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72Donnellan on definite descriptionsPhilosophia 6 (2): 289-302. 1976.Donnellan's distinction between the referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions is shown not to cover exhaustive and exclusive alternatives but to fix the termini of a continuum of cases. in fact, donnellan's distinction rests on a mixed classification: the referential use, concerned with intended referents regardless of what speakers may say about them; the attributive use, concerned with definite descriptions used in using sentences, that something or other may satisfy. given thi…Read more
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35Review of Stewart Goetz, Freedom, Teleology, and Evil (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (8). 2009.
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184Proper BasicalityPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2): 373-383. 2004.Foundationalist epistemologies, whether internalist or externalist, ground noetic structures in beliefs that are said to be foundational, or properly basic. It is essential to such epistemologies that they provide clear criteria for proper basicality. This proves, 1 argue, to be a thorny task, at least insofar as the goal is to provide a psychologically realistic reconstruction of our actual doxastic practices. I examine some of the difficulties, and suggest some implications, in particular for …Read more
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Mystical Experience of God: A Philosophical Inquiry, by Jerome Gellman (review)Ars Disputandi 2. 2002.
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131Do mystics see God?In Michael L. Peterson & Raymond J. VanArragon (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion, Blackwell. pp. 145--148. 2004.
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132Uniqueness and historical lawsPhilosophy of Science 47 (2): 260-276. 1980.This paper presents an argument for the claim that historical events are unique in a nontrivial sense which entails the inapplicability of the Hempelian D-N model to historical explanations. Some previous criticisms of Hempel are shown to be general criticisms of the D-N model which can be outflanked in cases where a reduction to fundamental laws is available. I then survey grounds for denying that explanations by reasons can be effectively reduced to causal explanations, and for rejecting metho…Read more
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79Can science explain mysticism?Religious Studies 35 (2): 213-227. 1999.Jerome Gellman has recently disputed my claim that a naturalistic explanation for mystical experiences is available, a better explanation than any current attempt to show that God is sometimes perceived in those experiences. Gellman argues (i) that some mystics do not 'fit' the sociological explanation of I. M. Lewis; (ii) that the sociological analysis of tribal mysticism cannot properly be extended to theistic experiences; and (iii) that mystical experiences merit prima facie credence, so the …Read more
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48Scientific explanations of mystical experiences, part I: The case of st Teresa: Evan FalesReligious Studies 32 (2): 143-163. 1996.Several writers have argued for the implausibility of there being naturalistic explanations of mystical experience. These writers recognize that the evidential significance of mystical experiences for theism depends upon whether explanations that exclude supernatural agency can be discounted; but they seem unaware of some of the best scientific work done in this area. Part I of the present paper introduces the theory of I. M. Lewis, an anthropologist, and tests it against the case of St Teresa. …Read more
Iowa City, Iowa, United States of America
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Religion |