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72Donnellan on definite descriptionsPhilosophia 6 (2): 289-302. 1976.Donnellan's distinction between the referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions is shown not to cover exhaustive and exclusive alternatives but to fix the termini of a continuum of cases. in fact, donnellan's distinction rests on a mixed classification: the referential use, concerned with intended referents regardless of what speakers may say about them; the attributive use, concerned with definite descriptions used in using sentences, that something or other may satisfy. given thi…Read more
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40Generic universalsAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 60 (1). 1982.This Article does not have an abstract
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35Review of Stewart Goetz, Freedom, Teleology, and Evil (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (8). 2009.
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184Proper BasicalityPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2): 373-383. 2004.Foundationalist epistemologies, whether internalist or externalist, ground noetic structures in beliefs that are said to be foundational, or properly basic. It is essential to such epistemologies that they provide clear criteria for proper basicality. This proves, 1 argue, to be a thorny task, at least insofar as the goal is to provide a psychologically realistic reconstruction of our actual doxastic practices. I examine some of the difficulties, and suggest some implications, in particular for …Read more
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Mystical Experience of God: A Philosophical Inquiry, by Jerome Gellman (review)Ars Disputandi 2. 2002.
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132Uniqueness and historical lawsPhilosophy of Science 47 (2): 260-276. 1980.This paper presents an argument for the claim that historical events are unique in a nontrivial sense which entails the inapplicability of the Hempelian D-N model to historical explanations. Some previous criticisms of Hempel are shown to be general criticisms of the D-N model which can be outflanked in cases where a reduction to fundamental laws is available. I then survey grounds for denying that explanations by reasons can be effectively reduced to causal explanations, and for rejecting metho…Read more
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131Do mystics see God?In Michael L. Peterson & Raymond J. VanArragon (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion, Blackwell. pp. 145--148. 2004.
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48Scientific explanations of mystical experiences, part I: The case of st Teresa: Evan FalesReligious Studies 32 (2): 143-163. 1996.Several writers have argued for the implausibility of there being naturalistic explanations of mystical experience. These writers recognize that the evidential significance of mystical experiences for theism depends upon whether explanations that exclude supernatural agency can be discounted; but they seem unaware of some of the best scientific work done in this area. Part I of the present paper introduces the theory of I. M. Lewis, an anthropologist, and tests it against the case of St Teresa. …Read more
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79Can science explain mysticism?Religious Studies 35 (2): 213-227. 1999.Jerome Gellman has recently disputed my claim that a naturalistic explanation for mystical experiences is available, a better explanation than any current attempt to show that God is sometimes perceived in those experiences. Gellman argues (i) that some mystics do not 'fit' the sociological explanation of I. M. Lewis; (ii) that the sociological analysis of tribal mysticism cannot properly be extended to theistic experiences; and (iii) that mystical experiences merit prima facie credence, so the …Read more
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87Reformed Epistemology and Biblical HermeneuticsPhilo 4 (2): 169-184. 2001.Literal-minded Christians are enjoying resurgent respectability in intellectual circles. Darwin isn’t the only target: also under attack is the application of modern historiography to Scripture According to Reformed epistemologists, ordinary Christians can directly know that, e.g., Jesus rose from the dead, and evidential concerns can be dismissed. This reversion to a sixteenth century hermeneutic deserves response.
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141A Defense of the GivenLanham: Rowman &Amp; Littlefield. 1996.The Doctrine of the Given The Myth of the Given A Methodological Problem To a convinced foundationalist, the project of establishing the existence of the ...
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72Natural kinds and freaks of naturePhilosophy of Science 49 (1): 67-90. 1982.Essentialism--understood as the doctrine that there are natural kinds--can be sustained with respect to the most fundamental physical entities of the world, as I elsewhere argue. In this paper I take up the question of the existence of natural kinds among complex structures built out of these elementary ones. I consider a number of objections to essentialism, in particular Locke's puzzle about the existence of borderline cases. A number of recent attempts to justify biological taxonomy are criti…Read more
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76Despair, Optimism, and RebellionInternet Infidels, Modern Library. 2007.I will make all my goodness pass before you, and will proclaim before you my name 'the LORD'; and I will be gracious to whom I will be gracious, and will show mercy on whom I will show mercy. But ... you cannot see my face; for man shall not see me and live. Exodus 33:19-20, RSV..
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32The Case for Humanism: An IntroductionRowman & Littlefield Publishers. 2003.The Case for Humanism is the premier textbook to introduce and help students think critically about the 'big ideas' of Western humanism—secularism, rationalism, materialism, science, democracy, individualism, and others—all powerful themes that run through Western thought from the ancient Greeks and the Enlightenment to the present day
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105Is a Science of the Supernatural Possible?In Massimo Pigliucci & Maarten Boudry (eds.), Philosophy of Pseudoscience: Reconsidering the Demarcation Problem, University of Chicago Press. pp. 247. 2013.This chapter examines arguments for the view that any science of the supernatural must be a pseudoscience. It shows that many of these arguments are not good arguments. It also argues that, contrary to recent philosophical discussions, the appeal to the supernatural should not be ruled out as science for methodological reasons, but rather because the notion of supernatural intervention probably suffers from fatal flaws.
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47Darwin’s Doubt, Calvin’s CalvaryIn Michael Ruse (ed.), Philosophy After Darwin: Classic and Contemporary Readings, Princeton University Press. pp. 309-322. 2009.
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186Plantinga's case against naturalistic epistemologyPhilosophy of Science 63 (3): 432-451. 1996.In Warrant and Proper Function, Alvin Plantinga claims that metaphysical naturalism, when joined to a naturalized epistemology, is self-undermining. Plantinga argues that naturalists are committed to a neoDarwinian account of our origins, and that the reliability of our cognitive faculties is improbable or unknown relative to that theory. If the theory is true, then we are in no position to know that, whereas theism, if true, underwrites cognitive reliability. I seek to turn the tables on Planti…Read more
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72World without design: The ontological consequences of naturalismPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2): 494-497. 2005.
Iowa City, Iowa, United States of America
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Religion |