•  1
    Dependent reliability: Why And How Conditional Reliability Should Be Replaced By It
    Wiley: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. forthcoming.
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.
  •  21
    Dependent Reliability: Why And How Conditional Reliability Schould Be Replaced By It
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 1-16. forthcoming.
    According to Alvin Goldman, reliabilists need to distinguish between uncondi-tionally and conditionally reliable processes. The latter category is used to account for processes such as reasoning or memory. In this paper, I will argue that Gold-man’s account of conditional reliability needs substantial revision in two respects. First, conditional reliability must be reinterpreted in terms of dependent reliability to avoid serious problems. Second, we need a more liberal account that allows depend…Read more
  •  59
    The Possibility of Epistemic Nudging
    Social Epistemology 1-11. forthcoming.
    Typically, nudging is a technique for steering the choices of people without giving reasons or using enforcement. In benevolent cases, it is used when people are insufficiently responsive to reason. The nudger triggers automatic cognitive mechanisms—sometimes even biases—in smart ways in order to push irrational people in the right direction. Interestingly, this technique can also be applied to doxastic attitudes. Someone who is doxastically unresponsive to evidence can be nudged into forming tr…Read more
  •  1
    Moral Realism and the Problem of Moral Aliens
    Logos and Episteme 11 (3): 305-321. 2020.
    In this paper, I discuss a new problem for moral realism, the problem of moral aliens. In the first section, I introduce this problem. Moral aliens are people who radically disagree with us concerning moral matters. Moral aliens are neither obviously incoherent nor do they seem to lack rational support from their own perspective. On the one hand, moral realists claim that we should stick to our guns when we encounter moral aliens. On the other hand, moral realists, in contrast to anti-realists, …Read more
  •  3
    Stellungnahmen: Zur Verbesserung des Philosophieunterrichts
    with Ralf Stoecker, Vanessa Albus, Roland W. Henke, Kirsten Meyer, and Michael Quante
    Information Philosophie 2014 (4): 42-54. 2014.
  • Anatomie der Subejktivität (edited book)
    with Catrin Misselhorn, Frank Hofmann, and Veronique Zanetti
    suhrkamp. 2005.
  •  215
    Descartes' Cogito-Argument
    In Thomas Grundmann, Catrin Misselhorn, Frank Hofmann & Veronique Zanetti (eds.), Anatomie der Subejktivität, Suhrkamp. pp. 255-276. 2005.
  •  85
    Warum ich weiß, dass ich kein Zombie bin
    In Albert Newen & Gottfried Vosgerau (eds.), Den eigenen Geist kennen, Mentis. pp. 135-149. 2005.
  •  69
  •  123
    Experts: What are they and how can laypeople identify them?
    In Jennifer Lackey & Aidan McGlynn (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology, Oxford University Press. forthcoming.
    In this chapter, I survey and assess various answers to two basic questions concerning experts: (1) What is an expert?; (2) How can laypeople identify the relevant experts? These questions are not mutually independent, since the epistemology and the metaphysics of experts should go hand in hand. On the basis of our platitudes about experts, I will argue that the prevailing accounts of experts such as truth-linked, knowledge-linked, understanding-linked or service-oriented accounts are inadequate…Read more
  •  317
    Moral Realism and the Problem of Moral Aliens
    Logos and Episteme: An International Journal of Epistemology. forthcoming.
    In this paper, I discuss a new problem for moral realism, the problem of moral aliens. In the first section, I introduce this problem. Moral aliens are people who radically disagree with us concerning moral matters. Moral aliens are neither obviously incoherent nor do they seem to lack rational support from their own perspective. On the one hand, moral realists claim that we should stick to our guns when we encounter moral aliens. On the other hand, moral realists, in contrast to anti-realists, …Read more
  •  24
    The Epistemology of Fake News (edited book)
    Oxford University Press. 2021.
  •  153
    Fake News: The Case for a Purely Consumer-Oriented Explication
    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy. forthcoming.
    Our current understanding of ‘fake news’ is not in good shape. On the one hand, this category seems to be urgently needed for an adequate understanding of the epistemology in the age of the internet. On the other hand, the term has an unstable ordinary meaning and the prevalent accounts which all relate fake news to epistemically bad attitudes of the producer lack theoretical unity, sufficient extensional adequacy, and epistemic fruitfulness. I will therefore suggest an alternative account of fa…Read more
  •  96
    Die Unhintergehbarkeit der Intuition
    Thinkling. Talking. Acting (Ed. By J. Brandl, D. Messelken, S. Wedmann). forthcoming.
    In diesem Aufsatz räume ich mit einigen tiefsitzenden Vorurteilen gegen die methodologische Rolle von Intuitionen in der Philosophie auf. Zunächst wird gezeigt, dass Intuitionen eine zentrale Rolle als epistemische Gründe in Gedankenexperimenten spielen. Aber auch völlig andere Methoden des Philosophierens (wie etwa die Transzendentalpragmatik) kommen ohne Rekurs auf Intuitionen als Gründe letztlich nicht aus. Außerdem kläre ich über die Natur von Intuitionen und deren epistemologischen Statu…Read more
  •  134
    Facing Epistemic Authorities: Where Democratic Ideals and Critical Thinking Mislead Cognition
    In Sven Bernecker, Amy Floweree & Thomas Grundmann (eds.), The Epistemology of Fake News, Oxford University Press. forthcoming.
    Disrespect for the truth, the rise of conspiracy thinking, and a pervasive distrust in experts are widespread features of the post-truth condition in current politics and public opinion. Among the many good explanations of these phenomena there is one that is only rarely discussed: that something is wrong with our deeply entrenched intellectual standards of (i) using our own critical thinking without any restriction and (ii) respecting the judgment of every rational agent as epistemically releva…Read more
  •  65
    Preface Special Issue GAP.10
    Erkenntnis 85 (3): 527-528. 2020.
    Introduction to a special issue with the keynote papers of the GAP.10 congress 2018 in Cologne.
  • Diese Analytische Einführung behandelt die wichtigsten Grundfragen und -probleme der Erkenntnistheorie und enthält eine ausführliche Darstellung von Positionen und Argumenten aus der gegenwärtigen Diskussion. Sie richtet sich an Studierende der Philosophie und anderer Fachgebiete, bietet aber auch für philosophische Kenner eine gewinnbringende kritische Orientierung. Für die zweite Auflage wurde der Text vollständig überarbeitet, um die jüngsten Entwicklungen im Themenfeld zu berücksichtigen. Am…Read more
  •  2
    Editorial
    with Thomas Spitzley and Ralf Stoecker
    Erkenntnis 71 (1): 1-1. 2009.
    The topic of this article is the dependency or, maybe, the interdependency of rationality and self-knowledge. Here two questions may be distinguished, viz. whether being rational is a necessary condition for a creature to have self-knowledge, and whether having self-knowledge is a necessary condition for a creature to be rational. After a brief explication of what I mean by self-knowledge, I deal with the first question. There I defend the Davidsonian position, according to which rationality is,…Read more
  •  6
    6. Skeptizismus
    In Analytische Einführung in Die Erkenntnistheorie, Walter De Gruyter. pp. 253-336. 2008.
  •  5
  •  79
    Standard Analytic Epistemology typically relies on conceptual analysis of folk epistemic terms such as ‘knowledge’ or ‘justification’. A cross-cultural and cross-linguistic perspective on this method leads to the worry that there might not be universally shared epistemic concepts, and that different languages might use folk notions that have different extensions. Moreover, there is no reason to believe that our epistemic common-sense terms pick out what is epistemically most significant or valua…Read more
  •  146
    Typically, expert judgments are regarded by laypeople as highly trustworthy. However, expert assertions that strike the layperson as obviously false or outrageous, seem to give one a perfect reason to dispute that this judgment manifests expertise. In this paper, I will defend four claims. First, I will deliver an argument in support of the preemption view on expert judgments according to which we should not rationally use our own domain-specific reasons in the face of expert testimony. Second, …Read more
  •  225
    Global meta-philosophical skepticism (i.e. completely unrestricted skepticism about philosophy) based upon disagreement faces the problem of self-defeat since it undercuts its motivating conciliatory principle. However, the skeptic may easily escape this threat by adopting a more modest kind of skepticism, that will be called “extensive meta-philosophical skepticism”, i.e., the view that most of our philosophical beliefs are unjustified, except our beliefs in epistemically fundamental principles…Read more