Thomas Sturm

The goal of a fifth EU freedom – the ‘freedom of knowledge’ – emerged from working towards a unified European research area, expanding upon the four basic freedoms of the Single Market. This additional freedom is not yet guaranteed and so this task should be taken up anew. Here, I support this goal by explicating the meaning of the ‘fifth freedom’, then justifying its importance via four arguments concerning scientific progress, freedom of research, the economic and technological progress of societies, and the democratic ideals of the European project. To end the main article, I then argue that this freedom should be viewed as a right. In the supplementary material, I present problems that arise in the administration, funding, and organization of science within the EU to demonstrate that the fifth freedom is still a long way from being a reality. The evidence includes cases of national rules and practices that reduce or block the mobility of EU researchers and weaken collaboration and progress. For each type of problem, I present specific policy proposals for advancing the fifth freedom goal. The proposals are directed at academic administrations, funding agencies, and political actors at the regional, national, and European levels.

Kant often uses the term ‘world’ in compound nouns such as Weltkenntnis, Weltklugheit, Weltbürger, and Weltbegriff der Philosophie, among others. These concepts present a challenge to translators, and scholars tend to interpret them in isolation, ignoring their connections. Focusing on Kant’s novel project of a pragmatic anthropology, our case study reveals the distinct roles of the concepts of Weltkenntnis, Weltklugheit, Weltmann, and Weltbürger within the whole network and shows how the network and his anthropology mutually support each other. We further show how the meaning of especially one of these concepts, Weltweisheit, goes beyond the limits of Kant’s anthropology, thus shedding new light on the boundary Kant draws between this discipline and his ethical theory.

We provide a reconstruction of Kant's empirical-pragmatic account of science, focusing on psychological, social, and historical conditions that ‘pragmatically’ promote or hinder the advancement of science. Our novel reconstruction offers a realistic portrayal of Kant's view. Part 1 claims that he presents a differentiated and dynamic account of research. Part 2 looks at psychological conditions, beginning with Kant's analysis of cognitive faculties (2.1), and the distinction between higher and lower faculties (2.2). Then, we turn to layers of scientific cognition: (2.3) observation, (2.4) imagination, (2.5) ‘methodical meditation’, and (2.6) ‘sagacity’, the talent for scientific discovery. Part 3 addresses biological, political, and historical conditions that hinder the development of science: mortality, lack of liberty, and ‘barbarism’. We explain how Kant conceptualizes science as a collective historical process promoting human flourishing (3.1). To cope with individual limits, Kant demands to divide scientific labour between (3.2) kinds of minds and (3.3) disciplines. Section (3.4) treats his views on truth and testimony as crucial for science. In our conclusion, part 4, we show how Kant thinks the history of science ought to be studied, how his pragmatic approach relates to his claims about reason's role in scientific progress, and what research questions emerge next.

This book provides the first comprehensive discussion regarding the role that Kant ascribes to systematicity in the sciences. It considers not only what Kant has to say on systematicity in general, but also how the systematicity requirement for science is specified in different fields of knowledge. The chapters are divided into three thematic sections. Part 1 is devoted to historical context. The chapters explore precursors of Kant's account of the systematicity of the sciences. Part 2 addresses the application of systematicity to the special sciences-cosmology, physics, chemistry, logic, mathematics, the life sciences and history. Finally, Part 3 explores the systematicity of philosophy. Kant and the Systematicity of the Sciences will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working on Kant and the history and philosophy of science.

Deep brain stimulation — a novel surgical procedure — is emerging as a treatment of last resort for people diagnosed with neuropsychiatric disorders such as severe obsessive-compulsive disorder. The US Food and Drug Administration granted a so-called humanitarian device exemption to allow patients to access this intervention, thereby removing the requirement for a clinical trial of the appropriate size and statistical power. Bypassing the rigors of such trials puts patients at risk, limits opportunities for scientific discovery, and gives device manufacturers unique marketing opportunities. We argue that Congress and federal regulators should revisit the humanitarian device exemption to ensure that it is not used to sidestep careful research that can offer valuable data with appropriate patient safeguards.

This book presents, for the first time in English, a comprehensive anthology of essays on Christian Wolff's psychology written by leading international scholars. Christian Wolff is one of the towering figures in 18th-century Western thought. In the last decades, the publication of Wolff's Gesammelte Werke by Jean École and collaborators has aroused new interest in his ideas, but the meaning, scope, and impact of his psychological program have remained open to close and comprehensive analysis and discussion. That is what this volume aims to do. This is the first volume in English completely devoted to Wolff's efforts to systematize empirical and rational psychology, against the background of his understanding of scientific method in metaphysics. Wolff thereby paved the way to the very idea of a scientific psychology. The book is divided into two parts. The first one covers the theoretical and historical meaning and scope of Wolff's psychology, both in its internal structure and in its relation to other parts of his philosophical system, such as logic, cosmology, aesthetics, or practical philosophy. The second part deals with the reception and impact of Wolff's psychology, starting with early reactions from his disciples and opponents, and moving on to Kant, Hegel, and Wundt. The Force of an Idea: New Essays on Christian Wolff's Psychology shows not only that Wolff's psychological ideas have been misinterpreted, but also that they are historically more significant than traditional wisdom has it. The book, therefore, will be of interest to historians and philosophers of science, historians of philosophy and psychology, as well as to philosophers and psychologists interested in understanding the roots of scientific psychology in 18th and 19th century German philosophy.

I offer an analysis of the concept of scientific innovation. When research is innovated, highly novel and useful elements of investigation begin to spread through a scientific community, resulting from a process which is neither due to blind chance nor to necessity, but to a minimal use of rationality. This, however, leads to tension between two claims: (1) scientific innovation can be explained rationally; (2) no existing account of rationality explains scientific innovation. There are good reasons to maintain (1) and (2), but it is difficult for both claims to be accepted simultaneously by a rational subject. In particular, I argue that neither standard nor bounded theories of rationality can deliver a satisfactory explanation of scientific innovations.

Kant speaks repeatedly about the relations between ends or aims and scientific research, but the topic has mostly been ignored. What is the role of ends, especially (though not exclusively) practical ones, in his views on science? I will show that while Kant leaves ample space for recognizing a function of ends both in the definition and the pursuit of inquiry, and in the further practical application of scientific cognition, he does not claim that science is simply an instrument for achieving practical ends. I explain his complex conception, pointing out that Kant argues (1) that the sciences require ends for their very definition, (2) that ends come in fundamentally different kinds, (3) that the relation between science and ends requires the rational determination and hierarchization of all our ends, with “wisdom” as the highest, and (4) that this determination and hierarchization – which ought to be done by metaphysics – has itself to be carried out in a “scientific way”. I show further that (5) Kant gives sui generis weight to the epistemic aims and standards of science and to the autonomy of science from our practical lives. This places his position between separatism and anti-separatism with regard to the relation between science and our ends or values.

Current psychology of human reasoning is divided into several different approaches. For instance, there is a major dispute over the question whether human beings are able to apply norms of the formal models of rationality such as rules of logic, or probability and decision theory, correctly. While researchers following the “heuristics and biases” approach argue that we deviate systematically from these norms, and so are perhaps deeply irrational, defenders of the “bounded rationality” approach think not only that the evidence for this conclusion is problematic but also that we should not, at least not very often, use formal norms in reasoning. I argue that while the evidence for heuristics and biases is indeed questionable, the bounded rationality approach has its limits too. Most especially, we should not infer that formal norms play no role in a comprehensive theory of rationality. Instead, formal and bounded rules of reasoning might even be connected in a more comprehensive theory of rationality.

This essay reconsiders Kant's denial of scientific status to the discipline of empirical psychology, which have often been viewed as quite problematic. In the preface to the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, Kant denies that psychology can be natural science proper. I argue that Kant's impossibility claim is based on a very specific conception of science that he did not put forward elsewhere, and that is restricted to *natural* sciences in any case. Also, Kant's critical remarks are directed merely against a particular conception of psychology, namely one going back to Baumgarten and adopted by many psychologists in the eighteenth century, according to which introspection is the sole means of gathering empirical evidence about the mind. Although this particular conception of psychology precludes it from being natural science proper, it is possible that other conceptions of psychology could allow it to be scientific. Also, for Kant the study of the mind should not be introspection-based. He himself developed a "pragmatic anthropology", which he viewed as a significant factor in our knowledge of the world

This book explores Kant's philosophy of the human sciences, their status, their relations and prospects. Contrary to widespread belief, he is not dogmatic about the question of whether these disciplines are proper sciences. Instead, this depends on whether we can rationally adjust assumptions about the methods, goals, and subject matter of these disciplines - and this has to be done alongside of ongoing research. Kant applies these ideas especially in lectures on "pragmatic antropology" given from 1772-1796. In doing so, he refines his conception of anthropology and clarifies its relation to physiology, psychology, history, and ethics. He also discusses then leading approaches in the human sciences, from Wollfian psychology over Bonnet's attempt to explain the mind in terms of the brain up to Hume's naturalism and Herder's historicism. Only against the background of these arguments can we understand and assess Kant's view of the human being as a social and rational being, capable of creating its own laws of conduct. He moreover argues that and why we can view ourselves as free agents even from an empirical point of view. This is quite a fresh perspective on the human sciences, their goals, potentials and limits - and fresh not only in the 18th century.