•  388
    Quantum Selections, Propensities and the Problem of Measurement
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (2): 219-255. 2004.
    This paper expands on, and provides a qualified defence of, Arthur Fine's selective interactions solution to the measurement problem. Fine's approach must be understood against the background of the insolubility proof of the quantum measurement. I first defend the proof as an appropriate formal representation of the quantum measurement problem. The nature of selective interactions, and more generally selections, is then clarified, and three arguments in their favour are offered. First, selection…Read more
  •  81
    Presentation
    Theoria 15 (1): 5-10. 2000.
    This monograph section of Theoria is devoted to the notion of causation in modern physics. The four long essays and short epilogue contained in this volume constitute a representative sample of recent work by philosophers of physics on causality. All the contributions to this volume share a healthy respect for science, and what science may be able to tell us about causation: these essays look for a notion of causation that can make sense of modern physical science. And, as is the norm in contemp…Read more
  •  352
    A causal model for EPR
    Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science. 2000.
    We present a causal model for the EPR correlations. In this model, or better framework for a model, causality is preserved by the direct propagation of causal influences between the wings of the experiment. We show that our model generates the same statistical results for EPR as orthodox quantum mechanics. We conclude that causality in quantum mechanics can not be ruled out on the basis of the EPR-Bell-Aspect correlations alone.
  •  204
    Science is popularly understood as being an ideal of impartial algorithmic objectivity that provides us with a realistic description of the world down to the last detail. The essays collected in this book—written by some of the leading experts in the field—challenge this popular image right at its heart, taking as their starting point that science trades not only in truth, but in fiction, too. With case studies that range from physics to economics and to biology, _Fictions in Science_ reveals th…Read more
  •  150
    It is widely accepted in contemporary philosophy of science that the domain of application of a theory is typically larger than its explanatory covering power: theories can be applied to phenomena that they do not explain. I argue for an analogous thesis regarding the notion of empirical adequacy. A theory’s domain of application is typically larger than its domain of empirical adequacy: theories are often applied to phenomena from which they receive no empirical confirmation.
  •  334
    The many Metaphysics within Physics. Essay review of 'The Metaphysics within Physics' by Tim Maudlin
    Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 40 (3): 273-276. 2009.
    Essay Review of Tim Maudlin's "The Metaphysics within Physics", Oxford University Press, 2007
  •  782
    Scientific representation: Against similarity and isomorphism
    International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 17 (3): 225-244. 2003.
    I argue against theories that attempt to reduce scientific representation to similarity or isomorphism. These reductive theories aim to radically naturalize the notion of representation, since they treat scientist's purposes and intentions as non-essential to representation. I distinguish between the means and the constituents of representation, and I argue that similarity and isomorphism are common but not universal means of representation. I then present four other arguments to show that simil…Read more
  •  543
    An inferential conception of scientific representation
    Philosophy of Science 71 (5): 767-779. 2004.
    This paper defends an inferential conception of scientific representation. It approaches the notion of representation in a deflationary spirit, and minimally characterizes the concept as it appears in science by means of two necessary conditions: its essential directionality and its capacity to allow surrogate reasoning and inference. The conception is defended by showing that it successfully meets the objections that make its competitors, such as isomorphism and similarity, untenable. In additi…Read more
  •  101
    Propensities in quantum mechanics
    Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science. 2006.
    I review five explicit attempts throughout the history of quantum mechanics to invoke dispositional notions in order to solve the quantum paradoxes, namely: Margenau’s latencies, Heisenberg’s potentialities, Popper’s propensity interpretation of probability, Nick Maxwell’s propensitons, and the recent selective propensities interpretation of quantum mechanics. I raise difficulties and challenges for all of them, but conclude that the selective propensities approach nicely encompasses the virtues…Read more
  •  102
    Mellor. 2005 Probability: A Philosophical Introduction
    Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 26 (1): 99-103. 2011.
  •  190
    The ample modelling mind
    Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 43 (1): 213-217. 2012.
  •  23
    Causality in Physics: Presentation
    Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 15 (1): 5-10. 2000.
    This monograph section of Theoria is devoted to the notion of causation in modern physics. The four long essays and short epilogue contained in this volume constitute a representative sample of recent work by philosophers of physics on causality. All the contributions to this volume share a healthy respect for science, and what science may be able to tell us about causation: these essays look for a notion of causation that can make sense of modern physical science. And, as is the norm in contemp…Read more
  •  85
    Probability (review)
    Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 26 (1): 99-103. 2011.
  •  116
    We offer a review of some of the most influential views on the status of Reichenbach’s Principle of the Common Cause (RPCC) for genuinely indeterministic systems. We first argue that the RPCC is properly a conjunction of two distinct claims, one metaphysical and another methodological. Both claims can and have been contested in the literature, but here we simply assume that the metaphysical claim is correct, in order to focus our analysis on the status of the methodological claim. We briefly rev…Read more
  •  111
    Hacking Kuhn
    Revista de Filosofía (Madrid) 28 (2): 261-284. 2003.
    Thomas Kuhn’s work, particularly his famous book Structure of Scientific Revolutions, is often interpreted as a failed attempt to defend four radical thesis about science: epistemic pessimism, semantic relativism, methodological irrationalism and metaphysical idealism. In this paper I argue that such interpretation depends essentially on a false model of scientific knowledge, according to which the objects of scientific belief are always explanatory scientific theories, which are in turn empiric…Read more
  •  766
    Theories: Tools versus models
    Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 39 (1): 62-81. 2008.
    In “The Toolbox of Science” (1995) together with Towfic Shomar we advocated a form of instrumentalism about scientific theories. We separately developed this view further in a number of subsequent works. Steven French, James Ladyman, Otavio Bueno and Newton Da Costa (FLBD) have since written at least eight papers and a book criticising our work. Here we defend ourselves. First we explain what we mean in denying that models derive from theory – and why their failure to do so should be lamented. S…Read more
  •  176
    Scientific representation
    Oxford Bibliographies Online. 2014.
    Scientific representation is a booming field nowadays within the philosophy of science, with many papers published regularly on the topic every year, and several yearly conferences and workshops held on related topics. Historically, the topic originates in two different strands in 20th-century philosophy of science. One strand begins in the 1950s, with philosophical interest in the nature of scientific theories. As the received or “syntactic” view gave way to a “semantic” or “structural” concept…Read more
  •  358
    Bohmian dispositions
    Synthese 192 (10): 3203-3228. 2015.
    This paper argues for a broadly dispositionalist approach to the ontology of Bohmian mechanics . It first distinguishes the ‘minimal’ and the ‘causal’ versions of Bohm’s theory, and then briefly reviews some of the claims advanced on behalf of the ‘causal’ version by its proponents. A number of ontological or interpretive accounts of the wave function in BM are then addressed in detail, including configuration space, multi-field, nomological, and dispositional approaches. The main objection to e…Read more
  •  454
    Quantum propensities
    Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 38 (2): 418-438. 2007.
    This paper reviews four attempts throughout the history of quantum mechanics to explicitly employ dispositional notions in order to solve the quantum paradoxes, namely: Margenau's latencies, Heisenberg's potentialities, Maxwell's propensitons, and the recent selective propensities interpretation of quantum mechanics. Difficulties and challenges are raised for all of them, and it is concluded that the selective propensities approach nicely encompasses the virtues of its predecessors. Finally, som…Read more
  •  367
    Experimental Realism Defended: How Inference to the Most Likely Cause Might Be Sound
    Contingency and Dissent in Science Project, Cpnss, London School of Economics and Political Science. 2005.
    On a purely epistemic understanding of experimental realism, manipulation affords a particularly robust kind of causal warrant, which is – like any other warrant – defeasible. I defend a version of Nancy Cartwright’s inference to the most likely cause, and I conclude that this minimally epistemic version of experimental realism is a coherent, adequate and plausible epistemology for science.
  •  188
    On quantum propensities: Two arguments revisited
    Erkenntnis 61 (1): 1-16. 2004.
    Peter Milne and Neal Grossman have argued against Popper's propensity interpretation of quantum mechanics, by appeal to the two-slit experiment and to the distinction between mixtures and superpositions, respectively. In this paper I show that a different propensity interpretation successfully meets their objections. According to this interpretation, the possession of a quantum propensity by a quantum system is independent of the experimental set-ups designed to test it, even though its manifest…Read more
  •  80
    Epr Robustness and the Causal Markov Condition
    with Iñaki San Pedro
    Centre of Philosophy of Natural and Social Science. 2007.
    It is still a matter of controversy whether the Principle of the Common Cause can be used as a basis for sound causal inference. It is thus to be expected that its application to quantum mechanics should be a correspondingly controversial issue. Indeed the early 90’s saw a flurry of papers addressing just this issue in connection with the EPR correlations. Yet, that debate does not seem to have caught up with the most recent literature on causal inference generally, which has moved on to conside…Read more
  •  257
    It is still a matter of controversy whether the Principle of the Common Cause (PCC) can be used as a basis for sound causal inference. It is thus to be expected that its application to quantum mechanics should be a correspondingly controversial issue. Indeed the early 90’s saw a flurry of papers addressing just this issue in connection with the EPR correlations. Yet, that debate does not seem to have caught up with the most recent literature on causal inference generally, which has moved on to c…Read more
  •  314
    The Contextual Character of Causal Evidence
    Topoi 33 (2): 397-406. 2014.
    I argue for the thesis that causal evidence is context-dependent. The same causal claim may be warranted by the same piece of evidence in one context but not another. I show this in particular for the type of causal evidence characteristic of the manipulability theory defended by Woodward (Making things happen: a theory of causal explanation. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003). My thesis, however, generalises to other theories—and at the end of the paper I outline the generalization to count…Read more
  •  209
    Science, philosophy and the a priori
    Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 43 (1): 1-6. 2012.
    This is an introductory essay to the symposium on Michael Friedman’s The Dynamics of Reason. It provides a summary description of the symposium and its rationale; an introduction to Michael Friedman’s views on the a priori and what it refers to as ‘developmental Kantianism’; a summary of the content of each of the four contributed papers in the symposium; and a philosophical analysis of the symposium as a whole in relation with developmental Kantianism