Vuko Andrić

Dieser Beitrag behandelt das Verhältnis von Utilitarismus und Sozialismus. Die ersten beiden Abschnitte leiten allgemein in das Thema ein und stellen dar, was unter „Sozialismus“ und was unter „Kapitalismus“ verstanden wird und welche Haupttypen von Sozialismus unterschieden werden. Der dritte Abschnitt zeichnet anhand ausgewählter Stationen die Ideengeschichte des Verhältnisses zwischen Utilitarismus und Sozialismus nach. In den Abschnitten vier bis sechs wird ausgeführt, inwieweit zeitgenössische Argumente für den Sozialismus mit dem Utilitarismus vereinbar sind. Die untersuchten pro-sozialistischen Argumente sind bezogen auf Freiheit, Demokratie und Gleichheit. Eine Zusammenfassung folgt im siebten Abschnitt.

The argument from queerness is one of the most important arguments for moral error theory. Moral error theory holds that moral discourse is hopelessly flawed or, more precisely, that all moral judgements are false. The argument from queerness, in the version I am concerned with, claims that moral discourse is centrally committed to the thesis that moral facts entail categorical reasons, understood as irreducibly normative favouring relations, and that if this thesis were true, moral facts would be queer. In this paper, I argue that axiology does not fall prey to the argument from queerness. Axiology is the part of moral discourse that examines which things are good, which things are bad, and what makes good things good and bad things bad. I argue that axiology survives the argument from queerness for three reasons. First, many axiological judgements are not committed to the thesis in question. Second, some judgements about moral value are committed to the thesis but do not belong to axiology. Third, some axiological judgements are committed to the thesis but can simply be removed from axiological discourse.

Der objektive Konsequentialismus besagt, dass es von den tatsächlichen Handlungsfolgen abhängt, ob eine Handlung richtig oder falsch ist. Im Gegensatz dazu hängen die Richtigkeit bzw. Falschheit von Handlungen laut dem subjektiven Konsequentialismus von den vernünftigerweise erwartbaren Handlungsfolgen ab. Die Debatte über objektiven und subjektiven Konsequentialismus – welche dieser beiden Theorien ist besser? – behandelt Argumente, die mit grundlegenden Themen der normativen Ethik und Metaethik zusammenhängen: dem handlungsleitenden Charakter von Moraltheorien, der Unterscheidung zwischen Richtigkeitskriterium und Entscheidungsprozedur, dem „Sollen impliziert Können“ Prinzip und Fall-bezogenen Intuitionen über die Perspektiven-Abhängigkeit moralischer Pflichten.

Wozu ein deutschsprachiges Handbuch zum Utilitarismus? Eine kurze Antwort: Die Studierenden bevorzugen deutschsprachige Texte, wie lange Universitätserfahrung lehrt. Also gerät jede Theorie ins Hintertreffen, bei der das Studienmaterial nicht auf Deutsch verfügbar ist. Eine ausführlichere Antwort: Deutschland gilt als Nation, die ethisch durch Immanuel Kant geprägt ist und die eine „natürliche Feindschaft“ zum Utilitarismus aufgebaut hat. Diese Feindschaft wurde zuletzt in der „Singer-Affäre“ in den 1990er-Jahren des letzten Jahrhunderts offensichtlich, als Peter Singer am Reden in Deutschland gehindert wurde, weil er tabulos utilitaristisches Denken an den Tag legte. Allerdings ist dieses traditionelle Rollenverständnis nicht das Selbstverständnis vieler junger Philosophen und Philosophinnen. Sie denken unvoreingenommen über die Probleme nach, wobei sich eben häufig utilitaristisches Gedankengut aufdrängt. Das dokumentieren wir, indem wir gerade viele Nachwuchsautoren an diesem Sammelband teilhaben lassen.

Beim skalaren Konsequentialismus handelt es sich um eine Alternative zum maximierenden Konsequentialismus des klassischen Utilitarismus. Der skalare Konsequentialismus besagt, dass alle normativen (deontischen wie auch evaluativen) Eigenschaften von Handlungen graduell sind und die Beurteilung der Handlungskonsequenzen reflektiven. So wären Handlungen im skalaren Konsequentialismus etwa nicht als schlechterdings verboten zu beurteilen, sondern als schlechter im Vergleich zu ihren Alternativen. Eines der Argumente für den skalaren Konsequentialismus stellt darauf ab, dass Konsequenzen im Utilitarismus graduell bewertet werden; warum dann nicht auch Handlungen? Die Kritik am skalaren Konsequentialismus beschränkt sich nicht auf die Entkräftung solcher Argumente. Weitergehende Kritiken versuchen zu zeigen, dass der skalare Konsequentialismus grundsätzlich scheitert, weil es ein Desideratum für Moraltheorien sei, dass sie binäre Urteile über Handlungen (erlaubt/verboten) implizieren.

The boundary problem in normative democratic theory is the problem of who should be entitled to participate in which democratic decision-making. The boundary problem is at the heart of many pressing political issues, including voting rights of resident aliens in their host countries and of expats in their home countries, the legitimacy of border regimes, the justifiability of global democracy, and the democratic representation of future generations. The two most popular answers to the boundary problem are the all-affected interests principle and the all-subjected principle. According to the all-affected interests principle, all (and only) persons whose interests are affected by a democratic decision should be entitled to participate in making that decision. According to the all-subjected principle, all (and only) persons who are subject to a democratic decision should be entitled to participate in making that decision, where being subject is spelled out either in terms of being legally bound or in terms of being exposed to coercion. A well-known challenge for the proposed solutions to the boundary problem is posed by tourists. Tourists seem to be affected in their interests and subject in the relevant sense by democratic decisions in their host countries. But we would not normally consider tourists entitled to participate in the making of such decisions. In this paper, I examine the most natural responses to the challenge of tourists and argue that both the all-affected interests principle and the all-subjected principle are on the horns of a dilemma. The dilemma arises because responses that yield intuitively plausible verdicts about tourists on the other hand commit their advocates to implausible verdicts about dying citizens.

This paper shows that versions of prioritarianism that focus at least partially on well-being levels at certain times conflict with conventional views of prudential value and prudential rationality. So-called timeslice prioritarianism, and pluralist views that ascribe importance to timeslices, hold that a benefit matters more, the worse off the beneficiary is at the time of receiving it. We show that views that evaluate outcomes in accordance with this idea entail that an agent who delays gratification makes an outcome worse, even if it is better for the agent and worse for no one else. We take this to show that timeslice prioritarianism and some pluralist views violate Weak Pareto, and we argue that these versions of prioritarianism are implausible.

This book develops an original version of act-consequentialism. It argues that act-consequentialists should adopt a subjective criterion of rightness. The book develops new arguments which strongly suggest that, according to the best version of act-consequentialism, the rightness of actions depends on expected rather than actual value. Its findings go beyond the debate about consequentialism and touch on important debates in normative ethics and metaethics. The distinction between criterion of rightness and decision procedures addresses how, why, and in which sense moral theories must be implemented by ordinary persons. The discussion of the rationales of "ought" implies "can" leads to the discovery of a hitherto overlooked moral principle, "ought" implies "evidence", which can be used to show that most prominent moral theories are false. Finally, in the context of discussing cases that are supposed to reveal intuitions that favour either objective or subjective consequentialism, the book argues that which cases are relevant for the discussion of objectivism and subjectivism depends on the type of moral theory we are concerned with (consequentialism, Kantianism, virtue ethics, etc.). From Value to Rightness will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in normative ethics and metaethics.

This paper critiques the All-Subjected Principle. The All-Subjected Principle is one of the most prominent answers to the Boundary Problem, which consists in determining who should be entitled to participate in which democratic decision. The All-Subjected Principle comes in many versions, but the general idea is that all people who are subjected in a relevant sense with regard to a democratic decision should be entitled to participate in that decision. One respect in which versions of the All-Subjected Principle differ concerns how to best understand ‘subjectedness’. One view spells out ‘subjectedness’ in terms of legal bindingness. Another view understands ‘subjectedness’ in terms of coercion. I argue that the All-Subjected Principle is extensionally inadequate on both views in that it yields verdicts that are at odds with our considered judgements about certain cases. These cases involve legal norms of referral or international administrative assistance.

In his recent book, The Dimensions of Consequentialism, Martin Peterson puts forward a new version of consequentialism that he dubs ‘multidimensional consequentialism’. The defining thesis of the new theory is that there are irreducible moral aspects that jointly determine the deontic status of an act. In defending his particular version of multidimensional consequentialism, Peterson advocates the thesis—he calls it DEGREE—that if two or more moral aspects clash, the act under consideration is right to some non-extreme degree. This goes against the orthodoxy according to which—Peterson calls this RESOLUTION—each act is always either entirely right or entirely wrong. The argument against RESOLUTION appeals to the existence of so-called deontic leaps: the idea is that endorsing RESOLUTION would not give each relevant moral aspect its due in the final analysis. Our paper argues that, contrary to Peterson, all moral aspects remain visible in what can properly be called the final analysis of a moral theory that involves RESOLUTION, moral aspects do not have to remain visible in judgements of all-things-considered rightness or wrongness, respectively, introduction of what Peterson calls verdictive reasons does not change the overall picture in favour of DEGREE. We conclude that multi-dimensional consequentialists should accept RESOLUTION rather than DEGREE.

God is thought to be eternal. Does this mean that he is timeless? Or is he, rather, omnitemporal? In this paper we want to show that God cannot be omnitemporal. Our starting point, which we take from Bernard Williams’ article on the Makropulos Case, is the intuition that it is inappropriate for persons not to become bored after a sufficiently long sequence of time has passed. If God were omnitemporal, he would suffer from boredom. But God is the greatest possible being and therefore cannot be bored. God, hence, is not omnitemporal. After the presentation of our argument, we address several objections by examining possible differences between human and divine persons.

This paper examines the impact of disability on wellbeing and presents arguments against the mere-difference view of disability. According to the mere-difference view, disability does not by itself make disabled people worse off on balance. Rather, if disability has a negative impact on wellbeing overall, this is only so because society is not treating disabled people the way it ought to treat them. In objection to the mere-difference view, it has been argued, roughly, that the view licenses the permissibility of causing disability and the impermissibility of causing nondisability. In her recent article, “Valuing Disability, Causing Disability,” Elizabeth Barnes attempts to show that this causation-based objection does not succeed. We disagree and argue why. We begin by explaining that in order to defeat the causation-based objection it does not suffice to show that it is not always true that the mere-difference view licenses causing disability. Rather, license in some cases, in a way that undermines the plausibility of the mere-difference view, would be sufficient for the causation-based objection to succeed. Then our discussion turns to an important challenge for proponents of the causation-based objection: Some defenders of the mere-difference view are prepared to simply accept the counterintuitive implications of their position. A dialogue with such proponents of the mere-difference view requires arguments with independent traction. We present several such arguments to the effect that the mere-difference view needs to be significantly reduced in scope—and may turn out to be false altogether.

In this article, I critique the moral theory developed in Philip Pettit's The Robust Demands of the Good: Ethics with Attachment, Virtue, and Respect. Pettit's theory, which I label Robust-Goods Consequentialism, aims to avoid the problems but retain the attractive features of traditional consequentialist theories. The distinctive feature of Robust-Goods Consequentialism is a value theory that attempts to accommodate what Pettit calls rich goods: certain moral phenomena that can be categorized under the headings of attachment, virtue and respect. I argue that Robust-Goods Consequentialism fails because it implies very implausible value judgements.

Hedonism claims that all and only pleasure is intrinsically good. One worry about Hedonism focuses on the “only” part: Are there not things other than pleasure, such as personal projects and relationships, that are intrinsically good? If so, it can be objected that Hedonism is incomplete. In this paper, I defend Hedonism against this objection by arguing for a distinction between goodness and desirability that understands “desirability” as a deontic concept, in terms of “reason to desire”, but goodness as an evaluative concept. Based on this distinction, I attempt to show that Hedonists should accept that things other than pleasure, such as personal projects and relationships, are desirable for their own sakes but deny that these things are intrinsically good.

In his new book, The Dimensions of Consequentialism, Martin Peterson proposes a version of multi-dimensional consequentialism according to which risk is one among several dimensions. We argue that Peterson’s treatment of risk is unsatisfactory. More precisely, we want to show that all problems of one-dimensional (objective or subjective) consequentialism are also problems for Peterson’s proposal, although it may fall prey to them less often. In ending our paper, we address the objection that our discussion overlooks the fact that Peterson’s proposal is not the best version of multi-dimensional consequentialism. Our reply is that the possibilities of improving multi-dimensional consequentialism are very limited as far as risk is concerned.

In this paper, I critique one way of arguing for global democracy on grounds of affected interests and defend another. A famous argument for global democracy, which I call the Demos-Based Argument, attempts to justify global democracy based on the claim that affected interests vindicate individual claims to democratic participation or representation. I analyze and evaluate the Demos-Based Argument and consider different ways of interpreting and justifying its crucial premise: the Principle of Affected Interests. The result is that the argument fails. One lesson of the discussion of the Demos-Based Argument is that the most promising, though eventually unsuccessful, justification of the Principle of Affected Interests is utilitarian. Given the failure of the Demos-Based Argument, the question suggests itself if there is another way to argue for global democracy on utilitarian grounds. I will outline a promising alternative argument for global democracy, which I call the Direct Argument. Like the De...

Some philosophers hold that objective consequentialism is false because it is incompatible with the principle that “ought” implies “can”. Roughly speaking, objective consequentialism is the doctrine that you always ought to do what will in fact have the best consequences. According to the principle that “ought” implies “can”, you have a moral obligation to do something only if you can do that thing. Frances Howard-Snyder has used an innovative thought experiment to argue that sometimes you cannot do what will in fact have the best consequences because you do not know what will in fact have the best consequences. Erik Carlson has raised two objections against Howard-Snyder’s argument. This paper examines Howard-Snyder’s argument as well as Carlson’s objections, arguing that Carlson’s objections do not go through but Howard-Snyder’s argument fails nonetheless. Moreover, this paper attempts to show that objective consequentialism and other objectivist moral theories are compatible with the principle that “ought” implies “can”. Finally, this paper analyses a special kind of inability: ignorance-induced inability.

Norbert Hoerster has tried to show on the basis of what I call special and general interests that it is rational to endorse moral judgements. I argue that Hoerster’s attempt to vindicate the rationality of moral judgements fails. By appealing to special interests Hoerster can only establish the rationality of endorsing judgements that – by Hoerster’s own standards – are not moral judgements because they do not pass the test of generalization. While the appeal to general interests, on the other hand, indeed establishes the rationality of endorsing judgements that pass the test of generalization, it does so only for some but not all people; for this reason, the vindicated judgements do not qualify as moral judgements either.

Frank Jackson has put forward a famous thought experiment of a physician who has to decide on the correct treatment for her patient. Subjective consequentialism tells the physician to do what intuitively seems to be the right action, whereas objective consequentialism fails to guide the physician’s action. I suppose that objective consequentialists want to supplement their theory so that it guides the physician’s action towards what intuitively seems to be the right treatment. Since this treatment is wrong according to objective consequentialism, objective consequentialists have to license it without calling it right. I consider eight strategies to spell out the idea of licensing the intuitively right treatment and argue that objective consequentialism is on the horns of what I call the licensing dilemma : Either the physician’s action is not guided towards the intuitively right treatment. Or the guidance towards the intuitively right treatment is ad hoc in some respect or the other.

This paper argues that objective consequentialism is incompatible with the rationales of ‘ “ought” implies “can” ’ – with the considerations, that is, that explain or justify this principle. Objective consequentialism is the moral doctrine that an act is right if and only if there is no alternative with a better outcome, and wrong otherwise. An act is obligatory if and only if it is wrong not to perform it. According to ‘ “ought” implies “can” ’, a person is morally obligated to φ only if the person can φ. The rationales of ‘ “ought” implies “can” ’ include considerations related to intuitive plausibility, action-guidance, blameworthiness and fairness, and the nature of practical reasons.

Christian List and Philip Pettit argue that some groups qualify as rational agents over and above their members. Examples include churches, commercial corporations, and political parties. According to the theory developed by List and Pettit, these groups qualify as agents because they have beliefs and desires and the capacity to process them and to act on their basis. Moreover, the alleged group agents are said to be rational to a high degree and even to be fit to be held morally responsible. And the group agents under consideration are autonomous, according to the List-Pettit Theory, because their beliefs and desires cannot easily be reduced to the beliefs and desires of the groups’ members. I want to show that we should not accept the List-Pettit Theory, because it implies the absurd claim that instrument-user units, like car-driver units, are rational agents over and above their user-parts, say drivers. The focus of my argument is on whether instrument-user units are autonomous in relation to their user-parts on the List-Pettit Theory.