Zhiyi Guo

The preceding papers in this series systematically distinguished three types of comparative mechanisms involved in the generation of happiness: unconscious comparison, conscious comparison, and forced conscious comparison. Among these, forced conscious comparison constitutes the principal means by which individuals actively seek and regulate their own happiness, and it is directly and closely related to the generation of subjective happiness. This paper further divides forced conscious comparison into two subtypes: internally forced conscious comparison (hereafter, internal comparison) and externally forced conscious comparison (hereafter, external comparison). Building on the previous analysis of the question “with whom do we compare?”, this paper focuses on the complementary question, “what do we compare?” It argues that the effective generation of happiness requires an individual to anchor comparison in an important super-existence at the individual level. Finally, extending the analysis beyond individual happiness, this paper introduces the concepts of group happiness and group suffering, thereby expanding the explanatory scope of Hyper-Existentialist happiness theory.

As the fourth paper in the series on the Hyper-Existentialist theory of happiness, this paper focuses on a central element in the mechanism by which happiness is generated: the formation and operation of comparative reference frames. It argues that the experience of happiness is not determined simply by an individual's objective conditions of existence. Rather, happiness emerges as a subjective psychological outcome when a subject selects and constructs particular objects of reference and compares their own circumstances with them. The selection of reference frames operates along two dimensions: space and time. Along the spatial dimension, an individual may engage in horizontal comparison with surrounding groups as well as with unfamiliar groups located at a distance. Along the temporal dimension, individuals primarily use their own past states as longitudinal points of reference. At the intersection of the temporal and spatial dimensions, individuals may also engage in cross-temporal and cross-social comparisons with historical figures or with the past states of other individuals. The paper further argues that the effective generation of happiness often depends on the coordinated operation of one or more reference objects, and, in extreme circumstances, on an almost infinite number of reference objects. By examining the operational pathways of different reference frames, this paper proposes a new analytical framework for understanding the subjectively constructed character of happiness.

Building on the preceding studies in the Hyper-Existentialist theory of happiness, this paper advances two central theoretical propositions. First, the comparative mechanisms capable of generating experiences of happiness can be divided into three types: unconscious comparison, conscious comparison, and forced conscious comparison. Each of these three forms of comparison can operate independently and generate a subject's experience of happiness. Second, this paper proposes what I call the “Principle of Double Positive Proportionality”: when a subject takes action in pursuit of a particular super-existence, if the pursuit ultimately succeeds, the degree of happiness experienced by the subject is positively correlated with the initial intensity of the subject's desire; if the pursuit ultimately fails, the degree of suffering experienced is likewise positively correlated with the initial intensity of that desire. This paper examines the mechanisms underlying these two propositions and further develops the theoretical framework of Hyper-Existentialist theories of happiness.

This paper develops a systematic account of the mechanism through which happiness is generated within the theoretical framework of Super-Existentialism. I argue that comparison is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the generation of human happiness: without some form of comparison, a genuine experience of happiness cannot arise. Comparative activity may lead either to happiness or to suffering, and the experiential outcome is not directly determined by objective facts but is instead shaped entirely by the subject’s subjective cognition. Even when a subject’s cognition is significantly distorted, or even completely inconsistent with objective reality, if that subjective cognition prevails within the process of comparison, it can directly determine whether an experience of happiness is generated. By integrating the concept of Super-Existence with a theory of happiness, this paper seeks to explain, at the level of underlying logic, why happiness appears to be so scarce in modern society. It thereby offers a novel approach to understanding the nature of happiness, one that differs substantially from traditional approaches in ethics and psychology.

This series of studies takes Super-Existentialism as its central theoretical framework and systematically addresses the long-standing practical difficulties and cognitive misconceptions surrounding human happiness. Its aim is to move beyond the limitations of traditional discussions of happiness, clarify widespread misconceptions about happiness, uncover the deeper causes of the scarcity of happiness, and propose practical pathways toward achieving it. The central objective of this research is to construct a comprehensive Super-Existentialist theory of happiness that can provide a new theoretical framework for enhancing individual happiness and fulfillment in life. I maintain that the Super-Existentialist theory of happiness is one of the most optimistic theoretical frameworks currently available in the study of happiness. Through its practical application, every ordinary person may have the opportunity to attain genuine happiness of their own. As for the practical value and explanatory power of this theory, I respectfully leave it to readers to make their own judgment after reading the entire series. In my earlier years, I published several articles discussing happiness in the Chinese-language online publication Huaxia Express. However, I never systematically organized the ideas developed in those writings. In the present work, I have reorganized, expanded, and further developed those earlier studies into a comprehensive theory of happiness grounded in Super-Existentialism. I therefore call this theory A Super-Existentialist Theory of Happiness.

In this article, I would like to summarize the work on Social Choice Phenomenology that I have carried out so far and then bring this book to an end. I believe that all of my work in this direction to date has merely served the purpose of “throwing out a brick to attract jade”—that is, offering an initial contribution in the hope of stimulating further and more substantial research. I hope that other researchers will continue to develop and expand this theory. My personal plan for my subsequent work is first to discuss my theory of happiness. This theory differs substantially from prevailing theories of happiness. It is the result of my application of the concept of Super-Existence to the domain of human happiness. After completing my theory of happiness, I plan to discuss my philosophical theory of the meaning of life. This theory is also based on Super-Existentialism. I previously wrote a work entitled Existence and Super-Existence, but I did not complete it. Perhaps I will return to Existence and Super-Existence and complete it after finishing my theory of the meaning of life. I have also previously completed a philosophical theory of love, The Theory of Love Permeation, which is intended to explain the phenomenon of love. I would also like to organize and develop this work into a more systematic form. As I have mentioned previously, the concept of Super-Existence is a particularly important concept. We can conduct Super-Existence analyses in all academic disciplines. For me, this is undoubtedly a task that is almost impossible to complete in its entirety, but I should at least complete part of it. There is therefore a great deal of work to be done, and I hope to complete it step by step.

Cognitive-System Phenomenology is Zhiyi Guo’s attempt to reconstruct phenomenology by replacing the traditional emphasis on Husserl’s transcendental structures and Kant’s a priori forms with the concept of a cognitive system. According to Guo, a cognitive system consists principally of pre-existing knowledge together with the cognitive capacities through which a person perceives, interprets, remembers, imagines, and reasons. The central claim is that human beings never encounter the world through completely unstructured perception. Rather, perception and experience are always mediated by the cognitive system through which the world is apprehended. On this view, cognition plays a constitutive role in perception, meaning, and the constitution of objects.

In this article, we discuss the relationship between problems and choices, that is, social choice in a more general sense. In this situation, the subject does not know in advance what the available courses of action are. Instead, a new problem arises in the subject’s life. Such problems may take many forms: they may be problems at work, conflicts within the family, or other kinds of difficulties. The subject must resolve this new problem and therefore must find a way to address it. In the process of searching for a solution, the subject may encounter various possible choices. Ultimately, the subject finds a solution that both resolves the problem and is realistically feasible for them.

The philosophical relationship between Jacques Derrida and Zhiyi Guo can be understood as a fundamental confrontation over the nature and stability of meaning. Derrida’s philosophy of différance emphasizes the relational character of signs and the continual deferral of meaning. Guo, by contrast, argues that meaning cannot be adequately explained through difference and deferral alone. He seeks to reconstruct a more stable account of meaning by grounding it in examples, language, individual cognitive systems, and shared cognitive communities. The following discussion summarizes how two major AI search systems—Microsoft AI and Google AI—characterized the relationship between Derrida and Guo. These AI-generated assessments should not themselves be regarded as independent scholarly evaluations; rather, they provide an interesting indication of how Guo’s philosophical project can be interpreted and summarized by contemporary AI systems.

In this article, we primarily examine the risks involved in choice. Every choice entails some degree of risk; the only difference is the magnitude of that risk. We divide the risk of losing value through choice into two types: absolute risk and relative risk. If we classify risk according to the objectivity and subjectivity of choice, we can further distinguish between subjective risk and objective risk. At the same time, we can see that the subject’s cognitive system plays an extremely important role in the process of choice. This is also why we propose replacing Schutz’s concept of “stock of knowledge at hand” with the concept of a cognitive system in sociological research.

This article discusses the importance of choices and the difficulty of making choices for a choosing subject. We argue that choices that are extremely difficult for a subject are necessarily very important choices for that subject. However, a choice that is extremely important to a subject is not necessarily an extremely difficult choice. We also discuss a more general form of what I call the Sartrean Choice Problem. The Sartrean Choice Problem refers, in its specific form, to the dilemma faced by the young French man in Sartre's famous example during the Second World War: whether to remain with his mother or join the French Resistance against Germany. The more general form of the Sartrean Choice Problem refers to all choices that are extremely difficult for a subject.

In this section, we examine the concrete process of social choice through an example from everyday life. Specifically, we analyze the process of purchasing a house. This is a very common form of social choice, one that can be found everywhere in ordinary life. As we shall see, this process involves numerous choices as well as many actions. Some choices are made independently by the subject, some are made by other people, and some are completed jointly by the subject and other individuals (or organizations). These fundamental forms of choice considerably extend the scope of traditional sociology.

In the previous section, we discussed wartime negotiations between states. As an element of the Fourth World, a state is itself an existent being. Consequently, it possesses numerous Super-Existences. At the same time, it acts and makes choices, even though these choices are formally made by the head of state and the cabinet. Once such a decision is made, however, it represents the choice of the state itself. In Cognitive System Phenomenology – A Critique of Husserl, I suggested that the concept of Super-Existence might be extended into other fields, making it possible to establish disciplines such as Super-Existential Family Phenomenology, Super-Existential Phenomenology of Love, Super-Existential Educational Phenomenology, Super-Existential Corporate Phenomenology, and Super-Existential State Phenomenology. Admittedly, these ideas may seem rather imaginative. Nevertheless, in this section I would like to continue along this line of thought. Since we introduced the notion of a state's Super-Existence in the previous discussion, we shall now explore the possibility of establishing a Super-Existential State Phenomenology.

In A Critique of Derrida (Part 1), I criticized the core philosophical theory of the French deconstructionist philosopher Jacques Derrida. That critique centered primarily on Derrida's key concept of différance. What is différance? It is the view that the meaning of signs or written symbols arises only through their differences from other signs, and that meaning is forever in flux, never possessing a fixed or stable identity. In the previous article, I argued that: The meaning of a sign is not formed through difference. Otherwise, no sign would possess any intrinsic meaning. The meaning of a sign is not in perpetual flux. These arguments fundamentally undermine the philosophical foundation of deconstruction. In this paper, I investigate the processes by which the meanings of signs or words are generated, transmitted, understood, and transformed. I establish a Four-Element Theory of the Meaning of Signs, according to which the generation, transmission, understanding, and change of meaning depend upon four indispensable elements: examples (instances), language, the subject's cognitive system, and the cognitive system community. This theory explains both the stability of linguistic meaning and its occasional changes. Ultimately, my objective is to restore the legitimacy of philosophy as a whole. I believe this objective has now been achieved.

In this paper, we primarily discuss negotiation choice, a special form of choice in which two parties reach an agreement through negotiation. In some cases, this is a form of object choice, while in others it is not. We distinguish three situations: (1) both negotiating parties are individuals; (2) one party is an individual and the other is an element of the Fourth World; and (3) both parties are elements of the Fourth World. At the end of the paper, we examine gift-giving choice, which is not a negotiation choice. It is a special kind of choice in which a subject selects a gift for another person. In this kind of choice, one must consider not only the Super-Existence of the gift itself, but also the Super-Existence of the subject and that of the gift recipient.

Jacques Derrida was the founder of twentieth-century French deconstructionism and one of the principal representatives of post-structuralism. The core of his philosophy is deconstruction: the thorough dismantling of the "logocentrism" that had dominated Western philosophy for more than two thousand years, thereby overturning the traditional metaphysical framework of binary oppositions. The central concept of deconstruction is différance. Derrida argues that the meaning of every sign is generated only through its differences from other signs and is perpetually deferred in an endless process of interpretation. There is no fixed, immutable, self-sufficient ultimate essence that requires no further explanation. This perpetual difference and deferral is what Derrida calls différance. Consequently, the "ultimate truth" pursued by traditional philosophy is itself an unattainable illusion. One can never finally grasp it, because it always awaits further interpretation in yet another sign. This amounts to a direct denial of the legitimacy of the entire metaphysical enterprise that has occupied Western philosophy for the past two millennia. In this paper, I shall examine Derrida's famous concept of différance in detail and argue that he failed to grasp the true nature of signs. Consequently, all of his conclusions are mistaken. Contrary to Derrida's claim, the meaning of signs is neither constituted through difference nor forever in flux. In this way, the entire philosophical foundation of deconstructionism can be overturned, and the legitimacy of the two-thousand-year philosophical tradition can be reestablished.

In this paper, we examine the selection of a romantic partner. In choosing a romantic partner, the subject necessarily has certain selection criteria, and these criteria are inevitably reflections of the subject's psychological needs. We once again employ the method of Super-Existence in analyzing this process of choice. We know that the selection of a romantic partner is not merely a man's choice of a woman but also a woman's choice of a man. In essence, romantic partner selection is a two-way process. However, in this paper we consider only one party's selection of the other and do not discuss mutual selection. The issue of two-way selection will be examined in the next section.

In this paper, we examine the relationship between the Super-Existence of an object and the constraints imposed upon it by the subject's psychological needs. At the same time, we define the attractiveness and resistance of a particular Super-Existence of an object X with respect to the subject. If a certain Super-Existence of object X satisfies the subject, we say that this Super-Existence possesses attractiveness for the subject. The greater the degree of satisfaction, the greater its attractiveness. Conversely, if the Super-Existence fails to satisfy the subject, we say that it possesses resistance for the subject. Resistance may arise from execution costs, risks, or psychological burdens. In addition, we propose a formula for evaluating the subject's degree of satisfaction with an object. The subject may use this formula when making object selections. Nevertheless, this is only a very simple formula. We hope that more elegant and more accurate formulas will be developed in the future.

(We cited this article in Social Choice Phenomenology – A Critique of Sartre (Part 20), so we are publishing it here.) In this paper, I propose two new categories of human psychological needs: the need for sacredness and the need for vanity. Accordingly, I divide human psychological needs into two major categories: secular needs and trans-secular needs. Trans-secular needs refer to the pursuit of a sense of sacredness, which includes both self-generated sacredness and other-generated sacredness. Secular needs, in turn, are divided into substantive needs and vanity needs. Substantive needs encompass Maslow's entire hierarchy of needs—namely, physiological needs, safety needs, social needs, esteem needs, cognitive needs, aesthetic needs, and self-actualization needs. In this way, Maslow's psychological theory is both revised and supplemented.

In this article, we primarily seek to establish a theory of object choice. What is an object choice? An object is a set of similar things that attract the subject's interest. Object choice refers to the choice a subject makes when confronted with two or more such objects. It is evident that object choice is one of the most common forms of choice encountered in daily life—for example, choosing clothes, purchasing a house, and so on. In this paper, I introduce my revised version of Maslow’s famous theory of psychological needs and attempt to solve the problem of object choice through this theory together with the concept of Super-Existence.

This article aims to provide a preliminary examination of the research topics of Social Choice Phenomenology. We argue that Social Choice Phenomenology represents a deepening and extension of both Weberian sociology and Schutz’s phenomenological sociology (indeed, Social Choice Phenomenology substantially encompasses the sociology of action). At the same time, replacing Schutz’s concept of the “stock of knowledge at hand” with the concept of a cognitive system, and replacing the “life-world” with the concept of a cognitive-system community, possesses significant advantages and better reflects the realities of contemporary society. Since I personally lack the time, energy, and financial resources required to conduct substantial empirical research in social choice—such as interviews and social surveys—the further development of Social Choice Phenomenology must ultimately be undertaken by other sociologists. My own subsequent investigations can only be regarded as a modest attempt to stimulate further research.

By introducing the concepts and methods of Husserlian phenomenology into the field of sociology—especially the concepts of intersubjectivity and the life-world—Schutz advanced the development of sociology. He also proposed the notion of the “stock of knowledge at hand” in order to explain the logic underlying the subject’s actions. In this article, we introduce the concepts of intersubjectivity, the life-world, the stock of knowledge at hand, the cognitive system, and the cognitive system community. Furthermore, we propose replacing Schutz’s “stock of knowledge at hand” with the concept of the “cognitive system,” and replacing Husserl’s and Schutz’s “life-world” with the concept of the “cognitive system community.” This is because, in essence, we solve social problems through our cognitive systems, and people possessing different cognitive systems together form cognitive system communities.

In this article, we further investigate the earlier example of choosing to eat a meal. First, from a phenomenological perspective, the subject’s entire post-choice process is a process of stream of consciousness, yet the subject’s stream of consciousness does not remain continuously focused on the subject’s primary choice. Second, the result of the subject’s choice may differ from the purpose of the choice, and the subject may sometimes fail to achieve the purpose of the choice. Third, the subject may encounter special situations causing certain sub-choices to become completely unrelated to the overall purpose. Fourth, if each action corresponds to a choice, then the purpose of the choice becomes the purpose of the action, and the motivation of the choice becomes the motivation of the action. In this way, the phenomenology of social choice becomes a natural extension of the action theories of Max Weber and Alfred Schutz. Fifth, we may also divide social choice into the following four categories: individual social choice, service-oriented social choice, authority-based social choice, and cooperative social choice.

In this article, we introduce the theory of reductionization in social choice, and arrive at the following conclusion: any social choice is either a monad choice or a non-monad choice, and every non-monad choice can be reduced to a combination of several monad choices. At the same time, according to whether the actions resulting from the subject’s social choice are completed by the subject himself, we divide social choice into three categories: completed solely by the subject, completed by others on behalf of the subject, and completed jointly by the subject and others.

In this article, we discuss the theories of Max Weber and Alfred Schutz concerning the meaning of social action and the motives behind social action. On this basis, we examine the concepts of the subjective purpose of choice, objective purpose of choice, subjective reason for choice, and objective reason for choice in social choice. These purposes and reasons are more complex than social action itself. We also point out that the inconsistency between subjective reasons for choice and objective reasons for choice is the true source of misunderstanding among people. Furthermore, subjective reasons for choice and objective reasons for choice correspond respectively to the subject’s self-oriented ultra-existence and other-oriented ultra-existence.

In this article, we mainly discuss the general process of choice. We divide the procedure of choice into three parts: the pre-choice stage, the choice stage, and the post-choice stage. Sometimes the pre-choice stage is extremely difficult, and the subject does not know how to choose. At other times, the post-choice stage is extremely difficult, and implementing the choice may encounter numerous obstacles. In some cases, both the pre-choice and post-choice stages are difficult: the subject struggles to make a decision, and after making the decision, achieving the purpose of that choice is equally challenging.

In this article, we discuss the classification of social choice. One method of classification divides social choice into two kinds: object-choice and non-object-choice. Object-choice is a very common form of social choice, one that frequently occurs in our daily lives, and we will discuss it in greater detail later. Another method classifies social choice into four ideal types: purposive-rational choice, value-rational choice, emotional choice, and habitual choice. We can see that these four kinds of choice correspond one by one to the four ideal types of action in Weber’s theory. In later discussions, we will also encounter other forms of classification for social choice.

In this article, we mainly aim to demonstrate that a choice is essentially a choice of a process. This process includes a series of actions as well as some sub-choices. Of course, as a special case, a choice may also be the choice of a single action. Regarding Sartre’s example of the young French man’s dilemma, whether he chose to accompany his mother or to join the anti-German resistance, he was in fact choosing a process. Choosing to accompany his mother was a process, although this process might consist of only one action. Choosing to join the anti-German resistance was also a process, and this process could involve a series of actions and sub-choices.