Joachim Schummer

Chemical ideas about the diversity of matter in terms of elements and compound substances and their transformations have been pivotal to any scientific or pre-scientific approach ever since. From ancient natural philosophy and alchemy to modern 19th-century chemistry, these ideas were made both the basis of philosophical systems and the target of critical reflection. After temporary interruption, when modern philosophy of science materialized as a discourse on mathematical physics, philosophy of chemistry emerged anew in the 1980s and is now a flourishing field in which philosophers, chemists, and historians of chemistry are engaged. While many of the old philosophical issues have been rediscovered and discussed, new issues have appeared due to shifts of general philosophical foci, alliances with historians and sociologists of science, and the changes of chemistry and its role in society.

Along with the rapid worldwide advance of nanotechnology, debates on associated ethical issues have spread from local to international levels. However, unlike science and engineer- ing issues, international perceptions of ethical issues are very diverse. This paper provides an analysis of how sociocultural factors such as language, cultural heritage, economics and politics can affect how people perceive ethical issues of nanotechnology. By attempting to clarify the significance of sociocultural issues in ethical considerations my aim is to support the ongoing international dialogue on nanotechnology. At the same time I pose the general question of ethical relativism in engineering ethics, that is to say whether or not different ethical views are irreconcilable on a fundamental level.

There is the popular notion according to which the world is built up in a hierarchical order, such that combining entities from the lower level results in entities of the next higher level, and so on. It seems beyond doubt in this view that the entities at the lowest level are some subatomic particles, to be followed at the next levels by atoms, molecules, biological organs and organisms including humans, and eventually societies. Accordingly, a scientific discipline is assigned to each level, resulting in a disciplinary hierarchy that starts with physics and goes via chemistry, biology, and psychology to sociology. This popular notion has its merits as it assures us that both the world and our scientific knowledge are perfectly ordered in a harmonious but hierarchical manner. It provides philosophical food to discuss the interfaces between the ontological levels or disciplines in terms of reduction, emergence, supervenience, and so on. And it appeals to some philosophers who are interested in science but unable to read the about two million scientific publications per year, because it allows them to focus on the handful of publications in what is supposed to be the fundamental level of Everything. The hierarchical picture became popular in the 19th century just when most of our scientific disciplines emerged in a process of horizontal diversification, when each discipline carved out and established its own specific subject matter, methodology, theories, and problems and rejected just the idea of the hierarchical dependencies between the disciplines (Stichweh 1984). Despite its anachronism at the time of its popularization, the hierarchical picture was appealing to all those who felt lost in the exploding fields of science and who were yearning for the good old days in which a simple metaphysical scheme could provide order to the entire world. It is more than likely that the hierarchical picture is appealing still nowadays for the same reasons. It would not be worthwhile to discuss the anachronistic hierarchical picture, if it had not such a great appeal to many philosophers.1 In this paper I discuss only one particular problem of the hierarchical picture, the lack of matter or stuffs2 in the ontological hierarchy, which actually consists in a series of structures or forms..

We are used to considering engineering ethics largely a critical enterprise. By pointing out ethical issues and by raising concerns about a technology, ethicists usually criticise rather than promote the technology in question. Of course, from a utilitarianist perspective, an ethicist might come to the conclusion that a certain technology is better than another one or than doing without. However, such conclusions are rare in philosophy and would not be considered uncritical promotion. In this essay I argue that engineering ethics, almost unavoidably, turns into the promotion and popularisation of a technology if that technology does not exist yet but is considered to be emerging in the near future. In other words, ethics of emerging technologies is not only prone to but almost destined to play a propaganda role in the public sphere. As engineering ethics moves from established to emerging technologies ethicists need to be aware that they become useful instruments in the struggle for public attention and funding.

Alle Menschen streben nach Glück. Es dürfte schwierig sein, einen Philosophen zu benennen, der diesen Satz jemals ernsthaft bestritten hat. Auf der Basis eines solchen, fast einzigartigen und mehr als zweitausend Jahre haltenden philosophischen Konsenses, so möchte man meinen, konnte eine konstruktive Philosophie des Glücks gedeihen, die sich in der Ausgestaltung der Begriffe des Glücks und des Strebens differenzierte; eine Philosophie, die Antworten gibt auf die Fragen, ob bzw. auf welche Weise wir das jeweils erstrebte Glück erreichen können, und die sich kritisch analysierend zu den wohlfeilen Glücksangeboten verhält, welche uns Werbeagenturen, (Ersatz-) Religionen und selbsternannte Seelenheiler aufdrängen; eine Philosophie, die uns beratend zur Seite stehen kann, wenn wir unsere Bedürfnisse, Lebenshaltungen, -erwartungen und -kontexte aufeinander abstimmen wollen.

The paper shows epistemological, methodological and ontological peculiarities of chemistry taken as a classificatory science of materials using experimental methods. Without succumbing to standard interpretations of physical science, chemical methods of experimental investigation, classification, reference, theorizing, prediction and production of new entities are developed one by one as first steps towards a philosophy of chemistry. Chemistry challenges traditional concepts of empirical object, empirical predicate, reference frame and theory, but also the distinction commonly drawn between natural science and technology. Due to its many peculiarities, I propose to treat chemistry philosophically as a special type of science, apart from other sciences.

Nowadays it is well known among historians of science that Francis Bacon, one of the modern defender of the experimental method, owed much of his thoughts to the chemical or alchemical tradition (cf. e.g., Gregory 1938, West 1961, Linden 1974, and Rees 1977). In fact, alchemy, particularly in the Arabic tradition, was always based on laboratory investigations by carefully examining the results of controlled manipulation of materials.1 It is also well known that Francis Bacon’s appeal to the experimental method was severe criticism of scholasticism in philosophy of nature and, in particular, of authority as the basis of knowledge.2 If we compare philosophy of nature in the early 17th century with phi-.

Zu Beginn eines wissenschaftlichen Projekts – manchmal schon bei dessen Beantragung – sind Wissenschaftler mit der Frage konfrontiert, wie sie sich öffentlich sichtbar präsentieren. Ein griffiger Name (am besten ein eingängiges Akronym) und ein Logo müssen her, um Website, Visitenkarte, Briefkopf, Plakate und Poster zu zieren. Wer Peinlichkeiten vermeiden will, beauftragt gleich einen Werbedesigner für die visuelle Präsentation. Doch woher weiß der Designer, wie Wissenschaft visuell dargestellt wird? Weiß der Wissenschaftler das nicht viel besser? Der Wissenschaftler kennt all die Dinge im Detail, die typisch für seine spezielle Forschung und Disziplin sind. Der Designer weiß hingegen Bescheid, was im Allgemeinen als typisch für Wissenschaft oder für die jeweilige Disziplin gehalten wird. Im besten Fall setzen sich beide zusammen und finden einen Mittelweg – einerseits zwischen allgemeinem und speziellem Wissenschaftsbild und andererseits zwischen dem, was in der Wissenschaft als typisch gilt, und dem, was öffentlich für wissenschaftstypisch gehalten wird. Der kompromissbereite Wissenschaftler wird vielleicht mit leichtem Unbehagen auch solchen Bildern zustimmen, die er als Platitüden oder überzogene Klischees empfindet, solange sie seinem Projekt öffentliche Aufmerksamkeit einbringen. So wird das öffentliche Bild der Wissenschaft nicht nur in jedem Einzelfall, sondern auch ganz allgemein zwischen unterschiedlichen Interessen und visuellen Kulturen ausgehandelt. Seit piktographische Designerprodukte in großen Datenbanken online verfügbar und nach Stichworten durchsuchbar sind (zum Beispiel in clipart.com), lässt sich das öffentliche Bild der Wissenschaft recht gut qualitativ und quantitativ untersuchen.1 Dabei fällt zunächst auf, dass die meisten klassischen Wissenschaftsdisziplinen stereotypische Piktogramme besitzen, die für typisch gehaltene Gegenstände darstellen. Ein Zirkel und mathematische Formeln sind eindeutige Symbole der Geometrie beziehungsweise der Algebra, ein Fernrohr repräsentiert die Astronomie, Knochen oder Schädel sind unverkennbare Indikatoren der Anatomie, die Biologie wird meist durch ein Mikroskop darstellt und so weiter..

The birth of a new discipline, called 'physical chemistry', is sometimes related to the names OSTWALD, ARRHENIUS and VAN'T HOFF and dated back to the year 1887, when OSTWALD founded the Zeitschrift für physikalische Chemie.[1] But as many historians have pointed out, the phrase 'physical chemistry' was widely used before that and the topics under investigation partially go back to Robert BOYLE's attempts to connect chemistry with concepts of mechanical philosophy.[2] The idea of a sudden birth of physical chemistry in 1887 seems to be a founder myth.[3] But there is no doubt that in the late nineteenth-century there was a rapid growth of research in fields now understood as physical chemistry: chemical thermodynamics, electrochemistry, photochemistry, spectroscopy, chemical kinetics etc