Joachim Schummer

The paper reappraises the operational definition of elements, adopted in the late eighteenth century, by investigating both epistemic discontinuities and continuities within the broader epistemological and cultural context. The first part points out the radical disruption that the operational definition implied for most of science, which consisted in giving up explanation, the primary goal of natural philosophy, because the new elements had to be discovered. The operational turn in chemistry is then compared to several well-discussed “revolutions,” including the Kantian, relativistic, and quantum revolutions in physics, which similarly modified our understanding of fundamental concepts of natural philosophy, such as time, space, and causation, by relating them to human capacities.

Societal and ethical implications of nanotechnology have become a hot topic of public debates in many countries because both revolutionary changes and strong public concerns are expected from its development. Because nanotechnology is, at this point, mostly articulated in visionary and futuristic terms, it is difficult to apply standard methods of technology assessment and even more difficult to consider it in engineering ethics courses. In this article, the authors suggest using selected science fiction stories in the engineering ethics classroom to provide students with ethical skills and cultural knowledge required for engaging in public debates and for responsible decision making. Against the background of general debates on teaching engineering ethics, they do so by discussing the advantages and possible drawbacks of this approach and by presenting two examples of nano-science fiction classics.

This paper presents an epistemological approach to the investigation of material properties that is opposed to both phenomenalistic epistemology and recent linguistical and ontological accounts of matter/mass terms. Emphasis is laid on the inherent context dependence of material properties. It is shown that, if this is taken seriously, some deep epistemological problems arise, like unavoidable uncertainty, incompleteness, inductivity, and nonderivableness. It is further argued that some widely held epistemological accounts, namely that of essentialism, constructivism, and pragmatism, all reveal some serious defects if related to the recognition of materials. In order to responsibly manage our material environment, a more realistic estimation of our epistemic abilities and prospects is suggested.

This paper investigates the development of nanotechnology from three different points of view: as a new technology, as social dynamics, and as an ideology. It argues that nanotechnology is not a new technology but a new social dynamics guided by programmatic ideas and situated at the interface between science and the public. Rather than being determined by social constructivism, the main argument is based on the poor scientific and technological identity of nanotechnology. Finally the paper concludes that nanotechnology is to be considered an extension and increase of materials science and engineering, not only scientifically but in particular socially and ideologically, by pointing out common characteristics and differences.

Nowadays it is well known among historians of science that Francis Bacon, one of the modern defender of the experimental method, owed much of his thoughts to the chemical or alchemical tradition (cf. e.g., Gregory 1938, West 1961, Linden 1974, and Rees 1977). In fact, alchemy, particularly in the Arabic tradition, was always based on laboratory investigations by carefully examining the results of controlled manipulation of materials.1 It is also well known that Francis Bacon’s appeal to the experimental method was severe criticism of scholasticism in philosophy of nature and, in particular, of authority as the basis of knowledge.2 If we compare philosophy of nature in the early 17th century with phi-.

There is a rapidly growing public interest in nanotechnology such that people increasingly buy various books to inform themselves about nanotechnology. This paper tries to measure the public interest focus on nanotechnology and its relation to the public interest in other fields of knowledge by applying a new method. I combine formal network analysis of co-purchase book data with traditional content analysis. The method is successful in identifying the books that the public reads to be informed about nanotechnology, in distinguishing between different kinds and classes of books and thereby between different interest foci and readerships and their relations. The results suggest that nanotechnology is for many the first intense contact with science and technology and that they read a great variety of different kinds of books. Rather than on general introductions to current research written by scientists or science journalists, readers focus on forecasting and visionary literature including business guides, written by software entrepreneurs and business consultants. Unlike expert readers, who connect nanotechnology to other fields of science and engineering, the broader public connects it to visions about dissolving the human/machine distinction. Although the distinction between non-fiction and science fiction is still important for readers, border-crossing authors increasingly blur it.

Zu Beginn eines wissenschaftlichen Projekts – manchmal schon bei dessen Beantragung – sind Wissenschaftler mit der Frage konfrontiert, wie sie sich öffentlich sichtbar präsentieren. Ein griffiger Name (am besten ein eingängiges Akronym) und ein Logo müssen her, um Website, Visitenkarte, Briefkopf, Plakate und Poster zu zieren. Wer Peinlichkeiten vermeiden will, beauftragt gleich einen Werbedesigner für die visuelle Präsentation. Doch woher weiß der Designer, wie Wissenschaft visuell dargestellt wird? Weiß der Wissenschaftler das nicht viel besser? Der Wissenschaftler kennt all die Dinge im Detail, die typisch für seine spezielle Forschung und Disziplin sind. Der Designer weiß hingegen Bescheid, was im Allgemeinen als typisch für Wissenschaft oder für die jeweilige Disziplin gehalten wird. Im besten Fall setzen sich beide zusammen und finden einen Mittelweg – einerseits zwischen allgemeinem und speziellem Wissenschaftsbild und andererseits zwischen dem, was in der Wissenschaft als typisch gilt, und dem, was öffentlich für wissenschaftstypisch gehalten wird. Der kompromissbereite Wissenschaftler wird vielleicht mit leichtem Unbehagen auch solchen Bildern zustimmen, die er als Platitüden oder überzogene Klischees empfindet, solange sie seinem Projekt öffentliche Aufmerksamkeit einbringen. So wird das öffentliche Bild der Wissenschaft nicht nur in jedem Einzelfall, sondern auch ganz allgemein zwischen unterschiedlichen Interessen und visuellen Kulturen ausgehandelt. Seit piktographische Designerprodukte in großen Datenbanken online verfügbar und nach Stichworten durchsuchbar sind (zum Beispiel in clipart.com), lässt sich das öffentliche Bild der Wissenschaft recht gut qualitativ und quantitativ untersuchen.1 Dabei fällt zunächst auf, dass die meisten klassischen Wissenschaftsdisziplinen stereotypische Piktogramme besitzen, die für typisch gehaltene Gegenstände darstellen. Ein Zirkel und mathematische Formeln sind eindeutige Symbole der Geometrie beziehungsweise der Algebra, ein Fernrohr repräsentiert die Astronomie, Knochen oder Schädel sind unverkennbare Indikatoren der Anatomie, die Biologie wird meist durch ein Mikroskop darstellt und so weiter..

The birth of a new discipline, called 'physical chemistry', is sometimes related to the names OSTWALD, ARRHENIUS and VAN'T HOFF and dated back to the year 1887, when OSTWALD founded the Zeitschrift für physikalische Chemie.[1] But as many historians have pointed out, the phrase 'physical chemistry' was widely used before that and the topics under investigation partially go back to Robert BOYLE's attempts to connect chemistry with concepts of mechanical philosophy.[2] The idea of a sudden birth of physical chemistry in 1887 seems to be a founder myth.[3] But there is no doubt that in the late nineteenth-century there was a rapid growth of research in fields now understood as physical chemistry: chemical thermodynamics, electrochemistry, photochemistry, spectroscopy, chemical kinetics etc

In this paper we investigate the most important visual stereotypes of chemistry as they occur in current portraits of chemists, depictions of chemical plants, and images of chemical glassware and apparatus. By studying the historical origin and development of these stereotypes within the broader context of the history of art and science, and by applying aesthetic and cultural theories, we explore what these images implicitly communicate about the chemical profession to the public. We conclude that chemists, along with commercial artists, have unknowingly created a visual image of chemistry that frequently conveys negative historical associations, ranging from imposture to kitsch. Other elements of this image, however, aestheticize chemistry in a positive manner by referring to classical ideals of beauty and borrowing from revered motifs of modern art

Ostwald (born September 2, 1853, Riga, Latvia, Russia; died April 4, 1932, at his private estate near Leipzig, Germany) almost single-handedly established physical chemistry as an acknowledged academic discipline. In 1909, he was awarded the Nobel Prize in chemistry for his work on catalysis, chemical equilibria, and reaction velocities. Ostwald was graduated in chemistry at the University of Dorpat (now Tartu, Estonia) and appointed professor of chemistry in Riga in 1881, before he moved from Russia to Germany on the chair in physical chemistry at the University of Leipzig in 1887. For about twenty years he made Leipzig an international center of physical chemistry: by establishing an instruction and research laboratory that attracted virtually the whole next generation of physical chemists; by editing the first journal of the field (Zeitschrift für physikalische Chemie); and by writing numerous textbooks. In 1906, he retired from university and devoted the rest of his life to various topics, including the history and philosophy of science, color theory, painting, the writing of textbooks and popular books about science, the international organization of science, and the formation of an artificial language for the international exchange of ideas. Since his master degree thesis in 1876, Ostwald followed the general approach of applying physical measurement and mathematical reasoning to chemical issues. One of his major research topics was the chemical affinity of acids and bases. To that end, he studied the point of equilibrium in reactions systems where two acids in aqueous solution compete with each other for reaction with one base and vice versa. Because chemical analysis would have changed the equilibria, he skillfully adapted the measurement of physical properties to that problem, such as volume, refractive index, and electrical conductivity. From his extensive data he derived for each acid and base a characteristic affinity coefficient independent of the particular acid-base reactions. To understand the different chemical affinities, Ostwald drew on a new, but then hardly accepted and not yet fully developed, theory advanced by Svante Arrhenius. According to this theory of electrolytic dissociation, electrolytes like acids, bases, and salts dissociate in solution into oppositely charged ions to a certain degree, such that at infinite solution dissociation is complete..

The artificial creation of life arises both strong fascination by scientists and strong concerns, if not abhorrence, by critics of science. What appears to be the crowning achievement of synthetic biology is at the same time considered a major evil. That conflict, which perhaps epitomizes many of the cultural conflicts about science in Western societies, calls for a deeper analysis. Standard ethical analyses, which would try to relate such conflicts to a difference in fundamental values, are difficult to apply here, because it is unclear what the underlying values of such emotions as fascination and abhorrence are. These emotions or affects, rather than just referring to what is morally right or wrong, seem to be rooted in our cultural heritage of desires and taboos of transgression. My analysis in this paper is primarily of historical nature. By investigating ideas about the creation of life from the earliest times to the present, I aim to clarify the cultural origins of those emotions. I argue that both the fascination and the abhorrence regarding the creation of life have a common religious basis. Moreover, unlike many commentators of 19th-century mad-scientist classics, from Mary Shelley to H.G. Wells, I argue that this basis has no ancient model in religious or mythological traditions but emerged only in the 19th century from an exchange between science and religion. As long as these emotions dominate public debates, ethical deliberations about synthetic biology are likely to be neglected

This chapter combines rhetorical with conceptual analysis to argue that the concept of convergence of technologies is a teleological concept that does not describe or predict any recent past, present, or future development. Instead it always expresses or attributes political goals of how future technology should be developed. The concept was already fully developed as a flexible rhetorical tool by US science administrators to create nanotechnology (as nano-convergence), before it was broadened to invent the convergence of nano-, bio-, info-, and cogno-research (NBIC-convergence). Analyzing the use of “convergence” in various US reports, such as in convergence did, does, can, will likely, will necessarily, should, and ought to happen, sheds new light on how science policy avoids public debates about goals and values in deliberating the future, which poses new challenges to STS.

Man ist sie fast schon leid, die Rede vom „Chaos“, mit der wissenschaftspublizistisch versierte Forscher bemüht sind, sich ihren Anteil am hart umkämpften Markt der Forschungsmittel und -reputation zu sichern. Die inflationäre Verkündigung von „wissenschaftlichen Revolutionen“, „Paradigmenwechseln“ und „postmoderner Wissenschaft“ mag manchem Philosophen zwar insgeheim noch schmeicheln wegen der Gebrauchs- und Marktfähigkeit - und Autorität - philosophischer Termini. So recht zu glauben sind solche Botschaften jedoch selten. Aber welcher Philosoph wollte sich da ein sachgerechtes und kritisches Urteil erlauben, ob die Inanspruchnahme philosophischer Begriffe an diversen aktuellen Forschungsfronten überhaupt angemesen ist? Wer könnte es andererseits besser, als jemand, der wie Theodor Leiber sowohl in Physik als auch in Philosophie promoviert ist und dessen überarbeitete Philosophiedisseration hier zur Diskussion steht?