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16This paper expands on, and provides a qualified defence of, Arthur Fine’s selective interactions solution to the measurement problem. Fine’s approach must be understood against the background of the insolubility proof of the quantum measurement. I first defend the proof as an appropriate formal representation of the quantum measurement problem. Then I clarify the nature of selective interactions, and more generally selections, and I go on to offer three arguments in their favour. First, selectio…Read more
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12We offer a review of some of the most influential views on the status of Reichenbach’s Principle of the Common Cause (PCC) for genuinely indeterministic systems. We first argue that the PCC is properly a conjunction of two distinct claims, one metaphysical and another methodological. Both claims can and have been contested in the literature, but here we simply assume that the metaphysical claim is correct, in order to focus our analysis on the status of the methodological claim. We briefly revie…Read more
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22The role of models in the application of scientific theories: epistemological implicationsIn Mary S. Morgan & Margaret Morrison (eds.), Models as Mediators: Perspectives on Natural and Social Science, . 1999.
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83Probabilities, Causes and Propensities in PhysicsIn Mauricio Suárez (ed.), Probabilities, Causes and Propensities in Physics, Springer. 2010.These are the introduction chapters to the forthcoming collection of essays published by Springer (Synthese Library) and entitled Probabilities, Causes and Propensities in Physics.
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21Experimental realism defended: how inference to the most likely cause might be soundIn Luc Bovens, Carl Hoefer & Stephan Hartmann (eds.), Nancy Cartwright's Philosophy of Science, . 2010.
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53Special issue: Inferentialism in philosophy of science and in epistemology—introductionSynthese 198 (Suppl 4): 905-907. 2018.
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429Scientific representation: A long journey from pragmatics to pragmatics Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s11016-010-9465-5 Authors James Ladyman, Department of Philosophy, University of Bristol, 9 Woodland Rd, Bristol, BS8 1TB UK Otávio Bueno, Department of Philosophy, University of Miami, Coral Gables, FL 33124, USA Mauricio Suárez, Department of Logic and Philosophy of Science, Complutense University of Madrid, 28040 Madrid, Spain Bas C. van Fraassen, Philosophy Department, San Francis…Read more
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432Kinds of ModelsIn Malcolm G. Anderson & Paul D. Bates (eds.), Model Validation: perspectives in hydrological science, Wiley. pp. 11-22. 2001.We separate metaphysical from epistemic questions in the evaluation of models, taking into account the distinctive functions of models as opposed to theories. The examples a\are very varied.
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57First Conference of the European Philosophy of Science Association, 14–17 November, Madrid, SpainJournal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 39 (1): 157-159. 2008.
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1040The tool box of science: Tools for the building of models with a superconductivity examplePoznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 44 137-149. 1995.We call for a new philosophical conception of models in physics. Some standard conceptions take models to be useful approximations to theorems, that are the chief means to test theories. Hence the heuristics of model building is dictated by the requirements and practice of theory-testing. In this paper we argue that a theory-driven view of models can not account for common procedures used by scientists to model phenomena. We illustrate this thesis with a case study: the construction of one of th…Read more
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86The Representational Semantic ConceptionPhilosophy of Science 86 (2): 344-365. 2019.This paper argues for a representational semantic conception of scientific theories, which respects the bare claim of any semantic view, namely that theories can be characterised as sets of models. RSC must be sharply distinguished from structural versions that assume a further identity of ‘models’ and ‘structures’, which we reject. The practice-turn in the recent philosophical literature suggests instead that modelling must be understood in a deflationary spirit, in terms of the diverse represe…Read more
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14I defend a three-fold form of pluralism about chance, involving a tripartite distinction between propensities, probabilities, and frequencies. The argument has a negative and a positive part. Negatively, I argue against the identity thesis that informs current propensity theories, which already suggests the need for a tripartite distinction. Positively, I argue that that a tripartite distinction is implicit in much statistical practice. Finally, I apply a well-known framework in the modelling li…Read more
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48On the Analogy between Cognitive Representation and TruthTheoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 21 (1): 39-48. 2010.In this paper we claim that the notion of cognitive representation is irreducibly plural. By means of an analogy with the minimalist conception of truth, we show that this pluralism is compatible with a generally deflationary attitude towards representation. We then explore the extent and nature of representational pluralism by discussing the positive and negative analogies between the inferential conception of representation advocated by one of us and the minimalist conception of truth.
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8SECCIÓN MONOGRÁFICA: Dispositions, Causes and Propensities in Science.IntroductionTheoria 19 (3): 257-258. 2010.
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26ChanceIn Eleanor Knox & Alastair Wilson (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Physics, Routledge. 2022.A brief introduction to the history and philosophy of physical chance.
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25Causal processes and propensities in quantum mechanicsTheoria 19 (3): 271-300. 2010.I offer an alternative interpretation of Van Fraassen's influential arguments against causal realism in quantum mechanics. These arguments provide in fact a good guide to the different causal models available for the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen correlations, which in turn shed light on the nature of quantum propensities.
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877Theories: Tools versus modelsStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 39 (1): 62-81. 2008.In “The Toolbox of Science” (1995) together with Towfic Shomar we advocated a form of instrumentalism about scientific theories. We separately developed this view further in a number of subsequent works. Steven French, James Ladyman, Otavio Bueno and Newton Da Costa (FLBD) have since written at least eight papers and a book criticising our work. Here we defend ourselves. First we explain what we mean in denying that models derive from theory – and why their failure to do so should be lamented. S…Read more
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67Fictions, Conditionals, and Stellar AstrophysicsInternational Studies in the Philosophy of Science 27 (3): 235-252. 2013.This article argues in favour of an inferential role for fictions in scientific modelling. The argument proceeds by means of a detailed case study, namely models of the internal structure of stars in stellar astrophysics. The main assumptions in such models are described, and it is argued that they are best understood as useful fictions. The role that conditionals play in these models is explained, and it is argued that fictional assumptions play an important role as either background or anteced…Read more
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105The ample modelling mindStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 43 (1): 213-217. 2012.
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31Contextos de descubrimiento causalRevista de Filosofía (Madrid) 37 (1): 27-36. 2012.Se distinguen dos acepciones del término “contexto de descubrimiento”: La acepción tradicional, que lo contrasta con el contexto de la justificación, y otra, más reciente, que lo relaciona con la metodología de inferencia causal. Curiosamente, el propio Reichenbach suscribió la segunda acepción, y no es coincidencia que su aportación al desarrollo del campo del descubrimiento causal haya sido capital. Se defiende la vigencia de esta metodología en todas las ciencias empíricas, incluidas las cien…Read more
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134Propensities and PragmatismJournal of Philosophy 110 (2): 61-92. 2013.: This paper outlines a genuinely pragmatist conception of propensity, and defends it against common objections to the propensity interpretation of probability, prominently Humphreys’ paradox. The paper reviews the paradox and identifies one of its key assumptions, the identity thesis, according to which propensities are probabilities. The identity thesis is also involved in empiricist propensity interpretations deriving from Popper’s influential original proposal, and makes such interpretations…Read more
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159Probabilities, Causes and Propensities in PhysicsSpringer. 2010.Table of Contents: Preface.- 1. Introduction; Mauricio Suárez.- PART I: PROBABILITIES.- 2. Probability and time symmetry in classical Markov processes; Guido Bacciagaluppi.- 3. Probability assignments and the principle of indifference: An examination of two eliminative strategies; Sorin Bangu.- 4. Why typicality does not explain the approach to equilibrium; Roman Frigg; PART II: CAUSES.- 5. From metaphysics to physics and back: The example of causation; Federico Laudisa.- 6. On explanation in re…Read more
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12A causal model for EPRCentre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science. 2000.We present a causal model for the EPR correlations. In this model, or better framework for a model, causality is preserved by the direct propagation of causal influences between the wings of the experiment. We show that our model generates the same statistical results for EPR as orthodox quantum mechanics. We conclude that causality in quantum mechanics can not be ruled out on the basis of the EPR-Bell-Aspect correlations alone.
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22The Many Faces of Non-Locality: Dickson on the Quantum CorrelationsBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (4). 2000.
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London School of EconomicsDepartment of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific MethodAssociate Researcher
Madrid, Madrid, Spain
Areas of Specialization
Science, Logic, and Mathematics |
Areas of Interest
8 more