Tijn Smits

The inefficacy problem arises when a group of agents has a collective impact, even though no individual agent can make a significant difference. Why would I perform an action that makes no difference anyway? This chapter presents a Kantian response based on the obligatory end of beneficence. This obligatory end gives rise to the unconditional, imperfect duty to help others achieve their rationally set goals and meet their true needs. It will be argued that one must be committed to combating paradigmatic collective impact problems to qualify as having adopted the end of beneficence. This commitment entails binding oneself to the collective solution and, consequently, performing one’s fair share. Even if my actions are superfluous in solving the problem, I must act as an “ideal agent” and honor my commitment to the victims’ well-being by performing my fair share.

The debate surrounding individual climate duties is divided between collectivists and unilateralists. The fair shares argument is the most influential unilateralist position. In this paper, I demonstrate how a Kantian approach could solve three problems the fair share argument faces. Firstly, the Kantian focus on an agent’s will avoids skepticism regarding the causal connections between individual actions and climate effects. Secondly, a Kantian argument for the imperfect duty to minimally restrict our emissions to an equal share justifies egalitarian fair shares. Thirdly, a Kantian ethical approach has direct political implications, taking away concerns about a distracting focus on individual efforts.