Dieter Mersch

The chapter addresses the transformations of transparency and opacity in the realm of digital networks. Rather than discussing the question of digital transparency as opposed to control, Mersch argues that we should focus on the destiny of the social and the political in an age of computation. As a concept inherited from Enlightenment, transparency suffers from the insufficiently acknowledged dialectic inherent to the concept, whereby complete transparency would lead to obfuscation. Moreover, in the age of digitalization, the privileged medium supposedly producing ultimate transparency is the technological system of digital communication through networks, social platforms and data exchanges. What once pertained to Enlightenment’s program of human emancipation boils down to a mathematical form. The idea of a transparent society based on justice and trust reveals itself to be nothing but an empty surface.

The figure of the 'other' is fundamental to the concept of communication. Online or offline, communication, which is commonly defined as the act of sending or imparting information to others, is only possible in the face of others. In fact, the reason we communicate is to interact with others—to talk to another, to share our thoughts and insights with them, or to respond to their needs and requests. No matter how it is structured or conceptualized, communication is involved with addressing the other and dealing with the ontological, epistemological, and ethical questions of otherness or alterity. But who or what can be other? Who or what can be the subject of communication? Is the other always and only another human? Or can the other in these communicative interactions be otherwise? This book is about others (and other kinds of others). It concerns the current position and status of the other in the face of technological innovations that can, in one way or another distort, mask, or even deface the other. Ten innovative essays, written by an international team of experts, individually and in collaboration with each other, seek to diagnose the current situation with otherness, devise innovative solutions to the questions of alterity, and provide insight for students, teachers and researchers trying to make sense of the opportunities and challenges of the 21st century.

What kind of relationship do we have with artificial beings (avatars, puppets, robots, etc.)? What does it mean to mirror ourselves in them, to perform them or to play trial identity games with them? Actor & Avatar addresses these questions from artistic and scholarly angles. Contributions on the making of »technical others« and philosophical reflections on artificial alterity are flanked by neuroscientific studies on different ways of perceiving living persons and artificial counterparts. The contributors have achieved a successful artistic-scientific collaboration with extensive visual material.

Providing a solid media-philosophical groundwork, _Beyond Mimesis_ contributes to the theory of mimesis and alterity in performance philosophy while serving to stimulate and inspire future inquiries where studies in media and art intersect with philosophy. It collects a wide range of philosophical and artistic thinkers' work to develop an exacting framework with clear movement beyond mimesis in aesthetic experiences in uncanny valleys. Together, the chapters ask if intersubjective acts of relating that are defined by alterity, responsivity or witness and trust can be transferred to artificial beings without remainder. The proposed framework uses a particularly fruitful theoretical model for this inquiry known as the “uncanny valley”—a fictitious schema developed in 1970 by Japanese roboticist Masahiro Mori. According to Mori, artificial beings or animated dolls become more eerie to us the more “humanlike” they appear. The model’s utility requires distinguishing between visual media and real life, but in general, it suggests that there is a fundamental incommensurability between people and artificial beings that cannot be ignored. This necessitates that all-too realistic representations as well as fictional encounters with artificial beings do not transgress certain limits. According to Mori, it is an ethical imperative of their design that they evidence a certain degree of dissimilarity with people. This notion seems especially applicable to artistic projects in which animated dolls or robots make explicit their “doll-ness” or “robot-ness” and thus inscribe a moment of reflexivity into the relations they establish. With contributions by Elena Dorfman, Jörg Sternagel, Dieter Mersch, Allison de Fren, Nadja Ben Khelifa, James Tobias, Grant Palmer, Stephan Günzel, Nicole Kuʻuleinapuananiolikoʻawapuhimelemeleolani Furtado, Misha Choudhry and a conversation between Carolin Bebek, Simon Makhali, and Anna Suchard.

Three phases of a cultural-philosophical criticism can be distinguished during the last 100 years: Firstly, the metaphysical critique of Heidegger, Wittgenstein, and Adorno, secondly, the poststructuralist critique of representation as put forward by Roland Barthes, Michel Foucault, and Jacques Derrida and thirdly ecological critiques as a countermovement, as emanating from Speculative Realism, New Materialism, and Latour's Actor-Network-Theory. Beyond critiques of rationality and of power and discourse, ecological critiques situate the human being in the exterior, which in some traits allows a vitalism of matter to return. Most importantly, ecologism, where it sees itself as relationalism, confuses network relations with interpersonal relationships, which are always already socially terminated. Consequently, they prefer ontology over social philosophy.

In media philosophy since Benjamin, the concept of medium is conceived in terms of »translation« or »transport«. In a similar vein, Christoph Tholen has brought the literal sense of »metaphor« as »meta-pherein« into focus. In my paper I argue that Tholen's approach misses the »meta« (»in the middle« or »beyond«) of »metaphor«, corresponding to the Latin »trans«. This is contrasted with the greek »dia« that allows the development of a performative notion of medium, which orients itself at material practices of transition.

Vom Tafelbild über den Film bis zum 3D-Bild. Bilder überfluten uns in allen Bereichen der Gesellschaft, der Umgang mit digitalen Bildern wird immer wichtiger. Seit dem Pictorial oder Iconic Turn haben sich auch die Kulturwissenschaften des Themas angenommen und eine Wissenschaft vom Bild und der Bildwahrnehmung begründet. Das Handbuch gibt erstmals einen umfassenden Überblick, erläutert Grundlagen wie Semiotik, Phänomenologie und Ikonologie, analysiert verschiedene Einzelmedien und sich anschließende Bilddiskurse. Ein abschließender Teil beleuchtet die Bildtheorien verschiedener Disziplinen, und wie sich diese als Bildwissenschaft verstehen.

Theodor Adorno's famous aesthetic theory was not merely a theory of the aesthetic; it also made a wider claim about the aesthetic implications of all theory. At the same time we have to deal with aesthetic objects and events in which an aesthetic theory is inherent, which show themselves as art. From both sides--theory and aesthetics--a link can be made to the etymological meaning of theōria, which understands the theoretical as a seeing or perspective. Featuring lucid essays by major thinkers, the book examines this link, focusing equally on the aesthetic implications of theory and the theoretical implications of aesthetic events.

Einem Ratschlag Theodor W. Adornos an seine Studenten folgend, dass sich die Ideen eines Denkers am besten durch die Lektüre seiner entlegeneren Schriften erschließen, sei mit einer Passage aus einem frühen Text Max Benses mit dem Titel Die Rezeption des Geistigen begonnen, die 1949 in der Essaysammlung Technische Existenz erschien. Dort heißt es: »Der Fortschritt der Welt besteht darin, dass sie synthetischer wird. Also müssen auch wir synthetischer werden.« Erschreckt über die offenkundig affirmative Diktion, die in einer artifiziellen Wirklichkeit eine ebenso artifizielle Existenz fordert, um deren Fortschritt zu entsprechen, lesen wir weiter: »Es gibt nur einen einzigen Fortschritt, den jedermann [...] nachprüfen kann [...], das ist die Vervollkommnung der Wissenschaft. Und diese Vervollkommnung besteht darin, dass die Summe der Einsichten größer, dass die Gewissheit dieser Einsichten unantastbarer und dass die Tieferlegung der Fundamente gründlicher wird.«

Nietzsche’s Dionysus, admittedly, represents a direct provocation and an attack on the classical interpretation accepted since Winckelmann, an interpretation that elevates the Apollonian to its central point of focus; Nietzsche’s introduction of another principle to oppose it, rather than representing a genuine invention, in actuality bridges the small gap between Hegel and Hölderlin. If, namely, the Hegelian aesthetic from the very beginning points to Schein and Erscheinung – as necessary conditions of truth, for the truth would not exist if it were not to “superficially appear” (scheinen) and “make its appearance” (erscheinen), writes Hegel – Schein and Erscheinung would still nonetheless be bound up everywhere with the criterium of the absolute; after all, the untruth of the aesthetic rests squarely in the fact that it cannot do other than to draw upon the language of Erscheinung. For Hölderlin, on the other hand, the Dionysian advances to become a metapoetic symbol combining itself – the enigmatic and continually transforming – with the practice of art. Nietzsche follows those very same lines even while giving the metaphor a thoroughly different twist.

A critique of algorithmic rationalisation offers at best some initial reasons and preliminary ideas. Critique is understood as a reflection on validity. It is limited to an “epistemological investigation” of the limits of the calculable or of what appears “knowable” in the mode of the algorithmic. The argumentation aims at the mathematical foundations of computer science and goes back to the so-called “foundational crisis of mathematics” at the beginning of the 20th century with the attempt to formalise concepts such as calculability, decidability and provability. The Gödel theorems and Turing’s halting problem prove to be essential for any critical approach to “algorithmic rationalisation”. Both, however, do not provide unambiguous results, at best they run towards what later became known as “Gödel’s disjunction”. The chosen path here, however, suggests the opposite way, insofar as, on the one hand, the topos of creativity appear constitutive for what can be regarded as cognitive “algorithmic rationalisation” and which encounters systematic difficulties in the evaluation of non-trivial results. On the other hand, the investigations lead to a comparison between the “mediality” of formally generated structures, which have to distinguish between object-and metalanguages, and the “volatile” differentiality of human thought, which calls for syntactically non-simulatable sense structures.

This volume offers transdisciplinary perspectives on the study of acting and performance in moving image forms. It assembles 26 international scholars from dance, theatre, film, media and cultural studies, art history and philosophy to investigate the art of acting and the presence of the human body in analog and digital film, animation and video art. The volume includes classical case studies and essays devoted to acting history and acting and genres, but its particular emphasis is on introducing a wide range of groundbreaking theoretical approaches - from continental and analytic philosophy to new media theory and cognitivist research - all of which interrogate the fundamental conceptions of "act" and "actor" that underwrite both popular and academic notions of performance in moving image culture.