Zhiyi Guo

In this article, we mainly introduce the sociologist Max Weber’s classification of social action. He divided social action into four types: purposive-rational action, value-rational action, affectual action, and traditional action. These four forms are ideal types, while actual actions in society are mixtures of these ideal types. This classification was developed by Weber on the basis that social action constitutes the foundation of sociology. Since we take social choice, rather than social action, as the foundation of sociology, we will later classify social choice in several different ways as well.

In this paper, we provide a summary of Chapter One. In that chapter, we mainly discussed Sartre’s theory of social choice. This theory holds that an individual’s choice is completely free; therefore, when making a choice, the individual must bear responsibility for it. Moreover, an individual’s choice is responsible not only to others but to all of humanity. We primarily used the theory of “transcendental existence” (or “meta-existence”) to critique Sartre’s theory, pointing out that individual choice is not completely free but is instead governed by transcendental existence. At the same time, we criticized the view that an individual’s choices must be responsible to others, or even to all humanity. Finally, we used the concept of transcendental existence to resolve Sartre’s dilemma of choice. In the following sections, we will see more applications of transcendental existentialism to solve additional problems in social choice.

In this article, we discuss certain extremely difficult choices. Sartre presents an example: a young French man during World War II faces two options. One is to stay with his mother, who might not survive without him; the other is to join the anti-German resistance for the sake of his country. The young man is completely unable to choose. I call this problem “Sartre’s dilemma of choice.” Sartre believes that there is no way to provide guidance for this young man’s decision. Therefore, he can only make a free choice on his own and must take responsibility for it. However, super-existentialism offers an effective solution to this problem through the concept of “super-existence.”

Sartre believes that the subject’s choice produces pain, and that this pain arises because the subject must be responsible for others and for all of humanity. Sartre gives a military example: he argues that a military commander experiences pain because some people may die, since he must take responsibility for his soldiers. I do not believe that a military commander experiences pain for these reasons. The fact that people die in battle is something everyone knows. I also point out that Sartre’s claim—that the subject suffers pain because he must be responsible for all of humanity—is extremely absurd.

In this paper we discuss the issue of choice and responsibility. Concerning this issue, Sartre has two viewpoints: a conventional one and an unconventional one. The conventional view holds that each of us must be responsible for our own choices and that nothing else bears responsibility for them. The unconventional view holds that our choices should be responsible to all of humanity. In this paper we mainly discuss the conventional view and divide responsibility into two parts: whether one ought to be responsible and whether one is in fact responsible. We find that the things that ought to be responsible and the things that are actually responsible do not coincide. This constitutes an internal contradiction.

In this section, the concept of super-existence is employed to demonstrate that human choice is not completely free, but rather a form of freedom operating under the control of super-existence. For Dasein, super-existence both provides protection and imposes limitations. Every individual is subject to the control of super-existence. It is comparable to a chain placed upon us: we walk along the road of life while wearing this chain. Consequently, freedom of choice in the absolute sense does not exist.

In this section we mainly introduce the concept of the super-existence of objects. We then proceed to discuss the super-existence of human beings, or Dasein. With regard to the super-existence of Dasein, we distinguish self-aspect super-existence, other-aspect super-existence, and true-aspect super-existence. Furthermore, we subdivide the super-existence of Dasein into additional categories, such as invariant super-existence, virtual super-existence, internal super-existence, external super-existence, and so forth.

In this section I would like to offer a conclusion and then bring this book to an end. Immediately afterward I will begin work on Phenomenology of Social Choice. I consider phenomenology of social choice to be an interdisciplinary field that applies philosophy to sociology, or integrates sociology into philosophy. Establishing phenomenology of social choice is the next task I hope to accomplish. To acknowledge that we already possess a cognitive system when we come to know things is, I believe, absolutely necessary for epistemology—indeed unavoidable. Although philosophers rarely make this assumption explicit, in fact they all consciously or unconsciously rely upon a cognitive system. A cognitive system consists of two aspects: a system of knowledge and a system of cognitive capacities. Within the system of cognitive capacities I have introduced a priori spatializing capacity. The introduction of this capacity makes the process of the constitution of objects clearer and thereby effectively avoids Bertrand Russell’s criticism of Kant, a well-known criticism which I call “Russell’s ordering challenge.” In essence, Husserl’s theory also faces the problem that the process of object constitution is not sufficiently clear; therefore Russell’s ordering challenge applies equally to Husserl’s theoretical system. Finally, we may summarize cognitive-system phenomenology as follows.

In the previous section, we discussed the three major tasks of cognitive-system phenomenology. In this section, we will further elaborate on one part of the first major task. At the same time, we will freely imagine the possibility of establishing additional disciplinary systems. Since Husserl relies solely on intuition, his understanding of things is limited to what intuition can reach. Although Martin Heidegger was able to discuss more kinds of meaning—such as historical meaning and relational meaning—I believe that these meanings still do not encompass all possible meanings of an object. In Section 20, I introduced the concept of super-existence, which in essence covers all possible meanings of an object. In this way, we extend Husserl’s intuitive meanings, as well as Heidegger’s historical and relational meanings, to their fullest generalization. This totality constitutes all the super-existential meanings of an object. Therefore, it is reasonable to take the acquisition of all super-existential meanings of an object as a goal of epistemology—or at least the acquisition of all important super-existential meanings. In my article “Popper’s Three Worlds Theory and My Fourth World”, I introduced the concept of the Fourth World. The so-called Fourth World refers to a world composed of collectives. For example, all families are elements of the Fourth World, and a nation is also an element of the Fourth World. By combining the elements of the Fourth World with the concept of super-existence, we can envision additional theoretical systems. I believe we could establish disciplines such as Phenomenology of super-existential Family, Phenomenology of super-existential Love, Phenomenology of super-Existential Education, Phenomenology of super-Existential Enterprise, and Phenomenology of Super-Existential State. These are conjectures, but I consider them entirely reasonable.

In this section I would like to further discuss the fundamental tasks and the current state of cognitive-system phenomenology. Our actual process of cognition operates within a cognitive system. Each person’s cognitive system may differ, but everyone necessarily possesses one. Therefore, I believe that cognitive-system phenomenology is an epistemology that is closer to the real cognitive processes of human beings. Precisely because each of us possesses a cognitive system, we face several fundamental questions: How does the transcendental ego cognize objects under a cognitive system? How does the knowledge system of the transcendental ego grow? How are entirely new concepts and new knowledge discovered and then recognized by a community?

We previously introduced the concept of a language-related cognitive-system community. We may, for example, specify the language as English, since it is widely used throughout the world. This community is essentially the general public community—that is, its members are ordinary people. We may also call it the ordinary-person community. Within this large community, however, there are meaningful subsets. These subsets can be called sub-communities of the language-related cognitive-system community. In fact, there are many different kinds of such sub-communities.

We have introduced the concept of a cognitive-system community related to language (hereafter simply “community”). I consider this to be an important concept, one that accords with our actual cognitive processes. Each of us lives within such a community, and every member of the community possesses a distinctive cognitive system. Accordingly, we are faced with two extremely important questions: First, how is an individual’s cognitive system established? In the previous section, we attempted to answer this question, but we discussed only the formation of concepts. Clearly, in addition to concepts, we must also examine the formation of general knowledge. In this section, we will explore this issue. Although we discussed the formation of concepts within a cognitive system in the previous section, it is evident that this account is incomplete. We need a deeper and more comprehensive investigation of how concepts within a cognitive system are established. The previous section merely served as a preliminary step. The second extremely important question is: how do we come to know a new object within a community? What is this process like? How do we arrive at a new theory? And how does such a theory gain recognition? These are likewise extremely important questions, and we will offer a preliminary discussion of them in the next section. In fact, I believe that, under the framework of cognitive systems, epistemology as a whole must be reconstructed. Traditional epistemology has not explicitly acknowledged that the knowing subject possesses a cognitive system (even though it implicitly presupposes one). As a result, the first question does not arise within it. At the same time, the second question differs entirely depending on whether the existence of a cognitive system is explicitly assumed or not.

In the previous section, we introduced the concept of a cognitive-system community. Our primary interest lies in those cognitive-system communities that are related to language. As mentioned earlier, even a particular dialect can constitute a cognitive-system community. Thus, we can see that there are in fact many such communities associated with language. At the same time, with the development of technology, we are now able to translate more and more languages instantly, thereby enabling communication between people who use different languages. As a result, the number of people with whom we can directly communicate through language continues to grow. Consequently, cognitive-system communities associated with globally prevalent languages will also expand. In this section, we will discuss the differences and connections between language-based cognitive-system communities and Husserl’s lifeworld. We will also briefly touch upon the process of knowledge transmission within a cognitive-system community. Clearly, a more comprehensive study is required for the problem of the development of cognitive systems, and I intend to return to this topic for further research when time permits. We have also discussed three types of relationships among members of a cognitive-system community and introduced the concepts of binary isomorphism, ternary isomorphism, and quaternary isomorphism.

Since we retain the cognitive system of the transcendental ego, the transcendental ego discussed here is a transcendental ego endowed with a cognitive system. Strictly speaking, each of us possesses a different cognitive system. Thus, in theory, there are infinitely many different cognitive systems. But do these cognitive systems have anything in common? Under these different cognitive systems, how do we come to know the world? Is the cognition of the world derived from the cognitive system of the transcendental ego completely different from the cognition of the world derived from the cognitive system of another alter ego? Do we have a community of cognitive systems? If such a community exists, how is it constituted? And if there is a community of cognitive systems, how can we demonstrate that it truly exists? These are the questions that concern us. We will introduce the concept of a community of cognitive systems. We hope that an investigation of this concept will help us make progress in answering the questions above. However, we will first briefly discuss Husserl’s theory of intersubjectivity and his theory of the lifeworld. It is evident that although Husserl discusses intersubjectivity and the lifeworld, his account of intersubjectivity does not address the cognitive system of the transcendental ego, nor does it address the cognitive system of the other alter ego. Before introducing the concept of a community of cognitive systems, we need to introduce the notion of a cognitive system into both the transcendental ego and the other ego.

I originally intended to introduce in this section the concept of a community of cognitive systems. Upon reflection, however, I realized that something remained incomplete in our discussion of Husserl’s eidetic intuition. Accordingly, in this section we continue the analysis of Husserl’s eidetic intuition and seek to extend its domain to its broadest possible scope. Husserl’s eidetic intuition is primarily applied in cases such as the eidetic intuition of an apple, of color, of a triangle, and so forth. An apple corresponds to a concrete object; color corresponds to a surface property of an object; and although a triangle is a mathematical concept, it nevertheless corresponds to a certain form or shape. Notice that in all of the above examples—whether apple, color, or triangle—the result of eidetic intuition is our grasp of a concept: we apprehend the essence of a concept. For example, through the eidetic intuition of an apple, we grasp the essence of apple; through the intuition of a red sheet of paper, we grasp the essence of “red,” no longer this particular red; and through the eidetic intuition of a triangle, we grasp the essential features of triangularity. For “apple,” “red,” and “triangle” are all concepts. We may now pose the following question: Question A: For every concept, is eidetic intuition possible in this way? If not every concept admits such eidetic intuition, which kinds of concepts do? Through Proposition A, to be introduced later, we shall provide an elegant answer to this question.

In the preceding sections, we examined the functional super-existential meaning of objects and introduced what I termed functional eidetic intuition in correspondence with Husserl’s eidetic intuition. In Section 23, I further introduced the notion of functional accompaniments of an object. In the present section, I introduce what may be called the accompanying functional eidetic intuition of objects. The introduction of this concept further extends the domain of functional intuition. It can be observed that in the exhibition of an object’s function, in addition to the object whose function is manifested, other objects are typically required in order for this functional performance to occur. These auxiliary objects may be termed the accompanying objects of the functional act. By carrying out free imaginative variation (freie phantastische Variation) with respect to these accompanying objects, we arrive at the accompanying functional eidetic intuition of the object. Through this procedure, further possible modes of functional manifestation are disclosed. At this stage, five forms of intuition concerning objects can be distinguished: intuition of the object itself, intuition of its function, eidetic intuition of the object, functional eidetic intuition, and accompanying functional eidetic intuition. These expand upon Husserl’s classical distinction between perceptual intuition and eidetic intuition. In this sense, the present analysis broadens Husserl’s phenomenological field.

In the previous section, we discussed the functional supra-existential meaning of objects. In fact, functional supra-existential meaning is the most important supra-existential meaning of many objects, and it is also the reason why many objects exist at all. We manufacture many objects precisely in order to realize their functions. I personally believe that this is the real reason why Heidegger discussed the functions of so many objects. Therefore, I think we should further excavate the functional supra-existential meaning of objects and carry out more extensive and more detailed research on this topic. In this section, we mainly discuss Husserl’s eidetic intuition and what I define as functional eidetic intuition, and we compare these two kinds of intuition. I personally believe that the functional eidetic intuition of objects has an importance comparable to that of the eidetic intuition of objects. This importance is manifested in the full utilization of object functions, and it complements Husserl’s eidetic intuition.

In this section, I would like to discuss the functional super-existential meaning of objects. This is also one of the most important kinds of super-existential meaning that an object can have. Although the functions of certain objects cannot be intuited—for example, the function of the heart, which we discussed earlier—there are objects whose functions can be intuited. When the transcendental ego intuits a situation in which an object is being used, it thereby obtains the object’s functional super-existential meaning. Of course, it is hardly surprising that when the transcendental ego observes an object being used, it must inevitably already possess a cognitive system; moreover, the transcendental ego must recognize all the relevant objects involved in the object’s use. It is unclear whether Husserl ever discussed the intuition of an object’s function, but it is evident that function is what truly matters for many objects. Once we speak of importance, we must inevitably refer to human beings. The importance of an object’s function is entirely dependent on humans; apart from humans, discussing the importance of an object’s function has little meaning. That is to say, the ultimate meaning of an object’s function must be related to human beings. Take a chair as an example. Aside from its color—which we may or may not care about—its function is what we care about most. Its function is to allow us to sit comfortably. It is precisely because of this function that we deliberately manufacture chairs, and this is also the fundamental reason why a chair is a chair. Therefore, in my view, the functional super-existential meaning of an object is the most important super-existential meaning for certain objects. Clearly, however, Heidegger was deeply interested in the function of objects, and he may also have believed that function constitutes the most important mode of an object’s being. He discussed the functions of many objects and connected these functions with human beings and with the world. The function of an object seems to go beyond our ordinary pragmatic understanding and is instead regarded as a bridge that brings together humans, the world, and Being. I personally find this perspective quite novel, even though the connection seems somewhat forced.

In Section 20 we introduced the super-existence of a general object, and defined the super-existence of a general object as those existences related to that object, all of which jointly determine the object. In the present section, we shall discuss the super-existence of the human being, or more precisely, the super-existence of Dasein. One can easily imagine that the kinds of super-existence of Dasein are extremely numerous. I personally believe that the super-existence of Dasein could even constitute a specialized field of research in its own right. This is because a human being can function both as a subject and as an object, and because the subject can also take itself as an object. These facts greatly diversify our investigation of the super-existence of the human being. In this section, we shall introduce in-itself super-existence, self-aspect super-existence, and other-aspect super-existence, corresponding to in-itself super-existence and subjective super-existence in the case of general objects.

In our previous discussions, we focused primarily on visual intuition, which is, of course, a form of sensuous intuition. In this section, we will turn to non-visual forms of sensuous intuition. In phenomenology, “intuition” (Anschauung) should not be understood as a merely visual activity. The core of intuition does not lie in which sensory organ is employed, but rather in the manner in which an object is given to consciousness in its own way. Wherever an object can present itself to consciousness with a certain originary givenness (originäre Gegebenheit), this presentation may be called intuition. Accordingly, experiences constituted through vision, hearing, touch, smell, and bodily movement all belong to different forms of sensuous intuition. Different sensory organs do not merely provide different channels of information; rather, they correspond to different modes of givenness of the object and thus participate, at the level of meaning-structure, in the constitution of the object. Therefore, through the participation of various sensory organs, we are not only able to obtain the content-meaning of an object, but also to acquire many other sensuous meanings. However, we must recognize that positing (Setzung) itself depends on the cognitive system of the transcendental ego. Consequently, all meaning-constitution depends on the cognitive system of the transcendental ego. Different transcendental egos, by virtue of having different cognitive systems, obtain different object-meanings. Moreover, Husserl does not restrict intuition to the sensuous level. In his phenomenology, there also exist non-sensory forms of intuition, most notably eidetic intuition (Wesensanschauung). Eidetic intuition is not realized through sensory organs but rather through the imaginative activity of free variation, by which the invariant structures of objects are grasped. Thus, the phenomenological call to “return to intuition” does not amount to a return to sensory empiricism, but rather to a return to the domain in which all meanings can receive originary givenness. In this section, however, we confine ourselves to a discussion of sensuous intuition.

In this section, we supplement the discussion of Section 17. In the previous section, we raised a question: if the constituent parts of an object cannot be intuited, how are we to know them? Indeed, how are we even to know that they exist? More generally, if an object itself cannot be intuited, how are we to know it? And how are we to know that it exists at all? Since Husserl relies exclusively on intuition, he does not devote much investigation to this problem. Consequently, he is unable to provide a solution to it. Yet this is a meaningful problem, for epistemology cannot be concerned solely with what can be intuited. Therefore, as a supplement to the previous section, I would like to discuss here some concrete ideas concerning possible solutions to this problem. I believe that its resolution ultimately leads us back to the methods of scientific research.

In this section, we continue our discussion of super-existence. I would like to focus mainly on why I introduce the concept of super-existence, and on the hope that this concept can provide a certain solution to Kant’s dual opposition between the thing-in-itself and appearances. Personally, I consider the concept of super-existence to be very important. I originally proposed this concept in my research on philosophy of life; that is, within my investigation of philosophy of life, human super-existence plays a foundational role. Clearly, there are many forms of human super-existence—so many, in fact, that they could constitute an independent field of study. I plan to discuss human super-existence in the next section. I believe that the concept of the super-existence of objects will find applications in many disciplines, because the “objects” discussed here are not limited to the natural objects with which we are usually familiar. They also include objects belonging to Popper’s World 3, as well as the objects of a “World 4” that I introduce—namely, collective entities such as nations, corporations, armies, and so forth. In the previous section, we saw that in mathematics, imposing constraints on the super-existence of mathematical objects can yield new concepts. This conclusion holds not only for mathematics but also for other disciplines. The example we gave was the triangle. If we impose a constraint on one of a triangle’s angles (which is part of its super-existence), setting it equal to 90 degrees, we obtain the concept of a right triangle. Within the right triangle, we discover the Pythagorean theorem: the sum of the squares of the two legs equals the square of the hypotenuse. This theorem is both beautiful and famous. Thus, I believe that super-existence plays a positive role in mathematical discovery. I have also conducted some interdisciplinary research combining sociology and philosophy. After completing Cognitive-System Phenomenology — A Critique of Husserl, I intend to complete Phenomenology of Social Choice, and then my work on philosophy of life. In all of these projects, I apply the concept of super-existence. Personally, I believe that the concept of super-existence may be applicable to all disciplines, including the humanities. Whether this is truly the case remains to be seen; perhaps time will ultimately provide an answer. Let us wait and see.

In the preceding sections, we have preliminarily discussed the super-existence of an object. The content of an object, its color, size, shape, weight, and so forth all belong to the object’s super-existence. In this section, we attempt to give a definition of an object’s super-existence, although this definition is not particularly rigorous. I truly cannot think of a better way to define it; perhaps once the reader understands the meaning of super-existence, they will be able to construct an appropriate definition themselves. The super-existence of an object refers to those existences that are related to the object, and all of these related existences together determine the object. This definition is very simple and easy to understand, but it also has some obvious problems. For example, what does it mean to say that these things “together determine the object”? How do all these super-existences determine the object? Here, we still need to return to traditional dualism for understanding. Let us return to Kant’s “thing-in-itself.” Because Kant’s thing-in-itself is unknowable, it seems to me that the only way we can approach this unknowable object is through the super-existences of the object. For example, we understand the object itself through its content, color, size, shape, weight, and so on. Although the thing-in-itself is unknowable, its super-existences can be discovered. Our aim is to find all the super-existences of an object, or at least those that are important. In this special way, we “approach” the object itself. Starting from the definition of an object’s super-existence, we can see that, in fact, for any given object there can be very many super-existences, even infinitely many. The key question is: do we need all of these super-existences? Which super-existences are important, and which are not? And in what sense are we using the terms “important” and “unimportant” with respect to these super-existences? Moreover, how do we obtain these super-existences? As we discussed earlier, many super-existences can be obtained through intuition. However, some super-existences cannot be obtained through intuition. And we find that, in many cases, it is precisely those super-existences that cannot be obtained through intuition that are more important. For those super-existences that cannot be obtained through intuition, how are we to obtain them?

In this section, we discuss the relationship between wholes and parts. However, the perspective we adopt is that of determining the meaning of an object’s constituent parts through intuition. That is to say, we treat parts as a kind of super-existential meaning of the object (which we call the meaning of an object’s constituent parts), and this super-existential meaning can be obtained through intuition. Of course, there are certain meanings of constituent parts that cannot be obtained through visual intuition. Therefore, through visual intuition, the transcendental ego can obtain only the meanings of some constituent parts of objects, while the meanings of other constituent parts cannot be obtained intuitively. How these meanings of constituent parts are obtained, or even how we know that they exist at all, in my view constitutes yet another epistemological problem. Naturally, this is a problem that Husserl is completely incapable of sensing. Since Husserl can only employ intuition, he is entirely unable to resolve such problems. Consequently, he neither raises this question nor any similar ones.

In this section we discuss dynamic intuition. In previous sections we dealt solely with static intuition, that is, cases in which, as the transcendental ego carries out its intuition, the object remains at rest. Here we examine the intuition of objects in motion, and accordingly the transcendental ego’s constitution of such objects under dynamic intuition, as well as possible constitution errors. Note that so-called dynamic intuition still occurs within a determinate situation or surrounding, and therefore belongs to what we called in Section 15 situational intuition, itself a species of sensuous intuition (sensible intuition).

Earlier we discussed an object’s content-meaning, size-meaning, color-meaning, shape-meaning, and even aesthetic-meaning. All of these meanings are obtained through the intuition of the eyes. Husserl holds that intuition is the only way to know things, because in his view only intuition can bring us clarity. Of course, besides this sensory intuition, he also discusses eidetic intuition, which he believes can disclose the essences of things. For now, let us still focus on sensory intuition. We can see that such intuition directly depends on our sensory organ—the eyes—and the meanings derived from it belong to what we called in the previous section “sensory meanings.” Sensory meanings belong to the sphere of super-existential meanings; therefore we may also call them “sensory super-existential meanings.” A very natural question then arises: beyond content-meaning, size-meaning, and other such super-existential meanings obtained through visual intuition, what other super-existential meanings can be derived? Here we attempt to exhaust all the kinds of super-existential meaning that can be given by visual intuition. In this section we will discuss another type of super-existential meaning derived from intuition: scene-meaning. The corresponding form of intuition is scene-intuition. We find that the process of scene-intuition is extremely similar to Husserl’s categorial object. We will discuss this in detail later.