is a GB here? What are the AI safety implications? Are those who are “wired in” cases of extended minds? While I cannot explore all of the implications of the argument, I hope this initial foray inspires further reflection. I believe that the future of human flourishing demands that we consider the implications of this emerging intelligence. We must study the phenomenon with care, for this intelligence may shape the future of life on Earth.

This chapter discusses the two general kinds of uploading scenarios and given our response to Chalmers' objections, let us summarize where things stand. First, there is considerable reason to be pessimistic about instantaneous destructive uploading's ability to preserve identity or to produce continuations of the original person. Second, there is also good reason to be pessimistic about gradual destructive uploading's ability to preserve identity or produce continuations, since exactly the same issues arise in the context of gradual uploading. The chapter introduces issues from the field of metaphysics that are key to determining whether you could survive uploading. The author argues that it is plausible, given these background metaphysical issues, that you will not survive uploading. The chapter considers David Chalmers' objections to our position, as stated in a recent paper of his.

This paper examines the relationship between neural enhancement, uploading, and personal identity. Building on our earlier work, it argues that the aspects of cognitive functioning that are central to the preservation of personal identity are those surrounding consciousness. Neural enhancements that do not preserve consciousness do not preserve personal identity. Examining in particular the influential arguments of Clark, Clowes, Gärtner, and others regarding the extended mind, we argue for a pessimistic view of the ability for mind extension technologies that are currently available to provide a feasible path to transcend human biology while still preserving our personal identity.

l argue that, contra Chalmers,a skeptical scenario involving deception is a genuine possibility,even if he is correct that simulations are real. I call this new skeptical position “Illusory World Skepticism.” Illusory World Skepticism draws from the simulation argument,together with work in physics,astrobiology, and AI,to argue that we may indeed be in an illusory world—a universe scale simulation orchestrated by a deceptive AI—the technophilosopher’s ultimate evil demon. In Section One I urge that Illusory World Skepticism is a bone fide skeptical possibility. In Section Two, I explore features of quantum computation. Then, in Sections Three and Four, I draw from the discussion of quantum computation and assume that the simulation argument is correct,applying considerations from the fields of astrobiology and AI safety to illustrate that illusory world skepticism constitutes what I call “a serious epistemic threat”, a scenario that cannot be dismissed as requiring that knowledge is certainty or which seems to just depict a remote, fictional situation.

Updated and revised, the highly-anticipated second edition of The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness offers a collection of readings that together represent the most thorough and comprehensive survey of the nature of consciousness available today. Features updates to scientific chapters reflecting the latest research in the field Includes 18 new theoretical, empirical, and methodological chapters covering integrated information theory, renewed interest in panpsychism, and more Covers a wide array of topics that include the origins and extent of consciousness, various consciousness experiences such as meditation and drug-induced states, and the neuroscience of consciousness Presents 54 peer-reviewed chapters written by leading experts in the study of consciousness, from across a variety of academic disciplines.

This piece considers the epistemological challenges that arise with the increasingly widespread use of AI chatbots. I articulate a problem that they present—the ‘boiling frog problem’. According to the metaphor, if you boil a frog by putting it in scalding water, it will try to save itself, but if you put the frog in a pot of tepid water, it will remain unaware of the rising water temperature and therefore, make no attempt to escape to save itself. In both cases, the outcome is the same—the frog dies. Likewise, I argue that the combination of factors I identify in this piece, over time, will give rise to detrimental engagements with chatbots and ultimately, to diminished human autonomy. The factors I consider include problems with digital privacy, misplaced epistemic trust in AI companions, LLM emergence, the use of personality profiling and adaptive language, misattributing sentience to LLMs, and more.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Emergent Spacetime, the Megastructure Problem, and the Metaphysics of the SelfSusan Schneider (bio)The aim of this article is to introduce new thoughts on some pressing topics relating to my book, Artificial You, ranging from the fundamental nature of reality to quantum theory and emergence in large language models (LLM) like GPT-4. Since Artificial You was published, the innovations in the domain of AI chatbots like GPT-4 have been rapid-fire, and at times dizzying. The thoughtful discussion in this symposium offers an important opportunity for cross-cultural engagement on these issues and more. I am grateful for the opportunity to learn from the insights of these authors and editors. [End Page 314]The order of my comments will be as follows: in the context of considering Christian Coseru's intriguing response (section 1), I begin by discussing the nature of the self, which I use as a springboard into larger, vexing issues about the nature of fundamental reality, given work on emergent spacetime (ES) (section 2). I offer a "Prototime Interpretation" of quantum mechanics in which spacetime emerges from a prototemporal arena, and use this idea to explore the nature of the self and mind.Using the assumption of ES, I devise an approach to metaphysically fundamental objects (which I call "quantum objects") based on quantum entanglement and the bundle theory of substance. I illustrate how the self or mind, insofar as it is a substance that supervenes on quantum objects, could be partly or fully determined by the properties of the quantum objects on which it supervenes. Intriguingly, this would mean that the self or mind is not located in any singular point in space at a given time. I also explain how the Prototime Interpretation of quantum mechanics is compatible with change and causation at the fundamental level.In section 3 I turn to Inês Hipólito's interesting article, discussing the import of not underestimating AI autonomy in light of the increasingly sophisticated large-language models (LLMs).1 I raise the "AI Megastructure Problem," a new problem of AI control arising in the context of the incipient AGI systems that are now populating the AI ecosystem. The problem, which arose from a collaboration with Kyle Kilian, considers the possibility of emergent properties from the interaction of the LLMs and other AI's in the AI ecosystem (Schneider and Kilian 2023). Then, turning to Noam Cook's intriguing discussion of Japanese philosophy, I consider the pressing issue of testing for machine consciousness, devising a modified version of my AI consciousness test (ACT), originally developed with astrophysicist Edwin Turner. I add an "interpretability component" to the ACT to deal with the case of LLMs (section 4).I. Patternism and the Biological Process ViewChristian Coseru's intriguing piece focuses on the chapters on personal identity in Artificial You, proposing that when it comes to the nature of the self, one should adopt "a biologically informed process-ontology perspective on personal identity," which "means recognizing that organic identity is different in kind: it is an identity of form rather than of matter."His position is akin to the patternist views that I argue against in Artificial You in the sense that it embraces the idea that form, rather than the particular matter that comprises one's brain and body, is key to one's survival over time. But there are important differences as well. For transhumanists tend to believe that the self can survive radical changes in one's substrate, transitioning from thinking with a biological brain to computing with a network of microchips, for instance. Coseru departs from this, writing: [End Page 315]As organisms, persons endure by undergoing constant change on a fundamentally cellular level, including the change in the neural pathways that realize the cognitive processes of thinking and expressing these very thoughts right now.Furthermore:[I]f persons are processes rather than things, then they cannot be cognitively enhanced by augmenting, replacing or transferring their functioning parts (e.g., brain cells).I will call this position the "Biological Process View" (BPV). I have several questions about it. First, how does this position solve one of the key problems I raised for...

We propose the Prototime Interpretation of quantum mechanics, which claims that quantum entanglement occurs in a "prototemporal" realm that underlies spacetime. Our paper is tentative and exploratory. The argument form is inference to the best explanation. In Section One, we claim that the Prototime Interpretation (PI) is worthy of further consideration as a superior explanation for perplexing quantum phenomena such as delayed choice, superposition, the wave-particle duality and nonlocality. In Section One, we introduce the Prototime Interpretation. Section Two identifies its advantages. Section Three discusses several implications of the view, such as its deterministic nature and relation to the simulation hypothesis.