B. Chen

This commentary extends Ko and Neuberg’s theoretical framework by incorporating two underexplored but developmentally critical ecological conditions of environments: digital social and outdoor natural environments. Applying life history and affordance management perspectives, it examines how these environments can be perceived as opportunities and threats across childhood, mating, and parenting stages. Incorporating these ecologies enhances the framework’s theoretical scope and relevance to modern developmental realities.

Driven by digital transformation, the practice logic of corporate social responsibility (CSR) has undergone a revolutionary shift, with virtual CSR co-creation becoming a hot topic in both industry and academia. However, existing research lacks analysis on the interactive characteristics of virtual CSR co-creation and their subsequent effects. Based on the conservation of resources theory, this paper constructs a dual-path model of how virtual CSR co-creation interactivity affects user stickiness. The results show that virtual CSR co-creation interactivity has a double-edged sword effect on user stickiness. The human-system interaction and human-human interaction of virtual CSR co-creation can positively affect user stickiness by enhancing users' perceived benefits, but they can also negatively affect user stickiness by exacerbating users' privacy concerns, with the effect of human-system interaction being more pronounced. At the same time, the customizability of virtual CSR co-creation can not only strengthen the positive effect of human-system interaction and human-human interaction on users' perceived benefits but also mitigate their negative impact on users' privacy concerns. Moreover, except for the insignificant moderating effect of customizability on the mediating effect of perceived benefits between human-human interaction and user stickiness, its moderating effect on other mediating paths is significant. This paper provides theoretical guidance and practical insights for enterprises to enhance user stickiness through virtual CSR co-creation activities.

DNA-dependent protein kinase, consisting of Ku and DNA-PKcs subunits, is the key component of the non-homologous end-joining pathway of DNA double strand break repair. Although the kinase activity of DNA-PKcs is essential for NHEJ, thus far, no in vivo substrate has been conclusively identified except for an autophosphorylation site on DNA-PKcs itself. Here we report the ionizing radiation -induced autophosphorylation of DNA-PKcs at a novel site, serine 2056, the phosphorylation of which is required for the repair of DSBs by NHEJ. Interestingly, IR-induced DNA-PKcs autophosphorylation is regulated in a cell cycle-dependent manner with attenuated phosphorylation in the S phase. In contrast, DNA replication-associated DSBs resulted in DNA-PKcs autophosphorylation and localization to DNA damage sites. These results indicate that although IR-induced DNA-PKcs phosphorylation is attenuated in the S phase, DNA-PKcs is preferentially activated by the physiologically relevant DNA replication-associated DSBs at the sites of DNA synthesis.

Background Preserving dignity is a core element of nursing care. Older adults admitted to intensive care units (ICUs) are particularly vulnerable to dignity loss due to critical illness, invasive interventions, and limited communication. Objective This study examined the status and influencing factors of dignified care practices among ICU nurses in caring for older patients, with the aim of informing quality-improvement strategies. Design An explanatory sequential mixed-methods design was employed. Participants and Setting A questionnaire survey was completed by 487 ICU nurses from 5 tertiary hospitals in Hunan Province, China. Semi-structured interviews were then conducted with 18 ICU nurses. Qualitative data were analyzed using a descriptive phenomenological approach. Ethical Considerations The study was approved by the institutional ethics committee, and informed consent was obtained from all participants. Findings Nurses reported moderately high dignified care (79.12 ± 10.40). Scores were higher in absolute dignity (87.05 ± 11.43) than in relative dignity (70.19 ± 12.86). Regression analysis identified six predictors—gender, education, ethics training, work environment, moral sensitivity, and psychological capital—explaining 38.4% of the variance. Qualitative findings revealed four themes: difficulty balancing technical demands with dignity preservation; patient-related barriers such as severe illness and poor adherence; cultural conflicts between traditional respect for older adults and family decision-making; and organizational constraints, including heavy workloads and implicit workplace norms. Conclusion ICU nurses generally demonstrate competence in dignity preservation; however, limitations remain in addressing individualized dignity needs. Dignified care is influenced by the interplay of individual, environmental, and cultural factors. Improvement requires optimizing the clinical environment, strengthening ethics education and psychological support, applying dignity-centered standards, and promoting patient-centered cultural transformation through leadership. Coordinated efforts by healthcare administrators are essential to achieve sustainable quality improvement.

High vocation education is an important foundation for China to cultivate high teaching quality and technical and skilled talents. In the new era, the acceleration of the development of modern vocational education is put in a more prominent position. It is proposed that we should adhere to moral education, closely combine this with the needs of technological change and industrial upgrading, constantly improve the quality of high vocational education teaching, and cultivate more technical and skilled talents with both political integrity and ability for modernization construction. Under the background of social informatization, using artificial intelligent technology to solve these problems can play an important role for improving the teaching quality of high vocational education. This paper proposed a data mining approach in promoting student satisfaction with the teaching quality of high vocational education. We design a questionnaire for Students’ satisfaction with the teaching quality of basic entrepreneurship curriculum. We take the survey data of vocation education as an example and use mining technology analysis software to understand the current status of the teaching quality of basic entrepreneurship curriculum. The results determine the main factors affecting Students’ satisfaction with teaching quality. The results of this paper can be used in student management, education strategy, student education satisfaction, and teaching quality in high vocation college education, and to improve the teaching quality of fundamentals of entrepreneurship curriculum in high vocation education.

This commentary expands Ellis et al.’s 2-tiered life history (LH) model by integrating shyness and insecure attachment as mediators of environmental adaptation. Shyness balances survival-reproduction trade-offs with mixed LH outcomes. Avoidant attachment accelerates LH strategies under harsh conditions; anxious attachment delays reproduction under unpredictable conditions. Incorporating social behaviors, which are related to survival and safety, enhances the model’s applicability across behavioral domains.

ABSTRACTThe six basic emotions have long been considered discrete categories that serve as the primary units of the emotion system. Yet recent evidence indicated underlying connections among them. Here we tested the underlying relationships among the six basic emotions using a perceptual learning procedure. This technique has the potential of causally changing participants’ emotion detection ability. We found that training on detecting a facial expression improved the performance not only on the trained expression but also on other expressions. Such a transfer effect was consistently demonstrated between disgust and anger detection as well as between fear and surprise detection in two experiments. Notably, training on any of the six emotions could improve happiness detection, while sadness detection could only be improved by training on sadness itself, suggesting the uniqueness of happiness and sadness....

ArgumentThis article considers the doctrine of energetical vitalism as proposed by the early twentieth-century philosopher, Eugenio Rignano. Rignano’s energetical vitalism aimed to present a comprehensive biological theory, addressing distinct phenomena of purposiveness—or what are called teleological phenomena—exclusive to the organic domain. His doctrine pivoted on two key hypotheses. The first, the hypothesis of vital energy, posited that life’s distinctiveness emanates from a unique energy form he termed “vital (or nervous) energy.” Rignano believed that while this form of energy shares attributes with conventional energy forms and adheres to basic laws of energetics, its manifestations are exclusively organic, dictating specific purposive phenomena. The second hypothesis, termed “centroepigenetic,” asserted that vital energies primarily accumulate in the chromosomes within nuclei but can be transferred through intercellular bridges connecting germinal and somatic nuclei. Rignano’s energetical vitalism synthesized ideas from three significant scientific trends of his era: the energetics, neo-Lamarckian, and mnemic movements. In closing, this article critiques Rignano’s energetical vitalism with two primary assertions. First, while empirical support for the vital energy hypothesis remains elusive, vitalism’s historical significance is arguably more profound than contemporary physicalists recognize, and it remains logically defensible to propose vitalistic hypotheses, irrespective of physicalist metaphysical constraints. Second, Rignano’s centroepigenetic hypothesis can be seen as prescient in light of recent molecular genetic discoveries. These two points are informed by Hasok Chang’s perspectives on “outdated” scientific theories.

As demonstrated in Chap. 1, current philosophy of biology is deeply hostile to vitalism. Simultaneously, it is widely acknowledged that philosophy of biology seeks to distance itself from reductionism, often referred to as physicalism in the epistemological version. Consequently, to defend the autonomy of biology, philosophers must navigate a middle path between vitalism and reductionism. This has led to the popularity of positions such as anti-reductionism, organicism (or emergentism), along with appeals to teleological terms in biological discourse. In this chapter, I offer a critique of current philosophy of biology by examining anti-reductionism, organicism, and teleology. I argue that these positions, intended to defend the autonomy of biology, inherently gravitate towards vitalism. I also briefly examine doctrines of evolution, contending that Driesch’s vital evolutionism—rather than Darwinism or Neo-Darwinism—holds promise for yielding a genuine synthetic theory of biology, namely, a comprehensive theory of life.

As discussed in Chap. 2, Driesch (1908a, b) posited that an individual was governed by his/her own entelechy, for which he prepared the more specified term “psychoid”. Drawing on his Kantian philosophy of nature, Driesch (1908b) argued that the existence of the psychoid was well-supported by empirical evidence, and he declared that “our ‘psychoid’…is an agent or factor of nature, looked upon as part of Givenness” (p. 116). Driesch was well aware that both concepts—the entelechy and the psychoid—had their roots extending back to Aristotle. Now, this chapter explores the historical relationship between vitalism and mind, tracing developments from Aristotle to the present. It first introduces the Aristotelian framework prevalent during antiquity and the Middle Ages, and then discusses significant shifts in early modern natural philosophy. This chapter further examines the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, comparing vitalistic explanations in modern biology with analogous concepts in the social sciences that employed mental theories and concepts. Additionally, since Driesch refuted Hegel’s philosophy of the super mind (a term adapted in part from Driesch) and argued that human history was merely the accumulation of “the individual history of the acting man” (p. 117), this chapter will also briefly discuss prominent post-Enlightenment philosophies of history that utilized or criticized concepts of “super-personal factor[s] of acting in history” (p. 117). This chapter concludes by introducing the concept of mental vitalism.

As demonstrated in Chap. 5, a comprehensive historical understanding of vitalism requires reference to a range of concepts and theories from the physical sciences. However, that list omits an important physical science: chemistry. In fact, chemistry played an indispensable role in the history of vitalism, a fact clearly evident in the work of Hans Driesch. As briefly mentioned in Chap. 2, Driesch meticulously clarified the relationship between his entelechies or vital agents, and physico-chemical entities or processes. Besides energy, enzyme particularly captured Driesch’s attention. In his work Organism, Driesch (1908) offered several brief but intriguing remarks on the relationship between “entelechy and ‘catalysis’” (pp. 180–184, 186–187). First, Driesch asserted that, unlike an enzyme in catalysis, an entelechy “is quite unable to remove any kind of an ‘obstacle’ to happening” (p. 180). Second, although Driesch conceded that “the effect of the ready made ferment or enzyme is inorganic, just like that of the inorganic ferments studied by [Georg] Bredig and others” (p. 186), he speculated that “in the formation or activation of ferments we hypothetically see the fundamental role played by entelechy” (p. 187). To support his vitalistic hypothesis, Driesch highlighted that even the contemporary chemist Georg Bredig, well-regarded through his research on catalysis, “is by no means a dogmatic enemy of vitalism” (p. 186). Now, to make sense of the historical relationship between vitalism and chemistry, this chapter undertakes two interconnected tasks. First, it is useful to contextualize Driesch’s remarks to clarify why he believed that the study of enzymes might pose an obstacle to his vitalism. To do this, I will provide a case study on the intriguing historical relationship among vitalism, fermentation, and enzyme. Second, using existing historical literature, I will reconstruct the relationship between vitalism and chemistry in the early modern and modern eras. This chapter concludes by briefly comparing the characteristics of vitalism in the early modern and modern eras with respect to chemistry.

As previously discussed in Chap. 2, Driesch envisioned his entelechy to act as an agent directing energy transformation and transportation. In doing this, he adopted the second vitalistic response elaborated in the preceding chapter. Moreover, Driesch suggested that, with his entelechy, “the work of the ‘demons’ of Maxwell is… regarded as actually accomplished” (Driesch, 1908, p. 225)! Driesch drew an analogy, perhaps not perfectly identical, to the hypothetical creature known as Maxwell’s demon, named after the eminent physicist James Clerk Maxwell. By the early twentieth century, the conception of the entelechy as a directive agent akin to Maxwell’s demon gained modest popularity, particularly in relation to its role in directing heat or thermal energy—the type of energy addressed by thermodynamics and statistical mechanics. To be more precise, the vital agent was thought to have the capability to convert thermal energy, which consisted of the kinetic energy of molecules, into kinetic energy usable by living organisms, thereby theoretically enabling perpetual motion of the second kind. Now, this chapter briefly explores the development of this short-lived speculation with the following two goals. First, this chapter briefly introduces the idea of Maxwell’s demon and its impact on the late-nineteenth-century vitalist discourse. Second, it contextualizes the hypotheses that considered the vital agent in terms akin to Maxwell’s demon during the early twentieth century.

This chapter employs Hans Driesch’s vitalism as a case study to set the stage for the remainder of this book, thereby serving as an introductory or “warm-up” chapter. It begins with basic biographical information about Hans Driesch, emphasizing his often-overlooked philosophical concerns following his conversion to vitalism. The chapter then explores Driesch’s Kantian philosophy of nature, where his doctrine of entelechy is thoroughly elaborated in terms of its relationship to evolution, mind (psychoid), energy, Maxwell’s demon, and enzyme. The chapter concludes that Driesch’s interaction with the sciences of his era was typical in the history of natural philosophy and the sciences, where vitalists sought to theorize about vitalism and its relation to non-biological sciences.

As demonstrated in Chap. 2, Driesch (1908) offered an insightful analysis of the relationship between his doctrine of the entelechy and doctrines of evolution. Driesch introduced what he termed “systematics of entelechies” (p. 293), conceptualizing a theory of possible organic forms. I have contended that Driesch presented—or perhaps revitalized—the most ambitious theoretical proposal in the history of evolutionary biology: Evolution proceeds according to a system of possible organic forms, (partly) predetermined by vital laws. This chapter refers to this concept as vital evolutionism and outlines its historical development. Subsequently, it first reviews pertinent historical literature, and then introduces various articulations of vital evolutionism by natural philosophers and theoretical biologists, both before and after Charles Darwin. Further, this chapter examines concepts of creative and emergent evolution, emphasizing their fundamental divergences from vital evolutionism. Before concluding with several brief remarks, this chapter provides some critical notes on Darwinism, with respect to its equivocal role in the history of evolutionary biology.

As demonstrated at the conclusion of the preceding chapter, the German natural philosopher Bernard Bavink posited that vitalism would be rejuvenated through the nascent field of quantum mechanics. His prediction proved accurate. Quantum mechanics emerged at the turn of the twentieth century, marked by Max Planck’s research on black-body radiation and Albert Einstein’s studies on the photoelectric effect. Quantum mechanics did not fully flourish until the 1920s, when Erwin Schrödinger, Niels Bohr, and others redefined its foundations. Now, this chapter concentrates on exploring the speculative relationship between vitalism and quantum mechanics, which did not surface until after quantum mechanics had become well-established. Indeed, beginning in the 1920s, several physicists sought “insights” from quantum mechanics to better comprehend the nature of life (Stent, 1998; McKaughan, 2005; Domondon, 2006; Joaquim et al., 2015; Van Strien, 2022). This chapter examines the quantum speculations about life made by three distinguished physicists—Erwin Schrödinger, Pascal Jordan, and Niels Bohr—and a contemporary biologist, Ralph Lillie. The chapter concludes with remarks on the fundamental logic underlying speculations about life from the perspective of quantum mechanics.

This chapter synthesizes the results from previous chapters and presents the final conclusion regarding the riddle of life. As consistently argued in this book, this conclusion arises from a critical examination of science and its history, focusing on vitalism, specifically through a historico-logical study of vitalism. Moreover, due to the open character of the history of science, it is evident that the solution proposed to the riddle of life cannot be absolute or definitive. Furthermore, it is crucial to emphasize that the endorsed solution stems from a historico-logical analysis that clarifies, rather than generates, scientific knowledge, marking a distinct approach from that of scientists. To achieve all these, this chapter first clarifies the two different, yet often conflated, meanings used in discourses on life; then, it addresses a recent debate on the riddle of life; further, this chapter proposes a modified Kantian solution; and finally, it summarizes the book and elaborates on the concept of life, contrasting it with matter and mind.

This extensive introductory chapter is divided into two parts. The first part revisits current scholarship on vitalism and poses three key questions: the historical question, the logical question, and the riddle of life. Regarding the historical question, I argue that additional forms of vitalism remain to be identified within the history of science. Concerning the logical question, I contend that a more penetrating analysis, grounded in extensive historical knowledge, should be conducted. Additionally, I assert that proper responses to both the historical and logical questions can illuminate the so-called central question in biology—the riddle of life. The second part of the chapter reviews several significant methodological issues from both historical and logical perspectives. I clarify that this book aims to address the aforementioned three questions through a comprehensive historico-logical study of vitalism, spanning from Aristotle’s natural philosophy to early-twentieth-century physical, biological, and social sciences. This historico-logical method, or the logical analysis of both historical and contemporary scientific knowledge, has been variously endorsed by figures such as Immanuel Kant, post-Kantian philosopher-scientists like Ernest Mach, and several early-twentieth-century philosophical schools including logical empiricism, British analysis, pragmatism, Husserlian phenomenology, and neo-Kantianism, as well as by historicists like French historical epistemologists and Kuhnians. In the second part, I also provide an exposition on the general logic of science and discuss the relationship between science and philosophy following the pivotal nineteenth-century separation of the sciences from philosophy.

As demonstrated in Chap. 2, Driesch (1908) gave an interesting treatment of the relationship between the vital and the physical, or that between his entelechies and various physical entities or processes. In fact, within the history of science, Driesch’s approach was typical, rather than an exception. Similarly to Driesch, nearly all vitalists sought to define their doctrines through theoretically exploring the relationship between vital forces and physical phenomena. Consequently, it is unsurprising that historians of science have extensively researched intriguing subjects such as animal heat (Mendelsohn, 1964), animal electricity (Piccolino & Bresadola, 2013), animal magnetism (Alvarado, 2009), and animal motion (Williams, 2000; Gill & Lennox, 1994). Additionally, following Newton, the concept of gravity—often interpreted as indicating universal attraction—served as a significant basis for speculations about the nature of life during the eighteenth century (Hall, 1968; Wolfe, 2015). Moreover, prior to the nineteenth-century differentiation of the sciences from natural philosophy, vitalistic and physicalistic concepts were integrated into comprehensive philosophical systems intended to offer unified explanations of natural phenomena across various domains. Now, this chapter explores each of these topics based on existing literature, focusing on the complex interplay between vitalism and various physical concepts and theories, including heat, gravity, electricity and magnetism, motion, and ultimately, philosophy of nature. This chapter concludes by introducing the concept of physical vitalism.

As outlined in Chap. 2, Hans Driesch presented a Kantian philosophy of nature with a particular focus on energy physics, centering his concern on the relationship between entelechy and energy. Regarding this relationship, Driesch emphasized three key points. First, he noted that every entelechy adhered to the principle of energy conservation, which he termed the first law of energetics. Second, he argued that an entelechy was not a form of energy specific to biological systems. Third, Driesch described an entelechy as influencing the inorganic realm by suspending energy transformation and transportation, akin to the role of Maxwell’s demon in mechanical systems. Now, this chapter demonstrates that understanding Driesch’s views on the relationship between entelechy and energy requires an examination of the development of energy physics in the nineteenth century and its impact on vitalism. Crucially, while the establishment of the principle of energy conservation did not eliminate vitalism, it significantly altered its manifestations after the mid-nineteenth century. This chapter first traces the development of energy physics in the nineteenth century, and then discusses how traditional vitalism was challenged from the standpoint of the conservation principle. Next, this chapter explores how late-nineteenth-century vitalists responded to this principle in two different manners, adopting either the doctrine of energetical vitalism or that of directive agency. Before concluding on vitalism and the logical nature of the conservation principle, this chapter briefly examines the fascinating case of mental energy, the social sciences equivalent of vital energy.

After critically examining the history of vitalism, particularly its complex interactions with other concepts and theories from non-biological sciences, it is now appropriate to offer a broader reflection. As demonstrated, akin to Hans Driesch, vitalists throughout the history of science frequently utilized prevalent non-biological concepts and theories of their era to develop and justify their doctrines. It is striking that over more than two thousand years, from ancient natural philosophers to modern quantum physicists, interest in vitalism has persisted. Now, this chapter first introduces the concept of chronic vitalism to describe these historical phenomena, and then elucidates three lessons on understanding vitalism and its roles throughout the history of science.

This book presents a historico-logical study of vitalism. It begins by uncovering previously unknown doctrines of vitalism from the history of science—encompassing biological, physical, and social sciences—and then subjects these doctrines to a thorough logical analysis. Through this process, the book offers a unified conceptual framework to understand the major doctrines of vitalism in the history of science, ultimately relating vitalism to the question of life. Following the classical methodological approach endorsed by Immanuel Kant, nineteenth-century philosopher-scientists like Ernst Mach, and early-twentieth-century logical analysts, including logical empiricists, British analysts, pragmatists, Husserlian phenomenologists, and neo-Kantians, this work provides unconventional and valuable perspectives on vitalism and the riddle of life, appealing to a broad audience, including scientists, historians, and philosophers of science, particularly those from biological backgrounds.

Critics frequently target Ernest Nagel’s model of reduction for its purported inadequacy in addressing the issue of approximation. In response, proponents of Nagel’s model have integrated approximations into the more comprehensive Generalized Nagel-Schaffner model, or the GNS model. However, this article contends that the pertinent criticisms and responses are both misplaced: There are no barriers to Nagel’s model incorporating approximations, and it assimilates them in a manner distinctly dissimilar to the approach of the GNS model. Indeed, Nagel’s model is fundamentally _static_, providing invariant formal and informal conditions for reduction; and it is the _dynamic_ history of science that fulfills relevant conditions for reduction, thereby achieving different _degrees of reductive success_. Consequently, approximations are essentially extraneous to Nagel’s model, since they pertain chiefly to temporally based scientific knowledge and concern merely the _means_ (e.g., approximate or exact deductions) of fulfilling the conditions for reduction within specific problem contexts. This article also develops a Nagelian treatment of approximation, demonstrating how distinctive types of approximations aid in fulfilling various conditions for reduction and contribute to different degrees of reductive success. Two case studies are presented to illustrate the Nagelian treatment: The first examines the specific heat ratio anomaly within the traditional endeavor of reducing thermodynamics to statistical mechanics, and the second addresses the consumption puzzle in the context of reducing macroeconomics to microeconomics.

Many scholars have investigated education management. Scholars in the education field have made significant achievements in contributing to multiple educational reform policies, while other scholars discuss teacher-related issues from the perspective of organizational behavior. The teaching innovation of high school teachers plays a critical role in students’ learning attitude and motivation, especially in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. Teachers need to utilize more diversified teaching methods to enable students to carry out effective learning. In order to examine teachers’ teaching innovation, this study explores teaching innovation intentions and performance from the perspective of individual and social factors in combination with goal-oriented behavior and social identity theory. This study conducts questionnaires with a sample of Chinese coastal high school teachers, and obtains a total of 475 responses. The research results show that innovation attitude, positive anticipated emotion, group norms and social identity positively affect teachers’ teaching innovation intention; furthermore, teachers’ teaching innovation intention also positively affects their teaching innovation performance. Based on the comprehensive research findings, this research proposes corresponding theoretical and practical implications.