D. D. Martin

A Reforma em território alemão possui duas figuras, por vezes próximas entre si, por vezes muito distantes: Lutero e Tomás Müntzer. À medida que foi se envolvendo na vida de seus fiéis, Müntzer foi tomando caminhos próprios, discordando de Lutero que este tomava a “Palavra, em sua realidade objetiva, como constitutiva da Igreja, e afirmando que os verdadeiros fiéis são os que possuem a experiência subjetiva do “Espírito”. Também contra Lutero, que defende a resistência à autoridade, mas em questões seculares aceita a tirania, Müntzer, que vê a fé fortemente inserida no social, defende a revolução armada contra os príncipes. Müntzer não nega a graça, mas esta possui papel secundário em seu pensamento, enquanto, para Lutero, ela se coloca no centro de suas preocupações teológicas. PALAVRAS-CHAVE – Reforma. Palavra. Graça. Experiência subjetiva. Resistência. Revolução. ABSTRACT The Reform in german territory has two figures, sometimes very close to each other, and sometimes very distant: Luther and Thomas Müntzer. As he got envolved in the lives of his followers, Müntzer began taking his own paths, disaccording of Luther that took the “Word” in its objective reality, as constitutive of the Church, and affirming that the true followers are the ones who own the subjective experience of the “Spirit”. Also against Luther, that stands for the resistance against authority, but in secular matters accepts tyranny, Müntzer, that sees tyranny deeply inserted in the social, stands for the armed revolution against the princes. Müntzer does not deny grace, but it has a secondary role in his thought, as, for Luther, it is placed in the center of his theological worries. KEY WORDS – Reform. Word. Grace. Subjective experience. Resistance. Revolution

Central to Kierkegaard’s account of religious existence is his critique of speculative reason. This critique begins with the distinction between subjective and objective reflection. Its most radical aspects appear in Kierkegaard’s discussions of the paradox. In spite of Kierkegaard’s frequent comments on this notion, it is not readily understood. I want to argue against a common reading of this notion and propose an alternative reading. This alternative reading allows for a conceptually quite plausible account of the manner in which the paradox presents reason with a boundary, in virtue of its relation to objective reflection and to subjective reflection as well. Because of this boundary, reason points beyond its own achievements to a domain of contemplation and appropriation. This is a domain that reason itself identifies in connection with the paradox. It both surpasses rational achievements and integrates them into itself.

Dream is a state of consciousness characterized by internally-generated sensory, cognitive and emotional experiences occurring during sleep. Dream reports tend to be particularly abundant, with complex, emotional, and perceptually vivid experiences after awakenings from rapid eye movement sleep. This is why our current knowledge of the cerebral correlates of dreaming, mainly derives from studies of REM sleep. Neuroimaging results show that REM sleep is characterized by a specific pattern of regional brain activity. We demonstrate that this heterogeneous distribution of brain activity during sleep explains many typical features in dreams. Reciprocally, specific dream characteristics suggest the activation of selective brain regions during sleep. Such an integration of neuroimaging data of human sleep, mental imagery, and the content of dreams is critical for current models of dreaming; it also provides neurobiological support for an implication of sleep and dreaming in some important functions such as emotional regulation

In this chapter, we aimed at further characterizing the functional neuroanatomy of the human rapid eye movement (REM) sleep at the population level. We carried out a meta-analysis of a large dataset of positron emission tomography (PET) scans acquired during wakefulness, slow wave sleep and REM sleep, and focused especially on the brain areas in which the activity diminishes during REM sleep. Results show that quiescent regions are confined to the inferior and middle frontal cortex and to the inferior parietal lobule. Providing a plausible explanation for some of the features of dream reports, these findings may help in refining the concepts, which try to account for human cognition during REM sleep. In particular, we discuss the significance of these results to explain the alteration in executive processes, episodic memory retrieval and self representation during REM sleep dreaming as well as the incorporation of external stimuli into the dream narrative.

A decade after the House of Lords declared the notion of an agreement to negotiate a contract in good faith to be 'wholly unworkable in practice' the Californian Appeals court affirmed the validity of just such a 'contract', opening up the possibility of significant reliance damages arising out of future failed business ventures. The case of Copeland v Baskin-Robbins, USA has major implications for pre-closing negotiations in the State of California, and the US generally, but what, if anything, does it mean for the European Commission's ongoing 'Common Frame of Reference' strategy aimed at removing problematic divergences and inconsistencies between European contract laws? Commercial bargaining, incomplete contracts and the spectre of precontractual reliance remain a significant, if largely neglected, challenge for emergent EC contract rules, yet does Copeland provide a lead on how best to police the formation of international commercial agreements or merely represent a further weakening of party autonomy for those seeking to drive the hardest bargain? In this paper the author explores the world of almost contract, the 'contract' to bargain in good faith and looks beyond the current resistance of the English common law to sketch the parameters of a new EC reliance doctrine.

In certain finite extensive games with perfect information, Cristina Bicchieri (1989) derives a logical contradiction from the assumptions that players are rational and that they have common knowledge of the theory of the game. She argues that this may account for play outside the Nash equilibrium. She also claims that no inconsistency arises if the players have the minimal beliefs necessary to perform backward induction. We here show that another contradiction can be derived even with minimal beliefs, so there is no paradox of common knowledge specifically. These inconsistencies do not make play outside Nash equilibrium plausible, but rather indicate that the epistemic specification must incorporate a system for belief revision. Whether rationality is common knowledge is not the issue.

A source of much difficulty and confusion in the interpretation of quantum mechanics is a naive realism about operators. By this we refer to various ways of taking too seriously the notion of operator-as-observable, and in particular to the all too casual talk about measuring operators that occurs when the subject is quantum mechanics. Without a specification of what should be meant by measuring a quantum observable, such an expression can have no clear meaning. A definite specification is provided by Bohmian mechanics, a theory that emerges from Schrödinger's equation for a system of particles when we merely insist that particles means particles. Bohmian mechanics clarifies the status and the role of operators as observables in quantum mechanics by providing the operational details absent from standard quantum mechanics. It thereby allows us to readily dismiss all the radical claims traditionally enveloping the transition from the classical to the quantum realm — for example, that we must abandon classical logic or classical probability. The moral is rather simple: Beware naive realism, especially about operators!