Toma Gruica

In this essay, I first analyze the extension of hermeneutical interpretation in the Heideggerian sense to products of contemporary technology which are components of our “lifeworld”. Products of technology, such as airplanes, laptops, cellular phones, washing machines, or vacuum cleaners might be compared with what Heidegger calls the “Ready-to-hand” (das Zuhandene) with regard to utilitarian objects such as a hammer, planer, needle and door handle in Being and Time. Our life with our equipment, which represents the “Ready-to-hand” in Heidegger's sense of the word, is determined by temporalization (Zeitigung) which cannot be separated and isolated from the wholeness of things in the world. In the second part of my paper, I explore the positive achievement of material hermeneutics (Don Ihde) with regard to its extension to technoscience and the discussion of how such hermeneutics can contribute to the preservation of our threatened lifeworld, but also to explore the possibilities of how technical inventions, medical innovations could improve our way of life.

This article explores what it means to position oneself existentially in relation to illness weariness in myasthenia gravis. Grounded in phenomenology and informed by autoethnographic principles, the study examines how the body’s changing disposition shapes lived meaning and coping in chronic illness. Phenomenological vignettes serve as experiential entry points, followed by reflective interpretation inspired by Havi Carel, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Drew Leder, and Kay Toombs. Two experiential themes emerge. First, When the body doesn’t always follow one’s lead anymore shows how myasthenia gravis disrupts habitual rhythm and bodily trust. Bodily hesitation and the oscillation between resistance and responsiveness give rise to illness weariness-an existential modality distinct from physical fatigue or mood. Within this terrain, uncompromisingness appears as a quiet, existential stance; a refusal to let illness fully determine the direction of one’s life, expressed through a persistent insistence on participation and dignity. Second, Physical activity and relational support as existential coping practices demonstrates how movement and relationship sustain existential positioning. Physical activity becomes an existential practice through which hope, orientation, and embodied rhythm are maintained, not by erasing illness weariness but by placing it alongside an uncompromising insistence on participation. At the same time, relational support, here exemplified by an attuned neurologist, serves as a subtle relational nudge that grounds and strengthens the will to continue. The study conceptualizes illness weariness and uncompromisingness as a continuum of existential responses shaped by bodily fluctuation and relational context. These insights extend beyond myasthenia gravis and point to the importance of existential attentiveness and relational continuity in clinical care.

Our intention is to show how Leonardo da Vinci applied the geometric method of the golden ratio, as conveyed in the work of his friend Luca Pacioli _De Divina Proportione_. It is not about the stencilled application of geometric rules, but about the artist’s creative eye, which is shaped by experience and produces beauty in the process. It is a continuation of the artistic practice of antiquity that characterised the artistic and scientific creation of the High Renaissance. This paper also explores the extent to which Leonardo’s model of science could serve us today as an orientation for redefining and transforming science from the perspective of our lifeworld. To this end, the question is raised as to whether we can approach the scientific model that Leonardo represented from the perspective of interdisciplinarity, whereby ethical reflection is integrated into the scientific discourse.

In our paper, we explore the question of what is wrong with Neurath’s “plank-by-plank” method, which Quine later also adopted with enthusiasm. Shipbuilding experts will confirm that plank-byplank replacement is only possible in the dock and never on the open sea. This is simply empty talk, flatus vocis, often attributed to philosophers. The main problem with Neurath’s ship metaphor is that it is completely alien to the seafarers’ way of life, or even in stark contradiction to it. If it is the task of philosophy to bring order into the house of concepts, the use of metaphors should also be scrutinized. Any practical test of the plank-by-plank methodology would prove unsuccessful, for as soon as one would remove a plank from the ship, the ship would sink very quickly due to the onslaught of the water. If the philosophers argue for empiricist epistemology, as Neurath and Quine do, they should not use such utopian metaphors in which the practical life world is completely ignored. When philosophers argue for an empiricist epistemology, as Neurath and Quine do, they should be more careful in their use of metaphors that exclude empiricism, practice, and the practical world of life. It is rather a vivid example of abstract armchair philosophy to explain how science works. Finally, it remains a problem to elaborate a concept of epistemology by “philosophizing” abstractly about empiricism and empiricist epistemology without referring to concrete life experiences. Neurath’s boat metaphor, praised by Quine, is, unfortunately, an example of epistemology without reference to concrete forms of life, and it is still questionable whether we can achieve anything factually with such non-functional metaphors, let alone make the process of cognition scientifically plausible. The whole thing is reminiscent of the scholastic witty remark about how someone convincingly tries to talk about swimming without jumping into the water. Every sailor knows that a ship could only be serviced and repaired in a dock. Seafaring as a way of life, all the turbulence associated with this form of life, obviously remained unknown to Neurath, who spent most of his life in a continental, mountainous country, so it is fair to say that he used a very unusual metaphor not grounded in the practice of life, which, to make the paradox even greater, is meant to represent a naturalistic-empiricist concept of knowledge.

This paper interprets the influential colony management simulator ‘Dwarf Fortress’ existentially, in terms of finitude, absurdity, and narrative. It applies Aarseth/Möring’s proposed method of game interpretation, adopting their definition of ‘cybermedia’ as a generalized game ontology, then providing a specialized ontology of ‘Dwarf Fortress’ which describes its genre and salient gameplay features, incorporating Ian Bogost’s concept of ‘procedural rhetoric’. It then gives an existentialist interpretation of ‘Dwarf Fortress’ which centres on ‘finitude’, ‘absurdity’, and ‘narrative’, showing that ‘Dwarf Fortress’ is a game about the existential tensions involved in being human. We live knowing our lives and civilizations are finite, that there are radical limits on what we can know and do. There is no meaning inherent in the world, or in history, so it is up to us to create our own, and one of our most powerful ways of doing this is narrative.