Victor Machado Barcellos

This paper offers a methodological critique of the material use of philosophical thought experiments and the common sense as evidence in the philosophy of consciousness. As such, I will use Farkas’ (2013) paper as a case study. I argue that these kinds of evidence, when used to support metaphysical claims about the nature of conscious states, rely on epistemically unstable judgments that lack sufficient empirical grounding. Drawing on recent findings from experimental philosophy and the social psychology, I propose a moderate restrictionist position, i.e., while not rejecting the method of cases wholesale, we ought to suspend judgment on conclusions drawn fromremote scenarios, particularly in domains where intuitive responses have proven highly variable and culturally contingent. Moreover, I introduce a distinction between objective and hypothetical common sense, arguing that Farkas's appeal to commonsense linguistic practice commits an error. The case study serves to illustrate broader concerns about the evidentiary role of a priori intuition and common sense in theorizing about consciousness. I conclude that methodological caution is warranted in the use of material thought experiments and common sense and that future work should prioritize empirically constrained approaches.

The ability to socialize in early life depends on developing commonalities with oth- ers. But what exactly constitutes the “sense of us” or the “we-perspective”? The interaction theory (IT) offers an attractive alternative to mindreading theories, such as theory-theory (TT) and simulation theory (ST), by presenting a further develop- ment of enactivism. During embodied interactions, individuals “directly” and “smartly” perceive the mental states of others. Despite the intuitive appeal of direct acquaintance with others’ mental states, IT relies on crude metaphors. We aim to retain IT’s core intuition—the embodied, embedded, enactive, and affective inter- action—within a new framework. First, we introduce Piccinini’s key notion of sit- uated neural representations, which fills the gaps that IT leaves behind. Second, we adopt Nicolelis’s concept of “brainets”. When one animal observes another’s be- havior, their brains synchronize by simulating the same means to achieve similar goals. We then interpret brainets as situated neural representations: embodied, em- bedded, enactive, and affective.

This review critically examines Frances Egan’s Deflating Mental Representation (MIT Press, 2025), a seminal work in the philosophy of mind that challenges traditional conceptions of mental representation and intentionality. Egan argues for a deflationary account wherein ascriptions of content to mental states are pragmatically grounded and serve primarily as explanatory tools, rather than reflecting substantive representational relations. The book navigates scientific, everyday, and philosophical contexts, showing how content attribution functions as a “gloss” that aids explanation without committing to metaphysical assumptions about representation. While Egan’s approach offers solutions to long-standing debates, it also faces critical tensions regarding the individuation of mental states and the role of the external environment. This review highlights both the originality and the philosophical challenges of Egan’s position, underscoring the book’s contribution to ongoing debates in cognitive science and the philosophy of mind.

This review critically examines Frances Egan’s Deflating Mental Representation (MIT Press, 2025), a seminal work in the philosophy of mind that challenges traditional conceptions of mental representation and intentionality. Egan argues for a deflationary account wherein ascriptions of content to mental states are pragmatically grounded and serve primarily as explanatory tools, rather than reflecting substantive representational relations. The book navigates scientific, everyday, and philosophical contexts, showing how content attribution functions as a “gloss” that aids explanation without committing to metaphysical assumptions about representation. While Egan’s approach offers solutions to long-standing debates, it also faces critical tensions regarding the individuation of mental states and the role of the external environment. This review highlights both the originality and the philosophical challenges of Egan’s position, underscoring the book’s contribution to ongoing debates in cognitive science and the philosophy of mind.

The ability to socialize in early life depends on developing commonalities with others. But what exactly constitutes the “sense of us” or the “we-perspective”? The interaction theory (IT) offers an attractive alternative to mindreading theories, such as theory-theory (TT) and simulation theory (ST), by presenting a further development of enactivism. During embodied interactions, individuals “directly” and “smartly” perceive the mental states of others. Despite the intuitive appeal of direct acquaintance with others’ mental states, IT relies on crude metaphors. We aim to retain IT’s core intuition—the embodied, embedded, enactive, and affective interaction—within a new framework. First, we introduce Piccinini’s key notion of situated neural representations, which fills the gaps that IT leaves behind. Second, we adopt Nicolelis’s concept of “brainets”. When one animal observes another’s behavior, their brains synchronize by simulating the same means to achieve similar goals. We then interpret brainets as situated neural representations: embodied, embedded, enactive, and affective.

One of the most challenging positions in contemporary philosophy of animal consciousness is that proposed by Peter Carruthers (2018a, 2018b, 2019, 2020). According to Carruthers, there is no fact of the matter about whether animals instantiate conscious states. This radical conclusion arises from the conjunction of two theses he endorses: the global workspace theory and the phenomenal concept strategy. This paper argues against Carruthers’ radical viewpoint. Its structure is as follows. First, I will present Carruthers’ theses on consciousness, such as the all-or-nothing characterization of consciousness and the distinction between ‘qualia realism’ and ‘qualia irrealism’. Subsequently, I will provide a brief overview of the global workspace theory and the phenomenal concept strategy. Next, I will reconstruct the arguments that underpin Carruthers’ skepticism about attributing consciousness to animals. Finally, I will present two arguments that challenge Carruthers’ position, highlighting inherent contradictions within his project. Contrary to Carruthers’ controversial assertion (2020, p. 18), I will conclude that animal consciousness deserves attention from both philosophy and the cognitive sciences.

Em contraste com a tradicional autoconsciência reflexiva na qual o sujeito se refere consciente e deliberadamente a si mesmo, a tradição fenomenológica, de Husserl a Heidegger e Sartre, postula uma forma de autoconsciência intransitiva pré-reflexiva primitiva. Infelizmente, essa autoconsciência intransitiva pré-reflexiva é sempre caracterizada negativamente: não reflexiva, não cognitiva, não transitiva, não objetiva, etc. Schear (2009, p. 14) observa que, como resultado, quando buscamos uma descrição ou caracterização positiva do suposto fenômeno, ficamos com frases ambíguas e pouco claras, como "presença sutil de fundo" (ZAHAVI, 2005, p. 124).

In this essay we will argue for the following theses: 1- know-how is not a form of practical knowledge devoid of propositional sense; 2- the relationship between each perception and the body itself is metaphysically contingent. 3- it is up to the brain to configure or to shape a physical body (Körper) into a living body (Leib) and not the other way around; 4- phenomenal externalism of enactivist nature, even in its mild form, is empirically implausible: the correlation between the conscious character of sensory experience with spatiotemporal neuronal patterns is much more systematic and regular than with anything outside the brain. But in its radical form is entirely implausible and contra-intuitive: phenomenal duplicates are not necessarily duplicates of agency; in short, 5-we are our own brain that has a body, avatars, and artifacts, properly configured and molded by the brain, and not a body that has a brain among other essential organs.

This essay aims to expose the metaphysical underpinnings of enactivism. While enactivism relies heavily on rejecting the traditional mind-body problem by excluding the familiar thought experiments that favor phenomenal dualism, the crucial point that is overlooked is instead the brain-body problem, specifically the crucial interaction between the brain and the bodily limbs in their embodied activities of perception and cognition. If enactivism is correct, differences in sensory experience necessarily entail differences in embodied activity—this is the metaphysical core of enactivism, which we think is entirely wrong. We will argue that a physical or biological body ("Körper") is configured or shaped into a perceptually living body ("Leib") by brain patterns and not by embodied activity or by the so-called sensorimotor contingencies. Undoubtedly, embodied actions influence sensory perception. However, since variations in embodied actions do not necessarily lead to variations in sensory experience, they are not metaphysically constitutive of these experiences (supervenience claim).

Os debates sobre a existência da consciência em animais não humanos vêm ganhando cada vez mais destaque nos círculos científicos e filosóficos ao redor do mundo. Um importante empecilho que a área atualmente enfrenta diz respeito à construção de um método confiável capaz de identificar se um determinado animal não humano possui estados mentais conscientes. A literatura nomeia essa questão de “o problema da mensuração da consciência animal”. A presente dissertação possui como objetivo analisar e responder esse problema através da combinação entre o uso de evidências empíricas e de ferramentas filosóficas. Dito isso, existem inúmeras formas de respondê-lo. Ao longo do texto, analisarei algumas das que são consideradas mais relevantes na discussão atual. Uma delas é a concepção cética de que não há questão de fato sobre os animais não humanos serem ou não conscientes. Em contraste, as abordagens neutras e newtonianas buscam se esquivar de compromissos metafísicos e teóricos para atribuir consciência aos animais. Ao final da dissertação defenderei a chamada “abordagem teórica leve”, posição originalmente proposta pelo filósofo Jonathan Birch. Buscarei mostrar que ela é atualmente a hipótese empiricamente mais adequada e filosoficamente plausível dentre as disponíveis na literatura.

In this essay we will argue for the following theses: 1- know-how is not a form of practical knowledge devoid of propositional sense; 2- the relationship between each perception and the body itself is metaphysically contingent (organisms and bodies can vary, as can even the spaces they occupy in the same experience vary), 3- it is up to the brain to configure or to shape a physical body (Körper) into a living body (Leib) and not the other way around; 4- phenomenal externalism of enactivist nature, even in its mild form, is empirically implausible: the correlation between the conscious character of sensory experience with spatiotemporal neuronal patterns is much more systematic and regular than with anything outside the brain. But in its radical form is entirely implausible and contra-intuitive: phenomenal duplicates are not necessarily duplicates of agency; in short, 5-we are our own brain that has a body, avatars, and artifacts, properly configured, and molded by the brain, and not a body that has a brain among other essential organs.

The goal of this paper is to assess biological naturalism in light of the adaptationist debate. Searle is famous for explicity pursuing a biological foundation for his theory of consciousness. However, evolutionary biology receives little attention in his work, which results in crucial theoretical confusions over adaptationism. In this paper, we will propose two theses concerning Searle's approach to consciousness in the context of the adaptationist debate. First, Searle's attack on adaptationism only applies to its naive version, failing to touch any of the more sophisticated versions of adaptationism, especially the empirical one. Second, despite his attack, in the end Searle embraces empirical adaptationism about consciousness. Howsoever, Searle's empirical foundation for his thesis that the evolutionary advantage of consciousness lies in a greater power of discrimination faces a serious problem of generalization regarding non-human animals.