B. Chen

ABSTRACT Between April 1820 and April 1822, stimulated by the restoration of the Cádiz Constitution, Bentham devoted himself to writing a number of works on the constitutional reform and colonial rule of Spain, which have been sources of a scholarly debate over Bentham's views on colony. By examining those works, this essay aims to supplement the scholarly debate by drawing attention to a thesis that Bentham developed in his criticism and evaluation of the Cádiz Constitution: a thesis concerning the irreconcilable incompatibilities of liberal constitution and colonisation. I focus on Bentham's critical analyses of the Constitution, and indicate that Spain's colonial rule of Ultramaria not only intensified the weaknesses of the Constitution, but also rendered its merits useless, if not harmful, to the public in both hemispheres. Moreover, I explore the tension that Bentham detected between liberal constitutionalism and colonialism. I maintain that, in Bentham's observation, the civil rights granted by the Cádiz Constitution to the Ultramarians stood to facilitate the enlightenment of citizens and the formation of civil society. As a consequence, the delusion of the Spanish ruling few would be exposed, and the Ultramarians’ discontent with exploitation by such foreign rulers would sow the seeds of disobedience and resistance.

ABSTRACTThe six basic emotions have long been considered discrete categories that serve as the primary units of the emotion system. Yet recent evidence indicated underlying connections among them. Here we tested the underlying relationships among the six basic emotions using a perceptual learning procedure. This technique has the potential of causally changing participants’ emotion detection ability. We found that training on detecting a facial expression improved the performance not only on the trained expression but also on other expressions. Such a transfer effect was consistently demonstrated between disgust and anger detection as well as between fear and surprise detection in two experiments. Notably, training on any of the six emotions could improve happiness detection, while sadness detection could only be improved by training on sadness itself, suggesting the uniqueness of happiness and sadness....

Property law treats intellectual property (IP) differently than physical property. This paper draws upon John Locke’s labor mixing theory of property to explain why we have different moral expectations for IP. In particular, this paper aims to demonstrate that a Lockean account leads to the conclusion that intellectual property rights must be limited by a policy of expiration although we have no such expectations for physical property. In so doing, this paper begins with an explanation of Locke’s original justification for physical property, conducts a modest exploration of what a Lockean theory of IP might look like, and ends by arguing that expiration is a way to reconcile the warring interests within such a theory of IP. In addition to labor mixing, Locke’s two restrictions of property acquisition, the enough and as good proviso and the waste condition, critically affect how we must balance the rights of original IP inventors, subsequent inventors, and the general public.

The recent advances in assisted reproductive technology, such as hormonal stimulation, IVF, and intracytoplasmic sperm injection (ICSI), have made it possible to circumvent many causes of male and female factor infertility. However, uterine infertility is still considered an ‘‘unconditionally infertile’’ condition. Owing to the continued advances in organ transplantation, microvascular anastomosis techniques, and immunosuppressive medicine, the transplantation of organs is no longer restricted to the ones necessary for continued life. Quality-of-life enhancing types of transplantation, such as uterine transplantation, in recent years, have also entered the clinical arena. This undoubtedly brings new hope to such women, but also creates ethical challenges. Selection of the donor, the impact on the recipient and offspring, as well as challenges to moral and social norms are issues that cannot be ignored. In the present review, the ethical issues of transplantation of the uterus will be discussed in light of recent progress in the procedure.

The recent advances in assisted reproductive technology, such as hormonal stimulation, IVF, and intracytoplasmic sperm injection (ICSI), have made it possible to circumvent many causes of male and female factor infertility. However, uterine infertility is still considered an ‘‘unconditionally infertile’’ condition. Owing to the continued advances in organ transplantation, microvascular anastomosis techniques, and immunosuppressive medicine, the transplantation of organs is no longer restricted to the ones necessary for continued life. Quality-of-life enhancing types of transplantation, such as uterine transplantation, in recent years, have also entered the clinical arena. This undoubtedly brings new hope to such women, but also creates ethical challenges. Selection of the donor, the impact on the recipient and offspring, as well as challenges to moral and social norms are issues that cannot be ignored. In the present review, the ethical issues of transplantation of the uterus will be discussed in light of recent progress in the procedure.

The recent advances in assisted reproductive technology, such as hormonal stimulation, IVF, and intracytoplasmic sperm injection (ICSI), have made it possible to circumvent many causes of male and female factor infertility. However, uterine infertility is still considered an ‘‘unconditionally infertile’’ condition. Owing to the continued advances in organ transplantation, microvascular anastomosis techniques, and immunosuppressive medicine, the transplantation of organs is no longer restricted to the ones necessary for continued life. Quality-of-life enhancing types of transplantation, such as uterine transplantation, in recent years, have also entered the clinical arena. This undoubtedly brings new hope to such women, but also creates ethical challenges. Selection of the donor, the impact on the recipient and offspring, as well as challenges to moral and social norms are issues that cannot be ignored. In the present review, the ethical issues of transplantation of the uterus will be discussed in light of recent progress in the procedure.

A longstanding criticism of Ernest Nagel's model of reduction is that it fails to take theory change into account. This criticism builds on the received view that Nagelian reductions are incompatible with theory change. This article challenges the received view by showing that Nagel's model can easily accommodate theory change. Indeed, Nagel's model is essentially static as it only gives unchanging formal and nonformal conditions for reduction; in contrast, theory change belongs to the dynamic history of science; as a result, the application of Nagel's model to scientific knowledge from different historical periods yields a series of Nagelian reductions of different degrees of reductive success. This Nagelian treatment of theory change is illustrated by considering the enterprise of reducing thermodynamics to statistical mechanics in the late nineteenth century. It is also contended that, in handling theory change Nagel's model has greater merits than subsequent models (exemplified by Kenneth Schaffner's general reduction-replacement model). This article concludes by suggesting that Nagel's model of reduction deals with theory change exactly in the same way as logical empiricism does with historicism.

Vitalism was long viewed as the most grotesque view in biological theory: appeals to a mysterious life-force, Romantic insistence on the autonomy of life, or worse, a metaphysics of an entirely living universe. In the early twentieth century, attempts were made to present a revised, lighter version that was not weighted down by revisionary metaphysics: “organicism”. And mainstream philosophers of science criticized Driesch and Bergson’s “neovitalism” as a too-strong ontological commitment to the existence of certain entities or “forces”, over and above the system of causal relations studied by mechanistic science, rejecting the weaker form, organicism, as well. But there has been some significant scholarly “push-back” against this orthodox attitude, notably pointing to the 18th-century Montpellier vitalists to show that there are different historical forms of vitalism, including how they relate to mainstream scientific practice. Additionally, some trends in recent biology that run counter to genetic reductionism and the informational model of the gene present themselves as organicist. Here, we examine some cases of vitalism in the twentieth century and today, not just as a historical form but as a significant metaphysical and scientific model. We argue for vitalism’s conceptual originality without either reducing it to mainstream models of science or presenting it as an alternate model of science, by focusing on historical forms of vitalism, logical empiricist critiques thereof and the impact of synthetic biology on current theorizing of vitalism.

Compared with Western Philosophy, Chinese Philosophy seldom talks about "the other world". This difference can be further proved in language categories. What exists in language text is different from what exists in language structure or language categories. Language categories reflect the styles of deep thinking. The lacking of subjunctive in Chinese language reflects the indifference between facts and ultra-facts in Chinese minds. There is a pan-fact attention in Chinese culture, while an ultra-fact attention in Western culture. This difference also embodies in the activities of religion, logic, mathematics and science.

Today vitalism is widely dismissed as a metaphysical heresy. For instance, Brigandt and Love (Reductionism in biology. In: Zalta EN (ed) The stanford encyclopedia of philosophy, 2017) claimed that “the denial of physicalism by vitalism, the doctrine that biological systems are governed by forces that are not physico-chemical, is largely of historical interest” (p. 3). Perhaps the most “infamous” vitalist is the German biologist Hans Driesch. However, Driesch (In Rádl E (ed) Actes du Huitième Congrès International de Philosophie a Prague 2–7 septembre 1934. Comité d’Organisation du Congrès, Prague, pp 10–30, 1936) himself very explicitly stated that his vitalism is “neither ‘mysticism’[…]nor ‘metaphysics’” (p. 27). So, in order to address the mismatch between the present conception of vitalism and his own, I seek to offer a historico-logical re-assessment of Driesch’s vitalism. From the historical point of view, I show that Driesch had provided long ignored theoretical reflections on the nature of entelechy (the central concept in his vitalism), especially those in relation to evolution and physics. From the logical point of view, following logical empiricists (Phillipp FrankFrank, Philipp and Rudolf CarnapCarnap, Rudolf), I indicate that Driesch’s vitalism should be rejected due to its lack of vital laws, at least with respect to current biology; it is an unestablished theory rather than a metaphysical heresy. Ironically, some current theoretical biologists have proposed similar theories (or principles and laws) of life, even though they (incoherently) reject Driesch’s vitalism. In the end, I briefly conclude that the failure of vitalism actually alludes to the fact that even today we understand very little about the nature of life (I mean, the pure concept/phenomenon of life!) (While I cannot elaborate here, it is of extremely importance not to conflate knowledge about the pure concept/phenomenon of life and knowledge about objects predicatable of life (Ben-Naim, manuscript, p. 281). For instance, it is common among philosophers of biology today to cite elementary knowledge in a particular biological discipline as offering a better understanding of life. Yet their promise fails to be delivered. At best, they are merely relying on knowledge about objects predicatable of life (in most cases, merely knowledge about complex organizations of matter: about heredity, reproduction, development, metabolism, etc); but such knowledge has not been shown of any relevance to the pure concept/phenomenon of life).

Presenting a thorough examination of the sacred forests of Asia, this volume engages with dynamic new scholarly dialogues on the nature of sacred space, place, landscape, and ecology in the context of the sharply contested ideas of the Anthropocene. Given the vast geographic range of sacred groves in Asia, this volume discusses the diversity of associated cosmologies, ecologies, traditional local resource management practices, and environmental governance systems developed during the pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial periods. Adopting theoretical perspectives from political ecology, the book views ecology and polity as constitutive elements interacting within local, regional, and global networks. Readers will find the very first systematic comparative analysis of sacred forests that include the karchall mabhuy of the Katu people of Central Vietnam, the leuweng kolot of the Baduy people of West Java, the fengshui forests of southern China, the groves to the goddess Sarna Mata worshiped by the Oraon people of Jharkhand India, the mauelsoop and bibosoop of Korea, and many more. Comprising in-depth, field-based case study, each chapter shows how the forest's sacrality must not be conceptually delinked from its roles in common property regimes, resource security, spiritual matters of ultimate concern, and cultural identity. This volume will be of great interest to students and scholars of indigenous studies, environmental anthropology, political ecology, geography, religion and heritage, nature conservation, environmental protection, and Asian Studies.