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Matthew Sims, Strong continuity of life and mind: the free energy framework, predictive processing and ecological psychologyDissertation, University of Edinburgh. 2021.
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Matthew Sims, A continuum of intentionality: linking the biogenic and anthropogenic approaches to cognitionBiology and Philosophy 36 (6): 1-31. 2021.
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Matteo De Benedetto, Explication as a Three-Step Procedure: the case of the Church-Turing ThesisEuropean Journal for Philosophy of Science 11 (1): 1-28. 2021.
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Matteo De Benedetto, Taming conceptual wanderings: Wilson-StructuralismSynthese 199 (5-6): 13225-13246. 2021.
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Neri Marsili and Alex Wiegmann, Should I say that? An experimental investigation of the norm of assertionCognition 212 (C): 104657. 2021.
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Louisa M. Reins and Alex Wiegmann, Is Lying Bound to Commitment? Empirically Investigating Deceptive Presuppositions, Implicatures, and ActionsCognitive Science 45 (2). 2021.
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Alex Wiegmann and Emanuel Viebahn, True lies and Moorean redundancySynthese 199 (5-6): 13053-13066. 2021.
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Elmarie Venter, Toward an Embodied, Embedded Predictive Processing AccountFrontiers in Psychology 12. 2021.
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Dunja Šešelja, Exploring Scientific Inquiry via Agent-Based ModellingPerspectives on Science 29 (4): 537-557. 2021.
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Bartosz Michal Radomski, Dunja Šešelja, and N. Kim, Rethinking the history of peptic ulcer disease and its relevance for network epistemologyHistory and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 43 (4): 1-23. 2021.
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Thomas Grundmann and Joachim Horvath, Preface Special Issue GAP.10Erkenntnis 85 (3): 527-528. 2020.
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Matthew Sims, How to count biological minds: symbiosis, the free energy principle, and reciprocal multiscale integrationSynthese 199 (1-2): 2157-2179. 2020.
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Alex Wiegmann and Ronja Rutschmann, Intending to deceive versus deceiving intentionally in indifferent liesPhilosophical Psychology 33 (5): 752-756. 2020.
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Leda Berio, Culturally embedded schemata for false belief reasoningSynthese (Special Issue: THE CULTURAL EVOL): 1-30. 2020.
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Leda Berio and Gottfried Vosgerau, Enriching the Cognitive Account of Common Ground Kinds of Shared Information and Cognitive ProcessesGrazer Philosophischen Studien 97 (3). 2020.
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Leda Berio and Gottfried Vosgerau, Enriching the Cognitive Account of Common GroundGrazer Philosophische Studien 97 (3): 495-527. 2020.
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Dunja Šešelja, Christian Straßer, and AnneMarie Borg, Formal Models of Scientific Inquiry in a Social Context: An IntroductionJournal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 51 (2): 211-217. 2020.
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Erik Weber and Dunja Šešelja, In Defence of Rationalist Accounts of the Continental Drift Debate: A Response to PellegriniJournal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 51 (3): 481-490. 2020.
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Eugen Fischer, Paul Engelhardt, Joachim Horvath, and Hiroshi Ohtani, Experimental ordinary language philosophy: a cross-linguistic study of defeasible default inferencesSynthese 198 (2): 1029-1070. 2019.
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Matthew Sims, Minimal perception: Responding to the challenges of perceptual constancy and veridicality with plantsPhilosophical Psychology 32 (7): 1024-1048. 2019.
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Matthew Sims, Coupling to Variant Information: an Ecological Account of Comparative Mental Imagery GenerationReview of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (4): 899-916. 2019.
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T. Schlicht and Elmarie Venter, Getting the World Right: Perceptual Accuracy and the Role of the Perceiver in Predictive Processing ModelsJournal of Consciousness Studies 26 (3-4): 181-206. 2019.
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Daniel Frey and Dunja Šešelja, Robustness and Idealizations in Agent-Based Models of Scientific InteractionBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 71 (4): 1411-1437. 2019.
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AnneMarie Borg, Daniel Frey, Dunja Šešelja, and Christian Straßer, Theory-choice, transient diversity and the efficiency of scientific inquiryEuropean Journal for Philosophy of Science 9 (2): 26. 2019.
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Dunja Šešelja, Some lessons from simulations of scientific disagreementsSynthese 198 (Suppl 25): 6143-6158. 2019.
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Daniel Frey and Dunja Šešelja, What Is the Epistemic Function of Highly Idealized Agent-Based Models of Scientific Inquiry?Philosophy of the Social Sciences 48 (4): 407-433. 2018.
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Joachim Horvath, Philosophical Analysis: The Concept Grounding ViewPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (3): 724-750. 2017.