•  102
    The ample modelling mind
    Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 43 (1): 213-217. 2012.
  •  25
    Contextos de descubrimiento causal
    Revista de Filosofía (Madrid) 37 (1): 27-36. 2012.
    Se distinguen dos acepciones del término “contexto de descubrimiento”: La acepción tradicional, que lo contrasta con el contexto de la justificación, y otra, más reciente, que lo relaciona con la metodología de inferencia causal. Curiosamente, el propio Reichenbach suscribió la segunda acepción, y no es coincidencia que su aportación al desarrollo del campo del descubrimiento causal haya sido capital. Se defiende la vigencia de esta metodología en todas las ciencias empíricas, incluidas las cien…Read more
  •  143
    Table of Contents: Preface.- 1. Introduction; Mauricio Suárez.- PART I: PROBABILITIES.- 2. Probability and time symmetry in classical Markov processes; Guido Bacciagaluppi.- 3. Probability assignments and the principle of indifference: An examination of two eliminative strategies; Sorin Bangu.- 4. Why typicality does not explain the approach to equilibrium; Roman Frigg; PART II: CAUSES.- 5. From metaphysics to physics and back: The example of causation; Federico Laudisa.- 6. On explanation in re…Read more
  •  111
    Propensities and Pragmatism
    Journal of Philosophy 110 (2): 61-92. 2013.
    : This paper outlines a genuinely pragmatist conception of propensity, and defends it against common objections to the propensity interpretation of probability, prominently Humphreys’ paradox. The paper reviews the paradox and identifies one of its key assumptions, the identity thesis, according to which propensities are probabilities. The identity thesis is also involved in empiricist propensity interpretations deriving from Popper’s influential original proposal, and makes such interpretations…Read more
  •  9
    A causal model for EPR
    Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science. 2000.
    We present a causal model for the EPR correlations. In this model, or better framework for a model, causality is preserved by the direct propagation of causal influences between the wings of the experiment. We show that our model generates the same statistical results for EPR as orthodox quantum mechanics. We conclude that causality in quantum mechanics can not be ruled out on the basis of the EPR-Bell-Aspect correlations alone.
  •  31
    Introduction
    Theoria 19 (3): 257-258. 2004.
    BIBLID [0495-4548 19: 51; pp. 257-258]
  •  10
    EPSA Philosophical Issues in the Sciences · Launch of the European Philosophy of Science Association (edited book)
    with Mauro Dorato and Miklós Rédei
    Springer. 2009.
    This volume collects papers presented at the Founding Conference of the European Philosophy of Science Association meeting, held November 2007. It provides an excellent overview of the state of the art in philosophy of science in different European countries.
  •  20
    The Many Faces of Non-Locality: Dickson on the Quantum Correlations
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (4). 2000.
  •  451
    Causal processes and propensities in quantum mechanics
    Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 19 (3): 271-300. 2004.
    In an influential article published in 1982, Bas Van Fraassen developed an argument against causal realism on the basis of an analysis of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen correlations of quantum mechanics. Several philosophers of science and experts in causal inference -including some causal realists like Wesley Salmon- have accepted Van Fraassen’s argument, interpreting it as a proof that the quantum correlations cannot be given any causal model. In this paper I argue that Van Fraassen’s article can…Read more
  •  84
    Scientific representation
    Oxford Bibliographies Online. 2014.
    Scientific representation is a booming field nowadays within the philosophy of science, with many papers published regularly on the topic every year, and several yearly conferences and workshops held on related topics. Historically, the topic originates in two different strands in 20th-century philosophy of science. One strand begins in the 1950s, with philosophical interest in the nature of scientific theories. As the received or “syntactic” view gave way to a “semantic” or “structural” concept…Read more
  •  78
    A critique of empiricist propensity theories
    European Journal for Philosophy of Science 4 (2): 215-231. 2014.
    I analyse critically what I regard as the most accomplished empiricist account of propensities, namely the long run propensity theory developed by Donald Gillies . Empiricist accounts are distinguished by their commitment to the ‘identity thesis’: the identification of propensities and objective probabilities. These theories are intended, in the tradition of Karl Popper’s influential proposal, to provide an interpretation of probability that renders probability statements directly testable by ex…Read more
  •  31
    Review (review)
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47 (3): 483-486. 1996.
  •  188
    On the analogy between cognitive representation and truth
    with Albert Solé
    Theoria 21 (1): 39-48. 2006.
    In this paper we claim that the notion of cognitive representation (and scientific representation in particular) is irreducibly plural. By means of an analogy with the minimalist conception of truth, we show thatthis pluralism is compatible with a generally deflationary attitude towards representation. We then explore the extent and nature of representational pluralism by discussing the positive and negative analogies between the inferential conception of representation advocated by one of us an…Read more
  •  151
    Science is popularly understood as being an ideal of impartial algorithmic objectivity that provides us with a realistic description of the world down to the last detail. The essays collected in this book—written by some of the leading experts in the field—challenge this popular image right at its heart, taking as their starting point that science trades not only in truth, but in fiction, too. With case studies that range from physics to economics and to biology, _Fictions in Science_ reveals th…Read more
  •  90
    Review of Bas Van Fraassen, Scientific Representation, Oxford University Press, 2008.
  •  173
    Deflationary representation, inference, and practice
    Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 49 (C): 36-47. 2015.
    This paper defends the deflationary character of two recent views regarding scientific representation, namely RIG Hughes’ DDI model and the inferential conception. It is first argued that these views’ deflationism is akin to the homonymous position in discussions regarding the nature of truth. There, we are invited to consider the platitudes that the predicate “true” obeys at the level of practice, disregarding any deeper, or more substantive, account of its nature. More generally, for any conce…Read more
  •  217
    The Contextual Character of Causal Evidence
    Topoi 33 (2): 397-406. 2014.
    I argue for the thesis that causal evidence is context-dependent. The same causal claim may be warranted by the same piece of evidence in one context but not another. I show this in particular for the type of causal evidence characteristic of the manipulability theory defended by Woodward (Making things happen: a theory of causal explanation. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003). My thesis, however, generalises to other theories—and at the end of the paper I outline the generalization to count…Read more
  •  157
    Causal inference in quantum mechanics: A reassessment
    In Frederica Russo & Jon Williamson (eds.), Causality and Probability in the Sciences, College Publications. pp. 65-106. 2007.
    There has been an intense discussion, albeit largely an implicit one, concerning the inference of causal hypotheses from statistical correlations in quantum mechanics ever since John Bell’s first statement of his notorious theorem in 1966. As is well known, its focus has mainly been the so-called Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (“EPR”) thought experiment, and the ensuing observed correlations in real EPR like experiments. But although implicitly the discussion goes as far back as Bell’s work, it is only…Read more
  •  85
    Science, philosophy and the a priori
    Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 43 (1): 1-6. 2012.
    This is an introductory essay to the symposium on Michael Friedman’s The Dynamics of Reason. It provides a summary description of the symposium and its rationale; an introduction to Michael Friedman’s views on the a priori and what it refers to as ‘developmental Kantianism’; a summary of the content of each of the four contributed papers in the symposium; and a philosophical analysis of the symposium as a whole in relation with developmental Kantianism
  •  205
    Quantum Selections, Propensities and the Problem of Measurement
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (2): 219-255. 2004.
    This paper expands on, and provides a qualified defence of, Arthur Fine's selective interactions solution to the measurement problem. Fine's approach must be understood against the background of the insolubility proof of the quantum measurement. I first defend the proof as an appropriate formal representation of the quantum measurement problem. The nature of selective interactions, and more generally selections, is then clarified, and three arguments in their favour are offered. First, selection…Read more
  •  20
    Procesos causales, realismo y mecánica cuántica
    Enrahonar: Quaderns de Filosofía 37 141-168. 2005.
  •  50
    Reichenbach’s Common Cause Principle and Indeterminism: A Review
    In José Luis González Recio (ed.), Philosophical Essays on Physics and Biology, Georg Olms Verlag. pp. 223-250. 2009.
    We offer a review of some of the most influential views on the status of Reichenbach’s Principle of the Common Cause (RPCC) for genuinely indeterministic systems. We first argue that the RPCC is properly a conjunction of two distinct claims, one metaphysical and another methodological. Both claims can and have been contested in the literature, but here we simply assume that the metaphysical claim is correct, in order to focus our analysis on the status of the methodological claim. We briefly rev…Read more
  •  138
    Interventions and Causality in Quantum Mechanics
    Erkenntnis 78 (2): 199-213. 2013.
    I argue that the Causal Markov Condition (CMC) is in principle applicable to the Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen (EPR) correlations. This is in line with my defence in the past of the applicability of the Principle of Common Cause to quantum mechanics. I first review a contrary claim by Dan Hausman and Jim Woodward, who endeavour to preserve the CMC against a possible counterexample by asserting that the conditions for the application of the CMC are not met in the EPR experiment. In their view the CMC i…Read more
  •  19
    Epr Robustness and the Causal Markov Condition
    with Iñaki San Pedro
    Centre of Philosophy of Natural and Social Science. 2007.
    It is still a matter of controversy whether the Principle of the Common Cause can be used as a basis for sound causal inference. It is thus to be expected that its application to quantum mechanics should be a correspondingly controversial issue. Indeed the early 90’s saw a flurry of papers addressing just this issue in connection with the EPR correlations. Yet, that debate does not seem to have caught up with the most recent literature on causal inference generally, which has moved on to conside…Read more
  •  191
    The many Metaphysics within Physics. Essay review of 'The Metaphysics within Physics' by Tim Maudlin
    Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 40 (3): 273-276. 2009.
    Essay Review of Tim Maudlin's "The Metaphysics within Physics", Oxford University Press, 2007
  •  2
  •  50
    This volume showcases the best of recent research in the philosophy of science. A compilation of papers presented at the EPSA 13, it explores a broad distribution of topics such as causation, truthlikeness, scientific representation, gender-specific medicine, laws of nature, science funding and the wisdom of crowds. Papers are organised into headings which form the structure of the book. Readers will find that it covers several major fields within the philosophy of science, from general philosop…Read more
  •  256
    An inferential conception of scientific representation
    Philosophy of Science 71 (5): 767-779. 2004.
    This paper defends an inferential conception of scientific representation. It approaches the notion of representation in a deflationary spirit, and minimally characterizes the concept as it appears in science by means of two necessary conditions: its essential directionality and its capacity to allow surrogate reasoning and inference. The conception is defended by showing that it successfully meets the objections that make its competitors, such as isomorphism and similarity, untenable. In additi…Read more