T. J. Perkins

In this paper I introduce the thesis of cultural readiness about science found in the historical analysis of the Alvarez impact hypothesis of the end-Cretaceous mass extinction. Cultural readiness posits that in some scientific domains, there are scientifically apt questions, methodologies or theories that are only developed, considered, and adopted by a scientific community once some combination of empirical and cultural factors obtains within and without that domain. I demonstrate that 21st century philosophy of the historical sciences has been motivated by a commitment to legitimization and has prioritized epistemic ingenuity and has not addressed cultural readiness. I then argue that one vehicle for cultural readiness in the historical sciences is their use of narrative explanatory forms. Narratives offer an arena to blend cultural and empirical phenomena by their characteristic elicitation of familiarity and emotionality.

The term ‘mechanism’ is ubiquitous in biology. This has caused philosophers of biology to closely examine what mechanisms are. Many characteristics of mechanisms have been generated by philosophers calling their movement the New Mechanist Philosophy, with some proponents even going as far to say that biology is fundamentally a science of mechanisms. This means that the activity of biologists is organized around the discovery, investigation, and understanding of mechanisms and offering mechanistic explanations. But other terms are also employed by scientists, like ‘pathway.’ Carl Craver, a New Mechanist, claims that ‘mechanism’ can do the work of ‘pathway’ and equates these terms. However, this fundamentalist approach runs afoul of the messy conceptual practices that real scientists engage in. I examine a case from ecology where ecologists are engaged in conceptual practices, employing the terms ‘mechanism’ and ‘pathway’ in their explanation. What I learn from this case is that the terms are designating concepts, which are designating scientific explanations, or objects of scientific knowledge. Instead of equating these terms, I argue that for a better understanding of scientific practice, these concepts designated by terms are to be thought of as cognitive tools, aiding the scientists to achieve their aims.

The recent global pandemic has led to a shift to online conferences in philosophy. In this paper we argue that online conferences, more than a temporary replacement, should be considered a sustainable alternative to in-person conferences well into the future. We present three arguments for more online conferences, including their reduced impact on the environment, their enhanced accessibility for groups that are minorities in philosophy, and their lower financial burdens, especially important given likely future reductions in university budgets. We also present results from two surveys of participants who attended one large and three small online philosophy conferences this year. We show that participants were in general very satisfied with presentations and discussions at the conferences, and that they reported greater accessibility. This indicates that online conferences can serve as a good alternative to in-person conferences. We also find that networking was less satisfactory in online conferences, indicating a point for improvement and further research. In general, we conclude that philosophers should continue to organize online conferences after the pandemic. We also provide some advice for those wishing to organize online conferences.