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105Essentialism, Metaphysical Realism, and the Errors of ConceptualismPhilosophia Scientiae 12 (1): 9-33. 2008.Le réalisme métaphysique est la conception suivant laquelle la plupart des objets qui peuplent le monde existent indépendamment de notre pensée et possèdent une nature indépendante de la manière dont nous pouvons éventuellement la concevoir. A mon sens cette position engage à admettre une forme robuste d'essentialisme. Beaucoup des formes modernes de l'anti-réalisme tirent leurs origines d'une forme de conceptualisme, suivant laquelle toutes les vérités que nous puissions connaître au sujet des …Read more
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34Review of Maria Elisabeth Reicher (ed.), States of Affairs (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (10). 2009.
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91Radical externalism or Berkeley revisited?Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (7-8): 78-94. 2006.Ted Honderich's 'Radical Externalism' concerning the nature of consciousness is a refreshing, and in many ways very appealing, approach to a long- standing and seemingly intractable philosophical conundrum. Although I sympathize with many of his motivations in advancing the theory and share his hostility for certain alternative approaches that are currently popular, I will serve him better by playing devil's advocate than by simply recording my points of agreement with him. If his theory is a go…Read more
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63Self, Reference and Self-ReferencePhilosophy 68 (263): 15-33. 1993.I favour an analysis of selfhood which ties it to the possession of certain kinds of first-person knowledge, in particular de re knowledge of the identity of one's own conscious thoughts and experiences. My defence of this analysis will lead me to explore the nature of demonstrative reference to one's own conscious thoughts and experiences. Such reference is typically ‘direct’, in contrast to demonstrative reference to all physical objects, apart from those that are parts of one's own body in wh…Read more
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27The Human Person: Animal and Spirit By David Braine London:Duckworth, 1993, viii+182pp., £35.00 (review)Philosophy 69 (268): 244-. 1994.
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25Modes of exemplificationIn Langlet B. Monnoyer J.-M. (ed.), Gustav Bergmann : Phenomenological Realism and Dialectical Ontology, Ontos Verlag. pp. 29--173. 2009.
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36Conditions of Identity: A Study of Identity and SurvivalPhilosophical Books 30 (2): 103-106. 1989.
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284The definition of enduranceAnalysis 69 (2): 277-280. 2009.David Lewis, following in the tradition of Broad, Quine and Goodman, says that change in an object X consists in X's being temporally extended and having qualitatively different temporal parts. Analogously, change in a spatially extended object such as a road consists in its having different spatial parts . The alternative to this view is that ordinary objects undergo temporal change in virtue of having different intrinsic non-relational properties at different times. They endure, remaining the …Read more
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48Substance dualism : A non-cartesian approachIn Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The Waning of Materialism: New Essays, Oxford University Press. 2009.
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57A simplification of the logic of conditionalsNotre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 24 (3): 357-366. 1983.
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172Miracles and laws of natureReligious Studies 23 (2): 263-78. 1987.Construing miracles as \textquotedblleft{}violations,\textquotedblright I argue that a law of nature must specify some kind of possibility. But we must have here a sense of possibility for which the ancient rule of logic---ab esse ad posse valet consequentia---does not hold. We already have one example associated with the concept of statute law, a law which specifies what is legally possible but which is not destroyed by a violation. If laws of nature are construed as specifying some analogous s…Read more
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203Self, agency, and mental causationJournal of Consciousness Studies 6 (8-9): 225-239. 1999.A self or person does not appear to be identifiable with his or her organic body, nor with any part of it, such as the brain; and yet selves seem to be agents, capable of bringing about physical events as causal consequences of certain of their conscious mental states. How is this possible in a universe in which, it appears, every physical event has a sufficient cause which is wholly physical? The answer is that this is possible if a certain kind of naturalistic dualism is true, according to whi…Read more
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T. C. POTTS "Structures and Categories for the Representation of Meaning" (review)History and Philosophy of Logic 16 (1): 140. 1995.
Areas of Specialization
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Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Action |
Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Mind |
Logic and Philosophy of Logic |
Philosophy of Physical Science |