Joachim Schummer

As supposed in the last Editorial (HYLE, 5-1, p. 78), our special topic ‘Models in Chemistry’ has attracted new attention to the philosophy of chemistry. Only during the past couple of month, the number of visitors of the HYLE website has nearly doubled to some 1,600 per month. There is nothing comparable in the whole field of philosophy of science, as there is no other science having such a lot to catch up on philosophical work. At the same time, this means a great challenge to meet the expectation of such a large and heterogeneous readership.

Of all the scientific disciplines chemistry seems to be particularly concerned about its public image. Indeed, popular associations with chemistry range from poisons, hazards, chemical warfare, and environmental pollution to alchemical pseudo-science, sorcery, and mad scientists. Despite repeated campaigns for convincing the public that chemistry would bring health, comfort, and welfare, chemists frequently meet with hostility in popular culture. As student enrollment numbers has been shrinking, chemistry departments have been closed in several countries. Also in humanist culture chemistry has a very low profile; philosophers in particular keep to their traditional neglect of anything related to chemistry. Of course, chemists have always been complaining about their low prestige, the lack of public acknowledgment of their achievements, and the misguiding popular associations with chemistry, such that we now have a long record of complaints of almost two centuries. More recently, in response to their public image, chemists have tried to launch slogans such as ‘green chemistry’ or even dropped the term ‘chemistry’ altogether and adopted more fashionable labels such as ‘materials science’, ‘molecular science’, or ‘nanotechnology’. Surprisingly or not, chemists have never translated their complaints into serious research programs to understand the public image of chemistry in its cultural and historical contexts. To be sure, chemical societies and, particularly, the chemical industry have commissioned many reports for promotional or marketing purposes. Yet, such reports usually scratch only on the surface and may well have recommended one or the other camouflage tactics. Even the recent boost of academic research in Public Understanding of Science (PUS) has virtually excluded chemistry and, instead, focused on topics such as ‘Frankenfood’ and genetic engineering. The failure to deal with chemistry in PUS studies is more serious than the traditional neglect in the humanities, because stereotypes of chemistry have dominated the popular image of science in general..

Is chemistry primarily about things or about processes, about chemical substances or about chemical reactions? Is a chemical reaction defined by the change of certain substances, or are substances defined by their characteristic chemical reactions? What appears to be a play on words to the modern scientist, is actually one of the most fundamental ontological question since antiquity, prompted by the most radical change – the chemical change or the ‘coming-to-be and passing-away’ as Aristotle’s treatise on theoretical chemistry came to be known. The question has bothered philosophers ever since, who were not satisfied with the much too simplistic answer of atomism, according to which the basic elements of nature are atoms.

According to ‘standard histories’ of nanotechnology, the colorful pictures of atoms produced by scanning probe microscopists since the 1980s essentially inspired visions of molecular nanotechnology. In this paper, I provide an entirely different account that, nonetheless, refers to aesthetic inspiration, First, I argue that the basic idea of molecular nanotechnology, i.e., producing molecular devices, has been the goal of supramolecular chemistry that emerged earlier, without being called nanotechnology. Secondly, I argue that in supramolecular chemistry the production of molecular devices was inspired by an aesthetic phenomenon of gestalt switch, by certain images that referred to both molecules and ordinary objects, and thus symbolically bridged the two worlds. This opened up a new way of perceiving and drawing molecular images and new approaches to chemical synthesis. Employing Umberto Eco’s semiotic theory of aesthetics, I analyze the gestalt switch and the inspiration to build molecular devices and to develop a new sign language for supramolecular chemistry. More generally, I argue that aesthetic phenomena can play an important role in directing scientific research and that aesthetic theories can help understand such dynamics, such that they need to be considered in philosophy of science.

There is a rapidly growing public interest in nanotechnology such that people increasingly buy various books to inform themselves about nanotechnology. This paper tries to measure the public interest focus on nanotechnology and its relation to the public interest in other fields of knowledge by applying a new method. I combine formal network analysis of co-purchase book data with traditional content analysis. The method is successful in identifying the books that the public reads to be informed about nanotechnology, in distinguishing between different kinds and classes of books and thereby between different interest foci and readerships and their relations. The results suggest that nanotechnology is for many the first intense contact with science and technology and that they read a great variety of different kinds of books. Rather than on general introductions to current research written by scientists or science journalists, readers focus on forecasting and visionary literature including business guides, written by software entrepreneurs and business consultants. Unlike expert readers, who connect nanotechnology to other fields of science and engineering, the broader public connects it to visions about dissolving the human/machine distinction. Although the distinction between non-fiction and science fiction is still important for readers, border-crossing authors increasingly blur it.

Nanotechnology has from its very beginning been surrounded with an aura of novelty. For instance, on the 28 introductory pages of the report that prepared the US National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI), Nanotechnology Research Directions (NSTC/IWGN 1999), we read 73 times the term “new”, 15 times “novel”, 7 times “innovation”, and 21 times “revolution”. The authors concede that one should distinguish between different nanotechnologies, because “Many existing technologies do already depend on nanoscale processes. Photography and catalysis are two examples of ‘old’ nanotechnologies” (ibid, p. xxvi). One might conclude here that, if all the existing nanotechnologies are “old” nanotechnologies, “new” nanotechnologies do not yet exists but are only promises of the future. However, without further explanation and distinction between presence and future, they suggest that most nanotechnologies are or will be new. Furthermore, they claim that nanotechnology (in singular) is a generator of further new technologies, since “Nanotechnology will give birth to new fields that at present are only visions of leading researchers” (ibid., p. xviii). Whenever science managers speak of nanotechnology (in singular), sophisticated distinctions seem to give way to plain claims about the present and future novelty of nanotechnology. As the NNI director Mihail Roco wrote in a 2001 report, “A revolution is occurring in science and technology […] Nanotechnology will fundamentally transform science, technology, and society. In 10 to 20 years, a significant proportion of industrial production, healthcare practice, and environmental management will be changed by the new technology.” (Roco & Bainbridge, pp. 1, 19) When they put on their hats as science managers, scientists rarely reject but mostly support such novelty claim, as did for instance the chemists George Whitesides and Paul Alivisatos in the earlier report: “Nanostructures are the entry into a new realm in physical and biological science.” (NSTC/IWGN 1999, p..

Chemistry is by far the most productive science concerning the number of publications. A closer look at chemical papers reveals that most papers deal with new substances. The rapid growth of chemical knowledge seriously challenges all institutions and individuals concerned with chemistry. Chemistry documentation following the principle of completeness is required to schematize chemical information, which in turn induces a schematization of chemical research. Chemistry education is forced to seek reasonable principles of selectivity, although nobody can have an overview any more. Philosophical evaluation of the growth of chemical knowledge proves that at the same time chemical ‘nonknowledge’ increases more rapidly. An analysis of reasons, why chemists are making new substances at all, shows that the proliferation of new substances is for the most part an end in itself. The present paper finally argues for the need of a rational discourse among chemists on the aims of chemistry.

In this paper we investigate the most important visual stereotypes of chemistry as they occur in current portraits of chemists, depictions of chemical plants, and images of chemical glassware and apparatus. By studying the historical origin and development of these stereotypes within the broader context of the history of art and science, and by applying aesthetic and cultural theories, we explore what these images implicitly communicate about the chemical profession to the public. We conclude that chemists, along with commercial artists, have unknowingly created a visual image of chemistry that frequently conveys negative historical associations, ranging from imposture to kitsch. Other elements of this image, however, aestheticize chemistry in a positive manner by referring to classical ideals of beauty and borrowing from revered motifs of modern art

The artificial creation of life arises both strong fascination by scientists and strong concerns, if not abhorrence, by critics of science. What appears to be the crowning achievement of synthetic biology is at the same time considered a major evil. That conflict, which perhaps epitomizes many of the cultural conflicts about science in Western societies, calls for a deeper analysis. Standard ethical analyses, which would try to relate such conflicts to a difference in fundamental values, are difficult to apply here, because it is unclear what the underlying values of such emotions as fascination and abhorrence are. These emotions or affects, rather than just referring to what is morally right or wrong, seem to be rooted in our cultural heritage of desires and taboos of transgression. My analysis in this paper is primarily of historical nature. By investigating ideas about the creation of life from the earliest times to the present, I aim to clarify the cultural origins of those emotions. I argue that both the fascination and the abhorrence regarding the creation of life have a common religious basis. Moreover, unlike many commentators of 19th-century mad-scientist classics, from Mary Shelley to H.G. Wells, I argue that this basis has no ancient model in religious or mythological traditions but emerged only in the 19th century from an exchange between science and religion. As long as these emotions dominate public debates, ethical deliberations about synthetic biology are likely to be neglected

Aristoteles hat in seiner berühmten Abhandlung über die Lust eine Einteilung der Philosophenmeinungen bezüglich der Lust vorgenommen.2 Die einen, sagt er, halten die Lust für das höchste Gut; die anderen meinen, daß die Lust ganz und gar schlecht sei. Unter den Lustgegnern nennt Aristoteles wiederum zwei Gruppen. Die einen lehnen die Lust aus Überzeugung ab, die anderen nur aus pädagogischen Gründen. Manchen liegt das Thema so am Herzen, daß sie, wie Aristoteles bemerkt, aus pädagogischen Gründen wider bessere Einsicht argumentieren.

This paper traces the historical roots of the “mad scientist,” a concept that has powerfully shaped the public image of science up to today, by investigating the representations of chemists in nineteenth-century Western literature. I argue that the creation of this literary figure was the strongest of four critical literary responses to the emergence of modern science in general and of chemistry in particular. The role of chemistry in this story is crucial because early nineteenth-century chemistry both exemplified modern experimental laboratory research and induced, due to its rapid growth, a ramification and fragmentation of knowledge that undermined former ideals of the unity of knowledge under the umbrella of metaphysics and religion. Because most writers considered contemporary chemistry an offspring of “wrong alchemy,” all four responses drew on the medieval literary figure of the “mad alchemist” to portray chemists. Whereas early writers considered the quest for scientific knowledge to be altogether in vain, later writers pointed out the narrow-minded goals and views specifically of chemistry. A third response moved that criticism to a metaphysical and religious level, by relating chemistry to materialism, nihilism, atheism and hubris. The fourth response, the “mad scientist,” elaborated on the hubris theme by attaching moral perversion to the “mad alchemist.”.

Man ist sie fast schon leid, die Rede vom „Chaos“, mit der wissenschaftspublizistisch versierte Forscher bemüht sind, sich ihren Anteil am hart umkämpften Markt der Forschungsmittel und -reputation zu sichern. Die inflationäre Verkündigung von „wissenschaftlichen Revolutionen“, „Paradigmenwechseln“ und „postmoderner Wissenschaft“ mag manchem Philosophen zwar insgeheim noch schmeicheln wegen der Gebrauchs- und Marktfähigkeit - und Autorität - philosophischer Termini. So recht zu glauben sind solche Botschaften jedoch selten. Aber welcher Philosoph wollte sich da ein sachgerechtes und kritisches Urteil erlauben, ob die Inanspruchnahme philosophischer Begriffe an diversen aktuellen Forschungsfronten überhaupt angemesen ist? Wer könnte es andererseits besser, als jemand, der wie Theodor Leiber sowohl in Physik als auch in Philosophie promoviert ist und dessen überarbeitete Philosophiedisseration hier zur Diskussion steht?

There is a particular irony that chemistry – the most visual, tactile, and pungent of sciences – is rarely associated with modern notions of aesthetics and science. Indeed, as any examination of aesthetics and modern science reveals, physics, rather than chemistry or biology, is considered the paradigm because of its extraordinary ability to comprehend and communicate through the symbolic language of mathematics. Echoing Heisenberg’s 1970 essay, "The Meaning of Beauty in the Exact Sciences", this perspective on physics takes the inherent abstraction of quantum mechanics and relativity as the result of the physicists’ search for beauty in nature.

This paper presents an epistemological approach to the investigation of material properties that is opposed both to phenomenalistic epistemology and recent linguistical and ontological accounts of matter/mass terms. Emphasis is laid on the inherent context dependence of material properties. It is shown that, if this is taken seriously, some deep epistemological problems arise, like unavoidable uncertainty, incompleteness, inductivity, nonderivableness. It is further argued that some widely held epistemological accounts, namely that of essentialism, constructivism, and pragmatism, all reveal some serious defects if related to the recognition of materials. In order to responsibly manage our material environment, a more realistic estimation of our epistemic abilities and prospects is suggested.

Chemical ideas about the diversity of matter in terms of elements and compound substances and their transformations have been pivotal to any scientific or pre-scientific approach ever since. From ancient natural philosophy and alchemy to modern 19th-century chemistry, these ideas were made both the basis of philosophical systems and the target of critical reflection. After temporary interruption, when modern philosophy of science materialized as a discourse on mathematical physics, philosophy of chemistry emerged anew in the 1980s and is now a flourishing field in which philosophers, chemists, and historians of chemistry are engaged. While many of the old philosophical issues have been rediscovered and discussed, new issues have appeared due to shifts of general philosophical foci, alliances with historians and sociologists of science, and the changes of chemistry and its role in society.

Along with the rapid worldwide advance of nanotechnology, debates on associated ethical issues have spread from local to international levels. However, unlike science and engineer- ing issues, international perceptions of ethical issues are very diverse. This paper provides an analysis of how sociocultural factors such as language, cultural heritage, economics and politics can affect how people perceive ethical issues of nanotechnology. By attempting to clarify the significance of sociocultural issues in ethical considerations my aim is to support the ongoing international dialogue on nanotechnology. At the same time I pose the general question of ethical relativism in engineering ethics, that is to say whether or not different ethical views are irreconcilable on a fundamental level.

There is the popular notion according to which the world is built up in a hierarchical order, such that combining entities from the lower level results in entities of the next higher level, and so on. It seems beyond doubt in this view that the entities at the lowest level are some subatomic particles, to be followed at the next levels by atoms, molecules, biological organs and organisms including humans, and eventually societies. Accordingly, a scientific discipline is assigned to each level, resulting in a disciplinary hierarchy that starts with physics and goes via chemistry, biology, and psychology to sociology. This popular notion has its merits as it assures us that both the world and our scientific knowledge are perfectly ordered in a harmonious but hierarchical manner. It provides philosophical food to discuss the interfaces between the ontological levels or disciplines in terms of reduction, emergence, supervenience, and so on. And it appeals to some philosophers who are interested in science but unable to read the about two million scientific publications per year, because it allows them to focus on the handful of publications in what is supposed to be the fundamental level of Everything. The hierarchical picture became popular in the 19th century just when most of our scientific disciplines emerged in a process of horizontal diversification, when each discipline carved out and established its own specific subject matter, methodology, theories, and problems and rejected just the idea of the hierarchical dependencies between the disciplines (Stichweh 1984). Despite its anachronism at the time of its popularization, the hierarchical picture was appealing to all those who felt lost in the exploding fields of science and who were yearning for the good old days in which a simple metaphysical scheme could provide order to the entire world. It is more than likely that the hierarchical picture is appealing still nowadays for the same reasons. It would not be worthwhile to discuss the anachronistic hierarchical picture, if it had not such a great appeal to many philosophers.1 In this paper I discuss only one particular problem of the hierarchical picture, the lack of matter or stuffs2 in the ontological hierarchy, which actually consists in a series of structures or forms..