Zhiyi Guo

This paper examines a controversial proposition: Why can the suffering of others sometimes make us feel happy about our own circumstances? At first glance, this proposition appears to conflict with conventional moral beliefs and may even be interpreted as a defense of schadenfreude. However, this paper does not argue that people ought to take pleasure in the suffering of others, nor does it claim that other people’s misfortunes necessarily constitute a source of one’s own happiness. Rather, drawing on Hyper-Existentialist theories of happiness, it analyzes the complex relationship between the suffering of others and an individual’s experience of happiness. According to Hyper-Existentialist theories of happiness, happiness is a subjective experience, and comparison is an important mechanism through which it arises. We compare ourselves not only with other people but also our present circumstances with our past experiences. When we observe others suffering hardships that we have not experienced, we may become aware of our own relative good fortune and consequently appreciate more deeply what we already possess. This mechanism, however, does not operate in every situation. If those who suffer belong to important Super-Existences with which we identify—such as our family, friends, national community, or other significant groups—their suffering may be experienced as our own loss, producing sadness rather than happiness. The paper further distinguishes relative happiness from schadenfreude and moral responsibility, and considers whether we ought to help others when they are suffering. It argues that the psychological mechanisms through which happiness arises and the moral actions an individual ought to take belong to different levels of analysis. Hyper-Existentialist theories of happiness can explain why we sometimes become aware of our own good fortune through the misfortunes of others, but this explanation does not imply that we should cause or tolerate their suffering. Finally, the paper extends this analysis to our retrospective evaluation of past suffering. It examines how past hardship can become a reference point for present happiness and why a person who once enjoyed a privileged life may experience greater distress when their circumstances deteriorate than someone who has long lived in relatively adverse conditions.

J. L. Austin’s theory of speech acts challenged the traditional view that language primarily serves as an instrument for describing facts. It demonstrated that language does not merely describe the world but can also be used to perform actions, including making promises, issuing commands, making declarations, and offering apologies. Nevertheless, Austin’s threefold distinction among locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary acts continues to raise interpretive difficulties in actual communication, particularly concerning the boundary between the illocutionary force of an utterance and its subsequent effects. Furthermore, Jacques Derrida’s criticism of Austin’s exclusion of non-serious speech contexts, such as theater and poetry, encourages us to reconsider the contextual dependence and iterability of speech acts. This paper introduces Super-Existence Theory into the study of speech acts and proposes a new analytical framework: Super-Existence Speech Act Theory. Grounded in Contextual Super-Existence, the framework begins by distinguishing Utterance Super-Existence from Purpose Super-Existence. It then employs Other-aspect Super-Existence to explain how a Receiver understands an utterance and Public Super-Existence to account for the ways in which speech acts acquire public recognition and social significance. Through examples involving wedding declarations, indirect speech acts, and wedding dialogue performed on a theatrical stage, the paper explores how this framework can reinterpret the performance, understanding, and effects of speech acts. Its aim is to offer an extension and supplementary perspective on Austin’s theory rather than to claim that all the difficulties associated with that theory have been resolved.

J. L. Austin’s theory of speech acts represents a major development in twentieth-century philosophy of language. Challenging the assumption that the primary function of language is to describe facts and produce statements that can be evaluated as true or false, Austin argued that utterances can also perform actions. His analysis of performative utterances, the distinctions among locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary acts, and his account of the felicity conditions governing successful speech acts have had a lasting influence on contemporary pragmatics and the philosophy of language. This chapter first reconstructs the principal stages of Austin’s theory, including his distinction between constative and performative utterances, his subsequent threefold analysis of speech acts, his classification of illocutionary acts, and his account of felicity conditions. It then examines the relationship between the success of a speech act and the social and contextual conditions under which it is performed. Particular attention is paid to the distinction between a speech act that fails to take effect and one that is performed but involves insincerity or subsequent noncompliance. Building on Austin’s framework, the chapter introduces a Super-Existence Analysis of speech acts. According to this approach, a speech act does not merely express linguistic content or perform an action. Under appropriate conditions, it may also alter the Super-Existence Relational Networks of the relevant participants and contribute to the formation, modification, or confirmation of Public Super-Existence. For example, an authorized marriage declaration may establish a new social relationship and change the publicly recognized identities of the persons concerned. Similarly, an agreement to cooperate may introduce a new relational attribute into the relevant Super-Existences. The chapter further argues that Austin’s felicity conditions can be reconsidered in terms of Contextual Super-Existence. The speaker’s institutional status, the circumstances of the utterance, the relevant procedures, and the expectations of the participants form part of the contextual structure that determines whether a speech act can successfully produce its intended effects. Super-Existence Analysis thus offers a framework for connecting speech acts with individual cognition, interpersonal relations, institutional arrangements, and collective cognitive structures. It does not replace Austin’s distinctions but seeks to explain, at a more fundamental level, how speech acts participate in changes in social and cognitive reality.

In previous studies, I have examined the concepts of Self-aspect Super-Existence, Other-aspect Super-Existence, True-aspect Super-Existence, Purpose Super-Existence, Motivation Super-Existence, Judgment Super-Existence, and Trust Super-Existence. This chapter extends Super-Existence Analysis from the individual level to the collective level by introducing the concept of Public Super-Existence. Public Super-Existence refers to a relatively stable shared cognitive structure concerning an object or a relation that emerges within a particular group of subjects through sustained linguistic communication, experiential interaction, mutual calibration, and social practice. It is neither the private cognition of a single subject nor identical to the object's True-aspect Super-Existence. Rather, it occupies an intermediary position between individual cognition and True-aspect Super-Existence. This chapter further distinguishes between Universal Public Super-Existence and Group Public Super-Existence. Universal Public Super-Existence refers to shared cognition generally accepted by the overwhelming majority of members of a society or human community, whereas Group Public Super-Existence exists only within a particular group. Drawing on examples such as geocentrism and heliocentrism, the fable of “The Wolf Is Coming,” and the announcement of a marriage, I show that Public Super-Existence may be either correct or incorrect. It may change in response to new experiences and evidence, or remain stable over an extended period. The chapter pays particular attention to the influence of Public Super-Existence on individual cognitive judgments. It argues that Public Super-Existence can provide default standards of judgment, shape cognitive pathways, calibrate private cognition, and establish a sense of cognitive identity within a group. Finally, the chapter introduces Public Super-Existence into the philosophy of language by examining its relationships with Utterance Super-Existence, Other-aspect Super-Existence, Judgment Super-Existence, and Trust Super-Existence. It also offers a preliminary account of how Public Super-Existence participates in the formation of linguistic meaning, the realization of speech acts, and the constitution of social facts.

Previous studies have offered a preliminary examination of the basic concepts and types of Super-Existence, as well as its possible applications to the philosophy of language. This chapter places Super-Existence Theory more directly within concrete contexts of linguistic communication and investigates the interactions among different types of Super-Existence and their effects on linguistic understanding and language use. The chapter first introduces the concept of Utterance Super-Existence. A particular utterance produced by an Expressor is not merely a linguistic expression; it can also be understood as a Super-Existence formed when the Expressor speaks in a specific time and context. Using the basic structure of “Expressor—Utterance Super-Existence—Receiver,” we can examine the degrees of agreement and disagreement among Utterance Super-Existence, the Expressor's Self-aspect Super-Existence, and the relevant True-aspect Super-Existence. When these three coincide, the linguistic expression, the subject's cognition, and the actual state of the object may correspond to one another. When they diverge, false statements, misunderstandings, deception, and other linguistic phenomena may arise. The chapter then introduces Purpose Super-Existence and Motivation Super-Existence. Drawing on the fable of “The Wolf Is Coming” and Searle's account of indirect speech acts, it argues that the practical meaning of a linguistic expression cannot be determined solely by its literal content. The Receiver must understand not only what the Expressor says but also what the Expressor intends to achieve through the utterance and why the Expressor chooses to speak in that way. Linguistic understanding can therefore be analyzed, in part, as a process of matching the Receiver's Other-aspect Super-Existence—particularly the Receiver's Other-aspect Super-Existence of the Expressor's purpose—with the relevant Super-Existences of the Expressor. The chapter concludes that an important problem in linguistic communication concerns the agreement, divergence, and matching of different Super-Existences. Successful communication depends, to a certain extent, on whether the Receiver can form a cognitive structure that appropriately corresponds to the relevant Super-Existences of the Expressor. Overinterpretation, underinterpretation, and complete misunderstanding can be understood as different kinds of deviation within this matching process. Super-Existence Analysis may thus offer a new analytical approach to indirect speech acts, linguistic deception, linguistic understanding, and linguistic action.

Building on the concept of Super-Existence introduced in Studies in the Philosophy of Language (1), this paper further examines the fundamental properties, types, and methods of analysis of Super-Existence, thereby establishing a conceptual foundation for applying Super-Existence Analysis to the philosophy of language. It begins by restating the basic definition of Super-Existence: the Super-Existence of an object X is “the totality of the various things associated with X and the relations among them.” It then examines the potentially infinite extensibility of the Super-Existence Relational Network and the necessity of selecting those Super-Existences that are significant for a particular research purpose. On this basis, the paper distinguishes three fundamental types of Super-Existence: Self-aspect Super-Existence, Other-aspect Super-Existence, and True-aspect Super-Existence. Self-aspect Super-Existence refers to the Super-Existence of an object as understood by a particular subject; Other-aspect Super-Existence refers to the Super-Existence of that object as understood by other subjects; and True-aspect Super-Existence refers to the actual state of affairs concerning the object, independently of any particular subject. These three may coincide completely, overlap partially, or differ from one another. The paper extends this distinction beyond the study of human beings to objects in general, illustrating the framework through examples involving a person's age, an object's color, and a traffic accident. The paper also proposes several additional classifications of Super-Existence from different perspectives: invariant and variable Super-Existence, sub-invariant Super-Existence, internal and external Super-Existence, readily definable and difficult-to-define Super-Existence, real and virtual Super-Existence, and perceptible and imperceptible Super-Existence. It further introduces the concept of the value of a Super-Existence to indicate that Super-Existence may have not only a mode of existence and a network of relations but also specific numerical, qualitative, or relational values. Finally, the paper returns to the philosophy of language and raises a series of questions for future investigation. Does a linguistic expression express an object itself, or does it express a particular subject's Super-Existence of that object? How do differences between the Super-Existence structures of Expressors and Receivers affect linguistic meaning, understanding, and communicative efficacy? These questions will be important directions for subsequent research. The paper does not claim that the classifications proposed here constitute a complete theory of Super-Existence. Rather, it presents them as a theoretical framework that remains open to further examination, revision, and development.

Face-to-face linguistic communication is not a closed process consisting solely of an Expressor, a Receiver, and linguistic content. Every actual communicative exchange takes place within a particular environment, which directly affects the meaning and appropriateness of linguistic expressions as well as the Receiver's understanding of what is expressed. Accordingly, in addition to the various forms of Super-Existence associated with the Expressor and the Receiver individually, linguistic communication involves a form of Super-Existence relevant to both participants. This chapter calls it Contextual Super-Existence, which may also be termed Situational Super-Existence when emphasis is placed on the concrete circumstances of an interaction. This chapter first examines the fundamental role of Contextual Super-Existence in linguistic communication, arguing that the appropriateness of an expression cannot be determined independently of the particular situation in which it occurs. The same sentence may have entirely different degrees of appropriateness, and even different practical meanings, in different situations. Drawing on John Searle's theory of indirect speech acts, the chapter then analyzes the relationship between an Expressor's literal utterance, underlying intention, and Purpose Super-Existence, using the example “It's very cold.” It further argues that whether the Receiver acts in accordance with the Expressor's actual intention depends not only on the Receiver's understanding of the linguistic content but also on Contextual Super-Existence, including the participants' current activities, their relationship, the physical environment, and other relevant background conditions. The chapter thus seeks to demonstrate that linguistic meaning does not reside entirely within linguistic expressions themselves. Rather, meaning emerges from the dynamic relations among the Expressor, the linguistic expression, the Receiver, and Contextual Super-Existence.

In the preceding discussion, we identified the two basic participants in linguistic communication as the Expressor and the Receiver. The Expressor conveys certain content to the Receiver through language, while the Receiver must understand, evaluate, and respond to what the Expressor communicates. Linguistic communication therefore involves not only linguistic signs and their meanings, but also the Receiver's judgment concerning the Expressor. Building upon the concept of Judgment Super-Existence introduced previously, this chapter further proposes the concept of Trust Super-Existence. Trust Super-Existence refers to a relatively stable judgmental structure formed by the Receiver concerning the credibility of an Expressor's future expressions, based on the Expressor's previous communicative record, behavioral performance, and relevant background. Trust Super-Existence is not simply a judgment concerning the truth or falsity of a particular statement; rather, it concerns the broader question of whether the Expressor is worthy of belief. Using the fable of “The Wolf Is Coming” as an example, this chapter analyzes how trust is formed, diminished, and eventually approaches zero through successive linguistic interactions. It further examines the relationships between Trust Super-Existence, Judgment Super-Existence, Purpose Super-Existence, and Motivation Super-Existence. I argue that the effectiveness of linguistic communication depends not only on the content of an expression but also on the Receiver's Trust Super-Existence concerning the Expressor. Once an Expressor repeatedly damages the Receiver's trust, even subsequent truthful expressions may lose their practical linguistic efficacy. Trust in linguistic communication is therefore not an external or secondary factor but an important condition for the continuation and effectiveness of linguistic communication.

This chapter begins with the basic structure of linguistic communication and examines the Expressor, the Receiver, and the relationship between them. In the linguistic communication discussed here, the Expressor and the Receiver constitute the basic participants in communication. Linguistic expression does not occur in isolation; rather, it takes place within specific subjects, cognitive conditions, and social relationships. Building upon the concept of Super-Existence proposed in the preceding chapter, this chapter further examines several basic super-existences associated with the Expressor and the Receiver and argues that the appropriateness of linguistic expression is, to a significant extent, constrained by the relevant super-existences of the participants in communication. This chapter focuses particularly on three groups of super-existences that are closely related to linguistic communication: the basic super-existences of the Expressor and the Receiver, including their identities, knowledge, and capacities for understanding; the Expressor's Purpose Super-Existence and Motivation Super-Existence; and the Judgment Super-Existence formed by the Receiver concerning the linguistic expression. Linguistic communication involves not only “what is said” and “what is heard,” but also questions such as “who is speaking,” “to whom,” “why is it being said,” and “how does the Receiver understand and judge it?” A comprehensive analysis of linguistic communication therefore requires us to relate the propositional content of linguistic expressions to the identities, cognitive states, purposes, motivations, and judgments of the participants in communication.

This paper presents a preliminary exploration of the philosophy of language. It begins with a basic question: when traditional philosophy of language examines language, meaning, reference, understanding, and language use, does it sufficiently take into account the subjects involved in linguistic communication—namely, the producer and the recipient of linguistic expressions? In this paper, I refer to the party who produces and transmits linguistic information as the “Expressor”, and to the party who receives and interprets linguistic information as the “Receiver.” I propose that both should constitute important components of philosophical analysis of language. Unlike approaches that begin primarily with linguistic structure or language itself, this paper attempts to place language, the Expressor, and the Receiver within a unified analytical framework in order to examine the formation and understanding of linguistic meaning, as well as the practical efficacy of language. I also propose a possible research approach: introducing the dimensions of the Expressor and the Receiver into existing theories in the philosophy of language, thereby extending and reinterpreting traditional theories. Methodologically, I attempt to apply my proposed method of “Super-Existence Analysis” to the philosophy of language. I first provide a preliminary account of the concept of “Super-Existence” and use a physical object as an example to illustrate what I mean by its “Super-Existence Relational Network.” The present paper is only the beginning of my research in the philosophy of language. The relevant concepts and theories remain subject to further argument, revision, and development.

Building upon the teleology of super-existence within Hyper-Existentialism, this paper develops a theoretical account of the widespread scarcity of happiness and offers an explanation of its underlying mechanisms. The central proposition of the teleology of super-existence can be summarized as follows: the purpose of each person's life is to preserve or expand the most important super-existences that constitute that person's life. More specifically, the purpose underlying each individual action is likewise to preserve or expand some dimension of one's super-existence. Human comparison, moreover, is fundamentally oriented upward. As a consequence, genuine experiences of happiness are inherently scarce. In other words, the fundamental reason why most people experience unhappiness lies in human nature itself, and this condition is therefore extremely difficult to overcome. This paper argues that the fact that most people remain in a relatively non-happy state over extended periods of time is deeply rooted in the underlying logic of human nature. It cannot be fundamentally remedied simply by improving external conditions.

The preceding papers in this series systematically distinguished three types of comparative mechanisms involved in the generation of happiness: unconscious comparison, conscious comparison, and forced conscious comparison. Among these, forced conscious comparison constitutes the principal means by which individuals actively seek and regulate their own happiness, and it is directly and closely related to the generation of subjective happiness. This paper further divides forced conscious comparison into two subtypes: internally forced conscious comparison (hereafter, internal comparison) and externally forced conscious comparison (hereafter, external comparison). Building on the previous analysis of the question “with whom do we compare?”, this paper focuses on the complementary question, “what do we compare?” It argues that the effective generation of happiness requires an individual to anchor comparison in an important super-existence at the individual level. Finally, extending the analysis beyond individual happiness, this paper introduces the concepts of group happiness and group suffering, thereby expanding the explanatory scope of Hyper-Existentialist happiness theory.

As the fourth paper in the series on the Hyper-Existentialist theory of happiness, this paper focuses on a central element in the mechanism by which happiness is generated: the formation and operation of comparative reference frames. It argues that the experience of happiness is not determined simply by an individual's objective conditions of existence. Rather, happiness emerges as a subjective psychological outcome when a subject selects and constructs particular objects of reference and compares their own circumstances with them. The selection of reference frames operates along two dimensions: space and time. Along the spatial dimension, an individual may engage in horizontal comparison with surrounding groups as well as with unfamiliar groups located at a distance. Along the temporal dimension, individuals primarily use their own past states as longitudinal points of reference. At the intersection of the temporal and spatial dimensions, individuals may also engage in cross-temporal and cross-social comparisons with historical figures or with the past states of other individuals. The paper further argues that the effective generation of happiness often depends on the coordinated operation of one or more reference objects, and, in extreme circumstances, on an almost infinite number of reference objects. By examining the operational pathways of different reference frames, this paper proposes a new analytical framework for understanding the subjectively constructed character of happiness.

Building on the preceding studies in the Hyper-Existentialist theory of happiness, this paper advances two central theoretical propositions. First, the comparative mechanisms capable of generating experiences of happiness can be divided into three types: unconscious comparison, conscious comparison, and forced conscious comparison. Each of these three forms of comparison can operate independently and generate a subject's experience of happiness. Second, this paper proposes what I call the “Principle of Double Positive Proportionality”: when a subject takes action in pursuit of a particular super-existence, if the pursuit ultimately succeeds, the degree of happiness experienced by the subject is positively correlated with the initial intensity of the subject's desire; if the pursuit ultimately fails, the degree of suffering experienced is likewise positively correlated with the initial intensity of that desire. This paper examines the mechanisms underlying these two propositions and further develops the theoretical framework of Hyper-Existentialist theories of happiness.

This paper develops a systematic account of the mechanism through which happiness is generated within the theoretical framework of Super-Existentialism. I argue that comparison is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the generation of human happiness: without some form of comparison, a genuine experience of happiness cannot arise. Comparative activity may lead either to happiness or to suffering, and the experiential outcome is not directly determined by objective facts but is instead shaped entirely by the subject’s subjective cognition. Even when a subject’s cognition is significantly distorted, or even completely inconsistent with objective reality, if that subjective cognition prevails within the process of comparison, it can directly determine whether an experience of happiness is generated. By integrating the concept of Super-Existence with a theory of happiness, this paper seeks to explain, at the level of underlying logic, why happiness appears to be so scarce in modern society. It thereby offers a novel approach to understanding the nature of happiness, one that differs substantially from traditional approaches in ethics and psychology.

This series of studies takes Super-Existentialism as its central theoretical framework and systematically addresses the long-standing practical difficulties and cognitive misconceptions surrounding human happiness. Its aim is to move beyond the limitations of traditional discussions of happiness, clarify widespread misconceptions about happiness, uncover the deeper causes of the scarcity of happiness, and propose practical pathways toward achieving it. The central objective of this research is to construct a comprehensive Super-Existentialist theory of happiness that can provide a new theoretical framework for enhancing individual happiness and fulfillment in life. I maintain that the Super-Existentialist theory of happiness is one of the most optimistic theoretical frameworks currently available in the study of happiness. Through its practical application, every ordinary person may have the opportunity to attain genuine happiness of their own. As for the practical value and explanatory power of this theory, I respectfully leave it to readers to make their own judgment after reading the entire series. In my earlier years, I published several articles discussing happiness in the Chinese-language online publication Huaxia Express. However, I never systematically organized the ideas developed in those writings. In the present work, I have reorganized, expanded, and further developed those earlier studies into a comprehensive theory of happiness grounded in Super-Existentialism. I therefore call this theory A Super-Existentialist Theory of Happiness.

In this article, I would like to summarize the work on Social Choice Phenomenology that I have carried out so far and then bring this book to an end. I believe that all of my work in this direction to date has merely served the purpose of “throwing out a brick to attract jade”—that is, offering an initial contribution in the hope of stimulating further and more substantial research. I hope that other researchers will continue to develop and expand this theory. My personal plan for my subsequent work is first to discuss my theory of happiness. This theory differs substantially from prevailing theories of happiness. It is the result of my application of the concept of Super-Existence to the domain of human happiness. After completing my theory of happiness, I plan to discuss my philosophical theory of the meaning of life. This theory is also based on Super-Existentialism. I previously wrote a work entitled Existence and Super-Existence, but I did not complete it. Perhaps I will return to Existence and Super-Existence and complete it after finishing my theory of the meaning of life. I have also previously completed a philosophical theory of love, The Theory of Love Permeation, which is intended to explain the phenomenon of love. I would also like to organize and develop this work into a more systematic form. As I have mentioned previously, the concept of Super-Existence is a particularly important concept. We can conduct Super-Existence analyses in all academic disciplines. For me, this is undoubtedly a task that is almost impossible to complete in its entirety, but I should at least complete part of it. There is therefore a great deal of work to be done, and I hope to complete it step by step.

Cognitive-System Phenomenology is Zhiyi Guo’s attempt to reconstruct phenomenology by replacing the traditional emphasis on Husserl’s transcendental structures and Kant’s a priori forms with the concept of a cognitive system. According to Guo, a cognitive system consists principally of pre-existing knowledge together with the cognitive capacities through which a person perceives, interprets, remembers, imagines, and reasons. The central claim is that human beings never encounter the world through completely unstructured perception. Rather, perception and experience are always mediated by the cognitive system through which the world is apprehended. On this view, cognition plays a constitutive role in perception, meaning, and the constitution of objects.

In this article, we discuss the relationship between problems and choices, that is, social choice in a more general sense. In this situation, the subject does not know in advance what the available courses of action are. Instead, a new problem arises in the subject’s life. Such problems may take many forms: they may be problems at work, conflicts within the family, or other kinds of difficulties. The subject must resolve this new problem and therefore must find a way to address it. In the process of searching for a solution, the subject may encounter various possible choices. Ultimately, the subject finds a solution that both resolves the problem and is realistically feasible for them.

The philosophical relationship between Jacques Derrida and Zhiyi Guo can be understood as a fundamental confrontation over the nature and stability of meaning. Derrida’s philosophy of différance emphasizes the relational character of signs and the continual deferral of meaning. Guo, by contrast, argues that meaning cannot be adequately explained through difference and deferral alone. He seeks to reconstruct a more stable account of meaning by grounding it in examples, language, individual cognitive systems, and shared cognitive communities. The following discussion summarizes how two major AI search systems—Microsoft AI and Google AI—characterized the relationship between Derrida and Guo. These AI-generated assessments should not themselves be regarded as independent scholarly evaluations; rather, they provide an interesting indication of how Guo’s philosophical project can be interpreted and summarized by contemporary AI systems.

In this article, we primarily examine the risks involved in choice. Every choice entails some degree of risk; the only difference is the magnitude of that risk. We divide the risk of losing value through choice into two types: absolute risk and relative risk. If we classify risk according to the objectivity and subjectivity of choice, we can further distinguish between subjective risk and objective risk. At the same time, we can see that the subject’s cognitive system plays an extremely important role in the process of choice. This is also why we propose replacing Schutz’s concept of “stock of knowledge at hand” with the concept of a cognitive system in sociological research.

This article discusses the importance of choices and the difficulty of making choices for a choosing subject. We argue that choices that are extremely difficult for a subject are necessarily very important choices for that subject. However, a choice that is extremely important to a subject is not necessarily an extremely difficult choice. We also discuss a more general form of what I call the Sartrean Choice Problem. The Sartrean Choice Problem refers, in its specific form, to the dilemma faced by the young French man in Sartre's famous example during the Second World War: whether to remain with his mother or join the French Resistance against Germany. The more general form of the Sartrean Choice Problem refers to all choices that are extremely difficult for a subject.

In this section, we examine the concrete process of social choice through an example from everyday life. Specifically, we analyze the process of purchasing a house. This is a very common form of social choice, one that can be found everywhere in ordinary life. As we shall see, this process involves numerous choices as well as many actions. Some choices are made independently by the subject, some are made by other people, and some are completed jointly by the subject and other individuals (or organizations). These fundamental forms of choice considerably extend the scope of traditional sociology.

In the previous section, we discussed wartime negotiations between states. As an element of the Fourth World, a state is itself an existent being. Consequently, it possesses numerous Super-Existences. At the same time, it acts and makes choices, even though these choices are formally made by the head of state and the cabinet. Once such a decision is made, however, it represents the choice of the state itself. In Cognitive System Phenomenology – A Critique of Husserl, I suggested that the concept of Super-Existence might be extended into other fields, making it possible to establish disciplines such as Super-Existential Family Phenomenology, Super-Existential Phenomenology of Love, Super-Existential Educational Phenomenology, Super-Existential Corporate Phenomenology, and Super-Existential State Phenomenology. Admittedly, these ideas may seem rather imaginative. Nevertheless, in this section I would like to continue along this line of thought. Since we introduced the notion of a state's Super-Existence in the previous discussion, we shall now explore the possibility of establishing a Super-Existential State Phenomenology.

In A Critique of Derrida (Part 1), I criticized the core philosophical theory of the French deconstructionist philosopher Jacques Derrida. That critique centered primarily on Derrida's key concept of différance. What is différance? It is the view that the meaning of signs or written symbols arises only through their differences from other signs, and that meaning is forever in flux, never possessing a fixed or stable identity. In the previous article, I argued that: The meaning of a sign is not formed through difference. Otherwise, no sign would possess any intrinsic meaning. The meaning of a sign is not in perpetual flux. These arguments fundamentally undermine the philosophical foundation of deconstruction. In this paper, I investigate the processes by which the meanings of signs or words are generated, transmitted, understood, and transformed. I establish a Four-Element Theory of the Meaning of Signs, according to which the generation, transmission, understanding, and change of meaning depend upon four indispensable elements: examples (instances), language, the subject's cognitive system, and the cognitive system community. This theory explains both the stability of linguistic meaning and its occasional changes. Ultimately, my objective is to restore the legitimacy of philosophy as a whole. I believe this objective has now been achieved.

In this paper, we primarily discuss negotiation choice, a special form of choice in which two parties reach an agreement through negotiation. In some cases, this is a form of object choice, while in others it is not. We distinguish three situations: (1) both negotiating parties are individuals; (2) one party is an individual and the other is an element of the Fourth World; and (3) both parties are elements of the Fourth World. At the end of the paper, we examine gift-giving choice, which is not a negotiation choice. It is a special kind of choice in which a subject selects a gift for another person. In this kind of choice, one must consider not only the Super-Existence of the gift itself, but also the Super-Existence of the subject and that of the gift recipient.

Jacques Derrida was the founder of twentieth-century French deconstructionism and one of the principal representatives of post-structuralism. The core of his philosophy is deconstruction: the thorough dismantling of the "logocentrism" that had dominated Western philosophy for more than two thousand years, thereby overturning the traditional metaphysical framework of binary oppositions. The central concept of deconstruction is différance. Derrida argues that the meaning of every sign is generated only through its differences from other signs and is perpetually deferred in an endless process of interpretation. There is no fixed, immutable, self-sufficient ultimate essence that requires no further explanation. This perpetual difference and deferral is what Derrida calls différance. Consequently, the "ultimate truth" pursued by traditional philosophy is itself an unattainable illusion. One can never finally grasp it, because it always awaits further interpretation in yet another sign. This amounts to a direct denial of the legitimacy of the entire metaphysical enterprise that has occupied Western philosophy for the past two millennia. In this paper, I shall examine Derrida's famous concept of différance in detail and argue that he failed to grasp the true nature of signs. Consequently, all of his conclusions are mistaken. Contrary to Derrida's claim, the meaning of signs is neither constituted through difference nor forever in flux. In this way, the entire philosophical foundation of deconstructionism can be overturned, and the legitimacy of the two-thousand-year philosophical tradition can be reestablished.

In this paper, we examine the selection of a romantic partner. In choosing a romantic partner, the subject necessarily has certain selection criteria, and these criteria are inevitably reflections of the subject's psychological needs. We once again employ the method of Super-Existence in analyzing this process of choice. We know that the selection of a romantic partner is not merely a man's choice of a woman but also a woman's choice of a man. In essence, romantic partner selection is a two-way process. However, in this paper we consider only one party's selection of the other and do not discuss mutual selection. The issue of two-way selection will be examined in the next section.

In this paper, we examine the relationship between the Super-Existence of an object and the constraints imposed upon it by the subject's psychological needs. At the same time, we define the attractiveness and resistance of a particular Super-Existence of an object X with respect to the subject. If a certain Super-Existence of object X satisfies the subject, we say that this Super-Existence possesses attractiveness for the subject. The greater the degree of satisfaction, the greater its attractiveness. Conversely, if the Super-Existence fails to satisfy the subject, we say that it possesses resistance for the subject. Resistance may arise from execution costs, risks, or psychological burdens. In addition, we propose a formula for evaluating the subject's degree of satisfaction with an object. The subject may use this formula when making object selections. Nevertheless, this is only a very simple formula. We hope that more elegant and more accurate formulas will be developed in the future.