• PhilPapers
  • PhilPeople
  • PhilArchive
  • PhilEvents
  • PhilJobs
  • Sign in
PhilPeople
 
  • Sign in
  • News Feed
  • Find Philosophers
  • Departments
  • Radar
  • Help
 
profile-cover
Drag to reposition
profile picture

Laurence Goldstein
(1947 - 2014)

PhD: University of St. AndrewsLast affiliation: University of Kent
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    125
    • Most Recent
    • Most Downloaded
    • Topics
  •  News and Updates
    43

 More details
  • University of Kent
    Regular Faculty
University of St. Andrews
PhD, 1977
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Language
Logic and Philosophy of Logic
Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy
20th Century Philosophy
  • All publications (125)
  •  51
    Happiness, Death and the Remainder of Life
    Philosophy Now 42 26-27. 2003.
  •  97
    Strengthened paradoxes
    with Leonard Goddard
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 58 (3). 1980.
    This Article does not have an abstract
    Liar Paradox
  •  203
    Review: Wittgenstein: Meaning and Judgement (review)
    Mind 115 (458): 437-439. 2006.
    Ludwig Wittgenstein
  •  101
    Drawing hands
    The Philosophers' Magazine 45 (45): 79-79. 2009.
  •  111
    Wittgenstein's Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics
    Philosophical Quarterly 27 (109): 370. 1977.
    Ludwig Wittgenstein
  •  1
    A Problem For The Dialetheist
    Bulletin of the Section of Logic 15 (1): 10-13. 1986.
    There has recently been revived logical interest, particularly in the context of attempts to solve the logico-semantical paradoxes, of the idea that there are true contracistions, and of semantics accomodating the glut value both true and false. By considering some generally accepted claims about assertion. I attempt to show that this dialetheist idea is untenable
    Liar Paradox
  •  99
    Paradoxes: Their roots, range and resolution
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (4). 2004.
    Book Information Paradoxes: Their Roots, Range and Resolution. Paradoxes: Their Roots, Range and Resolution Nicholas Rescher , Chicago and La Salle : Open Court , 2001 , xxiii + 293 , US$24.95 ( paper ). By Nicholas Rescher. Open Court. Chicago and La Salle. Pp. xxiii + 293. US$24.95 (paper:).
    Liar Paradox
  •  149
    The title of this paper is 'quotation'
    Analysis 45 (3): 137-140. 1985.
    Quotation
  •  113
    On failing to assert: Reply to David Sherry
    Philosophia 31 (3): 579-588. 2004.
    Philosophy of Linguistics
  •  67
    The Puzzle about Pierre
    Cogito 4 (2): 101-106. 1990.
  •  157
    III-A Unified Solution to Some Paradoxes
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (1): 53-74. 2000.
    The Russell class does not exist because the conditions purporting to specify that class are contradictory, and hence fail to specify any class. Equally, the conditions purporting to specify the Liar statement are contradictory and hence, although the Liar sentence is grammatically in order, it fails to yield a statement. Thus the common source of these and related paradoxes is contradictory (or tautologous) specifying conditions-for such conditions fail to specify. This is the diagnosis. The cu…Read more
    The Russell class does not exist because the conditions purporting to specify that class are contradictory, and hence fail to specify any class. Equally, the conditions purporting to specify the Liar statement are contradictory and hence, although the Liar sentence is grammatically in order, it fails to yield a statement. Thus the common source of these and related paradoxes is contradictory (or tautologous) specifying conditions-for such conditions fail to specify. This is the diagnosis. The cure consists of seeking and destroying the deep-seated preconceptions that make almost irresistible our belief in the existence of items which provably do not exist
    Liar Paradox
  •  1649
    The Barber, Russell's Paradox, Catch-22, God, Contradiction, and More
    In Graham Priest, Jc Beall & Bradley P. Armour-Garb (eds.), The Law of Non-Contradiction: New Philosophical Essays, Oxford University Press. pp. 295--313. 2004.
    outrageous remarks about contradictions. Perhaps the most striking remark he makes is that they are not false. This claim first appears in his early notebooks (Wittgenstein 1960, p.108). In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein argued that contradictions (like tautologies) are not statements (Sätze) and hence are not false (or true). This is a consequence of his theory that genuine statements are pictures.
    20th Century British PhilosophyParadoxesRussell's ParadoxLudwig WittgensteinBertrand Russell
  •  238
    False stipulation and semantical paradox
    Analysis 46 (4): 192-195. 1986.
    Liar Paradox
  •  14
    Reasoning without Contradiction
    The Reasoner 6 (12): 183-184. 2012.
  •  50
    Smooth and Rough Logic
    Philosophical Investigations 15 (2): 93-110. 1992.
    Logic and Philosophy of Logic, General Works
  • Clear and Queer Thinking: Wittgenstein's Development and His Relevance to Modern Thought
    Mind 110 (437): 207-211. 2001.
  •  30
    Wittgenstein and Legal Theory
    Philosophical Books 34 (4): 242-244. 1993.
    Ludwig Wittgenstein
  •  80
    A Buridanian discussion of desire, murder and democracy
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 70 (4). 1992.
    This Article does not have an abstract
    MurderDemocracyJean Buridan
  • Pasquale Frascolla, Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Mathematics
    Philosophical Investigations 19 337-341. 1996.
    Ludwig Wittgenstein
  •  137
    The sorites as a lesson in semantics
    Mind 97 (387): 447-455. 1988.
    Sorites Paradox
  •  106
    Logic and reasoning
    Erkenntnis 28 (3). 1988.
    Logic and Philosophy of LogicLogicsLogic and Philosophy of Logic, Miscellaneous
  •  60
    To Let: Unsuccessful Stipulation, Bad Proof, and Paradox
    American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (1): 93. 2013.
    Letting is a common practice in mathematics. For example, we let x be the sum of the first n integers and, after a short proof, conclude that x = n(n+1)/2; we let J be the point where the bisectors of two of the angles of a triangle intersect and prove that this coincides with H, the point at which another pair of bisectors of the angles of that triangle intersect. Karl Weierstrass's colleagues, in an attempt to solve optimization problems, stipulated that the minimum area for a triangle with a …Read more
    Letting is a common practice in mathematics. For example, we let x be the sum of the first n integers and, after a short proof, conclude that x = n(n+1)/2; we let J be the point where the bisectors of two of the angles of a triangle intersect and prove that this coincides with H, the point at which another pair of bisectors of the angles of that triangle intersect. Karl Weierstrass's colleagues, in an attempt to solve optimization problems, stipulated that the minimum area for a triangle with a given perimeter be a straight line segment conceived as a triangle with zero altitude. (Weierstrass complained that this obscured the insight that some problems have no solutions.) In mathematics applied to physics, we let x be the temperature in Fahrenheit corresponding to 30° Centigrade; we let v be the velocity of the Earth through the luminiferous ether. Before the error was spotted, the official rules for Little League Baseball made an inconsistent stipulation about the dimensions of home plate (Bradley 1996).
    Areas of Mathematics
  •  269
    How original a work is the tractatus logico-philosophicus?
    Philosophy 77 (3): 421-446. 2002.
    Wittgenstein's Tractatus is widely regarded as a masterpiece, a brilliant, if flawed attempt to achieve an ‘unassailable and definitive … final solution’ to a wide range of philosophical problems. Yet, in a 1931 notebook, Wittgenstein confesses: ‘I think there is some truth in my idea that I am really only reproductive in my thinking. I think I have never invented a line of thinking but that it was always provided for me by someone else’. This disarming self-assessment is, I believe accurate. Th…Read more
    Wittgenstein's Tractatus is widely regarded as a masterpiece, a brilliant, if flawed attempt to achieve an ‘unassailable and definitive … final solution’ to a wide range of philosophical problems. Yet, in a 1931 notebook, Wittgenstein confesses: ‘I think there is some truth in my idea that I am really only reproductive in my thinking. I think I have never invented a line of thinking but that it was always provided for me by someone else’. This disarming self-assessment is, I believe accurate. The Tractatus, despite making significant advances on the logical doctrines of Frege and Russell, is essentially a derivative work—Wittgenstein, as he elsewhere acknowledges, provided a fertile soil in which the original seeds of other peoples' thought grew in a unique way. In a play of mine, published in Philosophy (1999), Wittgenstein fails a tough viva on the Tractatus because he fails to properly support some of the weak arguments in the work and because of his inadequate acknowledgment of sources. The present paper further explores some of the antecedents of Wittgenstein's early views and answers some criticisms of the play.
    Ludwig Wittgenstein
  •  90
    Scientific scotism - the emperor's new trousers or has Armstrong made some real strides?
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (1). 1983.
    (1983). Scientific scotism — The emperor's new trousers or has armstrong made some real strides? Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 61, No. 1, pp. 40-57
    Ontology
  •  187
    Epimenides and Curry
    Analysis 46 (3). 1986.
    Liar Paradox
  •  49
    Wittgenstein’s Most Important Contribution to the Philosophy of Logic
    In Danièle Moyal-Sharrock, Volker Munz & Annalisa Coliva (eds.), Mind, Language and Action: Proceedings of the 36th International Wittgenstein Symposium, De Gruyter. pp. 3-20. 2015.
    Ludwig Wittgenstein
  •  166
    A yabloesque paradox in set theory
    Analysis 54 (4): 223-227. 1994.
    Science, Logic, and MathematicsParadoxes
  •  134
    Quotation of Types and Other Types of Quotation
    Analysis 44 (1). 1984.
    Quotation
  •  77
    Translating Utterances, Reporting Beliefs
    The Reasoner 2 (3): 3-4. 2008.
    Responds to Constaninescu on the Non-Substitutivity and suggests a better approach built on consideration of the way in which beliefs are (usually concisely) reported.
    Metaphysics and EpistemologyBeliefPhilosophy of Linguistics
  •  44
    Only Joking?
    Philosophy Now 34 25-26. 2001.
    When is a joke morally dubious?
    Humour
  • Prev.
  • 1
  • 2
  • 3
  • 4
  • 5
  • Next
PhilPeople logo

On this site

  • Find a philosopher
  • Find a department
  • The Radar
  • Index of professional philosophers
  • Index of departments
  • Help
  • Acknowledgments
  • Careers
  • Contact us
  • Terms and conditions

Brought to you by

  • The PhilPapers Foundation
  • The American Philosophical Association
  • Centre for Digital Philosophy, Western University
PhilPeople is currently in Beta Sponsored by the PhilPapers Foundation and the American Philosophical Association
Feedback