Tomasz Kubalica

The problem of social ontology in relation to the philosophy of German idealism requires a systematic settlement on the ground of this tradition, which would be also directed against the background of ‘transcendental philosophies of Kantianism’. Their doctrine of the fundamental axiotic relationship is understood as a ‘primacy of practical reason’ and ‘unity of theoretical and practical reason’. This essay analyzes how the fundamental axiotic relationship is understood in Hegel’s philosophy. On the one hand Hegel was aware of the need of overcoming the traditional opposition between theoretical and practical reason, but on the other side he included it in his work.

This article analyses Heinrich Rickert’s philosophy, focusing on the primacy of practical reason and the concept of an open philosophical system. Rickert criticizes closed philosophical systems for their rigidity and inability to adapt to changing realities. Instead, he proposes an open system characterized by flexibility, adaptability and the ability to integrate new ideas and cultural values. The primacy of practical reason is central to Rickert’s thought, which prioritizes theoretical values and links theory and practice. Rickert also emphasizes the subject’s autonomy in cognition and valuation, allowing for the formulation of a dynamic philosophical system that better responds to contemporary intellectual and cultural challenges.

This text is an introduction to the philosophy of Heinrich Rickert. The introduction has three levels: biographical, bibliographical, and doxographic. The doxography involves examining Rickert’s views in the context of the achievements of Neo-Kantianism, the Baden school and contemporary philosophy. Noras discusses the main issues Rickert treated in his philosophy, which was occupied with the theory of cognition, the methodology of the humanities and natural sciences and the philosophy of the history of philosophy.

Artykuł prezentuje wyniki analizy ilościowej i jakościowej zawiadomień o retrakcji w publikacjach z zakresu filozofii (o zasięgu globalnym) zawartych w Retraction Watch Database, z punktu widzenia zaleceń Komisji Etyki Publikacji. Pod względem ilościowym próba wynosi jedynie 0,48% rekordów w całej bazie, przez co trudno uznać ją za reprezentatywną dla dyscypliny, a tym bardziej niemożliwe jest uogólnienia wniosków na całą aktywność naukową. Statystyka wycofań publikacji może być jednak podstawą do studium przypadków. Treść zawiadomień jest często niekompletna lub niejednoznaczna. Normatywne uregulowania retrakcji publikacji w odniesieniu do przedmiotu badań należy uznać za nie w pełni adekwatne do specyfiki praktyki wydawniczej w filozofii.

The article looks at the concept of value in Heinrich Rickert?s philosophy of value and attempts a systematic study of this concept in the context of the fundamental problems in Roman Ingarden?s ontology of value. The result is a systematised presentation of Rickert?s notion of value and a series of conclusions concerning fundamental aspects of his philosophy of culture. The essential discrepancy that the comparison reveals concerns the formal character of Rickert?s philosophy of values, which implies a great deal of openness and freedom in the understanding and implementation of values. Another fundamental difference exposed by Ingarden concerns the ontological status of values.

The aim of this article is to apply Józef M. Bocheński’s logic of authority to a key interpersonal relation of philosophical interest: the master–disciple relation. The present research addresses the problem of philosophical authority in terms of the assumptions of the logic of authority and its consequences for philosophical historiographical research and verifies the claims of the logic of authority in this respect. The analyses show that, in the field of philosophy, the axiological authority of the master plays a fundamental role and is not limited solely to epistemic or deontic authority.

The article discusses the main directions of the reception of Alois Riehl’s philosophical thought in Poland in the period 1927-1950 based on the works of two representatives of that period: Jan Stepa and Władysław Tatarkiewicz. I will show that the reception of Riehl’s critical realism was determined primarily by the - variously motivated - interest in realism, which has left Riehl’s criticism on the margins of interest. The critical nature of Riehl’s realism was the reason why Riehl’s position met with rejection as being too unorthodox.

Hermann Cohen and Ernst Cassirer in the Master–Disciple Relationship of AuthorityThe aim of the paper is to analyze the relationship between the authority of the master and the disciple occurring between the two main representatives of the Neo-Kantianism of the Marburg School, Hermann Cohen and Ernst Cassirer. The analysis is based on the pragmatic-logical model of authority developed by Jozef M. Bocheński within the framework of his logic of authority in application to research on the basic relations taking place in the history of philosophy. The purpose of the analysis is to verify the hypothesis of the existence of the master– disciple authority relationship between the mentioned representatives of the school and to explain its logical consequences of the basis of historical-philosophical research of this particular philosophical formation.

The aim of the paper is to discuss primarily the epistemological theory of reflection as seen by Heinrich Rickert, the main representative of Neo-Kantianism Baden School. The most important arguments put forward by Rickert against taking the cognition as a reflection of the reality are being analysed. Rickert’s standpoint turns out to be moderate. He argues against the transcendental theory of reflection, but does not reject the idea of reflection as a model of cognition and takes the immanent theory of reflection as relatively justified. The paper contains also a discussion of the standpoint of another representative of Baden School, Emil Lask, who has rejected the theory of reflection in favour of the after-image theory.

The theme of the text is the interpretation of the philosophy of Leonard Nelson and his place in the history of philosophy. The author asks whether his philosophy should be classified as Neo-Kantianism or outside its borders? In response to this question the author has developed his own instruments. On the one hand, he tried to determine the concept of Neo-Kantianism and thus, Fries's reference to Kant; on the other hand, he applied the four-point scale for the classification of different philosophy communities and, in particular, the concept of philosophical school. In the light of these assumptions he has classified Nelson's philosophy as psychological Neo-Kantianism.

The paper is devoted to an analysis of the epistemology of Johannes Volkelt, its main arguments and the relation of Volkelt's theory of certainty to Kant and other contemporary philosophers, such as Edmund Husserl. Volkelt's problem of scepticism is closely related to the positivist principle, which aimed at limiting all knowledge to our individual sphere of representations. This principle in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason means the unknowableness of the thing in itself. Volkelt seeks for answer to the question about the trans-subjective knowledge. He finds a basis for the certainty in the dispresuppositional theory of the transsubjective minimum. The acceptance of the trans-subjective minimum determines too the possibility of metaphysics.

The critical method presented by Immanuel Kant in his three most important Critiques (Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft and Kritik der Urteilskraft) was to have become the basis of a new philosophy. The first Critique attempts to separate speculation from the contributions of pure reason to knowledge, and the other critiques show its practical and theoretical consequences. Kant’s critical philosophy was to have developed into a new philosophy but quickly became the subject of criticism. This study presents one of the first philosophical revisions of his critique in Jakob Friedrich Fries’ Neue Kritik der Vernunft and tries to compare both models of philosophical criticism. I argue that critical philosophy after Kant have begun to live its own life and manifests its own dynamics.