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82Thinking What We Want: A Moral Right to Acquire Control over our ThoughtsIn Marc Jonathan Blitz & Jan Christoph Bublitz (eds.), The Law and Ethics of Freedom of Thought, Volume 2, Palgrave. forthcoming.
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27Right to mental integrity and neurotechnologies: implications of the extended mind thesisJournal of Medical Ethics. forthcoming.The possibility of neurotechnological interference with our brain and mind raises questions about the moral rights that would protect against the (mis)use of these technologies. One such moral right that has received recent attention is the right to mental integrity. Though the metaphysical boundaries of the mind are a matter of live debate, most defences of this moral right seem to assume an internalist (brain-based) view of the mind. In this article, we will examine what an extended account of…Read more
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38Wrongful Rational Persuasion OnlinePhilosophy and Technology 37 (1): 1-25. 2024.In this article, we argue that rational persuasion can be a _pro tanto_ wrong and that online platforms possess features that are especially conducive to this wrong. We begin by setting out an account of rational persuasion. This consists of four jointly sufficient conditions for rational persuasion and is intended to capture the core, uncontroversial cases of such persuasion. We then discuss a series of wrong-making features which are present in methods of influence commonly thought of as _pro …Read more
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37Criteria for Assessing AI-Based Sentencing Algorithms: A Reply to RybergPhilosophy and Technology 37 (1): 1-4. 2024.
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1Neural Implants and the TRICK to AutonomyIn Hugh LaFollette (ed.), _Ethics in Practice_ 6th edition, Wiley Blackwell. forthcoming.
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5Commentary: Responsibility-Sensitive Healthcare Funding: Three Responses to Clavien and Hurst’s CritiqueCambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 29 (2): 192-195. 2020.Christine Clavien and Samia Hurst1 (henceforth C-H) make at least three valuable contributions to the literature on responsibility and healthcare. They offer an admirably clear and workable set of criteria for determining a patient's degree of responsibility for her health condition; they deploy those criteria to cast doubt on the view that patients with lifestyle-related conditions are typically significantly responsible for their conditions; and they outline several practical difficulties that…Read more
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13What makes a medical intervention invasive? A reply to commentariesJournal of Medical Ethics 50 (4): 244-245. 2024.We are grateful to the commentators for their close reading of our article 1 and for their challenging and interesting responses to it. We do not have space to respond to all of the objections that they raise, so in this reply, we address only a selection of them. Some commentaries question the usefulness of developing an account of the sort we provide, 2 or of revising the Standard Account (SA) in doing so. 3–5 Our schema is intended to provide a framework for developing a full account of invas…Read more
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10An Intuitive, Abductive Argument for a Right Against Mental InterferenceThe Journal of Ethics 1-22. forthcoming.Several authors have recently claimed that we each possess a right against interference with our minds. However, it remains unclear how this claim is to be justified. I offer a novel argument in defence of it. The argument is intuitive—appealing centrally to intuitions regarding cases—and abductive—taking the form of an inference to the best explanation; I offer a series of cases involving intuitively wrongful interventions, argue that five somewhat promising attempts to account for the wrongful…Read more
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13On the Relative Intrusiveness of Physical and Chemical RestraintsAmerican Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 15 (1): 26-28. 2024.Crutchfield and Redinger argue that consciousness-altering chemical restraints are less “liberty-intrusive” (or as we will sometimes put it, just less “intrusive”) than physical restraints. Physica...
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41Nudge Transparency Is Not Required for Nudge ResistibilityErgo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 10 (n/a). 2023.In discussions of nudging, transparency is often taken to be important; it is often suggested that a significant moral consideration to take into account when nudging is whether the nudge is transparent. Another consideration taken to be relevant is whether the nudge is easy to resist. Sometimes, these two considerations are taken to be importantly related: if we have reason to make nudges easy to resist, then we have reason to make them transparent, insofar as a nudge’s transparency is relevant…Read more
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4Genetic selectionIn David Edmonds (ed.), Ethics and the Contemporary World, Routledge. 2019.This chapter explores some implications of the view that the woman in the rubella case has a reason to defer conception. It considers its implications for the ethics of genetic selection. Genetic selection involves choosing to bring one child into existence rather than another, based in part on the genetic characteristics of the alternative possible children. The chapter argues that potential parents have reason to pursue genetic selection to avoid having a child with a disposition to a wellbein…Read more
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25The Moral Permissibility of Perspective-Taking InterventionsEthical Theory and Moral Practice 1-16. forthcoming.Interventions designed to promote perspective taking are increasingly prevalent in educational settings, and are also being considered for applications in other domains. Thus far, these perspective-taking interventions (PTIs) have largely escaped philosophical attention, however they are sometimes prima facie morally problematic in at least two respects: they are neither transparent nor easy to resist. Nontransparent or hard-to-resist PTIs call for a moral defense and our primary aim in this pap…Read more
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18How Moral Bioenhancement Affects Perceived PraiseworthinessBioethics 38 (2). 2024.Psychological literature indicates that actions performed with the assistance of cognition‐enhancing biomedical technologies are often deemed to be less praiseworthy than similar actions performed without such assistance. This study examines (i) whether this result extends to the bioenhancement of moral capacities, and (ii) if so, what explains the effect of moral bioenhancement on perceived praiseworthiness. The findings indicate that actions facilitated by morally bioenhanced individuals are c…Read more
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40Neurointerventions in Criminal Justice: On the Scope of the Moral Right to Bodily IntegrityNeuroethics 16 (3): 1-11. 2023.There is growing interest in the use of neurointerventions to reduce the risk that criminal offenders will reoffend. Commentators have raised several ethical concerns regarding this practice. One prominent concern is that, when imposed without the offender’s valid consent, neurointerventions might infringe offenders’ right to bodily integrity. While it is commonly held that we possess a moral right to bodily integrity, the extent to which this right would protect against such neurointerventions …Read more
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55What makes a medical intervention invasive?Journal of Medical Ethics 50 (4): 226-233. 2024.The classification of medical interventions as either invasive or non-invasive is commonly regarded to be morally important. On the most commonly endorsed account of invasiveness, a medical intervention is invasive if and only if it involves either breaking the skin (‘incision’) or inserting an object into the body (‘insertion’). Building on recent discussions of the concept of invasiveness, we show that this standard account fails to capture three aspects of existing usage of the concept of inv…Read more
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15Moral EnhancementIn Julian Savulescu, Ruud ter Meulen & Guy Kahane (eds.), Enhancing Human Capacities, Blackwell. 2011.The opponents of enhancement do not all set out to defend a common and clearly specified thesis. However, several would either assent or be attracted to the following claim (henceforth, the bioconservative thesis): Even if it were technically possible and legally permissible for people to engage in biomedical enhancement, it would not be morally permissible for them to do so. The scope of this thesis needs to be clarified. This chapter argues that the bioconservative thesis, thus qualified, is f…Read more
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95Quarantine, isolation and the duty of easy rescue in public healthDeveloping World Bioethics 18 (2): 182-189. 2018.We address the issue of whether, why and under what conditions, quarantine and isolation are morally justified, with a particular focus on measures implemented in the developing world. We argue that the benefits of quarantine and isolation justify some level of coercion or compulsion by the state, but that the state should be able to provide the strongest justification possible for implementing such measures. While a constrained form of consequentialism might provide a justification for such pub…Read more
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91Is the creation of artificial life morally significant?Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 44 (4b): 688-696. 2013.In 2010, the Venter lab announced that it had created the first bacterium with an entirely synthetic genome. This was reported to be the first instance of ‘artificial life,’ and in the ethical and policy discussions that followed it was widely assumed that the creation of artificial life is in itself morally significant. We cast doubt on this assumption. First we offer an account of the creation of artificial life that distinguishes this from the derivation of organisms from existing life and cl…Read more
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73Highlights from this issueJournal of Medical Ethics 38 (5): 257-257. 2012.Is NICE ageist? In the UK, new health technologies are assessed by the National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE). NICE determines the cost incurred for each additional quality-adjusted life-year (QALY) that the new technology provides over and above the currently standard treatment. Though there is considerable flexibility in the process, technologies which offer a cost-per-QALY of £20 000-£30 000 or less would normally be recommended for use. The thought is that, given a fixed total hea…Read more
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63Minding Rights: Mapping Ethical and Legal Foundations of ‘Neurorights’Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 32 (4): 461-481. 2023.The rise of neurotechnologies, especially in combination with artificial intelligence (AI)-based methods for brain data analytics, has given rise to concerns around the protection of mental privacy, mental integrity and cognitive liberty – often framed as “neurorights” in ethical, legal, and policy discussions. Several states are now looking at including neurorights into their constitutional legal frameworks, and international institutions and organizations, such as UNESCO and the Council of Eur…Read more
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27The Normative Evaluation of Neurointerventions in Criminal Justice: From Invasiveness to Human RightsAmerican Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 14 (1): 23-25. 2023.Medical interventions are usually categorized as “invasive” when they involve piercing the skin or inserting an object into the body. However, the findings of Bluhm and collaborators (2023) (hencef...
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33Rethinking the Right to Freedom of Thought: A Multidisciplinary AnalysisHuman Rights Law Review 22 (4): 1-14. 2022.In recent years, there has been increased academic interest in the human right to freedom of thought (RFoT). Scholars from various disciplines are currently debating the content and scope of this right. In his annual thematic report of 2021, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief paid explicit and comprehensive attention to the RFoT, encouraging further clarification of the content and scope of the right. This paper aims to contribute to this end, setting the stag…Read more
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383A Pragmatic Argument for an Acceptance-Refusal Asymmetry in Competence RequirementsJournal of Medical Ethics 48 (11): 799-800. 2022.In 2016, this Journal published an article by Rob Lawlor1 on what we might call the acceptance-refusal asymmetry in competence requirements. This is the view that there can be cases in which a patient is sufficiently competent to accept a treatment ( viz., to give consent to it), but not sufficiently competent to refuse it ( viz., to withhold consent to it). Though the main purpose of Lawlor’s paper was to distinguish this asymmetry from various other asymmetries with which it has sometimes been…Read more
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12Pragmatic argument for an acceptance-refusal asymmetry in competence requirementsJournal of Medical Ethics 48 (11): 799-800. 2022.In 2016, this Journal published an article by Rob Lawlor1 on what we might call the acceptance-refusal asymmetry in competence requirements. This is the view that there can be cases in which a patient is sufficiently competent to accept a treatment, but not sufficiently competent to refuse it. Though the main purpose of Lawlor’s paper was to distinguish this asymmetry from various other asymmetries with which it has sometimes been confused,1 Lawlor also presented a brief case in favour of it. De…Read more
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17(When) Is Adblocking Wrong?In Carissa Véliz (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Digital Ethics, Oxford University Press. 2023.In this chapter, I examine three deontological objections to adblocking: the objection from property (according to which adblocking involves accessing another’s property without satisfying the conditions placed on such access by the owner), the objection from complicity (according to which, by blocking ads, consumers become complicit in wrongdoing of adblocking software providers), and the objection from freeriding (according to which adblocking consumers free-ride on other consumers who allow a…Read more
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604The Mere Substitution Defence of Nudging Works for Neurointerventions TooJournal of Applied Philosophy 39 (3): 407-420. 2022.Journal of Applied Philosophy, EarlyView.
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47If Nudges Treat their Targets as Rational Agents, Nonconsensual Neurointerventions Can TooEthical Theory and Moral Practice 25 (2): 369-384. 2022.Andreas Schmidt and Neil Levy have recently defended nudging against the objection that nudges fail to treat nudgees as rational agents. Schmidt rejects two theses that have been taken to support the objection: that nudges harness irrational processes in the nudgee, and that they subvert the nudgee’s rationality. Levy rejects a third thesis that may support the objection: that nudges fail to give reasons. I argue that these defences can be extrapolated from nudges to some nonconsensual neurointe…Read more
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27What is Criminal Rehabilitation?Criminal Law and Philosophy 16 (1): 103-126. 2022.It is often said that the institutions of criminal justice ought or—perhaps more often—ought not to rehabilitate criminal offenders. But the term ‘criminal rehabilitation’ is often used without being explicitly defined, and in ways that are consistent with widely divergent conceptions. In this paper, we present a taxonomy that distinguishes, and explains the relationships between, different conceptions of criminal rehabilitation. Our taxonomy distinguishes conceptions of criminal rehabilitation …Read more
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40Gene Editing, Identity and BenefitPhilosophical Quarterly 72 (2): 305-325. 2022.Some suggest that gene editing human embryos to prevent genetic disorders will be in one respect morally preferable to using genetic selection for the same purpose: gene editing will benefit particular future persons, while genetic selection would merely replace them. We first construct the most plausible defence of this suggestion—the benefit argument—and defend it against a possible objection. We then advance another objection: the benefit argument succeeds only when restricted to cases in whi…Read more
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396If Nudges Treat Their Targets as Rational Agents, Nonconsensual Neurointerventions Can TooEthical Theory and Moral Practice 1 1-16. 2022.Andreas Schmidt and Neil Levy have recently defended nudging against the objection that nudges fail to treat nudgees as rational agents. Schmidt rejects two theses that have been taken to support the objection: that nudges harness irrational processes in the nudgee, and that they subvert the nudgee’s rationality. Levy rejects a third thesis that may support the objection: that nudges fail to give reasons. I argue that these defences can be extrapolated from nudges to some nonconsensual neurointe…Read more
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