Jonathan Dancy

In this much-anticipated book, Jonathan Dancy offers the only available full-scale treatment of particularism in ethics, a view with which he has been associated for twenty years. Dancy now presents particularism as the view that the possibility of moral thought and judgement does not in any way depend on an adequate supply of principles. He grounds this claim on a form of reasons-holism, holding that what is a reason in one case need not be any reason in another, and maintaining that moral reasons are no different in this respect from others. Ethics Without Principles offers detailed treatment and criticism of opposing positions of all sorts, with useful summaries. It also contains three chapters on the nature of what Dancy calls 'contributory' reasons, which, though the topic of much interest at the moment, are not often discussed in anything like the detail given here. And it offers a distinctive form of value-holism to go with the holism of reasons. As Dancy's definitive statement on particularism, the book will be required reading for all those working on moral philosophy and ethical theory.

In this paper I consider what might be my best response to various difficulties and challenges that emerged at a conference held at the University of Kent in December 2004, the contributions to which are given in the same volume. I comment on Crisp's distinction between ultimate and non-ultimate reasons, and reply to McKeever and Ridge on default reasons, and to Norman on the idea of a reason for action. I don't here consider what other particularists might want to say; I certainly don't think that my way of doing these things is the only possible one, but not surprisingly I am interested in seeing what resources it might have to defend itself.

This new introduction to the main themes of Berkeley′s philosophy assumes no previous knowlege of philosophy and will be accessible to first-year students and to the interested general reader. It also offers and defends its own interpretation of Berkeley′ position. Jonathan Dancy argues that we understand Berkeley′s idealism best if we take seriously his claim that realism (the view that material things have an existence independent of the mind) derives from a mistaken use of abstraction. Stress is laid on Berkelye′s determination to use idealism to bring his God as close to us as possible. Instances of this are his claims that the world we live in is a collection of ideas in God′s mind, and that natural events are divine utterances which science is the attempts to interpret. Dancy also discusses Berkelye′s attack on the distinction between primary and secondary qualities, and his views on perception and knowledge. There is an account of his theory of the mind and of the nature of human action, and a final chapter contrasts the interpretation offered here with others. Students who have read this book will be well equipped to understand and assess the frequent references to Berkeley in current literature.

This new edition of Berkeley's Principles of Human Knowledge has been designed especially for the student reader. It also includes the four letters between George Berkeley and Samuel Johnson, written in 1729-30. The text is supplemented by a comprehensive introduction, an analysis of the text, a glossary, detailed notes, and a full bibliography with guidance on further reading. Published alongside Berkeley's other masterpiece, the Three Dialogues this new edition aims to give the reader a thorough introduction to the central ideas of one of the world's greatest philosophers.