Tom Bailey

Kantian legalism is now the dominant scholarly interpretation of Kant and an important approach to legal and political philosophy in its own right. One notable feature is its construal of the relationship between law and politics decisively in law’s favour: Law subordinates politics. Political judgment is constrained by and only permissibly exercised through law. This paper opposes this subordination through a close analysis of an ambiguity in Kant’s conception of sovereignty. Understanding this ambiguity requires seeing that, for Kant, law cannot subordinate the sovereign’s political judgment because it is a condition which makes a legal system possible. Kant was not an exacting legalist, but a practical reasoner struggling with the pressures politics imposes on finite beings. Through discussion of a leading contemporary approach, and close engagement with its historical source, the paper raises new considerations about the relevance of political judgment in the relationship of law and politics.

Religions have ‘returned’ to liberal democracies. Neo-Protestant movements, Islamic immigrants and a wealth of new religious groups and sensibilities confront traditional Christian and secular cultures, contributing to controversies ranging from the public acceptability of the veil and the crucifix, homosexuality and polygamy, and abortion and euthanasia to the provision of religious group rights, the social integration of immigrants, and the promotion of ‘multiculturalism’. Such controversies go to the heart of liberalism’s fundamental commitment to a politics that respects citizens’ freedom and equality, and raises questions about the nature, extent, and coherence of this respect which, although much discussed, still remain without obvious answers. The responses that philosophical liberalism offers to these questions owe much to John Rawls’ influential theory of liberal politics. Rawls’ commitments to basic freedoms of conscience and speech, to freedom from discrimination, and to open public debate reflect many liberal intuitions. But it is his liberal manner of justifying his theory that has proved most influential philosophically. In particular, his notion of citizens’ abstracting from ‘unfair’ differences by means of a ‘veil of ignorance’, proposed in A Theory of Justice, models a rationality qualified by a sense of political fairness that is to take priority over other moral goods. And his notion of a ‘reasonable pluralism’ of moral convictions among which an ‘overlapping consensus’ might be found, proposed in his later Political Liberalism, models shared terms of public reasoning in contexts of moral pluralism. These justificatory concepts have proved extremely fruitful in contemporary philosophical attempts to show how far liberal institutions and policies may respect the freedom and equality of those subject to them. Yet the papers collected in this special issue of Philosophia tend to consider Rawls-inspired liberal thought to be sorely wanting as a response to the challenges that religions now pose to liberal democracies. For these challenges place enormous strain on ‘respect’ for and among citizens which underlie such liberal thought, suggesting that it needs fundamental reformulation or rethinking. In particular, the papers suggest, they strain three distinct senses or aspects of liberal ‘respect’ – one understood in terms of justified coercion, another as tolerance of diversity, and the third in terms of freedom from interference.

Catholic politics in Italy have evolved in complex ways since the collapse of the Democrazia Cristiana party (DC) twenty years ago. The changing role of the Vatican, especially under Cardinal Camillo Ruini and now, differently, under Pope Francis, and the changing configurations of Catholic leadership have led Catholic political concerns to be articulated and pursued in novel ways; new Catholic communities and movements have recomposed the agents and aims of Catholic civil society; an enduring and increasingly plural Catholic electorate continues to be attracted by political agendas inspired by Catholic social doctrine and ethics; religious claims continue to inform electoral and parliamentary debates; and the DC past is reflected and refracted in the backgrounds of Italy’s most recent Prime Ministers, Enrico Letta and Matteo Renzi, and its new President, Sergio Mattarella. These new configurations and dynamics remain surprisingly understudied and undertheorized. Indeed, much of the empirical study of political Catholicism remains mired in debates over whether the data indicate that Italy is still a ‘Catholic’ society, in which Catholic beliefs and votes rule. These debates are dominated by the classic secularization paradigm, according to which Italy must be viewed either as a secularized (or secularizing) country or as a religious exception to the rule. Moreover, this dichotomy is echoed in the language of many Catholic elites, who have tended to either privatize their religious commitments or to campaign against the supposed ‘secular agenda’ of democratic politics. As a result, both scholars and practitioners appear to lack an articulated empirical or theoretical grasp of the evolution of contemporary Catholic politics in Italy. The contributions to this special issue move beyond the secularization paradigm to better analyze the complex forms that Catholic politics now take in Italy. They examine the continued legacy of Italy’s distinctive understanding of Church–state relations; the forms and consequences of Catholic movements’ activism; the place of the ideas and representatives of Christian democracy in the newly configured party system; and the articulation of religious claims in informal, electoral, and parliamentary politics. They thus reveal that, while ‘secular’ and ‘secularizing’ trends in Italy are significant, they have not resulted in the disappearance or exclusion of Catholicism in politics. Rather, no longer articulated by a dominant political party, the Church and Catholic movements, Catholic politicians and citizens, and Catholic political ideas have come to influence Italian political life in a variety of new and often conflicting ways. These new features of Catholic politics in Italy thus represent fertile terrain in which to study the ‘return of religion’ to global politics. To that end, the articles engage with a range of scholarly fields, including political science research on new religious actors in democratic politics and on unstable party systems and sociological research on ‘low-intensity’ religious markets and on the discursive ‘framing’ of political debates. They thus offer challenging contributions to current debates over the roles of ‘post-secular’ religious politics in contemporary democracies.

Much high-quality work has recently been done to elucidate Nietzsche's ethics. But little attention has been given to the critical relations between his ethics and the Kantian approach to ethics and politics, dominant in both his and our time. Nietzsche on Kantian Ethics examines the critical responses to Kantian senses of agency, freedom, responsibility, duty, equality, and normativity and to specific Kantian moral and political duties that can be derived from Nietzsche's work. These responses and the normative, theoretical, and methodological issues that they raise are analysed and evaluated by established scholars from both Nietzschean and Kantian perspectives. The result is a rich and extensive treatment of the critical significance of Nietzsche and Kantian ethics and politics for each other.

John Rawls's influential theory of justice and public reason has often been thought to exclude religion from politics, out of fear of its illiberal and destabilizing potentials. It has therefore been criticized by defenders of religion for marginalizing and alienating the wealth of religious sensibilities, voices, and demands now present in contemporary liberal societies. In this anthology, established scholars of Rawls and the philosophy of religion reexamine and rearticulate the central tenets of Rawls's theory to show they in fact offer sophisticated resources for accommodating and responding to religions in liberal political life. The chapters reassert the subtlety, openness, and flexibility of his sense of liberal "respect" and "consensus," revealing their inclusive implications for religious citizens. They also explore the means he proposes for accommodating nonliberal religions in liberal politics, developing his conception of "public reason" into a novel account of the possibilities for rational engagement between liberal and religious ideas. And they reevaluate Rawls's liberalism from the "transcendent" perspectives of religions themselves, critically considering its normative and political value, as well as its own "religious" character. Rawls and Religion makes a unique and important contribution to contemporary debates over liberalism and its response to the proliferation of religions in contemporary political life.

Nietzsche directs much of his critical fire at ideas of agency, and particularly at ideas of choice, freedom, responsibility, reason, consciousness, and the self. Indeed, he is often read as denying or radically revising common-sense ideas about these things – as, say, reducing choices and actions to sub-personal ‘drives’ or agents’ essential natures. In this chapter I take issue with such readings. Specifically, I argue that, while Nietzsche’s criticisms of ideas of agency impose some constraints on how to understand agency, these constraints are not as demanding, and his own conception of agency not as limited or radical, as is sometimes supposed. For his criticisms are targeted at rather strong claims about agency, and do not themselves have any especially radical premises or implications. And his own conception is relatively modest too – that is, it affirms, rather than denies, many of the commonsense possibilities that his criticisms leave open. My argument is divided into four parts. In the first part, I distinguish a basic misunderstanding of agency that Nietzsche identifies from five particular instances that he focuses on. In the second part, I consider his treatments of the basic misunderstanding and four of these instances, as these are presented in two important sections of Beyond Good and Evil. In the third part, I consider his treatment of the fifth instance, here focusing on two sections of The Gay Science. In the case of each criticism that Nietzsche makes of these ideas of agency, I show that it leaves significant common-sense possibilities open. Then, in the final part of the chapter, I turn to the positive conception of agency that Nietzsche presents in one of the sections of Beyond Good and Evil and a section of On the Genealogy of Morality. There I show how he affirms, rather than denies, the common-sense ideas about agency that his criticisms leave untouched.

In both political philosophy and political discourse, a shared habitat, origin, status, history, practice or language is often considered sufficient to constitute a ‘community’ of individuals, whose identities as its members are supposed to justify their political obligations. Such claims raise worries about the identification, authority and demands of such a ‘community’, however, and it is often considered preferable to conceive of political obligations as determined independently of individuals’ membership of such a ‘community’. Membership of a ‘community’ is then, at most, considered a secondary, contingent and even voluntary, feature of an individual’s moral circumstances. However, these conceptions raise worries of their own, notably regarding their apparent commitment to a certain moral isolation of individuals. Hence the continuing debates between ‘communitarians’ and their ‘liberal’ or ‘individualist’ opponents and the echoes of these debates in political discussions of such highly-charged issues as euthanasia and abortion, immigration and multiculturalism and the international enforcement of human rights. The purpose of this paper is to argue that an alternative conception of political ‘community’ can be found in Immanuel Kant’s and Friedrich Nietzsche’s political philosophies and that this conception is a valuable one, not least because it avoids the worries raised by the common conception and its common rejection. Notably, by revealing this novel contribution to debates over the nature of political obligations, and the political ‘autonomy’, or selfdetermination, and ‘community’ involved, the paper also suggests that, notwithstanding his general criticisms of morality and politics, philosophy and language, and his caustic treatments of Kant, Nietzsche’s political philosophy is best understood in the context of such debates, and in the context of neglected aspects of Kant’s contribution to them in particular. The structure of the paper is as follows. The paper begins with an outline of the conceptions of moral goodness upon which Kant and Nietzsche base their political philosophies and a brief consideration of the ways in which they express their conception of ‘community’ when presenting these conceptions of moral goodness. The second part of the paper then provides an account of Kant’s and Nietzsche’s more elaborate employments of this conception of ‘community’ in their political philosophies. The third, and final, part of the paper turns to the critical consideration of this conception and argues that it offers substantial advantages over the prevailing options regarding ‘community’ in political thought.

This commentary identifies three lacunae in Anne Barnhill and Matteo Bonotti’s and Josh Milburn’s theories. (1) The first regards children’s interests in healthy food and drink. These interests are neglected in Barnhill and Bonotti’s account of when policies may justifiably interfere in families and in their broader ‘public reason’ theory of policy justification. I argue that insofar as parental authority, or the ‘family’, is conditional on its serving children’s interests in healthy food and drink, families ought not to be protected against interference in support of those interests. And I argue that various kinds of children’s interests in healthy food and drink are relevant to the shared liberal values according to which policies ought to be evaluated. (2) The second lacuna regards the agency of animals. Milburn insists that animals’ wants and choices are respected in his vision of an animal-rights-respecting food system. But I argue that identifying these wants and choices is more challenging than he supposes, and that the significant limits on animals’ agency he envisions require more justification than he provides. I suggest that a more developed account of the cultivation, interpretation, and restriction of animals’ agency might begin by drawing comparisons with parents’ responsibilities for their children’s agency. (3) The third lacuna regards ‘market’ values. Neither book considers values that might serve to justify the widespread use of markets to produce and distribute food and drink, such as property rights, freedom of choice or economic welfare. I argue that these liberal values too deserve consideration in evaluating market regulations.

In this article I attempt to explain Kant’s notoriously obscure argument for the principle that every rational being should be treated as an “end,” and not merely as a means. I take my lead from the appearance in the argument of terms and ideas that he uses earlier in the Groundwork to express two distinctive features of moral value and to make a related claim about how moral value is achieved. I argue that, of the candidates for the “end” of moral action that Kant considers, only rational beings instantiate both of these features and satisfy the related claim. I also argue that these features and this claim explain why no other candidates need be considered and why moral actions must have an “end” at all. Thus I show that these features and this claim resolve the puzzles posed by Kant’s own argument and make sense of some of the remarks that he makes in it.

This book provides a rich and systematic engagement with Jürgen Habermas' political theory from critical perspectives outside its Western locus. It constructively examines the theory's implications for non-'Western' contexts ranging from Latin America and the Middle East to India and China, and for themes ranging from cosmopolitanism, democracy, and human rights to colonialism, feminism, care, modernity, and religion. The chapters added to the second edition explore Habermas' own recent response to the charge of 'provincialism'. The book will be of special interest to scholars and students of political theory, global justice, international affairs, philosophy, and critical theory, and also to those working in postcolonial studies, religious studies, sociology, and cultural studies.

This thesis examines Kant's and Nietzsche's treatments of the moral agent. It argues for three broad conclusions. Firstly, it argues that, although Nietzsche's explicit criticisms of Kant's conception of the moral agent can be understood only in the context of Nietzsche's broader moral philosophy, neither these criticisms nor their context are well understood by the prevailing literature. The thesis thus engages with existing scholarship on the nature of Nietzsche's moral philosophy and with the scanty literature on the relationship between Kant's and Nietzsche's moral philosophies. Secondly, the thesis argues that Kant's conception of the moral agent is not undermined by the criticisms which Nietzsche explicitly levels at it, or, indeed, by others which are commonly made in Nietzsche's name. In doing so, the thesis combines original interpretations of Kant with elements of recent Kant scholarship. Finally, however, the thesis argues that neglected elements of Nietzsche's own moral philosophy provide for a more sophisticated, telling, and, indeed, original critical engagement with Kant's conception of the moral agent is not undermined by the criticisms which Nietzsche explicitly levels at it, or, indeed, by others which are commonly made in Nietzsche's name. In doing so, the thesis combines original interpretations of Kant with elements of recent Kant scholarship. Finally, however, the thesis argues that neglected elements of Nietzsche's own moral philosophy provide for a more sophisticated, telling, and, indeed, original critical engagement with Kant's conception of the moral agent. Thus the thesis defends an original interpretation of Nietzsche's moral philosophy and its critical relation to Kant's, and demonstrates the pertinence of a certain neglected critical approach to Kant's conception of the moral agent. On the basis of these conclusions, the thesis ultimately defends a conception of the moral agent which, although Kantian, owes something to both Kant and Nietzsche.

This article examines Nietzsche’s engagements with Kantian idealism and Kantian ethics. From the mid-1860s to the mid-1870s, Nietzsche’s engagement with Kantian idealism combined an interest in its potential therapeutic and cultural benefits with an exploration of its theoretical difficulties. In later works, Nietzsche rejects Kantian idealism not only for the conceptual incoherence, epistemological insignificance, and suspicious psycho-physical and cultural functions of its notion of an inaccessible reality, but also for the unlicensed ontology and primitive psychology of its notions of judgement. Nietzsche also developed his own version of ‘Kantian’ ethics—that is, an ethics which, like Kant’s, affirms agency as the highest and unconditional value, while, unlike Kant’s, admitting different degrees of agency and therefore moral significance, across agents and over time.

This is the editors' preface to a special issue of Philosophia on 'Religion and Limits of Liberalism'. It begins by noting the challenges which the 'return' of religions to liberal democracies poses to the liberal commitment to respect citizens’ freedom and equality. Then, with particular reference to Rawls' theory of liberal politics, it situates the papers in relation to three different senses of liberal ‘respect’ that are challenged by contemporary religions – one understood in terms of the justification of political power, another as tolerance of diversity, and the third in terms of freedom from interference.

This article argues that in Beyond Good and Evil (BGE) Nietzsche defends “will to power” as a transcendentally ideal condition of objectivity, in the sense in which Kant considers, say, space, time, or the concepts of substance and causation to be such conditions. The article shows how Nietzsche’s engage-ment with the transcendental idealist arguments of his Kantian contemporaries leads him to reject naturalism and to adopt a peculiarly transcendental kind of skepticism, which rejects as unjustified the conditions that would make objec-tivity possible. The article then turns to the argument for “will to power” in BGE 36, showing that it is best read as defending a transcendentally ideal condition of objectivity, and thus as responding to transcendental skepticism. The article concludes by elaborating on this understanding of “will to power,” particularly in relation to the sense of causality that Nietzsche invokes and in comparison with Kant’s own transcendental claims.

In this article I critically discuss Michael Steven Green's Nietzsche and the Transcendental Tradition and R. Kevin Hill's Nietzsche's Critiques: The Kantian Foundations of his Thought. Firstly, I raise textual doubts about Hill's interpretation of the early Nietsche as a Kantian critic of Schopenhaur. Secondly, I argue that Hill fails to establish that Nietzsche's later theoretical philosophy developed through a direct engagement with Kant's. Thirdly, I raise broader criticisms of Hill's 'Kantian' approach, and argue that Green's alternative account identifies an underappreciated Kantian theme in Nietzsche's theoretical philosophy, although Green misrepresents Nietzsche's ultimate conclusions. Finally, I argue that while Hill rehearses prevailing misinterpretations of Kant's and Nietzsche's moral philosophies, Green's accoung also illuminates Nietzsche's developing criticism of Kantian notions of moral agency.In diesem Artikel werden die Bücher Michael Steven Greens Nietzsche and the Transcendental Tradition un R. Kevin Hill's Nietzsche's Critiques: The Kantian Foundations of his Thought kritisch diskutiert. Erstens bezwifle ich aus textualen Gründen, dass Hills Interpretation richtig ist, der frühe Nietzsche habe mit Kant Schopenhaur kritisiert. Zweitens, so mein Argumentation gelingt es Hill nicht nachzuweisen, dass Nietzsches spätere theoretische Philosophie direkt aus seiner Auseinandersetzung mit Kant hervorgeht. Drittens kritisiere ich den Kantischen Ansatz Hills umfassender und ziehe die alternative Deutung Greens heran, die ein wenig beachteres Kantisches Thema in Nietzsches theoretischer Philosophie ausmacht, wenngleich Green Nietzsches letze Schlussforlgerungen falsch interpretiert. Schließlich zeige ich, dass hill die vorherrschenden Missdeutungen der Moralphilosophie von Kant und Nietzsche wiederholt, während Green Nietzsches wachsende Kritik an den Kantischen Vorstellungen vom moralisch handelnden Subjekt beleuchtet.

This essay examines neglected aspects of Jürgen Habermas’s account of “translating”, or “learning”, from religions and John Rawls’s account of religious contributions to public reasoning under the “proviso” and by “conjecture”. It argues that these aspects imply that the secular grounds to which Habermas and Rawls otherwise appeal - deliberative rationality and mutual respect, respectively - have no ultimate authority over religion and, indeed, that, like religions, these grounds presuppose an unjustifiable “faith” in their own possibility. The essay also argues that Rawls pursues this postsecular “modesty” further than Habermas, insofar as, unlike Habermas, Rawls conceives of secular grounds as a contingent and dynamic achievement of citizens in elaborating their particular moral resources. It is suggested that Rawls thus expresses a novel conception of liberal politics, one that is based only on a “faith” in the possibility and value of shareable terms of political justification and is otherwise contingent in its content.