•  4
    Selections, Dispositions and the Problem of Measurement
    Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science. 2001.
    This paper expands on, and provides a qualified defence of, Arthur Fine’s selective interactions solution to the measurement problem. Fine’s approach must be understood against the background of the insolubility proof of the quantum measurement. I first defend the proof as an appropriate formal representation of the quantum measurement problem. Then I clarify the nature of selective interactions, and more generally selections, and I go on to offer three arguments in their favour. First, selectio…Read more
  •  5
    The Pragmatics of Scientific Representation
    Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science. 2002.
    This paper is divided in two parts. In part I, I argue against two attempts to naturalise the notion of scientific representation, by reducing it to isomorphism and similarity. I distinguish between the means and the constituents of representation, and I argue that isomorphism and similarity are common means of representation; but that they are not constituents of scientific representation. I look at the prospects for weakened versions of these theories, and I argue that only those that abandon …Read more
  •  5
    Selections, Dispositions and the Problem of Measurement
    Discussion Paper (DP 57/01). 2001.
    This paper expands on, and provides a qualified defence of, Arthur Fine’s selective interactions solution to the measurement problem. Fine’s approach must be understood against the background of the insolubility proof of the quantum measurement. I first defend the proof as an appropriate formal representation of the quantum measurement problem. Then I clarify the nature of selective interactions, and more generally selections, and I go on to offer three arguments in their favour. First, selectio…Read more
  •  8
    The Pragmatics of Scientific Representation
    Discussion Paper (DP 66/02). 2002.
    This paper is divided in two parts. In part I, I argue against two attempts to naturalise the notion of scientific representation, by reducing it to isomorphism and similarity. I distinguish between the means and the constituents of representation, and I argue that isomorphism and similarity are common means of representation; but that they are not constituents of scientific representation. I look at the prospects for weakened versions of these theories, and I argue that only those that abandon …Read more
  •  1
    This paper critically reviews Philip Kitcher's most recent epistemology of science, real realism. I argue that this view is unstable under different understandings of the term 'representation', and that the arguments offered for the position are either unsound or invalid depending on the understanding employed. Suitably modified those arguments are however convincing in favor of a deflationary version of real realism, which I refer to as the bare view. The bare view accepts Kitcher's Galilean st…Read more
  •  9
    This paper is divided in two parts. In part I, I argue against two attempts to naturalise the notion of scientific representation, by reducing it to isomorphism and similarity. I distinguish between the means and the constituents of representation, and I argue that isomorphism and similarity are common means of representation; but that they are not constituents of scientific representation. I look at the prospects for weakened versions of these theories, and I argue that only those that abandon …Read more
  •  5
    This paper expands on, and provides a qualified defence of, Arthur Fine’s selective interactions solution to the measurement problem. Fine’s approach must be understood against the background of the insolubility proof of the quantum measurement. I first defend the proof as an appropriate formal representation of the quantum measurement problem. Then I clarify the nature of selective interactions, and more generally selections, and I go on to offer three arguments in their favour. First, selectio…Read more
  •  2
    We offer a review of some of the most influential views on the status of Reichenbach’s Principle of the Common Cause for genuinely indeterministic systems. We first argue that the PCC is properly a conjunction of two distinct claims, one metaphysical and another methodological. Both claims can and have been contested in the literature, but here we simply assume that the metaphysical claim is correct, in order to focus our analysis on the status of the methodological claim. We briefly review the …Read more
  •  55
    These are the introduction chapters to the forthcoming collection of essays published by Springer (Synthese Library) and entitled Probabilities, Causes and Propensities in Physics.
  •  2
    Predicció en les ciències socials
    Enrahonar: Quaderns de Filosofía 37 141-168. 2005.
    https://revistes.uab.cat/enrahonar/article/view/v37-salmon-2.
  •  17
    Special issue: Inferentialism in philosophy of science and in epistemology—introduction
    with Javier González de Prado Salas and Jesús Zamora-Bonilla
    Synthese 1-3. forthcoming.
  •  19
    Book review (review)
    with Hanne Andersen
    Erkenntnis 40 (3): 403-415. 1994.
  •  49
    First Conference of the European Philosophy of Science Association, 14–17 November, Madrid, Spain
    with Stathis Psillos
    Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 39 (1): 157-159. 2008.
  •  349
    Scientific representation: A long journey from pragmatics to pragmatics (review)
    with James Ladyman, Otávio Bueno, and Bas C. van Fraassen
    Metascience 20 (3): 417-442. 2011.
    Scientific representation: A long journey from pragmatics to pragmatics Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s11016-010-9465-5 Authors James Ladyman, Department of Philosophy, University of Bristol, 9 Woodland Rd, Bristol, BS8 1TB UK Otávio Bueno, Department of Philosophy, University of Miami, Coral Gables, FL 33124, USA Mauricio Suárez, Department of Logic and Philosophy of Science, Complutense University of Madrid, 28040 Madrid, Spain Bas C. van Fraassen, Philosophy Department, San Francis…Read more
  •  214
    We separate metaphysical from epistemic questions in the evaluation of models, taking into account the distinctive functions of models as opposed to theories. The examples a\are very varied.
  •  376
    The tool box of science: Tools for the building of models with a superconductivity example
    with Nancy Cartwright and Towfic Shomar
    Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 44 137-149. 1995.
    We call for a new philosophical conception of models in physics. Some standard conceptions take models to be useful approximations to theorems, that are the chief means to test theories. Hence the heuristics of model building is dictated by the requirements and practice of theory-testing. In this paper we argue that a theory-driven view of models can not account for common procedures used by scientists to model phenomena. We illustrate this thesis with a case study: the construction of one of th…Read more
  •  25
    The Representational Semantic Conception
    with Francesca Pero
    Philosophy of Science 86 (2): 344-365. 2019.
    This paper argues for a representational semantic conception of scientific theories, which respects the bare claim of any semantic view, namely that theories can be characterised as sets of models. RSC must be sharply distinguished from structural versions that assume a further identity of ‘models’ and ‘structures’, which we reject. The practice-turn in the recent philosophical literature suggests instead that modelling must be understood in a deflationary spirit, in terms of the diverse represe…Read more
  •  6
    I defend a three-fold form of pluralism about chance, involving a tripartite distinction between propensities, probabilities, and frequencies. The argument has a negative and a positive part. Negatively, I argue against the identity thesis that informs current propensity theories, which already suggests the need for a tripartite distinction. Positively, I argue that that a tripartite distinction is implicit in much statistical practice. Finally, I apply a well-known framework in the modelling li…Read more
  •  17
    On the Analogy between Cognitive Representation and Truth
    Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 21 (1): 39-48. 2006.
    In this paper we claim that the notion of cognitive representation is irreducibly plural. By means of an analogy with the minimalist conception of truth, we show that this pluralism is compatible with a generally deflationary attitude towards representation. We then explore the extent and nature of representational pluralism by discussing the positive and negative analogies between the inferential conception of representation advocated by one of us and the minimalist conception of truth.
  •  72
    Sumario analitico/summary
    with Dowe Phil
    Theoria 15 (1): 37-123. 2000.
  •  2
    SECCIÓN MONOGRÁFICA: Dispositions, Causes and Propensities in Science.Introduction
    Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 19 (3): 257-258. 2010.
  •  11
    A brief introduction to the history and philosophy of physical chance.
  •  6
    Causal processes and propensities in quantum mechanics
    Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 19 (3): 271-300. 2010.
    I offer an alternative interpretation of Van Fraassen's influential arguments against causal realism in quantum mechanics. These arguments provide in fact a good guide to the different causal models available for the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen correlations, which in turn shed light on the nature of quantum propensities.
  • Launch of the European Philosophy of Science Association (edited book)
    with M. Dorato and M. Redei
    Springer. 2010.
  •  63
    Presentation
    Theoria 15 (1): 5-10. 2000.
    This monograph section of Theoria is devoted to the notion of causation in modern physics. The four long essays and short epilogue contained in this volume constitute a representative sample of recent work by philosophers of physics on causality. All the contributions to this volume share a healthy respect for science, and what science may be able to tell us about causation: these essays look for a notion of causation that can make sense of modern physical science. And, as is the norm in contemp…Read more
  •  245
    Experimental Realism Defended: How Inference to the Most Likely Cause Might Be Sound
    Contingency and Dissent in Science Project, Cpnss, London School of Economics and Political Science. 2005.
    On a purely epistemic understanding of experimental realism, manipulation affords a particularly robust kind of causal warrant, which is – like any other warrant – defeasible. I defend a version of Nancy Cartwright’s inference to the most likely cause, and I conclude that this minimally epistemic version of experimental realism is a coherent, adequate and plausible epistemology for science.
  •  6
    This volume defends a novel approach to the philosophy of physics: it is the first book devoted to a comparative study of probability, causality, and propensity, and their various interrelations, within the context of contemporary physics -- particularly quantum and statistical physics. The philosophical debates and distinctions are firmly grounded upon examples from actual physics, thus exemplifying a robustly empiricist approach. The essays, by both prominent scholars in the field and promisin…Read more