-
53The Presidential Address: Why There Is Really No Such Thing as the Theory of MotivationProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 95. 1995.Jonathan Dancy; I *—The Presidential Address: Why there is really No Such Thing as the Theory of Motivation, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 95
-
14Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous (edited book)Oxford University Press. 1998.This new edition of Berkeley's Three Dialogues, specially designed to be accessible to the student reader, provides a comprehensive philosophical introduction, and analysis of the text, a glossary, detailed endnotes, and a full bibliography with guidance on further reading. Published alongside Berkeley's other masterpiece, the Principles of Human Knowledge, this new edition aims to give the reader a thorough introduction to the central ideas of one of the world's greatest philosophers.
-
18Two Conceptions of Moral RealismAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 60 (1): 167-206. 1986.
-
120Should We Pass the Buck?In Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen & Michael J. Zimmerman (eds.), Recent Work on Intrinsic Value, Springer. pp. 33--44. 2000.
-
57Supervenience, virtues and consequences: A commentary onknowledge in perspective by Ernest SosaPhilosophical Studies 78 (3). 1995.
-
333Should we pass the buck?Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 47 159-173. 2000.My topic is the relation between the right and the good. I introduce it by relating some aspects of the debate between various British intuitionists in the first half of the present century. In Principia Ethica G. E. Moore claimed that to be right is to be productive of the greatest good. He wrote ‘This use of “right”, as denoting what is good as a means, whether or not it be also good as an end, is indeed the use to which I shall confine the word’ . By the time he wrote his Ethics he seems to h…Read more
-
256Response to Mark Schroeder’s Slaves of the passions (review)Philosophical Studies 157 (3): 455-462. 2012.Response to Mark Schroeder’s Slaves of the passions Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s11098-010-9656-3 Authors Jonathan Dancy, The University of Reading, Reading, UK Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116
-
150Reasons, Relevance and Salience: A Response to HookwayPhilosophical Studies 130 (1): 71-79. 2006.This paper responds to Christopher Hookway’s article, “Reasons for Belief, Reasoning, Virtue.”
-
102Reading Parfit (edited book)Wiley-Blackwell. 1997._ Reading Parfit _ brings together some of the most distinguished scholars in the field to discuss and critique Derek Parfit's outstanding work, _ Reasons and Persons, _
-
34Review: Précis of "Practical Reality" (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2). 2003.
-
135Reasons and rationalityIn Simon Robertson (ed.), Spheres of Reason, Oxford University Press. pp. 93--112. 2009.
-
253Practical RealityOxford University Press. 2000.Practical Reality is a lucid original study of the relation between the reasons why we do things and the reasons why we should. Jonathan Dancy maintains that current philosophical orthodoxy bowdlerizes this relation, making it impossible to understand how anyone can act for a good reason. By giving a fresh account of values and reasons, he finds a place for normativity in philosophy of mind and action, and strengthens the connection between these areas and ethics
-
155Précis of Practical Reality (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2): 423-428. 2003.Practical Reality is about the relation between reasons for acting in the sense of good reasons, reasons why we should act or reasons in favour of acting, and reasons for acting in the sense of the reasons why someone did what he did—his reasons for acting as he did. This distinction I take to be mere commonsense. It is sometimes expressed by talking about motivating or explanatory reasons as opposed to normative or justifying reasons. Though I do use the motivating/normative distinction, I am w…Read more
-
29Prichard on Causing a ChangeRoyal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 80 127-138. 2017.This paper starts by considering an interesting argument of H.A. Prichard’s against the view that to act is to cause a change; the argument is that causing is not an activity. The argument is important because of the recent emergence of an ‘agent-causation’ view according to which actions are the causing of changes by agents. I suggest a way of responding to Prichard’s argument, and then, profiting from one of his own conclusions, turn to consider the relation between neurophysiological changes …Read more
-
2Prichard on Duty and 10 Ignorance of FactIn Philip Stratton-Lake (ed.), Ethical Intuitionism: Re-Evaluations, Oxford University Press. pp. 229. 2002.