Zhiyi Guo

We continue our discussion of positing meanings (Legitimation). In the preceding sections, we mentioned that objects possess various kinds of meanings. Among these, the most extensive system of meanings consists of all the super-existential meanings of an object. Naturally, what we discussed earlier was primarily the content meanings of an object, and content meanings are themselves a subset of super-existential meanings. In the next few sections, we will examine another relatively common kind of super-existential meaning aside from content meaning. I call this sensory meaning, a meaning obtained through the operation of the sensory organs upon an object. What we posit here is precisely the sensory meaning of an object. We see an object through the intuitive operation of the eyes; we touch an object through the hands; we hear sounds through the ears; we smell odors through the nose; we taste flavors through the mouth. The sensory impact of an object thus arises through the eye, nose, mouth, ears, and hands. Through the operation of the senses, we are able to discover more properties of an object, and in this way we may gain a deeper understanding of it. In this section we focus mainly on the contribution of visual intuition to our apprehension of an object. We observe that the intuitive operation of the eyes not only provides us with content meanings, but also yields other sensory meanings—namely, the sensory meanings derived from intuition.

In Section 10, we discussed meaning-establishment errors and mistakes, as well as the causes that give rise to them. In the examples we examined, the main causes of such errors were deficiencies in the transcendental self’s cognitive system—either deficiencies in its knowledge system or in its system of abilities. A very natural question arises: apart from deficiencies in the transcendental self’s cognitive system (its knowledge and abilities), what other factors might cause errors or mistakes in meaning-establishment? In this section, through our analysis, we want to point out to the reader that recognizing things, or distinguishing two different things, cannot be achieved solely through intuition. If, like Husserl, we rely only on intuition and only on clarity derived from intuition, we will be entirely unable to recognize certain things. We must make use of non-intuitive methods—and this is precisely what Husserl would inevitably oppose. In this section, we will present several examples that cannot be resolved by Husserl’s intuition alone. These examples are not at all rare. However, how to fully resolve these problems is a challenge that epistemology cannot avoid. Here, we merely offer a preliminary gesture—“throwing out a brick to attract jade.”

We continue our discussion of the Theory of Meaning-Establishment within the framework of the Phenomenology of the Cognitive System. In the previous section, we introduced the concept of the Transcendental Ego Group, in which each element corresponds to a different cognitive system. When facing an object G, a transcendental ego X may or may not recognize this object. In both cases, we discussed the establishment of meaning (liyi, 立义) regarding G, which depends on the object W as constructed in the consciousness of X. In this section, we ask: Why are we able to establish meaning at all? What is the underlying reason that makes meaning-establishment possible? I think this question is both natural and extremely important. Of course, Husserl never investigated it in depth. Why not? Given Husserl’s rigorous logical thinking, it is impossible that he did not consider such a question. I believe Husserl deliberately avoided it, because any inquiry into how meaning can be established necessarily presupposes a cognitive system — something Husserl absolutely refused to assume explicitly. Let us suppose that a transcendental ego X faces an apple G. According to the phenomenology of the cognitive system, through primary planar intuition and a priori spatialization re-intuition, X obtains a spatial object W. After constructing W, X can establish G as “an apple.” But why is G established as an apple rather than a peach? How does the transcendental ego X accomplish this? Obviously, when X sees an apple, he cannot be identifying it by recalling the definition of “apple.” Apples come from apple trees, but X cannot (and indeed, need not) determine it by tracing its origin. Yet, how do we know that it is an apple? In this section, I will introduce a special human capacity — the a priori capacity for essential sedimentation and essential intuition — to answer this question. This capacity belongs to the ability system within the cognitive system phenomenology. It also allows us to once again appreciate Kant’s idea that “man legislates for nature.”

The British philosopher Karl Popper first proposed his famous “Three Worlds” theory in 1967. This theory was later refined and developed in his book Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach. In my previous essay, Popper’s Theory of the Three Worlds and My Fourth World, I proposed the existence of a fourth world, one that does not depend on our individual will. The elements of this world are also familiar to us — families, companies, nations, and so forth. I call this the collective world, or World 4. It is in fact a vast domain, since every family, company, nation, group, or organization is an element of it. Obviously, these elements objectively exist — the United States exists objectively, China exists objectively, and Microsoft, as one of the largest corporations in the world, also exists objectively. I personally believe that the elements of this world are of extreme importance to human survival and continuation. However, I am not entirely satisfied with the limits Popper placed on his third world. I believe that World 3 should include more elements. In this essay, I propose the maximal expansion of Popper’s World 3, thereby introducing a new Third World — one that includes Popper’s original World 3 as a subdomain.

In this section, we will develop the theory of Signification within the framework of Cognitive System Phenomenology (here we mainly consider content signification; other forms of signification will be discussed later). Different cognitive systems lead to different transcendental egos, forming what I call a transcendental ego group. Each element within this group has a distinct way of signifying objects. The three most basic types of signification are: affirmative signification, possible signification, and negative signification. We must point out that our signification is not directed toward objects within consciousness, which makes it fundamentally different from Husserl’s. In fact, although Husserl believed his signification was directed at objects in consciousness, in essence, his signification also refers to transcendent objects, because it is impossible to signify an object that exists purely in consciousness. Thus, Husserl cannot truly “bracket” the external world (a conclusion that seems to shake the very foundation of his entire theory). We will explain why later. Through original intuition, we obtain a planar object; through spatialized re-intuition, we obtain a spatial object. Now we must ask—what exactly is this spatial object? This is the process of content signification. The content signification of an object is the conceptual definition of its content. We can imagine that this process is quite natural. The need to “signify” is also natural: if I wish to know something placed before me, I naturally want to know what it is. This is the most basic epistemological problem. It fully demonstrates the reasonableness and necessity of establishing a theory of signification. Beyond content signification, there are many other forms of signification (though content signification is the most important one). The broadest and most profound type of signification is what I call the trans-existential signification, related to my concept of super-existence. I believe the introduction of the super-existence concept is extremely important, for it will inevitably influence all disciplines. We will discuss the super-existence of objects later.

In this section, we will discuss Kant’s theory of space and Russell’s challenge to it, which I call Russell’s arrangement challenge. In fact, I do not know whether anyone has ever solved this challenge. In my view, Kant’s theory of space, Husserl’s theory of object constitution, and indeed all theories of object constitution face two fundamental difficulties: one is the clarity of the process of object constitution, and the other is Russell’s arrangement challenge. These two difficulties are, in essence, the essential problems inherent in all theories of object constitution. I have actually discussed this problem before in the example of the cube. But some readers, after reading that discussion, still have many doubts—especially regarding the solution to Russell’s arrangement challenge. Some believe that I have not solved it. In this section, I will rigorously prove that within my system, Russell’s arrangement challenge has indeed been completely resolved. In the next section, we will construct a theory of meaning constitution, which will differ from Husserl’s theory of meaning constitution, because we will be examining different cognitive systems. In fact, to establish any theory of meaning constitution, one must assume that we possess a knowledge system. We will also attempt to answer the question: How is meaning possible? It is evident that Husserl did not answer this question.

In the preceding discussions, we established a basic framework for Cognitive System Phenomenology. We have pointed out that every cognitive activity necessarily depends upon our existing cognitive system — this is beyond doubt. Therefore, I believe that Cognitive System Phenomenology is the truly correct method for epistemology and that it holds revolutionary significance for epistemology as a whole. Subsequently, we generalized the example of “seeing” a cube and developed a static phenomenological theory under Cognitive System Phenomenology. This theory corresponds to Husserl’s static phenomenology. In this section, we will first develop the theory of object constitution under Cognitive System Phenomenology. In fact, we have already discussed this theory in a general way earlier. Here, we will explore it in greater depth and detail to make it more complete.

This paper examines the deep structural parallels between Heidegger’s lectern experience and the author’s own Cognitive System Phenomenology. It argues that Heidegger’s analysis implicitly anticipates the framework of cognitive system phenomenology, yet remains incomplete without explicit recognition of the cognitive and knowledge systems that mediate perception. By reinterpreting Heidegger’s example through the lens of cognitive structure, this essay resolves key tensions in both Husserl’s and Heidegger’s accounts of perception, while situating cognition as the true locus of phenomenological constitution.

In this paper, I propose to develop a new form of phenomenology, which I call Phenomenology of the Cognitive System. How does this phenomenology differ from existing philosophical approaches? To answer this, let us begin with a basic idea: Kantian philosophy may be understood as equipping us with the “lenses” of time, space, and categories through which we view the world. Yet in reality, we see the world through the “lenses” of a cognitive system. This represents, in my view, a genuine improvement upon traditional epistemology. It is with this conviction that I am eager to construct a new theory of knowledge. This is the founding motivation of the Phenomenology of the Cognitive System.

Karl Popper’s well-known theory of the three worlds distinguishes between the material, the mental, and the world of objective knowledge. This framework, though groundbreaking, leaves unexplained certain forms of existence that cannot be reduced to any of the three. In this essay, I propose an extension to Popper’s model by introducing a Fourth World—the collective world, or World 4. This world encompasses entities such as nations, families, companies, and other social groupings, all of which exist objectively yet belong neither to the material, mental, nor knowledge domains. The theory of the Fourth World not only corrects an incompleteness in Popper’s ontology but also opens an entirely new field of philosophical investigation into the nature of collective existence and its relations to the other three worlds.