Xiyuan Li

Based on Kant’s doctrine of self in the Critique of Pure Reason, the self can be distinguished into three forms: transcendental self, inner-sense self, and noumenal self. The confusion between the transcendental self and the noumenal self primarily arises from the ambiguity in Kant’s own texts. This paper aims to clarify that the transcendental self is not identical to the noumenal self. First, by addressing the relationship between the transcendental self and the “Ich bin” in the B-version, this paper argues that the transcendental self is a function of consciousness, and serves as a mediator between the noumenal self and the inner-sense self. Next, the paper points out the ambiguity in Kant’s definition of the concept of the transcendental object. In the A-version, the transcendental object refers not only to the thought-thing that forms a subject-object relationship with the transcendental self, but also to a self-contradictory noumenon that is in a parallel relationship with the empirical object. The B-version of the text redefines the concept of noumenon and limits the transcendental object to the negative noumenon. By clarifying the differences and problems regarding the concept of the transcendental object in the two versions, this paper further substantiates the distinction between the transcendental self and the noumenal self. Finally, this paper addresses the claim that the transcendental self is identical to the noumenal self, and attempts to analyze the tripartite framework of the self that is supported in this study, demonstrating that it does not conflict with the “phenomenon-noumenon” dualism, but is limited to the domain of theoretical philosophy.