D. D. Martin

El presente artículo contiene una lectura cruzada del Fedro y el Crátilo en la que se aclaran algunos de sus ejes temáticos centrales con el fin de sacar a relucir las constantes del pensamiento platónico que ambos diálogos comparten. La descripción de la dialéctica presente en el Fedro encaja con una definición socrática del Crátilo que explicita que el nombre es un instrumento al servicio del dialéctico. Todo ello nos lleva a concluir que la técnica dialéctica, además de constituir el principal mecanismo regulador de la oratoria, se postula en los diálogos platónicos como un procedimiento de corrección que permite validar cualquier tipo de proposición y aproximar a la verdad los más variados discursos y representaciones de la realidad. Abstract: The current paper contains a comparative reading of the Phaedrus and the Cratylus. Some of their central topics are here contrasted in order to highlight the characteristic traits of Platonic thought present in both dialogues. The description of dialectic in the Phaedrus fits well with a Socratic definition in the Cratylus which clearly specifies that names are tools at the service of the dialectician. This evidence leads us to the conclusion that -besides being the main mechanism to control and judge rhetoric- dialectical technic appears in the dialogues as the only correcting procedure that makes it possible to verify any sort of proposition and bring speeches and depictions of reality closer to the truth.

Ich behaupte, dass Hegel in seinen Werken zwei unterschiedliche hermeneutische Ansätze anwendet, nämlich den assimilativen und den rekonstruktiven Ansatz. Ich charakterisiere sie, und erkläre, warum Hegel beide verwendet, sowie ich auf ihre Voraussetzungen eingehe. Im Zuge dieser Überlegungen gehe ich auf den angeblichen Widerspruch zwischen Hegels Reflexionen zur Interpretation und ihrer Anwendung ein. Konträr zu einem Teil der Literatur, argumentiere ich, dass Hegels hermeneutische Praxis nicht von seinem theoretischen Interpretationsansatz abweicht. Dann konzentriere ich mich auf die Frage, ob und inwieweit diese beiden Ansätze intellektuell demütige Praktiken sind. Ich behaupte, dass nur der rekonstruktive Ansatz in der Phänomenologie intellektuell demütig ist, im Gegensatz zum assimilativen Ansatz in Hegels Vorlesungen.

„Sinn und Recht jeder Zeit, […] liegt […] allein darin, dass sie dem Geist […] die Existenzmöglichkeit bietet.“Dieser 1930 geschriebene Satz stammt von einem der bekanntesten Architekten der Architektur-Moderne: Ludwig Mies van der Rohe. Sein im Zitat angedeutetes Menschenbild könnte man in Anlehnung an Max Scheler als,Leben + Geist‘ charakterisieren. Es bildet die Grundlage für die 1930 vollendete Villa Tugendhat und scheint darin auf.Der Beitrag analysiert die Villa Tugendhat im Hinblick auf das ihr zugrundliegende Menschenbild.

""A Monument to Saint Augustine, now happily reprinted by Wipf and Stock, gathers many diverse strands of the early twentieth century Catholic thought within its pages: the creative transformation of neo-scholasticism through a kind of ressourcement, the Catholic literary intellectual renaissance in Europe and Britain, the focus upon the renewal of Christian humanism in the face of modernity's proliferating dangers, and the Augustinian turn as a resource for the theology of crisis. Were it to do nothing else, this volume would be of extraordinary historical importance insofar as it makes clear how central the legacy of St. Augustine was to the interwar renaissance in Catholic thought and culture, not only to Burns, Dawson, and the British Catholics but also to the great figures of the Continent: Blondel, Gilson, Maritain, and Przywara. But the volume does much more. The contributions themselves are of real, substantive, and lasting value. The essays contained in this volume are not in theology per se--though theology, especially the doctrine of creation and theological anthropology, lies ever just beneath the surface. Rather, they treat Augustine from the perspective of philosophy, history, religious studies, and the humanities more generally."" -- From the New Introduction by Jacob Sherman ""A remarkable tribute."" -- The New Statesman ""No more appropriate monument could have been devised."" -- Observer ""Admirable... attractive... brilliant."" -- Spectator.

Inheritance is normally distributed to the heirs, but during the 20th century the state claimed a share of the estate through inheritance taxation. The purpose of this article is to examine how the successively increased importance of inheritance taxation in Scandinavia was justified in political debate between 1890 and 1935. The results shows that the tax was mainly motivated by the state’s increased revenue needs. The tax was not controversial in Denmark or Sweden, but caused strong conflicts in the Norwegian debate.

The public is largely innumerate, making systematic mistakes in estimating some politically relevant facts, such as the share of foreign-born citizens. In two-step or multistep flow models, such mistakes could be corrected if better-informed citizens were able to convince their peers, in particular by using good arguments citing reliable sources. In six experiments, we find two issues that dampen the potential power of this two-step flow process. First, even though participants were more convinced by good than by poor arguments, many did not change their minds, even when confronted with good arguments. Second, participants are not inclined to spontaneously generate arguments that cite reliable sources, even when they have just been influenced by such arguments. Both issues should put a significant brake in the spread of political numeracy through the two-step flow process, in particular in non-dialogic contexts.

This book explores an overlooked area in Hegel studies: his use of ‘individuality’ (Individualität). Hegel joined a lively conversation, from Leibniz to Romanticism and beyond, about this novel concept/phenomenon. Successive chapters track Hegel’s engagement, in such texts as the Phenomenology, Encyclopedia, and Aesthetics. Hegel’s system tends to follow a syllogistic logic (universal, particular, singular), but ‘individuality’ departs from the norm. The category enacts a certain pragmatics (as against semantics or syntactics) regarding tacit assumptions at work or implicit terms of address, which requires active participation by a thinking subject charged with discerning individuality (which bars resort to explicit rules). The category reflexively implicates the user even in presuming an objective context. ‘Individuality’ should not be confused with ‘individualism,’ wholly distinct in origin. Moreover, Hegel’s Aesthetics embraces a paradoxical anachronism. Like ‘art’ itself, ‘individuality’ emerged as an essentially modern category, though one transferred to the past and to distant cultures.

La démocratie souffre d'un curieux paradoxe : contrairement à l'aristocratie ou à la monarchie dont les contours institutionnels et symboliques peuvent être tracés avec clarté, la démocratie ne se fige jamais dans une quelconque forme et se maintient plutôt suspendue à sa réinvention permanente. Balibar n'est pas le premier à poser la question du manque d'ambition de la démocratie, mais le seul à refuser de dissocier la question de l'extension démocratique de celle de son intensité. Pages de début Introduction. Le refus de la démocratie finie Race et nation, les angles morts du marxisme Les multiples dimensions du concept de politique Une anthropologie de la citoyenneté Conclusion. La contradiction infinieBibliographie des ouvrages principaux de Balibar Pages de fin.

À ses frontières, la démocratie se heurte à un paradoxe. La liberté individuelle de mouvement s'y confronte à la volonté collective qui se juge souveraine dans ses politiques d'admission. La réconciliation entre le principe d'autodétermination et les normes universelles, opérée tant bien que mal à l'intérieur des États démocratiques, vole alors en éclats. Ce qui ne soulève pas seulement des interrogations quant à la porosité de la démocratie mais la met également face à la question de son horizon. Doit-elle se satisfaire d'un repli sur une autodétermination rassurante entre semblables? Ou faudrait-il réinventer les principes démocratiques en dehors d'un cadre devenu trop étroit?"--Page 4 of cover.

This book is a study in philosophy of religion, which proposes a new inversion model of self-transcendence. At the same time, the study examines the relation between self-transcendence and prosociality in order to broaden our understanding of self-transcendence also as a moral concept relevant to human behavior and its ethical reflection. The inversion model of self-transcendence is based both on the intentionality analysis of consciousness and phenomenological analysis of self-transcendence conducted on examples of great figures of spirituality from the East and the West - an anonymous medieval Christian author of «The Cloud of Unknowing», an Indian sage Ramana Maharshi, and a contemporary spiritual teacher Eckhart Tolle.

Der Glaube als existentieller Stabilitätsfaktor - dieses Bild macht dieses Buch zu seinem Thema. Es rekonstruiert, in welcher Weise religiöse Überzeugungen auch fragil und vor allem dynamisch und lernbereit zu denken sind. Glaube ist nicht selten mit Ideologieverdacht konfrontiert: Er liefert ein geschlossenes Weltbild, das determiniert, was wir wie beurteilen und für andere Standpunkte und Wahrnehmungen unsensibel macht. Dürnberger bringt dagegen die prinzipielle Dynamik des Glaubens ins Spiel; er legt (offenbarungs-)theologische und v. a. (sprach-)philosophische Möglichkeitsbedingungen eines lernenden Glaubens frei und fragt, wie sich Glaube in der Erforschung der Zeichen der Zeit legitim zu dynamisieren vermag. Wichtigster Referenzdenker dafür ist der US-amerikanische Philosoph Robert B. Brandom, dessen inferentialistischer Pragmatismus zu den prominentesten Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie zählt.