•  1
    Jules Vuillemin et la philosophie analytique
    Revue de Synthèse 141 (1-2): 11-33. 2020.
    Résumé Dans cette communication, qui reprend en partie les idées exposées il y a trente ans dans un article de Critique, François Recanati entreprend de caractériser la philosophie analytique en discutant une demi-douzaine de traits supposés distinctifs de la discipline : l’usage de la logique, l’importance de la philosophie du langage considérée comme philosophie première, le refus de réduire la philosophie à l’histoire de la philosophie, l’idée que la philosophie est une discipline de second n…Read more
  •  11
    Several authors have noted the proximity of Marty’s and Grice’s ideas. Both Marty and Grice distinguish natural meaning and the sort of meaning involved in human communication; and they both attempt to provide a characterization of human communication that does not essentially appeal to the conventional nature of its linguistic devices. In this contribution, I single out what I take to be a main difference between Marty and Grice. Marty views linguistic communication as continuous with natural m…Read more
  • About the Lekton: Response to Kölbel
    In Raphael Salkie & Ilse Depraetere (eds.), Semantics and Pragmatics: Drawing a Line, Springer Verlag. 2017.
  • Aims and Scope This volume brings together original papers by linguists and philosophers on the role of context and perspective in language and thought. Several contributions are concerned with the contextualism/relativism debate, which has loomed large in recent philosophical discussions. In a substantial introduction, the editors survey the field and map out the relevant issues and positions.
  •  31
    Transparent Coreference
    Topoi 1-9. forthcoming.
    Because reference is not transparent, coreference is not transparent either: it is possible for the subject to refer to the same individual twice without knowing that the two acts of reference target the same individual. That happens whenever the subject associates two distinct yet coreferential files with two token singular terms. The subject may not know that the two files corefer, so her ascribing contradictory properties to the same object does not threaten her rationality. But if the subjec…Read more
  •  16
    Réflexion et Réflexivité
    Journal of Ancient Philosophy 296-303. forthcoming.
  •  88
    Immunity to error through misidentification (edited book)
    Cambridge University Press. 2012.
    In this collection of newly commissioned essays, the contributors present a variety of approaches to it, engaging with historical and empirical aspects of the subject as well as contemporary philosophical work.
  •  53
    From Meaning to Content
    In Derek Ball & Brian Rabern (eds.), The Science of Meaning: Essays on the Metatheory of Natural Language Semantics, Oxford University Press. 2018.
    According to a widespread picture due to Kaplan, there are two levels of semantic value: character and content. Character is determined by the grammar, and it determines content with respect to context. In this chapter Recanati criticizes that picture on several grounds. He shows that we need more than two levels, and rejects the determination thesis: that linguistic meaning as determined by grammar determines content. Grammatical meaning does not determine assertoric content, he argues, but mer…Read more
  •  90
    Fictional, Metafictional, Parafictional
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 118 (1): 25-54. 2018.
  •  23
    Contextualism and Polysemy
    Dialectica 71 (3): 379-397. 2017.
    In this paper, I argue that that polysemy is a two-sided phenomenon. It can be reduced neither to pragmatic modulation nor to ambiguity, for it is a mixture of both. The senses of a polysemous expression result from pragmatic modulation but they are stored in memory, as the senses of an ambiguous expression are. The difference with straightforward ambiguity is that the modulation relations between the senses are transparent to the language users: the senses are felt as related – they form a fami…Read more
  •  6
    Replies
    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 58 (4): 408-437. 2015.
  •  10
    IV—Contextual Dependence and Definite Descriptions
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 87 (1): 57-74. 1987.
  • La Transparence et l'énonciation. Pour introduire a la pragmatique
    Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 85 (4): 529-533. 1980.
  •  7
    Direct Reference
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (4): 953-956. 1996.
  •  29
    Literal Meaning
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2): 487-492. 2007.
  •  4
    How Narrow is Narrow Content?
    Dialectica 48 (3-4): 209-229. 1994.
    SummaryIn this paper I discuss two influential views in the philosophy of mind: the two‐component picture draws a distinction between ‘narrow content’ and ‘broad content’, while radical externalism denies that there is such a thing as narrow content. I argue that ‘narrow content’ is ambiguous, and that the two views can be reconciled. Instead of considering that there is only one question and three possible answers corresponding to Cartesian internalism, the two‐component picture, and radical ex…Read more
  •  115
    Millikan’s Theory of Signs (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (3). 2007.
    Review of Millikan's book Varieties of Meaning (MIT Press/Bradford Books, 2004).
  • Déclaratif/non déclaratif
    Langages 67 23-31. 1982.
  •  6
    Response to Frapolli's contribution in the proceedings of the Granada workshop
  •  82
    Pragmatics and Logical Form
    In Esther Romero & Belen Soria (eds.), Explicit Communication: Robyn Carston's Pragmatics, Palgrave. pp. 25-41. 2007.
    Robyn Carston and I share a general methodological position which I call ‘Truth-Conditional Pragmatics' (TCP). TCP is the view that the effects of context on truth-conditional content need not be traceable to the linguistic material in the uttered sentence. Some effects of context on truth-conditional content are due to the linguistic material (e.g. to context-sensitive words or morphemes which trigger the search for contextual values), but others result from ‘free' pragmatic processes. Free pra…Read more
  •  118
    Contextualism: Some Varieties
    In Keith Allan & Kasia Jaszczolt (eds.), Cambridge Handbook of Pragmatics, Cambridge University Press. pp. 135--149. 2012.
    A number of distinct (though related) issues are raised in the debate over Contextualism in the philosophy of language. My aim in this chapter for the Cambridge Handbook of Pragmatics is to disentangle them, so as to get a clearer view of the positions available (where a 'position' consists of a particular take on each of the relevant issues simultaneously).
  •  10
    Response to Brabanter's contribution in the proceedings of the Granada workshop
  •  311
    The Fodorian fallacy
    Analysis 62 (4): 285-89. 2002.
    In recent years Fodor has repeatedly argued that nothing epistemic can be essential to, or constitutive of, any concept. This holds in virtue of a constraint which Fodor dubs the Compositionality Constraint. I show that Fodor's argument is fallacious because it rests on an ambiguity.
  •  200
    It is raining (somewhere)
    Linguistics and Philosophy 30 (1): 123-146. 2005.
    The received view about meteorological predicates like ‘rain’ is that they carry an argument slot for a location which can be filled explicitly or implicitly. The view assumes that ‘rain’, in the absence of an explicit location, demands that the context provide a specific location. In an earlier article in this journal, I provided a counter-example, viz. a context in which ‘it is raining’ receives a location-indefinite interpretation. On the basis of that example, I argued that when there is tac…Read more
  • La Pragmatique (edited book)
    with Anne-Marie Diller
    Larousse. 1979.
  •  53
    Moderate relativism
    In Manuel Garcia-Carpintero & Max Koelbel (eds.), Relative Truth, Oxford University Press. pp. 41-62. 2006.
    In modal logic, propositions are evaluated relative to possible worlds. A proposition may be true relative to a world w, and false relative to another world w'. Relativism is the view that the relativization idea extends beyond possible worlds and modalities. Thus, in tense logic, propositions are evaluated relative to times. A proposition (e.g. the proposition that Socrates is sitting) may be true relative to a time t, and false relative to another time t'. In this paper I discuss, and attempt …Read more