Vincent Blok

Ten years after introducing the RRI concept, a reflection on its key ambitions seems called for, now that RRI enters the global arena. This paper focues on the key challenge that RRI is currently facing: epistemic inclusion. From the beginning, there has been the awareness that RRI must be open to multiple voices and perspectives, coming from academia, and also from society at large. Besides representing impressive bodies of knowledge, academic disciplines face knowledge gaps as well and must reach out to other knowledge forms, e.g. practical, experiential, and indigenous knowledge. This paper analyses the challenges involved in epistemic inclusion while outlining viable pathways towards addressing them, based on experiences in European projects as our ‘laboratory'. After discussing interdisciplinarity, participatory research, and epistemic pluralism, while also addressing the academic reward system. Special attention is given to indigenous knowledge as a case study for epistemic pluralism.

Many researchers experiment with participatory settings to increase public engagement in research and innovation (R&I). Because of their temporary nature, it often remains unclear how such participatory experiments can contribute to structural change. This paper empirically explores options for bridging this gap. It analyzes how participants can be supported to act as institutional entrepreneurs to actively promote public engagement in R&I. To draw lessons, we analyze empirical material gathered on nineteen Social Labs which were set up to promote the uptake of Responsible Research and Innovation in a European R&I funding program (Horizon 2020). Involvement of motivated participants, insight in their institutional context, and specific methods and management choices that enhance a sense of agency are identified as essential for organizing change. These findings and the resulting framework of interventions may prove valuable for further (action) research into the institutionalization of public engagement in R&I.

I will start my inaugural address by outlining the main argument of my lecture. First, I will identify the phenomenon that philosophers of technology research. This subject matter, in my view, consists not only of ethical issues that disruptive technologies raise but also of the disruption of the world in which we live and act by these technologies. I will illustrate this disruption by reflecting on the convergence of the physical and the virtual in the digital world, which is expected to change the way we live together. I propose that philosophers of technology should research new disruptive technologies and the digital world in which they are embedded in an integrated manner. Subsequently, I will ask how the emergence of digital technologies disrupts the world’s design in the digital age. My hypothesis is that technological innovations themselves constitute the World in a non-anthropocentric and non-determinist manner. To make my case, I will first draw attention to the difference between technology and innovation and propose a philosophy of innovation. This will enable me to consider how innovation processes have an economic, social-political and ontological impact on the world. Based on historical and contemporary examples, I will illustrate the redesign of the world in the digital age. This broader understanding of the impact of digital technologies will subsequently enable me to articulate some of the critical questions I have regarding digitalisation, and how the philosophical tradition can be made fruitful to critically reflect on the elision between the physical and the virtual in the digital age. This criticism informs my engagement with ethical questions in ethics of technology, ELSA (Ethical, Legal and Social Aspects) and Responsible Innovation. As a final step, I open a progressive perspective on the emancipatory potential of disruptive innovations to set the world free. In times of climate change, we are urgently in need of an emancipation of the World. We need to move beyond the classical opposition between technophobia and technophilia and look for innovations that can set the World free and contribute to a sustainable future. I will illustrate the emancipatory potential of disruptive technological innovations by considering the shift from human-centred technology to bio-centred technology in biomimetic design.

This paper proposes a political concept of Responsible Innovation (RI). As a first step, we diagnose the RI discourse with a conceptual ambiguity, struggling to accommodate both private and public interests. To address this ambiguity, we distinguish between weak RI, which seeks to govern a techno-economic concept of innovation; and strong RI, which seeks to conceive a political concept of innovation beyond techno-economic ideology and practice. Secondly, we consult The Human Condition, in which Hannah Arendt articulates a threefold distinction between the activities of labor, work, and action. Although Arendt does not explicitly address the topic of innovation, her equation of politics with the human capacity to “begin the unexpected” inspires a political concept of RI which fundamentally empowers the public sphere and drives radical novelty. Finally, we account for how this political concept of RI can be operationalized, advocating for its integration at both substantive and procedural level.

In an effort to produce new and more sustainable technologies, designers have turned to nature in search of inspiration and innovation. Biomimetic design (from the Greek bios, life, mimesis, imitation) is the conscious imitation of biological models to solve today's technical and ecological challenges. Nowadays numerous different approaches exist that take inspiration from nature as a model for design, such as biomimicry, biomimetics, bionics, permaculture, ecological engineering, etc. This variety of practices comes in turn with a wide range of different promises, including sustainability, increased resilience, multi-functionality, and a lower degree of risk. How are we to make sense of this heterogeneous amalgam of existing practices and technologies, and of the numerous promises attached to them? We suggest that a typology of biomimetic approaches would provide a useful hermeneutic framework to understand the different tensions that pull this variegated landscape in different directions. This is achieved through a critical analysis of the literature in different fields of biomimetic design and the philosophy of biomimicry, in order to derive conceptual and normative assumptions concerning the meaning and value of the imitation of nature. These two dimensions are then intersected to derive an analytical grid composed of six different biomimetic types, which enable the classification of existing and possible biomimetic approaches, practices, and technologies according to their specific conceptual assumptions and guiding norms.

Quadruple Helix Collaborations (QHCs) is a cooperation model in which industry, government, academia, and the public interact to innovate. This paper analyses the impact of a training intervention to provide specific knowledge, skills, and attitudes to deal with barriers commonly found in the progress of QHCs. We designed, implemented, and evaluated three training programs in Austrian, Colombian, Danish, and Spanish institutions. We analysed trainees’ (n = 66) and trainers’ (n = 9) perceptions to identify the competencies acquired with the intervention and the approach’s limitations. We used online questionnaires (35 trainees; 9 trainers), semi-structured interviews (10 trainees), and a focus group (6 trainers). Trainees answered positively regarding their self-perception about the impact of the course and highlighted the acquisition of inspiration for their practice (score 4.1 out of 5.0) and knowledge (3.7). In contrast, they perceived that a deeper interaction with other participants (2.7) was challenging. After the courses, 74% of respondents indicated that they know more about how QHCs work in practice, and 86% about collaboration or engagement methods. Moreover, participants plan to be more sensitive towards setting common goals (71%) and power imbalances (63%). Trainers’ perceptions align with those expressed by participants, except that they considered that the interaction amongst participants during the course was higher. Qualitative analysis of interviews with participants and the focus group with trainers provides more detail about the strengths and weaknesses of the intervention. Our study shows that the collaborative design and implementation of training impact the participant’s learning competencies, with potential implications in their medium- to long-term practice.

Because climate change can be seen as the blind spot of contemporary philosophy of technology, while the destructive side effects of technological progress are no longer deniable, this article reflects on the role of technologies in the constitution of the (post)Anthropocene world. Our first hypothesis is that humanity is not the primary agent involved in world-production, but concrete technologies. Our second hypothesis is that technological inventions at an ontic level have an ontological impact and constitutes world. As we object to classical philosophers of technology like Ihde and Heidegger, we will sketch the progressive contribution of our conceptuality to understand the role of technology in the Anthropocene world. Our third hypothesis is that technology has emancipatory potential and in this respect, can inaugurate a post-Anthropocene World. We consider these three hypotheses to develop a philosophical account of the ontology of technology beyond an abstract and deterministic understanding. This concept enables us to philosophically reflect on the role of technology in the Anthropocene World in general, and its contribution to the transition to the post-Anthropocene World in particular.

One of the pressing issues in philosophy of technology is the role of human creativity in human-technology relations. We first observe that a techno-centric orientation of philosophy of technology leaves open the role and contribution of human creativity in technological evolution, while an anthropocentric orientation leaves open the role of the technical milieu in technological evolution. Subsequently, we develop a concept of creation as deviation and responsiveness in response to affordances in the environment, inspired by the affordance theory by James Gibson. With this concept of creation as deviative responsiveness, we articulate the human contribution to human-technology creation, namely, our intentional deviation of the inhibiting forces of the currently dominant niche or meaningful world of human-technology relations, in order to become responsive to new affordances in human-technology creation that constitute a new niche or world of human-technology relations.

Innovation leads to new products, business models and even changes to socio-economic systems. However, it is important that innovation has the ‘right impacts’. Responsible innovation can help to achieve this; however, it is unclear how to introduce responsible innovation to real-world, competitive, industry settings. We explore this challenge in the context of sustainability orientated start-up enterprises, developing innovations within agriculture, food or energy. We develop a tool that provides innovators with a systematic way to identify socio-ethical issues. Using the concept of experiential learning, we track the impact of the tool across 12 cases. For the tool to install responsible innovation, we propose that a full learning cycle must be completed. We find evidence that the tool can enable a full learning cycle and provide a method to identify socio-ethical factors. We contribute by articulating and operationalising an approach to introduce responsible innovation principles into real-world contexts.

The Anthropocene overthrows classical dichotomies like technology and nature and a new class of beings emerges: hybrids. The transitive status of hybrids - which establishes an extra, separate, 'third' ontological category, going beyond the dichotomy between nature and technology - constitutes a significant problem for environmental philosophy and philosophy of technology since they traditionally focus on either 'nature' (natural entities) or 'artefacts' (technological objects). In order to reflect on the ethical significance of hybrids, a classification of different types of hybrids is required. Such a classification is provided by this article, based on insights from both environmental philosophy and philosophy of technology. After explaining why a new class of beings emerges in the Anthropocene, and reflecting on the one-sidedness of philosophy of technology and environmental philosophy in their focus on either technology or nature, we propose a new classification of hybrids in this article that provides a new starting point for reflections on the moral significance of hybrids in environmental philosophy and philosophy of technology.

In this chapter, we will first argue that current practices in CBE are framed within the market or economic logic and miss the normative dimension of the call for circularity. The transition to the CBE requires a fundamental reflection on the role of economic actors in the social and ecological environment with significant consequences for their business practices. Second, we will argue that the transition to the CBE requires the acknowledgement of the normative and social dimensions of this transition at the meso and macro levels, and the establishment of an environmental and social logic on the micro level of business practices. Third, we will argue that the concept of responsible innovation (RI) can help to articulate the normative and social dimensions of the transition to the CBE, and enables the operationalisation of the environmental and social logic at the micro level. In this respect, RI can be understood as a driver for the transition to the CBE.

In this essay, we consider the philosophical method of reading and writing, of communication. Normally, we interpret the works of the great philosophers and explain them in papers and presentations. The thinking of Martin Heidegger has given us an indication of an entirely different method of philosophical thinking. In the 1930s, he gave a series of lectures on Nietzsche. In them, he calls his own way of reading and writing a confrontation (Auseinandersetzung) with Nietzsche. We consider the specific character of confrontation, and in what ways it is different from communication. First, we develop an answer to the question of how Heidegger reads Nietzsche. Does he give a charitable or a violent interpretation of Nietzsche and, if neither, how can his confrontation with Nietzsche be characterized? With this, we obtain an indication of the way we have to read Heidegger, indeed, of philosophical reading and writing as such.

During the second half of the twentieth century, several philosophers of technology argued that their predecessors had reflected too abstractly and pessimistically on technology. In the view of these critics, one should study technologies empirically in order to fully understand them. They developed several strategies to empirically inform the philosophy of technology and called their new approach the empirical turn. However, they provide insufficient indications of what exactly is meant by empirical study in their work. This leads to the critical question of what counts as an empirically informed philosophy of technology in the empirical turn. In order to answer this question, we first elaborate on the problems that the empirical turn philosophers tried to address; secondly, we sketch their solutions, and, thirdly, we critically discuss their conceptions of empirical study. Our critical analysis of the empirical turn contributes to new efforts to engage in an empirically informed philosophy of technology.

Ethical, Legal and Social Aspects (ELSA) originated in the 4thEuropean Research Framework Programme (1994) andresponsible research and innovation (RRI) from the EC researchagenda in 2010. ELSA has received renewed attention inEuropean funding schemes and research. This raises the questionof how these two approaches to social responsibility relate toone another and if there is the possibility to align. There is aneed to evaluate the relationship/overlap between ELSA and RRIbecause there is a possibility that new ELSA research will reinventthe wheel if it does not engage with the body of literaturealready present in RRI research. This provides unneeded extrabureaucracy, reformulations of research agendas, extrainvestment, and an overabundance of frameworks to implement,and ELSA research does not take advantage of the body ofresearch developed in RRI. This paper evaluates how ELSA andRRI diverge, are complementary, and can be aligned.

After a period in which Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) stood as a cross-cutting issue under the Eigth European Union Framework Programme for Research and Innovation (R & I), Horizon 2020, its further development and implementation has reached a crossroad. It turned out that there is a lack of consistent integration of RRI in Europe’s R & I practices (Novitzky et al. 2020), and dedicated funding for RRI is almost entirely absent in the Ninth European Union Framework Programme for R & I, Horizon Europe. At the same time, global challenges like climate change become increasingly more urgent and thus continue to call for collective efforts of scientific research and industry, policy makers and civil society. Further, the emergence of disruptive technologies like synthetic biology, artificial intelligence and robotics raises several new societal concerns. Finally, the growing disbelief in science, as shown during the Corona pandemic, demonstrates the importance of aligning R & I policy and societal values all the more. For reasons as these, the disinvestment in a dedicated Science With and For Society programme line for RRI in Horizon Europe did not result in decreased academic attention for embedding science in society. On the contrary, a dedicated research community emerged that engages in the academic discourse of RRI and tries to contribute to projects on topics such as responsible data governance, responsible AI, and responsible agroecology within the Horizon Europe framework programme, sometimes even without the use of the frame RRI.

In this concluding chapter, we want to take a broader perspective and, based on the contributions to this book, identify the key lessons from the NewHoRRIzon project about RRI implementation in general and via Social Labs in particular. From a bird’s eye perspective, the NewHoRRIzon Social Labs can be seen as interventions that depend on and are affected by several interrelated levels which might be separated roughly in the micro-level of Social Labs, the meso level of organisations, and the macro-level of national and European research and innovation systems and policy making.

In this paper, we carry out a critical analysis of the concept of technology in the current design of the bio-based economy (BBE). Looking at the current status of the BBE, we observe a dominant focus on technological innovation as the principal solution to climatic instability. We take a critical stance towards this “ecomodernist” worldview, addressing its fundamental assumptions, and offer an underarticulated explanation as to why a successful transition toward a sustainable BBE—i.e. one that fully operates within the Earth’s carrying capacity—has not yet been reached. Bernard Stiegler has developed a philosophical perspective on the concept of economy, broadening it to include the human condition through the notion of desire. This theory can help to obtain a more profound understanding of why ecomodernist strategies are dominant today. Stiegler’s theory of the libidinal economy offers an analysis of controlled and exploited human desire as a primary driver behind modern techno-economic structures. Our hypothesis is that a critique of contemporary technofixism _as_ a critique of libidinal economy is a necessary step to take in the discussion around the BBE as a concept, if the BBE is ever to bring about a system that can truly operate within the Earth’s carrying capacity.

In this article, we investigate how to explain the difference between traditional design, engineering, and technology—which have exploited nature and put increasing pressure on Earth’s carrying capacity since the industrial revolution—and biomimetic design—which claims to explore nature’s sustainable solutions and promises to be regenerative by design. We reflect on the concept of mimesis. Mimesis assumes a continuity between the natural environment as a regenerative model and measure for sustainable design that is imitated and reproduced in biomimetic design, engineering, and technology. We conceptualize mimesis in terms of two interdependent boundary conditions: differentiation and participation. We subsequently develop four characteristics of biomimicry as regenerative design, engineering, and technology: technological mimesis is 1) a participative differentiation of nature; 2) supplemental to natural mimesis in biomimetic design; 3) the participative differentiation of technological mimesis is constitutive of nature; 4) the participative differentiation of technological mimesis is always limited.

This contribution considers the world-historical significance of climate change. Climate change unmasks the stability of the living and acting in the world of human and nonhuman existence and confronts it with its living and acting on Earth, shifts the attention from World to Earth, and raises the question about the place of human and nonhuman existence on Earth. To answer this question, this chapter moves beyond humanist and post-humanist positions and argues for earth and world interest in times of climate change. First, an ontological concept of World is rehabilitated, which enables to distinguish between the Holocene World and the Anthropocene World. As climate change also confronts with Earth as exterior milieu beyond the interior milieu of the Anthropocene World, the chapter subsequently criticizes the self-interest of philosophers of the twentieth century and argues for world interest in times of climate change. It is argued that world interest should not lead to world production, whether it is found in a productive act by the Earth or by humanity, as world production is accompanied by Earth alienation. A gestalt-based understanding of the givenness of Earth as noncausal ontic-ontological ground of the givenness of World is developed. The conceptualization of World and Earth in this chapter helps to differentiate between the often ambiguous uses of these concepts in environmental philosophy and contributes to contemporary debates in philosophy of climate change.

Responsible innovation (RI), also termed Responsible Research and Innovation, has emerged due to increasing concern over how to integrate ethical and societal values into research and innovation policy and governance (Von Schomberg 2013), in response to questioning of the societal role of science as well as populist resurgence in some countries (Long and Blok 2017a). Within a RI approach, innovators must consider three dimensions of responsibility, including the dimensions of (1) ‘avoiding harm’ to people and the planet, (2) ‘doing good’ through the offering of innovations that foster sustainable development, and (3) the development of facilitative global governance schemes (Voegtlin and Scherer 2017).

This Open Access book builds on the experiences of one of the largest European projects in the domain of responsible Research and Innovation: NewHoRRIzon. It highlights the potential of and opportunity in responsible R&I to conduct innovation in a socially responsible way. Employing the methodology of Social Labs, the book analyses responsible R&I from an experience-based viewpoint and further explores the application of responsible R&I beyond scholarly and industrial interests. The contributors analyze the current European R&I landscape, provide reflection and reconceptualization of its core concepts, and project future challenges in relation to responsible R&I. The book complements the readers' line of work by providing insights on how responsible R&I can be applied by the audience, for example, in their decision-making processes.

Responsible innovation is centered around the ideal that societal stakeholders are entitled to participate in scientific and technological decision-making by voicing their needs and worries. Individuals who believe in science conspiracies (referred to here as ‘science conspiracists’) pose a challenge to implementing this ideal because it is not clear under what conditions their inclusion in responsible innovation exercises is possible and advisable. Yet precisely because of this uncertain status, science conspiracists constitute an instructive case in point to travel towards the edges of inclusion and understand how we draw the line between ‘includables' and ‘unincludables’. In this paper, we seek to explore this relationship between responsible innovation and science conspiracism by using the method of thought experimentaiton. We test four possible exclusion criteria for science conspiracists. We conclude by revisiting the relationship between conspiracism and responsible innovation and sketching a novel perspective on the ideal of stakeholder inclusion.

How does the Social Lab methodology support participatory research? This paper provides an evidence-based analysis of experiences of 19 implemented Social Labs applying experiential learning cycles on the question of how to induce Responsible Research and Innovation in the Horizon2020 research funding scheme of the European Commission and beyond. It looks at the potentials of Social Labs to allow participation in research and innovation addressing societal challenges and contrasts empirical results with the theoretical conceptualisation of a scientific Social Lab methodology. It discusses drivers and barriers of engagement, and provides evidence for the impacts of experimental engagement on participation in the context of the labs, substantiated by concrete examples from some of these labs.

The inclusion of stakeholders in science is one of the core ideas in the field of responsible innovation. Conspiracists, however, are not your garden-variety stakeholders. As the COVID-19 pandemic has shown, the conflict between conspiracists and science is deep and intractable. In this paper, we ask how the game of responsible innovation can be played with those who believe that the game is rigged. Understanding the relationship between conspiracism and responsible innovation is necessary in order to understand the unvisited corners of the science-society interface in the post-pandemic future. We claim that pluralism, already part of the philosophical background that spurred responsible innovation, can offer insights into how conspiracism can be approached. As a case in point, we develop these insights starting from the policy on conspiracism developed in 2021 by the European Commission. We show that the ideal of inclusion can only be extended to conspiracists by accepting a pluralist framework, and we explain this pluralist response.

Grasping the identity of hybrids, that is beings which cross the binarism of nature and technology (e.g. genetically-modified organisms (GMOs), syn-bio inventions, biomimetic projects), is problematic since it is still guided by self-evident dualistic categories, either as artefacts or as natural entities. To move beyond the limitations of such a one-sided understanding of hybrids, we suggest turning towards the categories of affordances and the juxtaposition of needs and patterns of proper use, as inspired by the Heideggerian version of phenomenology. Drawing upon selected concepts by Heidegger, we argue that hybrids can be conceptualised as a regenerative design and use to serve the planet. We argue that the ideal type of non-exploitative account of hybrids consists of the adaptive approach to the environment, which does not, however, exclude the possibility of designing and constructing new beings. We also point out that hybrids undermine the divide of being destructive/regenerative which marks the boundaries of nature and technology.

This report analyses the relationship between RRI-like practices and competitive advantage. RRI frameworks have traditionally been less oriented towards their application in competitive environments; hence resulting in limitations to the applicability of some of its main tenets in industry and in the context of the development of a national competitive advantage. Aiming to close this gap and identify how a competitive advantage based on engagement in RRI-like practices across world regions may be developed, a systematic literature review, a survey and case studies were carried out. Five main drivers of competitive advantage through RRI-like practices were identified: avoiding uncompetitive regulation, increasing social acceptance, incorporating stakeholder needs and tapping into new markets, increasing the efficiency of the innovation process, and reputational effects. On the other hand, four barriers were identified: obstacles during the research and innovation process, protecting intellectual property, lack of consumer awareness, and barriers derived from the institutional environment. The survey revealed that, while there are some differences in terms of attitudes and engagement in RRI-like practices across regions, both procedural and outcome dimensions were relevant. However, the application of particular practices in exercising such dimensions showed more variations across regions, reflecting adaption to local environments. In relation to competitive advantage, outcome dimensions and open and transparent innovation processes showed a clear relationship with performance, in particular with customer performance. The reason for this might lie in the increased visibility of such practices to the consumer. Two cases studies were carried out focusing on the management of socio-ethical concerns through RRI-like practices and their relationship with competitive advantage. The case on the bio-economy domain, identified different responses depending on local regulations and the focus placed on the development of competitive advantages at the micro and macro levels, and showcased the importance of domain specific considerations in RRI-like responses. The ICT case highlighted the importance of network approaches and second-order reflexivity, and the need to adapt RRI-like practices to local contexts to maximise their benefits for competitive advantage. Lastly, the analysis of the two cases concentrating on transversal issues made notable how strategic approaches to RRI and their proper integration in strategy showed an improved relation with competitive advantage. This study makes a significant contribution to existing research on RRI-like practices and competitive advantage and adds to the literature on business involvement in RRI that has been flourishing despite the tradition of overlooking RRI by actors in competitive environments. Moreover, it provides a set of practical recommendations for industry, policymakers, research performing organizations, research funding organizations, investors, civil society and NGOs and association bodies. These recommendations are oriented towards developing and sustaining a competitive advantage based on RRI-like practices by research and innovation actors, while supported by other stakeholders in the system. The advice is informed by the research study and proposes the need to tailor and adopt bottom-up approaches in the implementation of RRI-practices, integrating RRI-like logics and competitive advantage logics into organizational dynamic, and the need for collaboration among different actors, apart from recommendations particular to each stakeholder.

One of the pressing issues in philosophy of technology is the role of human creativity in human-technology relations. We first observe that a techno-centric orientation of philosophy of technology leaves open the role and contribution of human creativity in technological evolution, while an anthropocentric orientation leaves open the role of the technical milieu in technological evolution. Subsequently, we develop a concept of creation as deviation and responsiveness in response to affordances in the environment, inspired by the affordance theory by James Gibson. With this concept of creation as deviative responsiveness, we articulate the human contribution to human-technology creation, namely, our intentional deviation of the inhibiting forces of the currently dominant niche or meaningful world of human-technology relations, in order to become responsive to new affordances in human-technology creation that constitute a new niche or world of human-technology relations.