Isabella Marcinski

AbstractWie hängen ethische Fragen der Reproduktionsmedizin mit unterschiedlichen Vorstellungen des guten Lebens zusammen? Die Beiträger*innen nutzen das Konzept der Intersektionalität, um zu klären, wer als reproduktives Subjekt adressiert wird und welche Vorstellungen guten Lebens im Gegenzug durch Abwertung oder Nichtbeachtung ausgeschlossen werden. Im Zentrum stehen dabei normalistische Konzeptionen guten Lebens sowie angemessene Zeitlichkeit mit Blick auf menschliche Fortpflanzung. So gelingt es, zentrale Hintergrundannahmen in der Ethik der Reproduktionsmedizin kritisch zu reflektieren und Debatten über Marginalisierungsprozesse im deutschsprachigen Raum anzustoßen.

Wenn das Erleben immer leiblich ist, welche Rolle spielt dabei das Geschlecht? Wie gehen Machtverhältnisse, Normen und Diskurse in die Beschreibungen des eigenen Erlebens ein? Wie kann dennoch der Eigensinn des Erlebens zur Geltung kommen? Mit Fragen wie diesen bindet die Phänomenologie die Philosophie an die Lebenswirklichkeit zurück. Sie geht dabei vom Leib aus, der die Voraussetzung aller Erfahrung ist. Wissenschaftliche Disziplinen wie die Geschlechterforschung nutzen phänomenologische Kategorien und entwickeln sie außerdem praktisch und theoretisch weiter. Der Band stellt Ergebnisse dieser Forschungen aus feministischer Sicht vor. Dabei steht die Suche nach einer Sprache für die leibliche Erfahrung im Mittelpunkt.

Definition of the problem The concept of intersectionality is receiving increasing attention in international bioethical research on reproductive medicine. In medical ethics in German-speaking countries, however, intersectional considerations on reproductive medicine are still at their beginning; there is an obvious research desideratum here. This harbours the risk of incomplete analyses regarding questions of reproductive justice in German-speaking countries. Argument Intersectionality refers to the problem of who is addressed as a reproductive subject in the debates on the ethics of reproductive medicine—and who is not. In this context, the question arises as to which ideas of good life and appropriate timing with regard to reproduction are set as the norm in medical ethics literature. Whose ideas of the good life are excluded by not being addressed or even devalued? This article will present examples of previous considerations on intersectional perspectives on the ethics of reproductive medicine with a focus on questions of the good life and reproductive justice. Conclusion It will be shown that by drawing on intersectional perspectives, debates in the ethics of reproductive medicine and their central background assumptions can be critically reflected upon. In this way, previous blind spots are made visible and new perspectives are revealed.

Definition of the problem The concept of intersectionality is receiving increasing attention in international bioethical research on reproductive medicine. In medical ethics in German-speaking countries, however, intersectional considerations on reproductive medicine are still at their beginning; there is an obvious research desideratum here. This harbours the risk of incomplete analyses regarding questions of reproductive justice in German-speaking countries. Argument Intersectionality refers to the problem of who is addressed as a reproductive subject in the debates on the ethics of reproductive medicine—and who is not. In this context, the question arises as to which ideas of good life and appropriate timing with regard to reproduction are set as the norm in medical ethics literature. Whose ideas of the good life are excluded by not being addressed or even devalued? This article will present examples of previous considerations on intersectional perspectives on the ethics of reproductive medicine with a focus on questions of the good life and reproductive justice. Conclusion It will be shown that by drawing on intersectional perspectives, debates in the ethics of reproductive medicine and their central background assumptions can be critically reflected upon. In this way, previous blind spots are made visible and new perspectives are revealed.

Objectivist theories of the good life refer to lists of needs, goods or capabilities that must be realized in order to lead a good life. The purpose of such lists is to provide a better philosophical foundation for achieving social justice. This paper examines whether this is also possible with regard to gender justice and, in particular, to questions of reproduction and family. To this end, we will examine Martha Nussbaum's well-known objectivist theory of the good life and Angelika Krebs' critical addition to it. We will show that both philosophers adopt a one-sided understanding of reproductive justice that unjustifiably excludes the ability to parent from the list of objective goods of a good life.

Definition of the problemFeminist approaches to medical ethics are well established in international discourses. By contrast, in the German-speaking medical ethical discourse, they still seem to be rather marginal. In this article, we analyze which feminist perspectives are prominent in German medical ethics and suggest new approaches.ArgumentsWe present our results from a systematized review of the literature, in which we identify existing feminist approaches within the German-speaking medical ethics discourse as well as research gaps. Based on the review, our preliminary research and discussions in the working group “Feminist perspectives in bio and medical ethics”, we defend three hypotheses aimed at advancing the German feminist medical ethical discourse. We posit that (1) feminist medical ethics aim at (epistemic) justice, (2) feminist medical ethics are critical and context-sensitive, and (3) intersectional and postcolonial approaches within feminist medical ethics may contribute to epistemically just, critical, and context-sensitive medical ethics.ConclusionWe argue that feminist perspectives should be implemented as a fundamental perspective in medical ethics because they can bring together key dimensions such as epistemically just, critical, context-sensitive, intersectional, and postcolonial thinking.

Definition of the problemThe article addresses the relationship between reproduction, time and the good life. Services offered by reproductive medicine and conceptions of the good life in time influence each other reciprocally. This interaction is characterised by implicit and explicit normative settings and expectations of appropriate temporality.ArgumentsWe first discuss the significance of time for the life course and for parenthood from a sociological and social psychological perspective. Reproductive medicine can increase the options for becoming a parent and thus for life-time autonomy. However, in the context of societal imperatives for optimisation and efficiency, it can also have opposite effects and increase heteronomy. Overall, this leads to changed forms of adaptation and self-determination, new dilemmas and ambivalences in the temporal optimisation of parenthood.ConclusionsAgainst this background, we explain how the ethics of reproductive medicine could benefit from interdisciplinary research that focuses on life in its temporal course.